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ABSTRACT 
Implicit theories about emotion refer to people’s beliefs about whether their 
emotions are fixed (entity theory) or malleable (incremental theory). Growing research 
indicates that these beliefs influence emotion regulation efforts, psychological health and 
well-being, and may even play a key role in clinical disorders and their treatment. The 
aim of this thesis is to contribute to this growing body of literature. Across 10 studies and 
seven empirical chapters, I examine the associations between implicit theories of emotion, 
emotion regulation, and psychological health. Using the Process Model of Emotion 
Regulation as a framework, this thesis is divided into sections corresponding to different 
emotion regulation stages: Situation Selection; Attentional Regulation; Response 
Modulation and Cognitive Change. The first three studies are focused on measurement: 
The personal implicit theory scales are developed and evaluated, and qualitative measures 
are used to test whether implicit theories map onto different emotion regulation strategies. 
Studies 4 and 5 examine implicit theories of emotion and the first stages of the Process 
Model: Situation Selection and Situation Modification. In a Study 4 entity (versus 
incremental) beliefs were associated with poorer psychological health outcomes, and 
avoidance strategies mediated the links between implicit theories and psychological 
health.  In Study 5, participants’ emotion beliefs were experimentally manipulated leading 
them to believe that they struggled (entity condition) or did not struggle (incremental 
condition) with controlling their emotions. Participants in the entity condition reported 
increased intentions to engage in avoidance strategies, were more likely to avoid emotion 
regulation stimuli, and reported greater avoidance of psychological help. Studies 6 and 7 
examined implicit theories of emotion and the third stage of the Process Model: 
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Attentional Deployment. In a correlational study (Study 6), entity beliefs about emotions 
were positively associated with maladaptive attention regulation (e.g., catastrophizing) 
and negatively associated with adaptive attention regulation (e.g., mindfulness). Entity 
beliefs also predicted greater likelihood of using response modulation strategies like 
alcohol and medication as a means of regulating emotions. Attention regulation also 
indirectly explained links between emotion beliefs and response modulation. In a 
longitudinal Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) intervention study (Study 7), 
MBSR led to a significant reduction in entity beliefs (compared to controls). Changes 
emotion beliefs mediated MBSR-related reductions in stress, anxiety, depression and 
response modulation at 12-month follow-up. Studies 8, 9 and 10 examine implicit theories 
of emotion and the third stage of the Process Model: Cognitive Change. In a correlational 
study (Study 8), entity beliefs about emotions predict reduced likelihood of using 
cognitive reappraisal in daily life, which in turn predict poorer self-esteem and life 
satisfaction. In a clinical study (Study 9), patients with social anxiety disorder (compared 
to healthy controls) were more likely to view emotions as things that cannot be controlled 
(entity theory). These beliefs predicted anxiety symptom severity. Finally, in a waitlist-
controlled, 12-week Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) intervention study (Study 10), 
changes in implicit theories of emotion explained CBT-related reductions in social 
anxiety symptoms and uniquely predicted treatment outcomes even when controlling for 
baseline anxiety and other kinds of maladaptive beliefs. Emotion beliefs also continued to 
predict social anxiety 12-months post-treatment. The final chapters of this thesis employ a 
clinical case study to demonstrate why emotion beliefs can be harmful, and why 
psychoeducation may not always be an effective intervention. The implications of these 
findings in relation to emotion regulation and clinical treatment are discussed.    
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1. THESIS OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
When you ask someone if they believe emotions are things they can control, many 
consider the answer to be obvious. Nonetheless, people differ widely in how they 
respond: Some people list a variety of strategies they have and use for managing difficult 
emotions when they arise; others explain that they are often at the mercy of their emotions, 
viewing them as things that come and go mostly of their own accord. These simple beliefs 
have important consequences for how people experience and manage their emotional 
world. When people believe emotions can be changed or controlled, it is more likely they 
will be motivated to use adaptive and flexible emotion regulation strategies in day-to-day 
life. Conversely, when people believe emotions are uncontrollable, they are more prone to 
experiencing negative emotions as threatening, and may rely on maladaptive and 
avoidance strategies for regulating their emotions or respond helplessly when distressed. 
This thesis examines people’s beliefs about their emotions and how these beliefs are 
related both to emotion regulation and psychological health. It incorporates research from 
two traditions: implicit theories (beliefs about whether personal attributes can in principal 
be controlled) and self-efficacy (beliefs about one’s personal capabilities). Using the 
Process Model of Emotion Regulation as a framework, this thesis examines how beliefs 
about emotions are related to different emotion regulation strategies at different stages of 
the emotion-generation process. It also examines the clinical implications of these beliefs 
for anxiety and depression, as well as their role in treatment.  
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1.2 Overview of Thesis 
This first chapter outlines the progression of thesis chapters and studies: Chapter 2 
begins by defining emotion and emotion regulation, and by reviewing three different 
models that have historically been used to understand the emotion regulation process – 
these include the appraisal theory model, the modal model and the target function model. 
Chapter 3 then presents a fourth approach – the Process Model of Emotion Regulation, 
which serves as the organizing framework for the current thesis. It outlines the five stages 
of the Process Model (situation selection, situation modification, attention deployment, 
cognitive change and response modulation), how different emotion regulation strategies 
map onto each of these stages, and research on their effectiveness. Chapter 4 explores the 
question: “why is emotion regulation so difficult?” It examines why some people use 
more or less adaptive strategies for regulating their emotions and provides an overview of 
research on variables that influence the identification, selection and implementation of 
specific emotion regulation strategies. This chapter also examines points of failure in 
emotion regulation and their links with psychopathology. Chapter 5 introduces research 
on implicit theories – beliefs about the malleability of personal attributes and how much it 
is possible to change. Implicit theories are presented as a key variable that may impact 
emotion regulation identification, selection and implementation. This chapter reviews 
research on implicit theories across domains and introduces recent work on implicit 
theories of emotion. It ends with a review of research on a related construct – emotion 
regulation self-efficacy. Chapter 6 integrates research on implicit theories of emotion with 
the Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation by considering the potential impact 
of these beliefs on the identification, selection and implementation of different adaptive 
and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies. Chapter 7 then summarizes the first 6 
 14 
 
theoretical chapters, outlines hypotheses and provides an introduction to the subsequent 
empirical studies.  
In Chapters 8 – 11 empirical work is presented which tests the hypotheses outlined 
in Chapter 7. Studies 1, 2 and 3 (Chapter 8) focus on developing and validating the 
Personal Implicit Theory Scales. Beginning first with the more widely researched 
construct of Implicit Theories of Intelligence, Study 1 tested the validity of a personal 
measure of Implicit Theories in a sample of 643 Australian high school students. The 
findings provide some initial evidence that personal beliefs (incorporating both implicit 
theories and self-efficacy) are a more powerful predictor of outcomes than general 
implicit theories. In this first study, the belief that intelligence is 'fixed' – and outside of 
one’s control – was predictive of fewer achievement goals, greater helplessness 
attributions and poorer self-reported academic grades. Fixed 'entity' beliefs were also 
predictive of increased self-handicapping, truancy and disengagement from school. 
Consistent with predictions, the new self-theory scale uniquely explained greater variance 
on all these measures over and above the General Implicit Theories of Intelligence Theory 
Scale. In Study 2 these findings were extended to the development of the Personal 
Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale (ITES) which was validated in a sample of 216 
American university students. In this study, a perceived lack of control over emotions 
predicted increased stress and depression as well as reduced self-esteem and satisfaction 
with life. The revised Personal Scale also explained unique variance over and above the 
General Scale on all dependent variables. Finally, in a qualitative study (Study 3), open-
ended responses helped contextualize the different ways entity and incremental theorists 
actually think about their emotions. Blind content analysis helped further validate the 
ITES and revealed differences in the kinds of strategies entity and incremental theorists 
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spontaneously refer to for regulating their emotions. These findings lend some 
preliminary support to hypothesized links between Implicit Theories of Emotion and 
different forms of emotion regulation. 
Studies 4 and 5 (Chapter 9) focus on the first and second stages of the Process 
Model: Situation Selection and Situation Modification. More specifically, these studies 
examine the use of avoidance as a common and often maladaptive antecedent-focused 
strategy. In Study 4 (a correlational study) a perceived lack of control over emotions was 
associated with poorer psychological health outcomes (increased self-reported avoidance, 
lower well-being and higher levels of clinical symptoms). Avoidance strategies also 
mediated the links between emotion beliefs and psychological health. In Study 5 (an 
experimental study), participants’ emotion beliefs were manipulated by leading them to 
believe that they struggled (low perceived control) or did not struggle (high perceived 
control) with their emotions. Participants in the low perceived control condition 
(compared to the high perceived control condition) reported increased intentions to 
engage in avoidance strategies to manage their emotions over the next month and reported 
being more likely to avoid seeking psychological help. When asked if they would 
participate in follow-up studies, participants in the low perceived control condition were 
also significantly more likely to avoid studies that could be potentially distressing. These 
findings provide evidence for the causal role of emotion beliefs in avoidance-based 
emotion regulation, and document their impact on well-being. 
Studies 6 and 7 (Chapter 10) focus on the third stage of the Process Model: 
Attentional Deployment. In Study 6 (a correlational study) people who believed they 
could not control their emotions, were less likely to report engaging in adaptive 
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mindfulness-based attention regulation strategies and were more likely to engage in 
catastrophizing. People holding entity beliefs about their emotions were also more likely 
to report using later-stage response modulation strategies like alcohol use and medication 
as a means of regulating their emotions, and this link between beliefs and response 
modulation was indirectly explained by attention regulation strategies. Study 7 (a 
longitudinal treatment study), examined the role of emotion beliefs as a mediator of 
treatment in mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR). At the end of an 8-week 
mindfulness meditation program, participants in the MBSR group (compared with the 
control group) were more likely to view their emotions as things they could control. This 
change in thinking also persisted 12-months after completing MBSR and predicted 
improvements in psychological symptoms (reduced loneliness, stress, anxiety, depression 
and response modulation), mediating treatment outcomes at one year follow-up. These 
findings indicate that targeted interventions can bring about long-term changes in 
people’s perceived control over their emotions and these changes predict the utilization of 
adaptive attention-regulation strategies for managing their emotions in daily life.  
Studies 8, 9 and 10 (Chapter 11) focus on the fourth stage of the Process Model: 
Cognitive Change. In Study 8 (a correlational study), a perceived lack of control over 
emotions predicted reduced use of adaptive cognitive change strategies like cognitive 
reappraisal in daily life. Cognitive reappraisal also mediated links between implicit 
theories of emotion, stress, depression, self-esteem and satisfaction with life. In Study 9 (a 
clinical study) patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD) were more likely than healthy 
control subjects to believe that their emotions and anxiety could not be changed or 
controlled. Even when controlling for social anxiety severity, patients with SAD differed 
in their beliefs about their emotions, and these beliefs explained unique variance in 
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perceived stress, trait anxiety, negative affect, and self-esteem. Importantly, individuals 
with SAD viewed their own emotions and their social anxiety as more fixed than other 
people’s emotions generally, demonstrating that personal emotion beliefs play a stronger 
role in pathological levels of distress, at least within the context of SAD. Study 10 (a 
treatment study) examined implicit theories of emotion in the context of randomized 
clinical control trial of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) – a cognitive change based 
treatment – for social anxiety disorder. Implicit beliefs about emotions and social anxiety 
were assessed at baseline and at the completion of a 16-week randomized control trial of 
CBT for SAD. The aim of this study was to examine whether patients’ implicit theories of 
emotions changed through treatment, and if so, whether they might also explain CBT-
treatment outcomes. As predicted, patients receiving CBT (compared to waitlist controls 
(WL)) were less likely to hold entity beliefs about their anxiety post-treatment. This shift 
in thinking mediated treatment-related reductions in social anxiety. The degree of change 
in patients’ implicit beliefs also uniquely predicted how much they benefited from 
treatment, even when controlling for baseline social anxiety and changes in other 
maladaptive beliefs such as perceived social costs, social self-efficacy, and maladaptive 
interpersonal beliefs. Finally, follow-up assessments at 12-months revealed that these 
changes were maintained, indicating a reliable long-term shift in patients’ implicit 
theories about emotion and their anxiety symptoms. These findings suggest that cognitive 
treatments like CBT can also be a means of promoting a more incremental theory of 
emotion, and this change in beliefs predicts tangible therapeutic improvements and 
decreased anxiety symptoms. 
Studies 1 – 8 demonstrate that people’s beliefs about their ability to control their 
emotions influence emotion regulation efforts, psychological health and well-being, and 
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even play a key role in depression and anxiety disorders. Given these findings, some 
researchers suggest that clinicians should focus on addressing these beliefs using 
psychoeducation at the outset of therapy (Kneeland, Dovidio, Joormann & Clark, 2016). 
However, no research to date has investigated the efficacy of this approach. Chapter 13 
uses a clinical case study to examine difficulties that can arise when working with patients 
who hold fixed entity beliefs about their emotions. The case study illustrates why these 
beliefs can feel protective for clients (even when they are harmful), and why 
psychoeducation may not always be the most effective intervention for targeting people’s 
beliefs about their emotions. A revised case formulation and treatment plan is presented 
which focuses on using the therapeutic alliance, empathic responding, and interventions 
aimed at emotional awareness to affect therapeutic change. Finally, Chapter 14 provides 
an overview of the findings in previous chapters discusses some of the major themes and 
implications of this work both for research on implicit theories and emotion regulation, 
and more broadly for clinical practice.  
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2. EMOTIONS AND EMOTION REGULATION EXPLAINED 
2.1 What is Emotion?  
There is arguably no aspect of mental life more important to the quality and 
meaning of our existence than emotions. Our emotions are the very things that make life 
worth living, and in some cases, worth ending (de Sousa, 2013). It therefore comes as no 
great surprise that inquiry into the nature of emotions dates right back to the work of the 
great classical philosophers of our time – Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, 
and Hume – all of whom had recognizable theories of emotions and their role in human 
life (de Sousa, 2013). 
Contemporary research indicates that emotions play an important role in empathy 
and empathic accuracy (Soto & Levenson, 2009); in nonverbal communication (Ekman, 
Friesen, 1971); interpersonal interactions (Keltner & Kring, 1998); learning (Cahill, Prins, 
Weber, & McGaugh, 1994); and decision-making (Damasio, 1994; Oatley & Johnson-
Laird, 1987) and understanding the intentions of others (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 
1972; Fridlund, 1994). More biologically driven approaches focus on the neural 
mechanisms of emotions (Dalgleish, 2004), and the physiological changes that take place 
when emotions are experienced are believed to promote specific action tendencies (Frijda, 
1993, 1987); to enhance perception (Vermeulen, Godefroid & Mermillod, 2009); 
facilitate responses to important challenges or opportunities (Levenson, 1994); improve 
detection of threatening stimuli (e.g., Ohman et al., 2001; Williams et al., 2005); and to 
enhance our memory for important events (Luminet and Curci, 2009; see Phelps, 2006 for 
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a review). Despite a great deal of research on emotion and its many functions, researchers 
still lack consensus around how this term can be defined (Gendron, 2010).  
In 1884, William James famously asked: “What is an emotion?” (James, 1884). 
Now, over 130 year later, many would argue that he still hasn’t received a satisfactory 
answer (Gendron, 2010; Gotlib, 2007; Gross, 2015; Scherer, 2005). This is because 
despite widespread intuitive understanding, and common usage of the term, emotion 
remains exceptionally difficult to study and describe. Some researchers believe the task of 
defining emotions is “virtually impossible, except in terms of conflicting theories” 
(English & English 1958). As Young explains: 
"Almost everyone except the psychologist knows what an emotion is... The trouble with 
the psychologist is that emotional processes and states are complex and can be analyzed 
from so many points of view that a complete picture is virtually impossible. It is 
necessary, therefore, to examine emotional events piecemeal and in different systematic 
contexts” (1973, p.749). 
Over the years, researchers in this field appear to have done just that – defining 
emotions in the terms most appropriate to their respective methods of study. For example, 
from the biological perspective, emotion has been defined in physiological and 
neurological terms – as “hereditary 'pattern-reaction' involving profound changes of the 
bodily mechanism…including visceral and glandular systems” (Watson, 1924); as “a 
state of arousal tending to disrupt homeostatic baselines” (Bruno, 1980); and more 
recently, as “action-requiring neurological programs” (Damasio, 2010). From the 
cognitive perspective, emotion has been defined in terms of thought process – as “phases 
of an individual’s intuitive appraisals…” (Bowlby, 1969), or as “informationally 
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encapsulated brain processes” (LeDoux, 1996). From a behavioural perspective, emotion 
has been defined in terms of observable behaviour and learned responses – as “the 
association between widespread changes in ongoing operant behaviours and the 
presentation or removal of reinforcers” (Millenson, 1967). From an evolutionary 
perspective, the opposite has been put forth: “expressive actions, exhibited by man and by 
lower animals… innate or inherited… not learnt by the individual” (Darwin, 1965). From 
the perspective of motivation research, emotion is defined as “the fundamental means of 
motivation in the higher animals” (Leeper, 1948); and as “action tendencies like 
physiological appetites” (Arnold, 1960). From a clinical perspective, it has been referred 
to as a “process of discharge, the final expression of which is perceived as feeling” (Freud, 
1915; 1949); or as “a kind of judging” that differs from intellectual judgment “a 
subjective criterion of acceptance or rejection” (Jung, 1923). And finally, from a social 
constructivist perspective, “emotion is fundamentally an attribute of interactions between 
people rather than of individuals” (Parkinson, 1995).   
Defining emotion is clearly no easy task, and any definition contains within in it 
built in assumptions about the nature of emotion as a phenomenon, and the methods 
needed to study it. Gross (2010) – a pioneering researcher in the field of emotion and 
emotion regulation – explains that catching emotions as they unfold is rather like catching 
butterflies, only harder. This is made all the more complicated when one considers that 
many real-life emotional events simultaneously touch on multiple concerns (Sonnemans 
& Frijda, 1995); that it is possible to experience multiple emotions at the same time 
(Mesquita & Frijda, 2011); that emotions trigger multiple and discrete patterns of 
behaviour, physiology, thoughts and feelings (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & 
Gross, 2005); that there is no clearly marked non-emotion baseline (Davidson, 1998); and 
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that emotion is a term lifted from common language that refers to an astonishing array of 
happenings “from the mild to the intense, the brief to the extended, the simple to the 
complex, and the private to the public” (Gross & Thompson 2007, p. 4).  
According to Gross (2015), emotions simply cannot be defined in the tidy 
classical sense – by their necessary conditions (what is needed for something to be an 
emotion), or by their sufficient conditions (what guarantees that something is an emotion). 
Instead, researchers have been increasingly forced to rely on prototype conceptions of 
emotions which emphasize typical features that may or may not be evident, at a given 
point in time, but whose presence makes it more likely that something is an emotion. 
Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) set out to provide a clear prototypical definition when 
they conducted a review of 92 definitions and 11 sceptical statements about emotions by 
prominent psychologists. They searched for trends, common themes and theoretical issues, 
and identified 11 discrete categorical perspectives. The authors then developed, to the best 
of their ability, a prototypical definition that was broad enough to include traditionally 
significant aspects, and narrow enough to differentiate emotion from other psychological 
processes: 
“Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, 
mediated by neural-hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affective experiences 
such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such 
as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) activate 
widespread physiological adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to 
behaviour that is often, but not always, expressive, goal directed, and adaptive” 
(Kleinginna & Kleinginna 1981, p.355).  
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Over the years, this and other prototypical definitions have been further refined and 
simplified with most emotion researchers now acknowledging thoughts, feelings, 
physiology and behaviour as four core components of an emotional response. In addition, 
many contemporary researchers also agree: 1) that emotions arise when an individual 
attends to a situation deemed relevant to his or her goals; 2) that emotions unfold over 
time; and 3) that emotions can be either helpful or harmful depending on the context 
(Cacioppo, Berntson, & Klein, 1993; Frijda, 2006; Gross, 2008; Mauss, Levenson, 
McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005).  
 Gross (2015) argues that in many ways, saying what emotions are not, is easier 
than saying what they are. Clarifying the difference between emotions and the many 
related terms is also important for navigating what has been described as the “conceptual 
and definitional chaos” of emotion and emotion regulation literature (Buck, 1990). Based 
on the work of Gross and colleagues (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Gross, 2008; 2015), this 
thesis uses the following model for categorizing and understanding the differences 
between affect, emotions and other related concepts (see Figure 1 below). These terms are 
defined as follows: 
1) Affect: A superordinate category or ‘umbrella term’ for various states that involve 
attention and quick valence (positive or negative) judgments. Affective states have also 
been defined as neurophysiological changes experienced as feelings, moods, or emotions 
organized in terms of at least two dimensions: valence and arousal (Russell & Barrett, 
1999; Larsen & Diener, 1992).  
2) Moods: Typically more diffuse and longer lasting affective states that give rise to broad 
tendencies to approach or withdraw (Lange, 1994).  
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3) Emotions: “Multifaceted, whole-body phenomena that involve loosely coupled changes in 
the domains of subjective experience [thoughts and feelings], behaviour and central and 
peripheral physiology” (Gross, 2015, p.4) 
4) Stress: Typically refers to negative (but otherwise unspecified) affective states occasioned 
by an inability to manage situational demands (Lazarus, 1993) 
5) Coping: Typically refers to regulation efforts aimed at reducing negative affect (e.g., 
stress). Coping may also refer to longer period of time (e.g., coping with bereavement). 
6) Impulses: All other motivational states (e.g., eating, sex, aggression, pain).  
7) Defences: Psychological defences typically have as their focus the regulation of 
unconscious and automatic impulses (e.g., aggression and sexual desire), and their 
associated negative emotions, particularly anxiety. They are also most often studied as 
stable individual differences (Cramer, 2000).  
Figure 1. A Hierarchical Model of Affect and Related Terms. 
 
Affect
Moods
Attitudes
Emotions
Thoughts
Feelings
Physiology
BehaviourStressCoping
Impulses
Defences
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2.2 What is Emotion Regulation? 
 Unlike emotion, there has been much less contention among theorists about the 
definition of emotion regulation. It is broadly accepted that emotion regulation refers to 
any process by which individuals modify the trajectory of an emotional response. This 
includes influencing the kinds of emotions one experiences, their intensity, duration, 
and/or their expression (Gross, 2008). Emotion regulation can be conscious and effortful, 
or unconscious and automatic (Mauss et al., 2005). It can be intrinsic/ intrapersonal (e.g., 
regulating one's own emotions) or extrinsic/interpersonal (regulating someone else's 
emotions) (Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). It can also involve external efforts to control or 
change one’s environment, or internal efforts to regulate one’s subjective inner experience 
(Cicchetti, Ganiban, & Barnett, 1991). Finally, emotion regulation encompasses all 
aspects of an emotional response – including physiological, cognition, and behavioural 
components. For this reason, it is not surprising that adaptive emotion regulation is widely 
regarded as essential for well-being and psychological health (Werner & Gross, 2009; 
Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Gross, 2008; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012), physical 
health (Sapolsky, 2007), academic achievement (Valiente, Swanson & Eisenberg, 2012 
for a review), work performance (Côté & Morgan, 2002) and healthy relationships 
(Murray, 2005; Bloch, Haase & Levenson, 2014). Emotion dysregulation is also linked 
with a range of troubling outcomes including increased negative and decreased positive 
affect (Berking, Orth, Wupperman, Meier, & Casper, 2008), increased risk-taking and 
harmful behaviours (Gratz, 2007), as well as pathological, compulsive, and addictive 
behaviours (e.g., eating disorders, substance use, and gambling) (Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, 
Wade, & Bohon, 2007; Fox, Axelrod, Paliwal, Sleeper, & Sinha, 2007; Ricketts & 
Macaskill, 2003; Sim & Zeman, 2004). 
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 The last decade has seen a tremendous growth in research on emotion regulation. 
From only a small number of papers published each year throughout the 1990s, to more 
than 10,000 papers published on the topic of emotion regulation in 2013 alone (See 
Figure 1 below – adapted from Gross 2015). With such exponential growth, emotion 
regulation is now widely regarded as one of the fastest growing areas of research within 
the field of modern psychology (Gross, 2015).  
Figure 2. Growth in Emotion Regulation Citations 1990 - 2013 
 
Note: Figure 1 adapted from Gross (2015). Number of publications containing the exact 
phrase “emotion regulation” in Google Scholar each year from 1990 to 2013 (solid line). 
This is not a cumulative plot—each data point represents 1 year’s citations. For 
comparison purposes, the number of publications containing the exact phrase “mental 
control” is also provided for the same period (dashed line). 
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One reason for the exponential growth in research on emotion regulation appears 
to be connected to the importance of emotion regulation for many sub areas of 
psychology (see Figure 2). These overlapping fields include: personality psychology 
(Gross & John, 2003; Mayer & Salovey, 1995), clinical psychology (Webb, Miles & 
Sheeran, 2012; Werner & Gross 2009), health psychology (DeSteno, Gross, & Kubzansky, 
2013), biological (Hartley & Phelps, 2010), cognitive (Miller, Rodriguez, Kim, & 
McClure, 2014), developmental (Thompson, 2014), social (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2014), 
and organizational psychology (Grandey, Diefendorff & Rupp, 2013). Still other 
overlapping areas of research including neuroscience and neurobiology (Barrett, Mesquita, 
Ochsner & Gross, 2007), economics (Harris, Hare, & Rangel, 2013), Education 
(Boekaerts & Pekrun, 2015), Law (Maroney, 2006), political science (Halperin, 2014), 
anthropology (e.g., Tarlow, 2012), business (e.g., Cote, 2005), and medicine (Haque & 
Waytz, 2012).  
Figure 3. The Centrality of Emotion Regulation. 
 
Figure 3. Adapted from Gross (2015): Emotion regulation is an active topic of 
investigation in all of the major sub-areas within psychology. 
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Across fields of research, much of this work has focused on understanding exactly 
what constitutes adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation responses, and why people 
choose to regulate their emotions the way they do. These questions are complicated, in 
part, because what constitutes ‘adaptive’ and ‘maladaptive’ emotion regulation is largely 
context dependent. While many individuals use emotion regulation to decrease the 
experience or expression of negative emotions (Gross et al, 2006), emotion regulation can 
also be used to decrease (down-regulate) positive emotions (e.g., to ‘play it cool’ in order 
not to look desperate on a date; or to look less happy after acing a test that a friend failed), 
or to increase (up-regulate) negative emotions (e.g., to increase feelings of anger an 
assertiveness in preparation for a difficult conversation or to increase feelings of sadness 
at a funeral). These strategies can also be applied interpersonally in attempts to help 
someone else regulate their emotions. Some strategies can also prove adaptive for 
managing emotions in the short-term (e.g., avoiding airplanes if one has a fear of flying), 
but can prove maladaptive if they interfere with longer-term goals (e.g., the desire to 
travel). See Figure 4 for a visual depiction of these different kinds of emotion regulation 
goals according to Gross’ (2014a) 2 x 2 model. In this light, the same emotion regulation 
strategies can be deemed adaptive or maladaptive depending on the specific individual, 
the context, the emotion and its intensity (Bonnanno et al., 2004; Sheppes et al., 2011; 
Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012).  
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Figure 4. Examples of Different Emotion Regulation Goals 
 
 
Note: Figure adapted from Gross (2014a). Emotion regulation goals may include decreasing or increasing 
either negative emotion or positive emotion. Decreasing negative emotion appears to be the most common 
regulation goal in everyday life, followed by increasing positive emotion. Strategies are listed as intrinsic 
(Int) or extrinsic (Ext). 
 
For this reason, Gross and Thompson (2007) have typically defined emotion 
regulation strategies as ‘contextually adaptive’ if they are flexible and meet the 
regulator’s goals (regardless of social norms or long-term adaptive values) (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). Over the years, several models have been developed to understand the 
‘emotion-generation process’ and the points at which it is possible to intervene for the 
purposes of emotion regulation. Three of these models will be covered in the next 
sections – they include 1) The Appraisal Theory Model; 2) The Modal Model; and 3) The 
Target Function Model.  
Trying	to	calm	onself	down	when	angry	(INT)Helping	a	tearful	child	untangle	his	kite	(EXT)
Firing	oneself	up	before	a	big	game	(INT)Reframing	a	friend's	"little	fight"	with	a	spouse	as	serious	(EXT)
Wiping	a	smile	off	one's	face	at	a	funeral	(INT)Helping	giggling	girls	calm	down	at	bedtime	(EXT)
Sharing	great	news	with	close	friends	(INT)Telling	someone	a	joke	to	cheer	them	up	(EXT)
 
Negative 
Emotion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive 
Emotions 
 
Decrease       Increase 
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2.3 The Appraisal Theory Model 
According to appraisal theory, emotions are elicited not by situations, events or 
objects themselves but by perceivers’ cognitive appraisals of them (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 
1991a, 1991b; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). From this perspective, emotional states can be 
differentiated according to patterns of key underlying cognitive appraisals (or evaluations). 
Roseman and Smith (2001) explain that appraisal theories developed to explain a number 
of previously unaccounted for elements of emotional experience. For example: why 
people experience so many distinct emotions; why the same event or situation can elicit 
very different emotional reactions both across people and within the same person over 
time; why emotions can be elicited by an endless number of events with which one has no 
prior learning or experience; and why emotional responses can sometimes be irrational 
(e.g., in the case of paralyzing fear or anxiety).  
One of the most well-known appraisal theory models is Lazarus’ cognitive-
motivational-relational theory of emotion (Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b; Smith & Lazarus, 
1993). In this model, Lazarus identifies key appraisal components necessary for the 
production of wide array of emotions. These include: (a) a relational component (e.g., that 
a situation, event or object is relevant to the perceiver), (b) a motivational component (e.g., 
that a situation, event or object is congruent or incongruent to the perceiver’s goals), and 
(c) a cognitive aspect (e.g., the perceiver’s appraisal of the situation and its relevance to 
one’s life). Furthermore, Lazarus differentiates primary appraisals (which concern 
relevance and meaning) from secondary appraisals (which concern a perceiver’s 
assessment of their coping abilities and of the target responsible for the situation).  See 
Figure 5 for a summary of the primary and secondary appraisals necessary for emotion.  
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Figure 5. The Appraisal Theory Model of Emotion 
  
  By focusing on these cognitive components of emotions, appraisal theories 
explain how emotions develop and can be regulated. One can predict emotions by 
examining individual appraisals, or gain insight into a person’s thinking by examining 
their emotions. From the perspective of appraisal theory, one can regulate one’s own 
emotions by changing the cognitive appraisals they have about a situation, event or object. 
An example can be seen in the case of fear. According to Lazarus (1991a, 1991b), three 
key appraisals are necessary for the production of fear: the appraisal that a situation is (1) 
personally relevant, (2) potentially harmful (primary appraisals) and (3) that one may not 
be able to cope with the present threat (secondary appraisal). If, however, a person 
appraises a situation as (1) relevant and (2) harmful but focuses instead on (3) attributions 
of other blame or accountability, it is more likely the individual will experience anger 
rather than fear as the primary emotional response.  
In terms of emotion regulation, there are number of ways to work with one’s 
emotions from the perspective of appraisal theory.  Because multiple appraisal elements 
are necessary for any one emotional response, there are also multiple ways to re-appraise 
a situation, event or object in order to change the ensuing emotion. For example, someone 
Motivational	relevancePrimary	Appraisal	1:	That	the	situation	event	or	object	is	relevant	to	the	perceiver.
Motivational	congruencePrimary	Appraisal	2:	That	the	situation	event	or	object	is	congruent	or	incongruent	with	the	perceivers'	goals.
Perceived	copingSecondary	Appraisal:	That	the	perceiver's	appraisal	of	who	is	responsible	and	their	coping	abilities.
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who is afraid of sharks and fearful of swimming in the ocean, might tell themselves (1) 
that this fear isn’t relevant at this particular beach as there are no sharks (relational 
component), (2) that even though there might be sharks they are a species that are 
harmless (motivational component), or (3) that they will be safe because they are a good 
swimmer and they know what to do to signal the life guard should they need help 
(assessment of coping abilities). These are only three examples of countless appraisals 
that could be used to in working with such phobias.  
In summary, Lazarus’ (1991a, 1991b) appraisal theory places a strong emphasis 
on cognition and requires that thoughts precede emotion and physiological arousal (which 
occur together simultaneously).  Critics of Lazarus’ appraisal theory argue that the 
model’s inherent cognitive bias fails to capture the dynamic and reciprocal nature of 
many emotions, and that classifying emotions according to categorical labels provides 
only a crude attempt at describing the intricacy of emotional experience – particularly 
complex emotions like love and desire (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; LeDoux, 1996; 
Scherer, 1984; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Some even argue that there are as 
many different emotional states as there are patterns of appraisals (Scherer, 1984). In 
addition to these problems, the appraisal theory model fails to adequately account for the 
role of situational and environmental cues, attention and response tendencies.  
2.4 The Modal Model of Emotions 
The modal model of emotions (Gross, 1998b; Gross & Thompson, 2007) suggests 
that while appraisal plays a key role in emotion generation, ultimately emotions arise 
within a complex person-situation interaction “that compels attention, has particular 
meaning to an individual, and gives rise to a coordinated yet flexible multisystem 
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response to the ongoing person-situation transaction” (Gross & Thompson, 2007 p.5). 
Gross explains that this modal model underlies many intuitive understandings of emotions 
(Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner & Gross, 2007), and incorporates elements from existing 
models and theories of emotion and emotion regulation. Figure 5 presents an abstracted 
situation-attentional-appraisal-response sequence.  
 
Figure 6. The Modal Model of Emotion (adapted from Gross & Thompson, 2007) 
 
 
 
In the first part of the model in Figure 6, we see that the appraisal process is 
influenced and preceded by a particular situation or environmental trigger. This may be 
an external situation, event or object, or an internal representation such as a thought or 
memory. In addition to this trigger, a person’s appraisal of the situation also requires 
some degree of attention to certain aspects of that situation. A small child might 
immediately start crying when a toy is taken from them, but stop suddenly when a parent 
excitedly starts pointing at and playing with something else.  
In addition to incorporating the role of environmental triggers, attention and 
appraisal, the modal model also accounts for emotional response tendencies. Emotions 
often trigger changes in experiential, behavioural and physiological response systems. 
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These responses can also feed back into, and change the situation that triggered the 
emotion in the first place, affecting subsequent attention and appraisal processes. A 
feedback arrow running from ‘response’ all the way back to the ‘situation’ represents this 
element in the modal model. For example, the small child that lost its toy and was 
distressed only moments ago begins playing with a new toy. As their sobbing subsides, 
they receive encouragement, attention and positive reinforcement from their parent, which 
leads to further engrossment in the new activity. The modal model thus accounts 
environmental factors and attentional processes as well as for the recursive nature of 
emotion.  
2.5 The Target Function Model 
Another way of classifying and thinking about emotion and emotion regulation 
strategies is to consider the target and function of emotion regulation. Koole (2009) 
argues that most forms of emotion regulation target one of three different emotion-
generating systems: 1) attention (e.g., selecting incoming information from sensory input), 
2) knowledge (e.g., appraising information in a particular way) and 3) embodiment (e.g., 
the many physical ways emotions unfold – including posture, facial-expression and 
psycho-physiological responses). For example, mindfulness and meditation are strategies 
that target attention (e.g., bringing one’s attention to the sensation of breathing), while 
expressive writing is a strategy targeting the knowledge systems (e.g., with its focus on 
developing insight into one’s thoughts and emotions). In addition to identifying the target 
of emotion regulation, Koole (2009) argues that strategies can be further divided and 
broadly grouped into three categories according to the psychological functions they serve: 
1) hedonic needs (e.g., seeking pleasure and avoiding pain), 2) specific goals (e.g., using 
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negative emotions to promote caution or to improve performance) or 3) person-oriented 
needs, motives and self-aspects (e.g., integrating difficult or unwanted emotional 
experiences). Together, the target by function classification yields nine cells by which 
emotion regulation strategies can be organized. Figure 7 displays examples of different 
kinds of emotion regulation strategies according to their target and function. 
 
Figure 7. The Target by Function Classification of Emotion-Regulation Strategies 
(Adapted from Kool, 2009) 
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Together Koole’s (2009) classification of emotion regulation provides a useful 
framework for organizing a wide range of emotion regulation strategies. By examining 
different psychological functions of emotion regulation strategies (e.g., needs, goals and 
person-oriented motives), Koole’s (2009) model also distinguishes between several forms 
of attention, appraisal and response modulation strategies that would otherwise be 
grouped together in the modal model of emotion regulation. Despite these advantages, the 
Target Function Model does not address how and why emotions unfold as they do in 
response to specific emotional stimuli, nor questions regarding why some strategies may 
be more effective than others particularly with reference to the temporal unfolding and 
strength of certain emotional responses.  To address these elements, I turn to a fourth 
model of emotion regulation – The Process Model of Emotion Regulation – that will 
serve as the primary theoretical model for this thesis.  
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3. THE PROCESS MODEL OF EMOTION REGULATION 
3.1 Overview 
Building on existing models, the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 
1998b) assumes that emotions unfold in a series of stages and each stage offers 
opportunities for regulating the unfolding emotion. These five stages (or emotion 
regulation families) include: situation selection, situation modification, attentional 
deployment, cognitive change and response modulation (see Figure 8). Each of these 
stages will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
Figure 8.0 The ‘Process Model of Emotion Regulation’ (Gross, 1998b; 2014) 
 
 
 
Like the modal model, because an emotional response or reaction can result in 
changes to the situation, there is also a feedback loop indicating the dynamic and 
recursive nature of emotion generation and regulation. In addition to distinguishing 
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between the five emotion regulation strategies, the process model also distinguishes 
between antecedent-focused and response-focused strategies. Antecedent-focused 
strategies refer to everything that takes place before the emotion occurs (situation 
selection, modification, attentional deployment and cognitive change), while response-
focused strategies (response modulation) refer to strategies that are used to change, 
increase or decrease an emotion once it has occurred. Some researchers have also 
distinguished between external or situational strategies – strategies that seek to choose or 
change the environment in some way (e.g., situation selection and situation modification); 
and internal or cognitive strategies – strategies that use attention, or thought processes to 
change the meaning of a situation or to change its visible impact (attentional deployment, 
cognitive change, and in some cases response modulation; see Duckworth, Gendler & 
Gross, 2014).  
While the process model organizes emotion regulation strategies according to a 
temporal sequencing of emotion, some critics have argued that this is problematic because 
the order in which emotional responses are generated is often highly variable (see Koole, 
2009). For example, there is some evidence that posture and body movements directly 
activate emotional experience (Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, 
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005) and that some emotional stimuli (like music) can trigger 
emotions without any intervening cognitive appraisals (Thoma, Ryf, Mohiyeddini, Ehlert, 
& Nater, 2012). Nonetheless, the process model of emotion regulation is to date one of 
the most widely used frameworks for organizing emotion regulatory processes (Gross & 
Jazaieri, 2014; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). It also provides a useful and flexible 
framework for examining the points at which different emotion regulation strategies have 
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their primary impact and reasons why some strategies are more or less effective than 
others. Each of these stages and their associated strategies are described in below.   
3.2 Situation Selection 
 The first stage – situation selection – typically involves approaching or avoiding 
situations that might give rise to certain wanted or unwanted emotions. Some obvious 
examples might include: avoiding a family member one frequently get into arguments 
with, choosing to drive rather than take a flight if one has a fear of flying, seeking out a 
close friend for social support, or treating oneself to funny movie after a hard week. 
Situation selection works to help a person pre-emptively regulate specific emotions by 
approaching or avoiding environments that trigger them. Choosing situations in order to 
care for oneself and in order to avoid negative experiences can aid in successfully 
navigating one’s emotional life (Werner & Gross, 2009). However, habitual reliance on 
avoidance as a form of coping is associated with a range of indicators of poor long-term 
health and well-being (Suls & Fletcher, 1985; Penley et al., 2002; Aldao, Nolen-
Hoeksema & Schweizer, 2010 for meta-analyses and reviews). Habitual avoidance can 
also contribute to phobias and anxiety (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Strosahl, 1996) 
as well as feelings of loneliness, inauthenticity, and disconnection (John & Gross, 2004). 
When avoidance leads to isolating behaviour, it can further predict lower levels of social 
and emotional support, fewer close relationships with others, and poorer overall 
satisfaction with life (Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004). For these reasons, 
approach-based situation selection strategies have long formed a core component of 
cognitive behavioural therapies and other psychological interventions such as behavioural 
activation for depression (Jacobson, Martell & Dimidjian, 2001; Martell, Addis & 
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Jacobson, 2001), prolonged exposure therapy for trauma (Joseph & Gray, 2008), 
systematic desensitization for phobias and anxiety (Rachman, 1967), and exposure and 
response prevention for obsessive compulsive disorder (see Abramowitz, Deacon & 
Whiteside, 2011 for a review) – all of which use exposure to certain situations or objects 
to facilitate longer-term changes in affect and behaviour.   
In addition to using situation selection to regulate one’s emotions, people also 
enlist this strategy to help others with emotion regulation. Examples of this process 
include persuading a friend to come to a social event or join an activity that is likely to be 
emotionally satisfying, and, in the context of child care, using routines and scheduled 
naps to assist emotional coping in young children (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Whether it 
is regulating one’s own emotions, or helping others with theirs, situation selection 
requires an understanding of remote situations and the likely emotional responses that 
might follow in a particular circumstance or environment. This is not always easy as there 
is growing evidence that people frequently misestimate their emotional responses – both 
in remembering past emotional experience (Kahneman, 2000) and in predicting their 
responses and duration of their affective reactions to future scenarios (Gilbert, Pinel, 
Wilson, Blumberg & Wheatley, 1998). Complicating things further, one must also 
consider the short-term benefits of specific situation selection strategies and weigh them 
again longer-term costs. For example, by habitually avoiding a difficult family member, a 
small disagreement can turn into a longer more serious conflict.  
3.3 Situation Modification 
 The second stage in the process model is situation modification. Situation 
modification involves active efforts to directly modify an environment or situation so as 
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to alter its emotional impact (Gross, 1998b p.283). This might involve tidying the house 
before a parent or spouse returns home after being away, injecting some humor into a 
serious conversation, or explaining to a friend that you’d rather not talk about a painful 
break-up. Some other core examples of situation modification strategies include problem-
focused coping (e.g., fixing a computer problem or rehearsing for a stressful job 
interview), seeking social support (e.g., asking for help with fixing a problem or having a 
friend help with a practice interview), and conflict resolution (e.g., taking steps to modify 
or diffuse a conflict, mediation, arbitration etc). Many of these situation modification 
strategies are adaptive – for example, problem-focused coping is associated with positive 
health outcomes (Penley et al., 2002), increased well-being and fewer psychological 
disorders (see Aldao et al, 2010 for a meta-analysis). Help-seeking is also widely 
regarded as adaptive in clinical and educational settings (Wills, 19987; Newman, 1994). 
And conflict resolution – while imperfect – has proved an effective strategy for emotion 
regulation in violent conflicts (see Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). However, 
not all situation modification strategies are adaptive. Gross (2015) explains that, in many 
anxiety disorders, individuals often engage in “safety behaviours,” such as standing apart 
from a social gathering (Werner & Gross, 2010 cited in Gross, 2015). Strategies like this 
can lead to short term relief, but they prevent longer-term benefits of more complete 
exposure to the feared stimuli. To date, little research currently exists examining the 
immediate and longer term consequences of situation modification as an emotion 
regulation strategy (Gross, 2015).  
Gross (1998b) explains that one difficulty with the category of situation 
modification, is that it can be challenging identifying where situation selection ends and 
situation modification begins, as efforts to modify a situation can effectively bring a new 
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situation into being. This is even more complicated when one considers the role of 
emotional expression in situation modification – if, for example, in an argument with a 
friend, our friend suddenly looks remorseful and sad, this might change the situation and 
the entire course of an angry interaction: “we pause to express concern, backpedal, or 
offer support. In this sense, emotion expressions can be powerful extrinsic forms of 
emotion regulation, changing the nature of the situation” (Gross & Thompson, 2007 p.12).  
In considering examples like this one, it is easy to see that emotion regulation is a 
dynamic and reciprocal process, and many efforts at regulation change the very situation 
which is being regulated (Sheppes, Suri & Gross, 2015). This point is addressed in more 
detail in Chapter 4. For now, it is important to note that both situation selection and 
situation modification are external or situational strategies because they are focused on 
regulating one’s emotions through changes in one’s external environment. These 
strategies are also typically regarded as pro-active emotion regulation strategies used to 
regulate emotions prior to or at early onset. However, merely anticipating an emotional 
experience can also lead to partial and unconscious activation of similar emotion systems. 
In this way, even anticipatory emotion regulation strategies may be preceded by an 
emotional response that arises in anticipation of the desirable or undesirable emotional 
outcome.     
3.4 Attentional Deployment 
Situation selection and situation modification are strategies used to approach, 
avoid or change an emotion-eliciting situation. However, there are also many strategies 
for regulating emotions that do not require changing one’s environment. The third stage 
of the process model – attentional deployment – refers to “how individuals direct their 
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attention within a given situation in order to influence their emotions” (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007 p.13). Strategies for directing attention can be grouped broadly into two 
categories: distraction and concentration. 
Distraction includes directing attention away from oneself to non-emotional 
aspects of a situation (Nix, Watson, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 1995) or mentally 
“checking-out” by directing one’s attention away from a situation completely (Rothbart, 
Sheese, & Posner, 2007). This can include withdrawing one’s senses, for example, by 
covering one’s eyes or ears to prevent exposure to unwanted stimuli, or it can include 
changing one’s internal focus, for example, by invoking or recalling thoughts and 
memories that are inconsistent with an unpleasant emotional state (Boden & Baumeister, 
1997). From a developmental perspective, distraction is one of the first strategies that 
infants and children use to regulate their emotions (Rothbart, Ziaie, & O'Boyle, 1992). 
Rothbart, Ziaie and O-Boyle (1992) explain that between 3 and 13.5 months of age, 
infants undergo rapid development in self-regulatory behaviours, particularly attention 
regulation strategies. When faced with aversive stimuli, for example, infants 
spontaneously redirect their visual attention toward inanimate aspects of the environment, 
and at 10 months, they are also significantly more likely to redirect their attention towards 
their mothers.  Children may also use distraction to assist with delay of gratification 
(Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). And, as children age, 
their attentional processes can be redirected and guided by others to assist with emotion 
management. For example, a parent might seek to subdue a child’s crying by excitedly 
pointing at something, or by offering them something to play with.  
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Concentration, by contrast, involves focusing on a situation or a particular object 
of attention that has the ability to absorb cognitive resources (Erber & Tesser, 1992). 
Whether it is focusing on working, gardening, rock-climbing or art, concentration in the 
form of a well-chosen task can lead to a pleasurable, self-sustaining state sometimes 
referred to ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Csikszentmihalyi & LeFevre, 1989). 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) explains that flow states are timeless experiences of complete 
absorbtion and, in these states, emotion is regulated and harnessed in the service of 
performing and learning. Another concentration strategy that appears to have many 
benefits for emotion regulation is ‘mindfulness’ – paying attention, on purpose in the 
present moment, non-judgmentally to one’s immediate experience (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). 
Mindfulness practices involve sustaining attention on present experience rather than 
becoming lost in self-referential judgments about the self and others.  
Research indicates that both ‘flow’ states and mindfulness practices have positive 
consequences for performance and well-being (Carmody & Baer, 2008; Chiesa & Serretti, 
2009; Clarke & Haworth, 2011; Shao & Skarlicki, 2009). However, not all concentration 
strategies have beneficial effects. When concentration involves directing attention to the 
emotional features of a situation, such as repeatedly focusing on feelings, their causes and 
consequences, this is known as rumination. When rumination is directed towards negative 
emotions, it can lead to longer and more sever depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Girgus, & Seligman, 1992; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).  
Like rumination, worrying is often uncontrollable and associated with negative 
affect, but rather than focusing on the emotional features of a situation, worrying typically 
involves directing attention towards possible future threats and negative events. As an 
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emotion regulation strategy, worrying can serve as a method for avoiding strong emotions 
(Borkovec, 1994), and can have a dampening effect on physiological arousal (Borkovec 
& Hu, 1990). However, ultimately, like rumination, worry is a poor form of emotion 
regulation and is associated with anxiety disorders (Borkovec, 1994), longer-lasting 
anxiety (Borkovec, Roemer, & Kinyon, 1995), and poor habituation to emotional stimuli 
(Butler & Gross, 2004).  
3.5 Cognitive Change 
If someone is unable to change or modify a situation and is forced to pay attention 
to what is happening, they may engage in a fourth strategy: cognitive change. Building on 
the work of appraisal theorists (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b; Smith & Lazarus, 
1993), cognitive change – the fourth stage in the process model – refers to “changing how 
we appraise the situation we are in to alter its emotional significance, either by changing 
how we think about the situation or about our capacity to manage the demands it poses” 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007 p.14). Common examples of cognitive change strategies 
include classical psychological defenses such as denial, defensive pessimism, projection 
and intellectualization; downward social comparison by comparing one’s situation with 
those less fortunate (Taylor & Lobel, 1989); reinterpreting a situation in a more positive 
light or assuming the position of a detached observer (Ochsner & Gross, 2008).  
One cognitive change strategy that has received particular attention is cognitive 
reappraisal (Gross, 2002; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007). This cognitive 
change strategy involves “changing a situation’s meaning in a way that alters its 
emotional impact” (Gross & Thompson, 2007 p.14). This might involve regulating one’s 
emotions prior to an emotion-eliciting or challenging situation (e.g., thinking about a job 
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interview as an opportunity to evaluate the company rather than focusing on being 
evaluated); regulating one’s emotions in the moment (e.g., viewing an interviewer’s blank 
face as a sign that they’ve had a long day of interviews rather than thinking about the 
possibility that they’re bored or unimpressed); or regulating emotions that might arise as a 
consequence of thinking about a situation that has already occurred (e.g., reflecting on the 
interview as a learning opportunity rather instead of regretting things that were said or 
done).  In addition to assisting emotion regulation in these circumstances, habitual use of 
cognitive reappraisal, particularly during stressful life events, is associated with a positive 
bias in memory over time – an overestimation of positive emotion and an underestimation 
of negative emotions when recalling difficult life experiences (Levine, Schmidt, Kang, & 
Tinti, 2012). 
From a developmental perspective, cognitive reappraisal requires greater 
introspective skills and emotional awareness than strategies focused on attending to, 
changing or avoiding emotion-arousing situations. For example, when children are asked 
how they would regulate negative feeling states, six-year-olds typically suggest 
situational and behavioural change strategies, while 10-year-olds acknowledge the 
usefulness of changing what they’re thinking about (Saarni, 1999; Stegge & Meerum 
Terwogt, 2007). 
Although it is true that reappraisal can be used in ways that are beneficial or 
detrimental for emotional health and well-being, in general reappraisal is considered an 
effective emotion regulation strategy for decreasing negative, and increasing positive 
emotions in the present moment (Gross & Thompson, 2007 p.14). Habitual use of 
reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy is also associated with higher levels of 
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positive and lower levels of negative affect and depressive symptoms, as well as 
improved interpersonal functioning, self-esteem, and satisfaction with life (Goldin et al, 
2009; Gross & John, 2003).  
3.6 Response Modulation 
The last stage of the process model – response modulation – refers to “influencing 
physiological, experiential or behavioural responding as directly as possible” (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007 p.15). As seen in figure 2.2, response modulation occurs much later in 
the emotion-generative process, typically once an emotion and its response tendencies 
have been initiated. Even at this late stage, however, there are still many strategies 
available. Medication, for example, is commonly used to help manage symptoms of 
anxiety or depression even after these response tendencies have been initiated. Common 
medications include anxiolytics (used to reduce muscle tension) or beta-adrenergic 
blocking agents/‘beta blockers’ (used to assist with the physiological symptoms of stress 
or anxiety). Other common strategies used to either up-regulate or down-regulate 
emotional states include exercise (Thayer & Lane, 2000; Thayer et al., 1994) relaxation 
(Manzoni, Pagnini, Castelnuovo & Molinari, 2008 for a review) and biofeedback (Peira, 
Fredrikson & Pourtois, 2014; Schwartz, 1979), alcohol (e.g., Hull & Bond, 1986), drugs 
(e.g., Khantzian, 1985) and cigarette use (e.g., Brandon, 1994; Gilbert & Welser, 1989), 
and even food (e.g., Lingswiler, Crowther & Stephens,1989). While many of these 
response modulation strategies have adaptive short-term benefits for managing emotions 
in daily life, reliance can become problematic (even dangerous for long-term health) 
especially when short-term strategies conflict with longer-term personal goals.  
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In addition to modulating the physiological and experiential aspects of emotion, 
one can also regulate behavioural responding and emotional expression.  Examples 
include suppressing anger while in the midst of an interpersonal conflict, hiding the 
physical signs of anxiety and nervousness on a first-date, or repressing a desire to laugh at 
someone when doing so might be hurtful or inappropriate. Research on emotion 
expression indicates that suppressing emotions has mixed effects on emotional experience. 
When instructed to suppress the visual signs of emotions, participants often self-report 
decreased positive but not negative emotional experience (Gross, 1998a; Gross & 
Levenson, 1993). For example, suppressing signs of amusement while watching an 
amusing film clip (Davis, Senghas, & Ochsner, 2009; Gross & Levenson, 1997) or while 
reading cartoons (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) dampened the experience of 
amusement. However, when instructed to suppress signs of embarrassment in public 
(Harris, 2001), or negative emotional expression in response to a disgusting film or a sad 
movie clip (Gross, 1998a; Gross & Levenson, 1997), there were no changes in the 
experience of those emotions for participants. 
 Interestingly, regardless of self-reported experience, suppressing emotion 
expression while viewing emotion-eliciting slides and films or during conversations, 
typically increases in the body’s stress response measured via sympathetic nervous 
system activation and systolic blood pressure (Gross, 1998a; Gross & Levenson, 1993; 
Gross & Levenson, 1997; Harris, 2001). Other research indicates that suppression is 
associated with a number of additional clinical symptoms as well as cognitive and social 
costs (Aldo, Nolen-Hoeksema & Schweizer, 2010). For example, in a series of studies on 
memory, Richards and Gross (2000, 2006) found that expressive suppression (both when 
spontaneously occurring and when experimentally manipulated) predicted poorer memory 
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for material presented during the suppression period. Butler and colleagues (2003; 2004) 
also identified consequences of suppression for social interaction. In their laboratory 
studies, participants were divided into pairs and asked to discuss an upsetting topic. One 
member of each pair was randomly assigned to (a) suppress their emotions during the 
interaction, (b) respond naturally, or (c) use cognitive reappraisal to reduce emotional 
responding. Results indicated that suppression alone distracted participants from the 
conversation, reduced their responsiveness and caused increased stress (and heightened 
blood pressure) in their conversation partners. Finally, research on individual differences 
in the habitual use of suppression compared to more adaptive strategies (like cognitive 
reappraisal) indicates that suppression poses significant costs for long-term individual 
functioning (Gross & John, 2003). In a series of studies, Gross and John (2003) found that 
habitual suppressors reported that they typically dealt with difficult situations by masking 
their inner feelings and by “clamping down on their outward displays of emotion” (2003 
p.360). Habitual suppressors reported that they had less clarity about what they were 
experiencing, were less able to change their moods and were more likely to judge 
themselves and ruminate over negative events (Gross & John, 2003). Overall, habitual 
suppressers also reported greater negative and fewer positive emotional experiences in 
daily life, poorer interpersonal functioning, lower self-esteem and lower satisfaction with 
life. Finally, habitual suppressors more frequently reported avoiding close relationships 
and were reluctant to share their emotions with others scoring lowest in the domain of 
positive relationships. Taken together these findings indicate a number of maladaptive 
short-term and long-term consequences of using emotional suppression in daily life. 
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3.7 Which Strategy Should I Choose? 
Not surprisingly, with growth in research on emotion regulation, researches have 
become increasingly interested in understanding which strategies are most effective. 
Three recent meta-analyses on this topic have attempted to categorize strategies based on 
their immediate effectiveness and on their consequences for longer-term psychological 
health. First, Augustine & Hemenover (2009) examined 34 studies on emotion regulation 
and compared the effectiveness of cognitive strategies (involving thought) and 
behavioural strategies (involving physical action). They found that behavioural strategies 
were more effective in repairing affect (d+ = 0.54) than cognitive strategies (d+ = 0.33). In 
comparing specific strategies, reappraisal (d+ = 0.65), distraction (d+ = 0.46) and 
suppression (d+ = 2.02) all had large effects in hedonic shifts in affect. The findings for 
suppression, however, run counter to most research on the effects of suppression (Gross 
& Levenson, 1993; Richards & Gross, 2000) and should be interpreted with caution given 
that results were based on only one study.  
 In a second study, Aldo, Nolen-Hoeksema and Schweizer (2010) conducted a 
meta-analysis of 114 studies, examining the association between six different regulation 
strategies (acceptance, avoidance, problem solving, reappraisal, rumination and 
suppression) and different forms of psychopathology (anxiety, depression, disordered 
eating and substance-use disorder). They found that rumination (d+ = 1.12), avoidance (d+ 
= 0.82) and suppression (d+ = 0.72) were all positive predictors of psychopathology. On 
the other hand, psychopathology was negatively associated with the use of acceptance (d+ 
= -0.39), problem solving (d+ = -0.65) and cognitive reappraisal (d+ = -0.28). 
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Finally, Webb, Miles & Sheeran (2012) conducted a meta-analysis of 306 
experimental studies on emotion regulation. Their findings indicated much more modest 
effects for different regulation strategies. Overall findings revealed no effect for 
attentional deployment (d+ = 0.00), a small effect for response modulation (d+ = 0.16), 
and a small-to-medium effect for cognitive change (d+ = 0.36). Importantly, the authors 
identified adaptive and maladaptive strategies within each of these categories. For 
example, for attentional deployment strategies, distraction proved effective at regulating 
emotions (d+ = 0.27). Concentrating on feelings, their causes and consequences 
(rumination) proved to have a negative effect on behavioural, physiological and self-
report measures (d+ = -0.26). For cognitive change strategies, reappraising the emotional 
response (d+ = 0.23) had a smaller effect than reappraising the emotional stimulus (d+ = 
0.36) or using perspective taking (d+ = 0.45). Using a combination of reappraisal 
strategies was also better than any one specific strategy and had a large effect on 
emotional outcomes (d+ = 0.89). Finally, for response modulation strategies, suppressing 
the expression of emotions had a small-to-medium effect on outcomes (d+ = 0.32), but 
suppressing thoughts (d+ = -0.04) or the experience (d+ = -0.12) of emotions did not have 
a significant impact on outcomes. Expressive suppression also had a small negative effect 
on physiological indicators (d+ = -0.22). The authors explain that their findings are 
consistent with prior research on the adaptive or maladaptive nature of various emotion 
regulation strategies, albeit some findings were more modest than meta-analyses based 
primarily on self-report measures (e.g., Augustine & Hemenover, 2009). 
While there is growing research indicating that some regulation strategies are 
broadly more effective and adaptive than others, it is important to recognize that emotion 
regulation is high context specific. For example, while suppression is often regarded as a 
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maladaptive regulation strategy (Aldo et al., 2010; Gross & Levenson, 1993; Richards & 
Gross, 2000), the negative consequences of suppression do not appear to apply to 
individuals with bicultural European/Asian values, where emotional restraint is culturally 
normative and valued over emotional expression (Butler, Lee & Gross, 2007; Soto, Perez, 
Kim, Lee & Minnick, 2011).  Similarly, strategies widely regarded as adaptive – like 
cognitive reappraisal – can be maladaptive if they lead to increased or dangerous risk 
taking (Heilman, Crisan, Houser, Miclea & Mu, 2010; Panno, Lauriola & Figner, 2013) 
or when applied to stressors that are controllable and require active action and 
intervention (Troy, Shallcross & Mauss, 2013).  
This chapter reviewed the five stages of the process model of emotion regulation – 
situation selection, modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change and response 
modulation – and some of the research on the consequences of these different strategies 
for emotion regulation and psychological health. The next chapter examines the question: 
“why is emotion regulation so difficult?” It begins by exploring a number of factors that 
influence what, how, and why people regulate their emotions the way they do.  
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4. WHY IS EMOTION REGULATION SO DIFFICULT? 
4.1 Overview 
Despite most people regarding happiness a very important personal goal (Diener, 
Suh, Smith & Shao, 1995), for many it remains elusive. In the United States, only one 
third of people describe themselves as “very happy” (Yang, 2008). In Australia, in any 
given year, approximately 3 million adults live with depression or anxiety (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2008), and approximately 45 per cent will experience a mental health 
condition in their lifetime (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008). Could these difficulties 
be due to problems with emotion regulation? 
People differ considerably in how they choose to regulate their emotions. In the 
past few decades, research on emotion regulation processes has demonstrated that 
different emotion regulation strategies have wide ranging consequences for psychological 
health (Gross, 2015; Mennin & Fresco, 2015). Some strategies, like cognitive reappraisal 
and acceptance, are generally considered useful and adaptive, while others, like 
suppression, rumination and avoidance, are associated with a range of negative health and 
well-being outcomes (Aldo & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Webb et al., 2012, see chapter 3 
for a review). In fact, Emotion dysregulation is a core feature of many, if not most, Axis I 
and Axis II psychology disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), and training 
in emotion regulation strategies like cognitive reappraisal is a key component of many 
forms of treatment (Werner & Gross, 2009). Why then, if there are so many adaptive 
strategies for regulating emotions, do so many people struggle to regulate their own? 
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What constitutes adaptive emotion regulation? And, why do people often use maladaptive 
strategies, or certain strategies in maladaptive ways?  
It is becoming increasingly clear that emotion regulation is a complex 
phenomenon – decidedly more so than it might appear from the process model diagram in 
Chapter 3 (see Figure 8.0). There is growing acknowledgment that emotion regulation is a 
dynamic, multifaceted, multi-process, reciprocal phenomenon with regulatory stages that 
proceed and follow the implementation of specific regulatory strategies (see Batja & 
Frijda, 2011; Bonnanno & Burton, 2013; Gross, 2015; Webb et al., 2012; Sheppes, Suri & 
Gross, 2015). To capture some of this complexity and to begin addressing the questions 
outlined above Gross and colleagues (Gross, 2015; Sheppes, Suri & Gross, 2015) recently 
developed the Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation. 
4.2 The Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation 
The extended process model of emotion regulation holds that emotions – like 
other kinds of affect  – involve valuation (judgements about the personal “goodness” or 
“badness” of situations, events, objects and experiences). According to this model, when 
an internal or external aspect of the world (W) is encountered and perceived (P), a 
positive, negative or neutral valence (V) is attached to it, which then leads to a specific 
response or action (A) (see Figure 9(a) below). In the case of most emotion-eliciting 
events, an emotional response and reactions represents the ‘action component’ or 
‘reaction’ to an emotion generating value system that perceives and judges something as 
positive or negative. However, emotional reactions can also be an internal aspect of the 
world (W), also becoming the focus of perception (P) and valuation (V). Within this 
second-level regulatory value system, specific emotion regulation strategies are then 
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implemented to regulate these emotional reactions (A). For example, imagine John looks 
at the clock on his desk (W) to discover that it is several hours later than he realized (P), 
something which is “not good” (V) for his encroaching deadline. This gives rise to a 
flustered rush of panic (A) as the emotional response. John feels his heart and mind racing 
(W) and notices his mounting anxiety (P). He realizes it isn’t helpful (V) and tells himself 
he needs to ‘keep his cool’ to get this work done. So, he takes a couple deep breaths (A) 
to regain his composure again before returning to his work. This example highlights how 
a second level ‘regulatory value system’ (John ‘keeping his cool’) can intervene to 
compete with and in some cases, override the first level ‘emotion generation value system’ 
(John panicking about his deadline).  
 
Figure 9.0 The Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation & The Valuation Process 
 
Note: Figure 9(a) A situation, event or object in the world (W) gives rise to a perception (P) which 
is positively or negatively valued (V) leading to a specific action, reaction or response e.g., an 
emotion regulation strategy (A). Figure 9(b) This process happens over time as seen with the 
recursive cycles 1, 2, 3 and 4. Adapted from Sheppes, Suri & Gross, (2015). 
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In Gross’ words: 
“According to this model, emotions are instantiated via valuation systems. Emotion 
regulation occurs when one valuation system (which I refer to as a second-level valuation 
system) takes another valuation system (one that is generating emotion, which I refer to as 
a first-level valuation system) as a target and evaluates it either negatively or positively, 
activating action impulses that are intended to modify the activity in the first-level 
valuation system” (Gross, 2015, p. 11) 
Within the emotion regulatory value system, there are three stages, which determine: 1) 
whether or not emotion regulation takes places (Identification Stage); 2) what strategy is 
used to regulate emotions (Selection Stage) and 3) how a strategy is implemented 
(Implementation Stage). Because each stage represents a decision point in the regulation 
process, each stage also represents a point of potential failure in emotion regulation 
(Gross, 2015). In the following sections, each of these stages are reviewed along with 
potential difficulties in regulation and their consequences of psychological health.  
4.3 Identification (Deciding to Regulate) 
According to the extended process model, the first stage of emotion regulation is 
identifying the need to regulate. Successfully navigating the identification stage requires: 
1) basic emotional awareness, 2) belief in the utility of emotion regulation, and 3) 
appropriate goals or motivation to engage in emotion regulation. This section examines 
each of these factors in-turn. Basic emotional awareness (Coffey et al. 2003, Gohm 2003, 
Salovey & Mayer 1990), includes interceptive ability to sense bodily changes (Füstös et al. 
2013), and the capacity to differentiate between different emotions with sufficient clarity 
(Barrett, Gross, Conner & Benvenuto, 2001; Farb, Anderson, Irving & Segal, 2014; 
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Kashdan, Barrett & McKnight, 2015; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Awareness of emotions is 
essential for regulation because it is difficult to regulate an emotional reaction if one is 
not aware it is happening! Emotional reactions can also be more difficult and require 
more effort to regulate as they increase in intensity over time (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). 
For this reason, acute sensitivity to, and awareness of, emotional reactions at early stages 
of their unfolding makes it possible to identify the need to regulate early and to intervene 
more successfully.  
Second, deciding to regulate requires that one believes emotion regulation is 
effective and possible (Mauss & Tamir, 2014). This includes general beliefs in the utility 
of emotion regulation and the belief that one has sufficient ability or skill (e.g., self-
efficacy) to make emotion regulation a worthwhile pursuit (Gutentag, Halperin, Porat, 
Bigman & Tamir, 2016; Golden et al., 2009). This also makes logical sense because 
people are unlikely to attempt emotion regulation if they do not believe that they are 
capable of controlling their emotions (Webb et al., 2012) – this is a key point of interest 
for the current thesis and a point that will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
Third, in addition to emotional awareness and beliefs about emotions, the decision 
to regulate is also determined by an individual’s unique values, goals, and the perceived 
utility of certain emotional responses (Tamir, Bigman, Rhodes, Salerno & Schreier, 2015). 
Research for example, indicates that although people typically value positive emotions 
(e.g., happiness and calmness etc.), they will regulate their emotions in the direction of 
negative states (e.g., anger or worry), if they believe these states serve specific situational 
and contextual goals. For example, research indicates that individuals will down-regulate 
their anger if they hold collaborative goals, but up regulate their anger if given a task that 
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requires confronting others (e.g., in computer games or in social interactions, Tamir & 
Ford, 2012a; 2012b). In a related set of five studies, Tamir et al. (2015) motivated 
participants to engage in emotion regulation to increase unpleasant emotions (e.g., anxiety 
and anger) by making them believe these emotions were useful. They explain that 
although people may not typically want to feel anger and anxiety, or succeed in changing 
their emotions in the direction they desire, shaping what people want to feel can set the 
course for subsequent emotion regulation.  
Further research also indicates that the values and goals individuals have 
regarding the emotions they want to feel can be influenced by the cultural and social 
norms within the environment in which they live (Caprara et al., 2008; Tsai, Knutson & 
Fung, 2006). For example, research indicates that people from Eastern cultural traditions 
often place a higher value on controlling their emotions than those in Western cultures 
(Mauss, Butler, Roberts, & Chu, 2010). In one study Tsai, Knutson and Fung (2006) 
demonstrated that even the desirability of certain emotional states differs across cultures. 
They found that students from individualistic countries (like the United States) were 
significantly more likely to value high-arousal emotional states (e.g., excitement and 
enthusiasm). Students from collectivist countries (like China) by contrast, were more 
likely to value low arousal positive states (e.g., calmness and peacefulness). In a follow-
up study, Tsai and colleagues (Tsai, Miao, Seppala, Fuing and Yeung, 2007) 
demonstrated that differences in ideal affect were also connected to culturally specific 
interpersonal goals (e.g., to assert personal needs or to suppress personal needs in order to 
meet the needs of others). Tsai et al., (2007) argue that cultural differences in ideal affect 
begin to explain a range of well-documented but poorly understood cross-cultural 
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differences in mood-producing behaviours (e.g., recreational and leisure activities, music 
preferences, as well as drug use and abuse etc.).  
Difficulties at the initial identification stage may lead to a number of potential 
problems with emotion regulation. Potential points of failure include problems related to 
emotional awareness. For example, one may have difficulty identifying the need to 
regulate due to an extreme lack of emotional awareness. This is often the case in 
alexithymia (van der Velde et al., 2015) and binge eating disorders with estimates 
suggesting that over 50 per cent of people with eating disorders suffer from alexithymia 
(Corcos et al., 2000). Conversely, one may struggle with over-identifying the need to 
regulate due to affect misattribution and a hyper-vigilant degree of emotional awareness, 
as in panic attack disorder (Bar-Haim et al. 2007; Sheppes, Suri & Gross, 2015) and 
hypochondriasis (Schreiber et al., 2014). Problems are also related to beliefs about 
emotion regulation. For example, one may decide not to engage in emotion regulation 
(when it would be helpful) because one believes that emotions cannot be controlled, or 
because one possesses a low degree of regulatory self-efficacy, as in case of depression, 
learned helplessness and dependent personality disorders (Abramson, Seligman & 
Teasdale, 1978). Finally, identification stage problems may be related to motivation, 
values and goals. For example, one may not be sufficiently motived to engage in active 
emotion regulation because one has other simultaneous goals that conflict with one’s 
desire to change one’s emotions. This might be the case if an individual identifies with a 
particular psychological disorder (Cruwys & Gunaseeelan, 2016), or if one believes in the 
utility or certain negative emotions like worry and anger (Tsai et al., 2007). Other 
research indicates that self-esteem can also interfere with the motivation to engage in 
emotion regulation because people with low self-esteem are often less motivated to repair 
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negative moods (Heimpel, Wood, Marshall, & Brown, 2002), and may even feel 
undeserving of positive emotional experiences (Wood, Heimpel, Manwell, & Whittington, 
2009).  
4.4 Selection (Choosing a Regulation Strategy) 
The second stage of the extended process model requires choosing an appropriate 
emotion regulation strategy. Successfully navigating the selection stage requires selecting 
effective and adaptive strategies, which are flexible, suited to the specific context, and 
consistent with an individual’s short and long-term goals (Bonanno & Burton, 2013; 
Wermer & Gross, 2009). These strategies can be broadly divided into the five emotion 
regulation categories presented in the process model – each category containing a range 
of strategies with divergent consequences for emotion regulation, interpersonal 
functioning, and psychological health (see Chapter 4 for a review). Given that some 
emotion regulation strategies have clearly more adaptive profiles than others, what then 
influences the strategies people choose? To date there is limited research addressing this 
question, but some key factors appear to include: contextual variables such as the type 
and strength of the emotional impulse (Raio, Orederu, Palazzolo, Shurick, & Phelps, 
2013; Sheppes & Gross, 2011), available cognitive (Urry & Gross, 2010) and 
physiological resources (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Beedie & Lane, 2012), and an 
individual’s personal values, beliefs and goals (Bandura, 1977; 1997; 2001 Ozer & 
Bandura, 1990). This section examines these variables in-turn.  
The first factor that may influence strategy selection is the type and intensity of an 
emotional response. Research indicates that people regulate their emotions differently if 
they are exposed to something mildly upsetting (e.g., conversing with a irritable doctor in 
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a hospital) compared to something extremely upsetting (e.g., seeing a gruesomely injured 
patient being wheeled into the emergency room). Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri and Gross 
(2011) argue that early stage emotion regulation strategies (like distraction – an 
attentional deployment strategy) are capable of blocking emotion-related processing 
quickly before an emotion gathers force and is represented in working memory (see also 
Sheppes & Meiran, 2007; 2008). Later-stage cognitive strategies by contrast (like 
reappraisal – a cognitive regulation strategy) allow emotion-related processing, evaluation, 
and remembering – which have adaptive benefits for long-term goals and adaptation 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2008 for a review), but also require greater cognitive effort and 
increased exposure to the emotional stimuli.  
Across a series of studies Sheppes and colleagues demonstrated that when given a 
choice between different emotion regulation strategies, people’s strategy preferences vary 
depending on the intensity of the emotion being regulated (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & 
Gross, 2011; Sheppes et al., 2014). In their research, participants were trained in using 
distraction and cognitive reappraisal to regulate their emotions and were asked to choose 
(and indicate with a button press) the strategy they believed would be most effective in 
the present moment. The authors found that across multiple experimental studies, using 
different stimuli (e.g., viewing distressing images and receiving electric shocks), people 
showed a preference for cognitive reappraisal in low-intensity negative situations (e.g., a 
mild electric shock or viewing a woman looking sad nursing her head in her hands), and a 
preference for distraction in high-intensity negative situations (e.g., a strong electric shock 
or viewing a female war victim with blood on her face) (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross, 
2011; Sheppes et al., 2014). These findings held even when participants were offered a 
monetary reinforcement to engage in a counter preference regulatory strategy (Sheppes et 
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al., 2014). They were also replicated in two studies using electroencephalogram (EEG) 
and event related potentials (ERPs) indicating that distraction and reappraisal intervene at 
separate stages during emotion generation and have distinct consequences depending on 
the type and intensity of the emotional response (Blechert, Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams, 
& Gross, 2012; Thiruchselvam, Blechert, Sheppes, Rydstrom, & Gross, 2011).  
A second factor that appears to influence emotion regulation choice is an 
individual’s available internal and external resources (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Beedie 
& Lane, 2012; Urry & Gross, 2010). In some cases, situation selection or modification 
strategies may not be available (e.g., when one needs to go to work despite really 
disliking one’s job). In these cases, one may be forced to find alternative ways to regulate 
one’s emotions (e.g., mentally checking out or daydreaming about a holiday (attention 
regulation) or comparing one’s work situation to someone less fortunate (cognitive 
change)). In other settings, situational strategies like avoidance (e.g., of cleaning the 
toilet) may be easier and require less cognitive effort than using internal attentional or 
cognitive change strategies (e.g., cleaning the toilet while distracting oneself (attention 
regulation); or trying to think about the situation in a way that makes it feel less 
unpleasant (cognitive change). The selection of specific strategies may also be influenced 
by effort required to use specific strategies and the availability of internal resources. For 
example, one might be less inclined to select reappraisal or perspective taking during a 
conflict with a spouse, if one is half-asleep or otherwise exhausted. Indeed, Sheppes and 
Meiran (2008) demonstrated that some strategies (like reappraisal) require more cognitive 
effort than others. In their experimental study, the authors instructed participants to 
reappraise or distract themselves part way through watching a sad film. They found that 
reappraisal consumed greater resources than distraction, as indicated by a relatively 
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poorer performance on a subsequent stroop test (Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). Research on 
ego depletion (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice, 
1998; Beedie & Lane, 2012) indicates that internal regulatory strategies also rely upon 
physical energy stores and when depleted this can make subsequent effortful regulation 
more difficult. In a series of studies, Baumeister and colleagues had participants engage in 
self-regulation (e.g., eating radishes instead of tempting chocolates) or an act of choice 
(e.g., choosing between a pro- or counter-attitudinal speech task). They then examined 
participants’ ability to regulate their emotions and make responsible decisions during a 
frustrating puzzle task. Results indicated that prior self-regulation, and even the act of 
“choosing,” impaired subsequent regulation, self-control, and decision-making ability 
(Baumeister et al., 1998). More recent research has found similar ego depletion effects 
and working memory impairments under conditions that lead people to believe they are 
physically fatigued (Clarkson et al., 2010), or when exposed to a surplus of consumer 
choices (Hofmann, Strack & Deutsch, 2008; Schmeichel, Vohs and Baumeister, 2003). 
Finally, in another study, dieters (who were already cognitively depleted from regulating 
their food choices) were required to suppress their emotional reactions while watching a 
film. After the doing so, they experienced more ego depletion than those who were not 
asked to suppress their emotions and ate significantly more ice cream in a subsequent 
taste-test (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). This last study demonstrates that even prior 
emotion regulation may impact one’s ability to engage in subsequent regulatory efforts if 
the strategies are effortful and ego depleting. Evidence for ego depletion in meta-analytic 
studies however, is mixed with results suggesting moderate to large effect sizes (d = .6) in 
some studies (Hagger, Wood, Stiff & Chatzisarantis, 2010) and small (d = .2) or non-
significant effect sizes in others (Carter & McCullough, 2014). Nonetheless, it appears 
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that different emotion regulation strategies require different degrees of effortful 
engagement (and this may also be particularly true when one is utilizing a new or 
unfamiliar strategy). In addition to identifying, selecting and implementing a cognitively 
complex strategy (like reappraisal), individuals may need to simultaneously override 
strong default preferences for more habitual (and in some cases, less adaptive) forms of 
emotion regulation (Gross & John, 2003). 
A third factor that may influence the selection of emotion regulation strategies is 
an individual’s unique preferences and habits (Gross & John, 2003; Wood & Neal, 2007) 
as well as their beliefs, values and goals (Bandura, 1997; Bandura, Caprara et al., 2003). 
Imagine, for example, encountering a snake on a hike. If you were afraid of snakes, you 
might select an early phase emotion regulation strategy like avoidance (slowly backing 
away and turning around) or distraction (standing still and closing your eyes, thinking 
about something else until the snake disappears).  However, your selected strategy might 
also depend on contextual factors and personal goals (maybe you are on a date and decide 
it is more important to suppress your fear of snakes so as not to appear cowardly!). 
Alternatively, if encountering snakes will likely be a frequent occurrence (you just moved 
to a location overrun with snakes, or started a job that involved coming into contact with 
them), avoidance and distraction might conflict with other active goals (like the freedom 
to go where you choose, or your ability to be effective in your job). For emotional stimuli 
like this, that are encountered repeatedly, it may be preferable to select a later stage 
regulation strategy like reappraisal (maybe you proceed carefully to walk around the 
snake while reassuring yourself that the species is harmless; or problem-solve the 
situation by picking up a stick to make noise and scare the snake away). Because 
reappraisal and problem solving allow for deeper cognitive processing, these strategies 
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could be preferentially selected in the service of gradual adaption and their potential to 
reduce fear over time (Wilson & Gilbert, 2008; Blechert et al., 2012).  
Emotion regulation goals can also influence emotion regulation efforts in 
maladaptive ways. In one study, Millgram, Joormann, Huppert & Tamir (2015) found that 
clinically depressed participants chose to regulate their emotions in a direction that was 
more likely to maintain or increase their existing levels of sadness. This was true both 
with regards to strategies involving situation selection (choosing to view sad images and 
listen to sad music) and with regards to strategies involving cognitive reappraisal 
(choosing to increase their reactions to sad pictures despite training in cognitive 
reappraisal). These findings indicate that even when one is able to successfully identify 
and implement emotion regulation strategies, one’s goals can lead them astray.    
In addition to these contextual factors, a person’s perceived self-efficacy for 
meeting situational demands and engaging various emotion regulation strategies will also 
affect the strategy they choose. If, for example, you have a severe phobia of snakes (and 
believe there is nothing you can do to manage this fear), you might resort to extreme 
situational avoidance of snakes and hiking all together – a strategy that also reinforces 
phobic tendencies by preventing exposure to feared stimuli (Bandura, 1977; 1997; Ozer & 
Bandura, 1990). Bandura (1997) explains that people typically avoid activities and 
situations they believe exceed their coping capabilities, but readily undertake activities 
and select environments they judge themselves capable of handling (Bandura, 1997; Ozer 
& Bandura, 1990). In this way, self-efficacy for using specific emotion regulation 
strategies will likely also influence which ones are selected.  
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Finally, research by Gross and John (2003) indicates that there are consistent 
individual differences in habitual preferences for certain emotion regulation strategies 
across situations (some people are just more likely to use reappraisal in situations like the 
one described above, while others are more likely to use suppression or avoidance). And, 
in some cases this is also associated with gender and demographic variables, with men 
being significantly more likely to suppress their emotions than women, and ethnic 
minorities in America being more likely to suppress their emotions more than European 
Americans (Gross & John, 2003).   
There is clearly considerable variation in the kinds of emotion regulation 
strategies people choose to use on a daily basis, and any given strategy can be adaptive or 
maladaptive depending on the context (Aldo & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). For example, 
distracting oneself by ‘closing one’s eyes’ might prove to be an effective strategy for 
mitigating negative emotions during a gruesome horror film, but the same strategy would 
prove dangerously incompetent for a doctor conducting surgery. The many competing 
factors that influence strategy selection make choosing the ‘right’ strategy all the more 
difficult. Perhaps this is why many emotion regulation problems and clinical disorders are 
due to failures in strategy selection (Sheppes, Suri & Gross, 2015). While there are many 
ways to ‘select’ the wrong strategy, most often difficulties at the selection phase appear to 
be due to narrow and ‘inflexible’ strategy choice, maladaptive emotion-regulation goals 
and values, and problems related to beliefs about emotion regulation and regulatory self-
efficacy.  
Many selection stage problems are characterized by a reliance on narrow and 
‘inflexible’ emotion regulation strategies (Aldao, Sheppes & Gross, 2015; Bonanno & 
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Burton, 2013; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010) – for example, a reliance on habitual 
regulation preferences like suppression, despite alternative strategies (like reappraisal) 
being more adaptive or better suited to the specific context (Gross & John, 2003). In some 
cases, inflexible strategy selection is the consequence of a person “seeing” only a few 
strategies to choose from, perhaps because they only have a few in their repertoire (due to 
overreliance on specific strategies), or because they are unable to accurately represent or 
recall other available strategies in the present moment (Gross, 2015). Suicidal ideation 
and non-suicidal self-injury are clear examples of maladaptive strategies that individuals 
may turn to if they believe there are no adequate alternative options for managing states 
of hopelessness, fear or depression. Other maladaptive “escape-based” emotion regulation 
responses like substance use and abuse, binge eating, and certain compulsive behaviours 
may also represent habit-based maladaptive methods for regulating emotions in the 
absence of other more adaptive options. 
In addition to problems with flexibility, selection stage difficulties can also be 
characterised by maladaptive emotion-regulation goals. For example, during a manic state, 
someone with bipolar I disorder may find themselves selecting strategies that further up-
regulate positive emotions rather than selecting strategies for down-regulating their 
euphoria, despite the longer-term consequences of doing so (Gruber, 2011; Meyer, 
Johnson, & Winters, 2001; Werner & Gross, 2009). Emotion regulation goals can also 
represent a point of failure when immediate or short-term benefits (e.g., relief in avoiding 
social gatherings for a person with social phobia) interfere with an individual’s longer-
term goals (e.g., making friends and overcoming social fears). This is particularly 
common with reliance on cognitive and behavioural avoidance strategies as they provide 
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immediate relief typically at long-term expense (Elliot et al., 2012; Gross 1998; Gross & 
John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004).  
Finally, individuals may lack sufficient regulatory self-efficacy or belief in their 
ability to utilize specific emotion regulation strategies (Goldin et al., 2012; Tamir & Maus, 
2011). Research indicates that low emotion regulation self-efficacy is a strong predictor 
of maladaptive, phobic, and avoidance-based emotion regulation (Bandura, 1997; Ozer & 
Bandura, 1990) as well as experiential avoidance – avoidance of unwanted inner 
experiences including emotions, thoughts and memories (Bardeen, Fergus, & Orcutt, 
2013; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Selection stage difficulties can also be apparent in 
conditions like post-traumatic-stress disorder where low emotion regulation self-efficacy 
pre-disposes individuals towards maladaptive experiential avoidance (Andrews et al., 
2013; Hayes et al., 1996). In addition to predisposing one to avoidance-based strategies, 
self-efficacy beliefs also predict reduced use of adaptive strategies like cognitive 
reappraisal (Tamir et al., 2007). Tamir et al. (2007) for example, found that when people 
held low emotion regulation self-efficacy (judging themselves poorly able to manage their 
emotions in 10 emotion-eliciting scenarios), they were also less likely to use active 
cognitive strategies like reappraisal. Tamir and Mauss (2011) explain that even if an 
individual identifies the need to regulate their emotions, they may not select the most 
appropriate strategy if they lack confidence in that strategy or in their ability to implement 
it effectively – this point will be address in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
4.5 Implementation (Executing and Monitoring a Strategy) 
 The third stage of the extended process model involves implementing a strategy. 
Successfully navigating the implementation stage requires being able to effectively 
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initiate a regulatory strategy, use the strategy effectively and at the appropriate time, 
maintain regulation efforts, and know when it is necessary to stop using the strategy or to 
switch to an alternative.  The effectiveness of the emotion regulation effort relies upon 
successful implementation, and points of failure at this stage make prior efforts (strategy 
identification and selection) fruitless. Gross (2015) explains that the implementation stage 
represents particularly fertile soil for difficulties with emotion regulation. These areas of 
difficulties can broadly be categorized as: 1) problems related to the type of emotion, the 
stimuli and its intensity; 2) individual difference in regulation skill; and 3) contextual 
factors or factors related to strategy use. 
First, research indicates that some emotions and some kinds of stimuli are simply 
harder to regulate than others. Research by Sheppes et al. (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007; 
Sheppes & Gross, 2011; Sheppes et al., 2014) found that emotion regulation is more 
difficult at later stages of the emotion generation process – when emotions are intense and 
have gathered force. This makes intuitive sense, as most people are familiar with the 
difficulty involved in regulating powerful emotions (anger or anxiety) once they are in 
full swing. However, it also points to the importance of timing in strategy implementation 
and explains why some regulation efforts fail even when an individual identifies and 
selects an adaptive response. In recent meta-analysis of 306 experimental studies on 
emotion regulation, Webb et al. (2012) found that, in addition to emotional intensity, 
regulation is effected by emotion type: across emotion regulation strategies, people were 
more successful at regulating sadness (B = .29, p<.01) and positive emotions like 
amusement (B = .29, p<.01), than they were at regulating neutral or negative emotions 
like anxiety, anger and disgust. The authors also found that people were better able to 
regulate their emotions in response to seeing pictures and films, but were less effective at 
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implementing regulation strategies in response to failure feedback (Webb et al., 2012). 
The authors suggest that effectively executing an emotion regulation strategy may 
therefore depend on how frequently certain emotions are encountered, how often certain 
strategies are used, and may become all the more difficult when an emotional stimulus 
contains self-referential information (Webb et al., 2012).  
Second, difficulties with the implementation phase can also arise as a product of 
individual differences in emotion regulation skills and abilities, or because of limited 
availability of specific resources. For example, when compared to healthy control subjects, 
individuals with bipolar disorder report being less successful implementing adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies like cognitive reappraisal (Gruber, Harvey & Grosss, 2012). 
This is true even when people with bipolar disorder exert greater engagement in 
regulatory efforts and report more frequently using cognitive reappraisal in daily life 
(Gruber, Harvey & Gross, 2012). In community samples, Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross and 
Mauss (2010) also found that self-reported use of cognitive reappraisal was not related to 
participants’ actual reappraisal ability – as measured in a multi-method laboratory 
procedure involving real-time behavioural challenges. In their research, they found that 
some people were more effective at using reappraisal than others, and effective 
reappraisers were also able to implement the strategy across a wide range of stressor types. 
Compared to those with lower levels of reappraisal ability (and similarly high levels of 
stress), people who were skilled in reappraisal experienced fewer depressive symptoms 
(Troy et al., 2010). Other research comparing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ emotion regulators found 
that most people are able to achieve positive and negative mood states. However, for 
people with ‘poor’ regulation ability, implementing regulation strategies depleted blood 
glucose levels and came at a cost to self-regulatory resources (Niven, Totterdell, Miles, 
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Webb and Sheeran, 2013). These findings are consistent with the reported effort and 
limited effectiveness of strategy implementation seen in patients with bipolar disorder 
(Gruber, Harvey & Gross, 2012). Niven et al. (2013) explain that ‘good regulators’ may 
develop more efficient and automatic methods of regulating emotions, where ‘poor 
regulators’ need to devote more conscious effort to implementing the same strategies. 
Ultimately, this is good news for individuals with poor emotion regulation ability as it 
suggests that with practice these behaviours may become more efficient over time 
(Ouellette & Wood, 1998).   
Finally, difficulties with implementing a regulation strategy can arise due to a 
range of contextual factors. For example, one might fail at successfully implementing a 
regulation strategy if one is unable to sustain the necessary regulation efforts for a 
sufficient amount of time (in response to a child’s repeated nagging requests), or if one is 
unable to shield one’s regulation goals from other competing goals (like staying away 
from the left-over chocolate cake in the fridge!). On the other hand, difficulties can also 
arise if one persists longer than necessary with a strategy that is no longer effective (for 
example, when planning and thinking about a job interview becomes so ruminative and 
rehearsed it leads to anxiety and makes the social interaction awkward and unnatural). 
Finally, difficulties can arise in the implementation stage if there is a failure in strategy 
‘switching’ (the ability to use an alternative strategy when one is no longer working), or if 
the strategy is not appropriately suited to the context (such as using distraction during a 
conversation, which leaves the other person feeling ignored). There is clearly a wide 
variety of factors that affect whether or not an emotion regulation strategy is implemented 
successfully. When implementation problems are persistent, regulatory failures can have a 
significant negative impact on long-term psychological health.  
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Many clinical problems can be characterized by failures at the implementation 
stage. For example, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) – which involves 
impaired ability to focus and sustain attention – is an example of a condition in which 
engaging and sustaining regulatory efforts may be difficult (if not significantly impaired) 
(Barkley, 1997; Sheppes, Suri & Gross, 2015). Rumination in depression (Aker, Hammer 
& Landro, 2014; Joorman et al. 2011), and worry in generalized anxiety disorder 
(Newman, Llera, Erickson, Przeworski & Catonguay, 2013) by contrast, are examples of 
an inability to disengage cognitive processes when they are no longer adaptive or 
effective. Research also indicates that individuals with generalized anxiety disorder often 
believe that worry is uncontrollable (Wells, 2005) or that it is productive, beneficial or 
indicative of good character (Dugas & Koerner, 2005) – beliefs that may lead to 
individuals implementing and persisting with this strategy far beyond the point where it 
ceases to be beneficial. Other clinical disorders like substance use have been linked with 
limited cognitive resources for self-control which, when depleted, lead to poorer 
regulation of alcohol intake (Muraven, Collins, Shiffman & Paty, 2005). Depression is 
also associated with cognitive impairments including an impaired ability to use certain 
strategies (like cognitive reappraisal) or a tendency to give up too early due to a perceived 
lack of self-efficacy and control (Joormann et al., 2007). In research by Joormann and 
colleagues (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joormann et al., 2007), clinically depressed 
individuals displayed impairments in working memory and the ability to recall happy 
memories to repair depressed mood states. This impairment even persisted after clinical 
recovery (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joormann et al., 2007). Another example of 
cognitive impairments that affect strategy implementation is the wide variety of 
attentional biases present in many anxiety disorders (social anxiety, generalized anxiety, 
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phobias and post-traumatic stress disorders; see Barry, Vervliet & Hermans, 2015 for a 
review). Still other clinical conditions, like borderline personality disorder, are 
characterized by impaired ability to implement adaptive emotion regulation strategies and 
a reliance on maladaptive regulation strategies instead (see Carpenter & Trull, 2013 for a 
review). Finally, impairments in the ability to switch to an alternative regulation strategy 
are also apparent in several forms of psychopathology including anxiety and depression 
(Kato, 2012).  
Emotion regulation is difficult. It is clear that there is no shortage of reasons why 
this is the case. To regulate emotions effectively one needs to be able to identify, select 
and implement the right strategy, for the right context, in the right way, at the right time. 
This requires having accurate emotional awareness, clear and appropriate values and 
goals, the ability to select effective and adaptive strategies which are flexible, suited to the 
context and consistent with one’s goals, and it requires the necessary skills, timing, and 
resources to implement the strategy effectively. In the above review one variable that 
emerged repeatedly, playing a role in all three stages of emotion regulation (identification, 
selection and implementation), was an individual’s belief in the utility of emotion 
regulation and in their beliefs about their personal ability to regulate their emotions 
effectively. These beliefs have, to date, received limited attention in research on emotions 
regulation and serve as a point of focus for the current thesis. Chapter 6 examines how 
these beliefs might unfold and influence emotion regulation efforts at each stage of the 
regulation process. But, first it is necessary to examine research on beliefs and their 
impact on motivation, self-regulation and psychological health. This next chapter begins 
with a review of the literature on beliefs about the malleability of certain attributes 
otherwise, known as implicit theories.   
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5. IMPLICIT THEORIES 
5.1 Implicit Theories of Across Domains 
Research indicates that people hold implicit beliefs about the fixed or malleable 
nature of a wide range of abilities and traits including: intelligence (Blackwell, 
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Robins & Pals, 2002), personality (Erdley, Cain, Loomis, 
Dumas-Hines, & Dweck, 1997), athletic ability (Ommundsen, 2001), chronic pain 
(Higgins, Bailey, LaChapelle, Harman, & Hadjistavropoulos, 2014); relationships (Knee, 
Nanayakkara, Vietor, Neighbors, & Patrick, 2001), and even one’s morality or the nature 
of the world in general (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997). 
Compared to incremental theorists (who believe in the potential for change), people 
holding entity theories typically believe in the fixed, unchanging nature of these attributes 
and traits.  
There is a great deal of theoretical and empirical support for the impact of implicit 
theories on self-regulation, motivation, social, and emotional functioning (Blackwell et al., 
2007; Dweck, 1999; Robins & Pals, 2002). When students hold an entity theory of 
intelligence for example, believing intelligence to be fixed, they frequently become more 
concerned with demonstrating their ‘fixed’ level of ability. These students are quicker to 
make low-ability, helpless attributions when faced with failure (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, 
& Wan, 1999), and are more likely to shun opportunities for learning (Hong et al., 1999). 
This response to setbacks makes them particularly vulnerable to negative feedback and 
criticism, prone to disengagement, and at greater risk of declining academic performance 
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over time (Blackwell et al., 2007; Hong et al., 1999; Mangels, 2006; Robins & Pals, 
2002).  
 Entity theorists also often make global positive and negative trait judgments about 
people based on their actions and are also more likely to blame or condemn these personal 
qualities when they or others encounter setbacks (Chiu, Hong, et al., 1997; Gervey, Chiu, 
Hong, & Dweck, 1999). Because entity theorists believe their weaknesses cannot easily 
be improved, they are more likely to view their performance as providing definitive and 
diagnostic information about their abilities. Poor performance is thus interpreted as a 
reflection of a permanent lack of intelligence or skill. These global, stable attributions for 
setbacks are important mediators of students’ subsequent reactions and are consistently 
associated with helpless patterns of behaviour and disengagement (Diener & Dweck, 
1980; Dweck, 1975), and promote maladaptive self-regulation strategies including self-
handicapping behaviour, helplessness and defensive pessimism (Hong et al., 1999; 
Ommundsen, Haugen, & Lund, 2005; Rhodewalt, 2006). It is not surprising then, that 
entity theorists (compared to incremental theorists) display poorer overall coping 
strategies under stress (Doron, Stephan, Boiché, & Le Scanff, 2009), exhibit reduced self-
esteem (Rhodewalt, 2006) and are susceptible to greater negative affect over time (Tamir, 
John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007).  
In contrast, the belief that abilities are malleable (an incremental theory) typically 
orients people towards ‘growing’ their abilities. These people gravitate towards 
challenges and are more likely to attribute setbacks to their own efforts or strategies 
(Hong et al., 1999). Because they believe abilities are things which can be cultivated, 
incremental theorists are also less defensive about their shortcomings and show greater 
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engagement, persistence, and resilience in the face of setbacks with a focus on learning 
from their mistakes (Hong et al., 1999; Mangels, 2006). In this way, implicit theories set 
up complex ‘meaning systems’ associated with goals, attributions and behaviour that 
collectively impact motivation, self-regulation, and emotional functioning. Implicit 
theories are not always consciously held (Dweck, 1999), however, they are measured 
using self-report scales and are, therefore, distinct from measures designed to assess 
implicit or automatic associations (e.g., as with the implicit-association-test or IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Decades of research indicate that these beliefs 
have important implications for self-regulation and achievement as well as social and 
emotional functioning. The following chapter reviews research on implicit theories, 
starting with the earliest work on implicit theories of intelligence.  
5.2 Implicit Theories of Intelligence 
Achievement and motivation and self-regulation have a long history of research in 
the field of psychology (Atkinson, 1957, 1978; Dweck & Wortman, 1982; McClelland, 
Atkinson, Clark & Lowell, 1953). Over the last four decades, much of this work has 
focused on achievement goals (Ames & Archer, 1988; Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Elliot & 
Church, 1997), attributions (Ames, 1984; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Wilson & Linville, 
1985) and their impact on motivation and performance. But the goals people set for 
themselves and the attributions they make for their performance may stem in important 
ways from the beliefs they hold about the nature of intelligence. According to work by 
Dweck and colleagues (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; See Dweck, 1999 for a review), students 
typically view intelligence in one of two ways: Some believe it to be more of a fixed 
unchanging ‘entity’, perhaps something genetically determined or inherited (entity 
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beliefs); while others regard it more as something that is malleable and subject to change 
(incremental beliefs).  
One of the key ways that implicit theories of intelligence have been found to affect 
achievement and motivation is by orienting students towards different kinds of goals. 
Research has shown, for example, that when students believe their intelligence or 
academic ability is fixed, they become concerned with pursuing performance goals, which 
focus on obtaining approval and displaying one’s existing level of competence or 
avoiding a display of incompetence (Chen, & Pajares, 2010; Elliot & Dweck, 1988; 
Bempechat, London & Dweck, 1991: Blackwell et al, 2007; Cury, Elliot, Da Fonseca & 
Moller, 2006; Dweck & Legget, 1988; Robins & Pals, 2002). As a consequence, these 
students often select less challenging or somewhat familiar tasks and report a preference 
for getting a “good grade” over “being challenged” (Blackwell, 2002). By contrast when 
students hold an incremental theory, believing their intelligence is malleable, they 
become more concerned with pursuing learning or mastery goals, which focus on growing 
one’s abilities. As a consequence, these students often select tasks that will enable them to 
learn and improve even if it means being faced with short-term confusion and mistakes 
(Blackwell 2002; Hong et al., 1999). This differential goal preference is apparent even 
when controlling for students’ prior level of ability and has been demonstrated both in 
experimental studies and real-world settings (Blackwell et al., 2007; Robins & Pals, 2002). 
 In addition to influencing students’ goal orientations, implicit theories can affect 
students’ beliefs about effort and the way they make sense of their difficulties in school. 
For entity theorists, the belief that intelligence is fixed suggests that academic outcomes 
can provide definitive information about one’s abilities. Poor performance is thus 
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interpreted as a reflection of one’s permanent lack of intelligence or skill. These global, 
stable attributions for setbacks are important mediators of students’ subsequent reactions 
and are consistently associated with helpless patterns of behaviour and disengagement 
(Diener & Dweck, 1978; 1980; Dweck, 1975). Research looking at implicit theories and 
attributions has found that across studies, entity theorists more readily attribute poor 
performance to a lack of ability, that is, they are quick to make helpless attributions for 
their failures (Blackwell et al., 2007; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999). Incremental 
theorists by contrast, are less perturbed by failures and setbacks as these events reflect on 
effort or strategy and provide valuable information about how to improve. For this reason, 
they are more likely to pursue remedial action aimed at improving future performance 
(Hong et al., 1999).  
5.3 Implicit Theories – The Research Evidence 
 Given the relationship between implicit theories, achievement goals and attributions, 
it is not surprising that implicit theories hold important consequences for motivation and 
academic performance. In both correlational and experimental studies, an incremental 
theory of intelligence predicts higher performance on standardized tests (Curry, Da 
Fonseca, Zahn & Elliot, 2008; Cury, Elliot, Da Fonseca & Moller, 2006; Good, et al., 
2003) as well as grade differences in middle school (Blackwell et al., 2007; Stipek & 
Gralinski, 1996), and college (Aronson et al., 2002). The causal relationship between 
implicit theories and achievement has also been demonstrated in interventions that teach 
an incremental theory to students. In one study, Blackwell et al. (2007) ran an 
intervention over 8 weeks that taught either an incremental theory or study skills to 
seventh grade students. While all students showed a downward trend in grades prior to the 
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intervention, this decline was reversed for students who had received the 8-week 
incremental theory workshop. Students in the experimental condition were also three 
times more likely to be cited by their teachers (blind to the experimental and control 
conditions) as showing positive changes in classroom motivation. The impact of implicit 
theory interventions has also been documented in studies specifically targeting the 
negative impact of stereotype threat – underperformance among individuals who belong 
to negatively stereotyped groups (Aronson et al., 2002; Good, et al., 2003). In these 
studies, an incremental theory message was reinforced through pen pal letter-writing tasks 
(Aronson et al., 2002) and/or in discussions with college-aged mentors (Good et al, 2003). 
In both contexts, students who were exposed to the incremental theory message earned 
significantly higher achievement at follow-up as seen in their end of term GPAs or overall 
performance on statewide-standardized tests.  
 In addition to affecting students’ goals, attributions and academic achievement, the 
beliefs students’ hold about the mutability of intelligence may also lead to self-protective 
behaviour and student disengagement. When students believe their intelligence is fixed 
and feel threatened by the prospect of poor performance, they may seek to deflect the 
causes of failure away from their ‘fixed’ level of ability onto a premeditated excuse 
should failure occur. In academic contexts, these ‘self-handicapping’ strategies can 
include the adoption of any impediment or obstacle to successful performance (Jones & 
Berglas, 1978). These include the strategic reduction of effort, procrastination, feigning 
sickness, or the choice of other performance debilitating circumstances. Not surprisingly, 
in an attempt to distance themselves from failure, students often bring about the failure 
that they are trying to avoid. Ironically, this can confirm doubts about ability and further 
perpetuate defensive behaviour (Nurmi, Aunola, Salmela-Aro, & Lindroos, 2003). 
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Through a cascading effect, entity beliefs about intelligence may then ultimately lead to 
more serious problems such as truancy and disengagement from school altogether.  
 While there is limited research in this area, there is some evidence linking an entity 
theory with self-handicapping among college students. Early work by Rhodewalt (1994) 
found that high self-handicappers are generally more likely to hold entity beliefs about 
their abilities in academic, athletic and social domains. Entity beliefs about intelligence 
have also been linked with procrastination (Howell & Buro, 2009); reduced practice prior 
to tests (Cury, Da Fonseca, Zahn & Elliot, 2008); poorer coping strategies under stress 
(Doron, Yannick, Boiche & Le Scanff, 2009); and disengagement from math as a career 
path (Priess-Groben & Shibley Hyde, 2016) particularly for women (Burkley, Parker, 
Stermer & Burkley, 2010). These findings suggest implicit theories may also be a key 
factor in explaining poor academic self-regulation, self-handicapping and student 
disengagement.  
5.4 Implicit Theories of Emotions 
Building on a large body of work on implicit theories, researchers have recently 
begun examining implicit beliefs about the fixed or malleable nature of emotions (Tamir, 
John, Srivastava & Gross, 2007). People holding entity beliefs about emotions more 
readily agree that, “people can’t really change the emotions they have.” People holding 
incremental beliefs, on the other hand, view emotions as malleable and more readily 
believe that “everyone can learn to control their emotions.”  
In the first reported study on implicit theories of emotions, Tamir et al. (2007) 
found that these beliefs have important consequences for students during the transition to 
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college. In a longitudinal study with 437 Stanford undergraduate students, Tamir et al. 
(2007) assessed implicit theories of emotions, emotional and social adjustment prior to, 
and throughout, their first year of study at Stanford University. Emotion regulation was 
assessed by asking students to read and rate how confident they were that they could 
control their emotions in 10 emotion-eliciting scenarios relevant to university life. The 
authors also assessed habitual use of certain emotion regulation strategies – cognitive 
reappraisal and suppression – as well as emotional intensity, positive and negative affect, 
well-being, social adjustment and depressive symptoms. Students were also asked to 
complete 10 weekly assessments throughout the term that reported on emotional 
experience and social support from friends and family. Finally, students rated their peers 
in terms of positive and negative affect, psychological well-being and depression and 
these ratings were available for 163 students.  
Results revealed that like implicit theories of intelligence, people differed in their 
implicit beliefs about emotions. The two constructs were only moderately related (r 
= .27), indicating that people clearly hold different implicit theories in these two domains. 
By the end of the first term, students holding a stronger entity theory of emotions – 
compared to an incremental theory – reported experiencing fewer positive emotions and 
more negative emotions throughout the school term (this was also the case after 
controlling for implicit theories of intelligence). Entity beliefs about emotions were also 
associated with less perceived social support from friends in the first academic quarter, 
but were not associated with social supports from parents. In terms of emotion regulation, 
an entity theory of emotions was associated with poorer emotion regulation self-efficacy 
and reduced use of cognitive reappraisal in daily life but was not associated with 
emotional suppression.  
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At the end of the first year of university, the impact of entity beliefs about 
emotions was even more apparent. Using mixed linear models and data from the weekly 
reports, the authors found that entity beliefs about emotions predicted increased negative 
and decreased positive emotions over the course of 10 weeks. Tamir et al. (2007) also 
identified a significant time by implicit theories interaction on perceived support from 
friends: as time went by, students holding entity beliefs reported receiving gradually less 
and less social support from their peers, but the opposite was true for students holding an 
incremental theory who reported increasing support from peers over time. Implicit 
theories of emotion – prior to starting at Stanford – were also correlated with a range of 
emotional and social outcomes at the end of the first academic year: Initial entity beliefs 
were associated with decreased positive emotions and poorer social adjustment, as well as 
increased negative emotions, loneliness and depression. These findings remained when 
controlling for implicit theories of intelligence. And, in peer ratings, entity theorists were 
identified as displaying less positive emotions and more negative emotions, poorer 
adjustment, and increased loneliness and depression when compared to their incremental 
theory counterparts.  
In addition to these findings, Tamir et al. (2007) also found some evidence for the 
indirect effect of implicit theories of emotion on emotional outcomes (positive and 
negative emotions, psychological well-being and depression) via emotion regulation self-
efficacy. There was no indirect effect, however, for social outcomes (social adjustment 
and loneliness) and no indication that these outcomes were explained by the use or lack of 
use of particular emotion regulation strategies (e.g., cognitive reappraisal or suppression). 
Because the measure of emotion regulation self-efficacy in this study asked students 
about their general ability to “control their emotions” in various hypothetical emotion-
 83 
 
eliciting scenarios, it raises questions about the difference and overlap between these two 
constructs: implicit theories of emotion and emotion regulation self-efficacy. Implicit 
theories typically reflect broad beliefs about one’s capacity for change, and in this way, 
differ from self-efficacy beliefs, which assess “current operative capabilities” and 
“perceived competences” in the present moment, and in highly specific situations 
(Bandura, 2006). There is however, a significant degree of overlap between these two 
constructs, and research that indicates self-efficacy beliefs are also extremely important 
for motivation and self-regulation. In order to understand the differences and points of 
overlap between implicit theories and self-efficacy, it is important to examine the 
construct of self-efficacy in more detail.  
5.5 Implicit Theories and Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy beliefs refer to an individual’s belief about his or her own personal 
capacity to exert control over the events that matter (Bandura, 1997). People with high 
self-efficacy in a particular domain typically display more effortful, persistent, and 
resilient coping efforts (Bandura, 1997, 2001). People with low self-efficacy, on the other 
hand, have little incentive to undertake challenging tasks or persevere in the face of 
difficulties (Bandura, 1997, 2001). Like implicit theories, efficacy beliefs contribute to 
the quality of human functioning by influencing cognitive, affective, motivational and 
decisional processes that support individuals in achieving their goals. Research on self-
efficacy also spans a wide range of social, emotional, psychological and performance 
domains including but not limited to, academic achievement (Bandura, 1997; Honicke & 
Broadbent, 2016); athletic performance (Moritz, Feltz, Fahrbach, & Mack, 2000); social 
skills (Moe & Zeiss, 1982); adolescent adjustment (Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, 
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Gerbino, & Pastorelli, 2003; Caprara, Fida, et al., 2008a); self-defence (Ozer & Bandura, 
1990); phobias (Bandura, 1983); addiction (Kadden & Litt, 2011); depression (Maddux & 
Meier, 2015); eating disorders (Berman, 2006; Pinto, Heinberg, Coughlin, Fava, & 
Guarda, 2008), and trauma (Benight & Bandura, 2004; Benight et al., 2015).  
In the domain of emotions, people with high emotion regulation self-efficacy are 
typically confident in their ability to ameliorate negative emotional states once they have 
arisen  (e.g., “keep from getting discouraged by strong criticism” or “avoid flying off the 
handle when you get angry”) (Caprara, Di Giunta, et al., 2008a; 2008b). By contrast, 
people with low emotion-regulation self-efficacy are not confident about their ability to 
regulate their negative emotions. Research indicates that when people expect to be 
unsuccessful at regulating their emotions, they experience more depressive symptoms 
(Catanzaro & Mearns, 1999), exhibit greater patterns of threat-based cardiovascular 
reactivity (Blascovich, 2008), and are more likely to appraise these physiological signals 
in a way that increases negative affect, vigilance for threat cues, and performance 
impairments (Jamieson, Mendes, & Nock, 2013). Capara et al. (2008b) found that across 
three countries low emotion-regulation self-efficacy was also associated with poorer 
adjustment (self-esteem, prosocial behavior and positive affect), as well as higher levels 
of maladjustment (negative affect, shyness, irritability, aggression, anxiety, and 
depression). Other research indicates that low emotion regulation self-efficacy predicts 
anxiety, worry and social avoidance (Tahmassian & Moghadam, 2011), sexual risk-taking 
behaviors (Valois, Zullig, Kammermann, & Kershner, 2013), as well as depression and 
delinquency concurrently and longitudinally at three and seven years follow-up studies 
(Caprara, Fida, et al., 2008b). Finally, Caprara, Di Giunta, Pastorelli and Eisenberg (2013) 
found that regulatory self-efficacy for specific emotions (e.g., anger, depression, fear, 
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shame and guilt) also predict outcomes for those specific emotional responses (e.g., low 
self-efficacy for managing anger predicts irritability, and low self-efficacy for managing 
guilt predicts need for reparation etc.). 
In a recent study, Zelkowitz and Cole (2016) examined the convergent and 
discriminant validity of seven commonly used emotion regulation, self-efficacy and 
emotion reactivity measures in three independent samples. Confirmatory factor analysis 
failed to differentiate between the various instruments and subscales, however exploratory 
factor analysis revealed three core factors consisting of emotional control, emotional 
awareness/expression and cognitive strategies for emotion regulation. The authors explain 
that the first factor (explaining most of the variance across measures) tapped participants’ 
perceived lack of control over negative emotions, representing “the degree to which a 
person experiences… emotions so strongly that they are beyond one's ability to regulate” 
(Zelkowitz & Cole, 2016, p. 127). This research highlights the importance of people’s 
beliefs about their emotions. It indicates that these beliefs may be even stronger predictors 
of psychological health outcomes than emotional awareness, expression, and the use of 
cognitive strategies – processes, which have to date, received much greater attention in 
the emotion regulation literature.  
A review of research on emotion regulation self-efficacy indicates that there are 
important differences between believing emotional change is possible (implicit theories) 
and believing personally in one’s ability to change or control one’s emotions (emotion 
regulation self-efficacy). Given that both these beliefs are important for psychological 
health, a measure that captures the general and personal nature of these constructs may 
have significant value in research on emotion regulation (this point will be addressed in 
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more detail in Chapter 7). For the purpose of the current thesis, the term ‘emotion beliefs’ 
is used to refer to both kinds of beliefs (general and personal beliefs about emotional 
control). Chapter 6 will consider why these beliefs are so important for emotion 
regulation by looking at a number of ways they may impact the identification, selection 
and implementation of emotion regulation strategies.  
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6. EMOTION BELIEFS AND EMOTION REGULATION 
6.1 Overview 
The prior chapters reviewed a significant body of research highlighting important 
links between emotion beliefs (implicit theories and self-efficacy) and psychological 
health. However, what is not yet clear is why these beliefs have such important affective 
and social correlates. Why is perceived control over emotions (or lack thereof) related to 
so many psychological health problems? One possibility is that emotion beliefs influence 
emotion regulation efforts – specifically the identification, selection and implementation 
of effective strategies, which in turn, determine how successful one is at regulating one’ 
emotions. The following chapter integrates research from these two theoretical 
perspectives – implicit theories and the process model of emotion regulation – to explain 
how these beliefs may serve to either help or hinder regulatory efforts. 
6.2 Emotion Beliefs at the Identification Stage 
 According to the extended process model (see Chapter 4), the first stage of the 
emotion regulation process is identification: deciding to engage in emotion regulation. 
Not everyone “sees” opportunities for regulation, or believes that it is worthwhile, or for 
that matter, even possible. At the identification stage, beliefs about emotions may 
determine how ‘visible’ opportunities for emotion regulation are. Research for example, 
indicates that incremental theorists focus more on their ‘desired future’ than entity 
theorists who focus more on ‘current reality’ (Sevincer, Kluge & Oettingen, 2014). In 
research by Sevincer et al. (2014), entity theorists wrote and elaborated less on their 
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desired futures (e.g., finding an internship and gaining experience) and more on aspects 
that stood in the way of them realizing their goals (e.g., limited internship opportunities 
available, concerns about the interview process). Incremental theorists by contrast were 
significantly more likely to think about and elaborate on the hoped-for aspects of their 
desired futures. This was true across domains (academia and sport) and in correlational 
and experimental research (which manipulated participants’ beliefs about their abilities). 
The authors suggest that entity theorists may engage in more ‘reality-focused’ self-
regulatory thought where incremental theorists more readily focus on and see 
opportunities to learn and to expand on their abilities. In the context of emotion regulation, 
this difference in motivational focus may in-turn influence whether opportunities for 
regulation are visibly identified and realized.  
At the identification stage, when an individual “sees” an opportunity to engage in 
regulation, beliefs about emotions may also influence whether or not they are motivated 
to make an attempt. For example, it is unlikely that one will even attempt emotion 
regulation if one does not believe one’s emotions are controllable, or if one does not 
believe one can change or control their own. A failure at this early regulation stage might 
lead to helpless patterns of responding like just “giving up” in the case of depression, or 
“giving in” to panic in the case of anxiety. A large body of research indicates that entity 
and incremental theorists do indeed respond very differently when they encounter 
frustrating challenges or negative feedback (see chapter 5). This research highlights the 
resilient and mastery-oriented coping strategies that are displayed by incremental theorists 
(Hong et al., 1999; Robins & Pals, 2002; Diener & Dweck, 1980), and the helplessness 
patterns of responding displayed by entity theorists (Blackwell et al., 2007; Diener & 
Dweck, 1980; Dweck, 1975; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999; Robins & Pals, 
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2002), in some cases even self-sabotaguing their own efforts (Cury, Da Fonseca, Zahn & 
Elliot, 2008; Howell & Buro, 2009; Rhodewalt, 1994; Dweck & Leggett 1988).  
From a clinical perspective, reseach on implicit theories is consistent with studies 
indicating that perceived control plays a key role in anhedonia, learned helplessness 
(Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Dweck, 1965; Diener & Dweck, 1980), and 
anxiety (Hofmann, 2005); and is integrally related to neurobiologial reward systems 
(McAulay, McGovern & Cohen, 2014). Other relevant research comes from treatment-
focused studies indicating that the belief that change is possible is vital for predicting 
general treatment response (Arnkoff, Glass & Shapiro, 2002), with positive expectations 
for change in treatment predicting both rate of change (Price & Anderson, 2011) and 
treatment outcomes (Chambless, Tran & Glass, 1997) for patients with anxiety and 
depression (Westra, Arkowitz, & Dozois, 2009). Together this reserach suggest that entity 
beliefs about emotions could be associated with regulatory failures at the identification 
stage – contributing to helpless patterns of responding when emotinally distressed, and 
even undermining the motivation to seek and engage with treatment.  
6.3 Emotion Beliefs at the Strategy Selection Stage 
In addition to influencing the decision to engage in emotion regulation, entity 
beliefs about emotions may impact strategy selection in three key ways: 1) by restricting 
the range of adaptive strategy options available; 2) by guiding people towards avoidance-
based regulation strategies; and 3) by inclining people toward a range of maladaptive 
strategies for managing negative emotions and emotion-eliciting situations. This section 
will examine these points in-turn. 
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6.3.1. Restricted Range of Emotion Regulation Strategies 
One of the ways entity beliefs may influence strategy selection, is by expanding or 
restricting the range of available options for emotion regulation. Bonanno and Burton 
(2013) argue that a key feature of effective emotion regulation is the ability to select 
strategies that are appropriate to the shifting nature of contextual demands over time. 
Similarly, many selection stage problems arise due to a reliance on narrow and ‘inflexible’ 
emotion regulation strategies that are poorly suited to the specific context or are 
inconsistent with an individual’s short- and long-term goals (Aldao, Sheppes & Gross, 
2015; Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). At the selection stage, the 
belief that one has little or no control over one’s emotions may lead one to misrepresent 
the range of emotion regulation strategies that are available. For example, this might 
manifest for entity theorists in an over-reliance on external strategies (like situation 
selection and situation modification). These strategies can be employed to change aspects 
of an emotion-eliciting situation or scenario, and make sense if one believes the emotional 
response is less susceptible to change. A reliance on external strategies, however, 
excludes many adaptive and active internal strategies for regulating emotions (like using 
attentional deployment and cognitive change), which work more directly with the 
thoughts, feelings and physical sensations that arise as part of the emotional response. 
Incremental theorists, on the other hand, may have a wider range of emotion regulation 
strategies at their disposal drawing upon external and internal strategies deepening on 
contextual demands. Kneeland et al (2016) for example, argue by promoting emotion 
regulation flexibility, incremental beliefs about emotions may help buffer individuals 
against psychopathology by helping them shift flexibly between the different emotion 
regulation strategies in their repertoire. Having a broad range of strategies available 
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certainly makes it more likely that one will select strategies that are, by and large, more 
effective (Webb, Miles & Sheeran, 2012), more appropriate to the type and intensity of an 
emotional reaction (Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri & Gross, 2011; Sheppes et al., 2014), as well 
as being better suited to one’s long-term goals (Millgram, Joormann, Huppert & Tamir, 
2015), and to the availability internal and external resources (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Urry 
& Gross, 2010). To date, there is no research directly examining whether implicit beliefs 
influence regulation strategy range and flexibility. However, some research has pointed to 
this possibility as an explanation for the greater number of regulation strategies 
incremental theorists report using (Doron, Stephan, Boiche & Le Scanff, 2009; Schroder, 
Dawood, Yalch; Donnellan & Moser, 2015). 
6.3.2. Approach vs. Avoidance Strategies 
Most emotion regulation strategies can be broadly categorized into approach-
based and avoidance-based strategies.  Approach-based strategies involve an impulse to 
move towards a situation or stimuli (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones & Price, 2013); while 
avoidance-based strategies involve avoidance of internal psychological events (Hayes et 
al, 1996) or of external factors (Werner & Gross, 2010). To date, a great deal of research 
has examined differences between approach and avoidance strategies and their impact on 
motivation, emotion regulation and psychological health (Elliot & McGregor, 1999; Elliot 
& Thrash, 2002; Johnson, Turner & Iwata, 2003; Roth & Cohen, 1986). Yet, while there 
is evidence for consistent individual differences in approach and avoidance regulation 
(Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Gabel, Reis & Elliot, 2000; Roth & Cohen, 1986), there has been 
less work examining how beliefs about emotion might shape these two very different 
regulatory responses.  
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At the selection stage, beliefs about emotions may lead people to preferentially 
select avoidance-based strategies if believe they cannot change or control their emotions. 
For example, entity theorists may be more likely than incremental theorists to rely on 
strategies like behavioural avoidance (avoiding an action, person or thing) to prevent 
exposure to situations that could cause distress. They might also be more likely to engage 
in cognitive avoidance (denying, minimizing, or suppressing thoughts or feelings about an 
experience) in order to escape from unpleasant bodily sensations, thoughts, memories and 
emotions. Avoidance strategies like these may provide relief in the short-term, but they 
can also increase the frequency of unpleasant thoughts, feelings, and sensations (Gross, 
1998; 2002; Wegner, 1987; 1994), as well as dampen positive emotions by interfering 
with one’s ability to be fully immersed in present experience (Gross & Levenson, 1997; 
Gross & John, 2003; Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth & Steger, 2006). Chronic use of 
avoidance is also associated with a range of negative outcomes (Hayes et al., 1996) 
including feelings of loneliness, inauthenticity, and disconnection (John & Gross, 2004), 
lower levels of social and emotional support; fewer close relationships with others; and 
lower levels of life satisfaction and well-being (Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004). 
Even across cultures, avoidance goals are significant negative predictors of well-being 
outcomes (Elliot et al., 2012), and are strongly associated with anxiety and depression 
(Spielberg, Heller, Silton, Stewart & Miller, 2011). By contrast, people who believe their 
emotions can be controlled may be more likely to pursue strategies aimed at experiencing 
positive emotions, and may also be more open to experiencing and working with difficult 
emotions when they arise. If they believe even negative emotions can be changed or 
controlled, they may also be less threatened by, and less likely to avoid, potentially 
distressing emotional situations and stimuli.  
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To date there is one study that links entity beliefs about emotions with avoidance-
based emotion regulation. Kappes and Schikowski (2013) invited 84 female university 
students to participate in a study about movie perception. The authors measured 
participants’ implicit theories about emotions and their feelings of discomfort during and 
after watching a distressing movie clip. They also assessed participants’ self-reported use 
of experiential avoidance (e.g., distracting themselves during the movie) and situational 
avoidance (e.g., their interest in watching the same clip again to learn about its ending). 
Results revealed that entity beliefs about emotions were correlated with increased 
negative affect after watching the clip (r = .29, p < .01) and increased cognitive avoidance 
(r = .26, p < .05). Finally, the authors report a marginal but non-significant effect for 
situational avoidance with entity theorists more readily avoiding the distressing clip, 
choosing instead to watch an uplifting animation rather than learn about the clip’s ending 
(r = .21, p < .10). These findings lend some support to the potential links between implicit 
theories of emotion and the selection of avoidance-based strategies. However, it is not 
clear from this correlational lab-based study whether implicit beliefs are playing a causal 
role in strategy selection and the extent to which they influence avoidance in daily life.  
6.3.3. Adaptive vs. Maladaptive Strategies 
 A final way in which emotion beliefs may influence the selection of emotion 
regulation strategies is by inclining people towards more or less adaptive strategies. 
Chapter 5 reviewed research on different kinds of emotion regulation and findings from 
several meta-analyses describing the broadly adaptive or maladaptive profiles of certain 
regulatory strategies. From the perspective of beliefs about emotions, people holding 
entity beliefs may be forced to turn to maladaptive coping strategies particularly if they 
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have tendency towards avoidance-based forms of coping, and a restricted range of 
regulation strategies to choose from. Gross (2008) also predicted that incremental 
theorists might be more inclined to engage in early ‘antecedent-focused’ emotion 
regulation strategies like reappraisal which have the potential to influence the 
developmental course of an emotion before it has fully arisen. Entity theorists, on the 
other hand, may be more inclined to rely upon later-stage response-focused efforts (like 
suppression and rumination) to cope with the consequences of an emotional response 
once it has arisen. From this perspective, one might expect entity theorists to be more 
likely to turn towards ‘escape’ based coping methods and strategies focused more on 
symptom management (e.g., medication or substance use).  
 To date, there is growing research linking entity beliefs with fewer adaptive, and 
greater maladaptive emotion regulation strategies. In one study, Doron, Stephan, Boiche 
and Le Scanff (2009) examined how undergraduates’ implicit beliefs about ability were 
related to the selection of various coping strategies for managing exam-related stress. 
They found that entity beliefs predicted behavioural disengagement, and were negatively 
associated with active coping and acceptance. Incremental beliefs, on the other hand, 
predicted active coping, planning, emotional expression, and social support seeking – a 
wide range of adaptive strategies for navigating stressful life situations.  
In a set of two studies, Howell, Passmore and Holder (2016) examined the 
associations between implicit beliefs about well-being (e.g., “You have a certain amount 
of well-being, and you can’t really do much to change it’’) and a variety of well-being 
outcomes and adaptive regulation strategies. In their first correlational study, the authors 
found that compared to incremental theorists, people holding entity beliefs were 
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significantly less likely to view a range of adaptive situation selection and situation 
modification strategies as helpful for well-being. These included: exercise (r = -.21, p 
< .01); recreation (r = -.24, p < .01); maintaining good nutrition/diet (r = -.23, p < .01); 
involving oneself in nature (r = -.23, p < .01); community service (r = -.23, p < .01); 
maintaining relationships with others (r = -.25, p < .01) and involving oneself in 
religion/spirituality (r = -.23, p < .01). The only strategy that was not correlated with 
well-being beliefs was an attentional deployment strategy – “engaging in relaxation and 
stress management” (r = -.13, p > .05). Across strategy types, Howell et al. (2016) found 
that participants were also significantly less likely to engage in these strategies in the near 
future (r = -.32, p < .01). In a second experimental study (n = 123), Howell et al. (2016) 
manipulated implicit theories of well-being to examine the causal role of these beliefs. 
The authors randomly assigned participants to a condition with they read and summarized 
a short article describing evidence for the ‘fixedness’ (entity condition) or ‘malleability’ 
(incremental condition) of well-being. The article described the role of well-being 
interventions, motivational and attitudinal factors in well-being, and changes in well-
being with age. Participants then rated their endorsement of, and openness to, the eight 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies assessed in Study 1. Results indicated a significant 
difference between conditions for three of the eight variables: exercise (d = .45, p < .05); 
recreation (d = .54, p < .01); and time spent in nature (d = .51, p < .01). Other strategy 
means trended in the same direction but were small, marginal, or non-significant. There 
was also a significant effect across strategy type for the perceived benefits of adaptive 
strategies (d = .52, p < .01), but only a marginal effect for actual intention to engage in 
adaptive strategies (d = .38, p = .54). These findings indicate that implicit theories may 
influence people’s selection of adaptive or maladaptive strategies by affecting their 
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beliefs about the kind of strategies that are useful for increasing well-being and 
psychological health. These findings also indicate that implicit beliefs about well-being 
can also be changed through psychoeducation – but it is not clear yet whether this 
translates into emotion regulation strategy selection.  
Research explicitly on implicit beliefs about emotions has also linked entity 
beliefs with reduced self-reported use of adaptive emotion regulation strategies. Much of 
this work to date has focused on the use of cognitive reappraisal – a widely regarded 
adaptive emotion regulation strategy (see Chapter 4 and 5). Across several studies, 
participants holding entity beliefs about their emotions reported reduced frequency of 
using of cognitive reappraisal in daily life (Tamir et al., 2007; Schroder et al., 2015; 
Veilleux, Salomaa, Shaver, Zielinski & Pollert, 2015). These findings have also been 
replicated in experimental research. In a recent study by Kneeland, Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Dovidio and Gruber (2016a), the authors manipulated participants’ beliefs about their 
emotions using psychoeducation methods similar to those described above (Howell et al., 
2016). Participants were randomly assigned, either to an incremental condition where 
they read an “emotion is malleable” passage (e.g., “Emotion is not set in stone: it can be 
changed…”) or to entity condition where they read an “emotion is fixed” passage 
(“Emotion is set in stone, meaning it cannot be changed…”). They were then given five 
minutes to summarize the argument as if they were describing it to a peer. After 
completing the manipulation, participants underwent an impromptu speech task designed 
to elicit anxiety and completed measures of anxiety and negative affect, as well as 
measures reporting on their spontaneous use of specific emotion regulation strategies. 
Results indicated a significant interaction between conditions on reappraisal use. 
Specifically, participants in the entity condition were significantly less likely to engage in 
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spontaneous use of cognitive reappraisal when compared to participants in the 
incremental condition. There were however, no significant differences between conditions 
in use of other regulation strategies including: expressive suppression, rumination, self-
blame, positive refocusing, cognitive suppression and acceptance. The authors suggest 
that although there appears to be robust effects across studies for the impact of emotion 
beliefs on cognitive reappraisal, the association with other adaptive and maladaptive 
strategies remains unclear. Results from a second experimental study by the same authors 
Kneeland, Nolen-Hoeksema, Dovidio and Gruber (2016b), also yielded mixed results. In 
this study, participants (n = 169) completed the same experimental manipulation 
described above, but instead of undergoing a speech task, they completed a negative 
emotion induction, which involved recalling a personally upsetting memory for five 
minutes before typing out open-ended descriptions of the upsetting memory. Participants 
then completed measures of adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies using 
the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ), which included measures of: 
self-blame, acceptance, rumination, reappraisal, positive refocusing/distraction, and 
perspective taking. Results indicated that participants in the entity condition were 
significantly less likely to engage in perspective taking (an adaptive strategy), but they 
were also less likely to engage in self-blame (a maladaptive strategy) – findings which 
indicate that in some cases, entity beliefs might be associated with less internal criticism. 
Interestingly, there were no significant differences between conditions for other emotion 
regulation strategies (despite means trending in predicted directions). Together these 
findings indicating that the causal role of emotion beliefs in adaptive strategy selection 
remains somewhat unclear.  
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Examining more severe examples of maladaptive emotion regulation, Schroder et 
al. (2017) recently assessed existing links between entity beliefs about anxiety, stressful 
life events and the use of a range maladaptive coping strategies in everyday life including: 
drug use, alcohol use, and motivation to engage in non-suicidal self-injury. The authors 
also examined the association between implicit beliefs about emotion and clinical 
symptoms of PTSD and depression. Results indicated that incremental beliefs about 
anxiety were negatively correlated with all outcomes. Incremental beliefs also moderated 
the relationship between stressful life events and outcomes, predicting PTSD, depression, 
drug abuse and non-suicidal self-injury over and above the number of stressful events 
people had experienced across their lifespan. Alcohol use was the only variable that was 
not moderated by emotion beliefs because it was not significantly associated with 
stressful life events.  
Finally, in addition to influencing the selection of aforementioned adaptive and 
maladaptive regulation strategies, implicit beliefs about emotions may influence help 
seeking behaviour and treatment preferences. In two studies with undergraduates (Study 1, 
n = 477; Study 2 n = 298) Schroder et al. (2015) examined links between implicit beliefs 
about emotions, psychological symptoms (anxiety, depression and perfectionism), 
emotion regulation strategies (reappraisal and suppression), and treatment preferences (no 
treatment, medication and individual therapy). Participants were asked, ‘‘If you struggle 
or if you were to struggle with mental health problems (e.g., anxiety, depression) and had 
a choice between individual therapy, medication, or no treatment to help you with your 
mental health problems, which would you choose?” Results indicated that across both 
studies, individuals who chose medication over personal therapy were more likely to hold 
entity beliefs about their emotions (Study 1, d = .26, p < .05; Study 2, d = .82). The 
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authors suggest that these findings are consistent with research on essentialist beliefs 
about mental illness – specifically that a perceived lack of control over mental health 
conditions is associated with a preference for medication and biological treatments (Dar-
Nimrod & Heine 2011; Deacon 2013; Easter 2012; Kvaale et al. 2013; Phelan et al. 2006). 
Together a growing body of research on implicit beliefs indicates that a perceived lack of 
control over emotions may predispose individuals towards fewer adaptive strategies for 
managing emotions in day-to-day life.  
6.4 Emotion Beliefs at the Implementation and Monitoring Stage 
The final stage of the extended process model is the implementation stage. Even if 
an individual successfully identifies the need to regulate their emotions, is motivated to 
implement a strategy, and selects an adaptive regulation strategy, regulatory efforts may 
still fail if the strategy is not implemented effectively. Entity beliefs about emotions could 
be associated with difficulties in strategy implementation if they lead to: 1) reduced 
motivation, persistence and resilience with implementing selected strategies, and 2) 
deficiencies in regulatory skills and abilities. These potential points of failure are 
examined below: 
6.4.1. Motivation, Persistence and Resilience 
 Becoming skilled at implementing emotion regulation strategies requires practice 
– practice with applying certain strategies in different settings and contexts, and practice 
trying out different regulatory strategies in response to the same emotion-eliciting 
situations. It also requires practice persisting with the same strategies until they prove 
effective. To take a real-life example, imagine struggling to regulate anxiety over the 
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results of a recent job interview. Successful regulation might involve repeat attempts at 
distraction – thinking about anything else each time the familiar fears and thoughts arise; 
it might involve practicing focused attention – mindfully bringing attention back to the 
breath, or to sensations in the body. Alternatively, one might try out a range of different 
kinds of reappraisals – reassuring oneself that “the wait is normal – the interview went 
well,” or that “there are other options if it doesn’t work out”. Because regulation 
strategies are rarely a silver bullet, most people will encounter setbacks and regulatory 
difficulties as they practice, explore and attempt to implement certain strategies. For 
entity theorists, however, initial setbacks could have more problematic consequences for 
strategy implementation. If they undermine motivation and persistence, this might result 
in “giving up” on a selected strategy too soon, or in “giving up” on certain adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies based on limited unsuccessful past attempts.   
Research indicates that sometimes it is when individuals are experiencing 
psychopathology that they display reduced effort regulating emotions (Kneeland et al., 
2016; Kring & Sloan, 2009; Millgram, Joormann, Huppert & Tamir, 2015). This is 
unfortunate as it may be when effective emotion regulation is needed most! It is not 
surprising, however, that emotion regulation difficulties serve to undermine the very 
motivation necessary for effective emotion regulation. People often exert reduced effort 
and even abandon activities they believe exceed their coping abilities (Bandura, 1997). A 
perceived lack of control over emotions may, therefore, make entity theorists particularly 
vulnerable to giving up when it comes to implementing adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies, especially if initial attempts at regulation are not successful. Because emotion 
regulation is a skill that requires practice, giving up on strategies too soon could also 
serve to further perpetuate deficiencies in regulatory skills and ability. To date, there is 
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limited research examining whether emotion beliefs influence regulatory efforts or 
persistence. However, there is research on implicit theories in other domains that indicate 
people holding entity beliefs are more likely to withdraw effort when they encounter 
failures and setbacks (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999), and are more likely to 
attribute these failures to stable internal attributes (such as a lack of ability or skill) rather 
than contextual factors (like effort) that allow room for improvement (Hong et al., 1999). 
In a series of studies on implicit theories of intelligence, Hong et al. (1999) 
examined how implicit beliefs influenced students’ responses to setbacks and negative 
feedback: In Study 1 (n = 97) students received false feedback that they had performed 
poorly on a test. Compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists were significantly 
more likely to attribute their poor results to their innate ability, where incremental 
theorists more readily attributed their results to lack of effort. In Study 2 (n = 168) the 
intention to take a remedial course in English was moderated by students’ beliefs about 
their intelligence. Participants with a high level of English ability, were generally less 
likely than those with a low English ability to sign up for the remedial English course. At 
low levels of English ability, however, participants were only interested in taking the 
remedial English course if they also held incremental beliefs about their intelligence. 
Finally, in Study 3 (n = 60), Hong et al. (1999) manipulated students’ beliefs about 
intelligence by having them read passages describing intelligence as malleable 
(incremental condition) or fixed (entity condition). Participants then completed a difficult 
intelligence test and received fictitious feedback that their performance was either 
“satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory” based on national standards.  After receiving this 
feedback, they were given the choice between a difficult or an easy task, and a remedial 
tutorial exercise (that could help them improve on their performance) or an unrelated 
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activity. Results indicated that participants in the entity condition were significantly less 
likely than those in the incremental condition to select a difficult task after struggling with 
the intelligence test (Mentity = 2.61 vs. Mincremental = 4.09). There was also a significant 
implicit theory by feedback condition interaction on participants’ interest in the remedial 
course: most participants in the incremental condition chose to take the remedial course 
regardless of their level of performance feedback (73% for both groups). For participants 
in the entity condition, however, those that had received feedback that their performance 
was “unsatisfactory” were significantly less likely to take the remedial class (13%) than 
students who received “satisfactory” performance feedback (67%). These results indicate 
that for entity theorists, a perceived lack of ability can lead to “giving up,” undermining 
the very motivation needed to improve one’s abilities and skills. This suggests that in 
some cases, the people who need the most help are the least likely to seek it. In the 
context of emotion regulation, this may serve to perpetuate existing deficiencies in 
emotion regulation.   
6.4.2 Regulatory Skills and Abilities 
In addition to requiring practice and persistence, effective emotion regulation 
requires skill. Many forms of psychotherapy teach adaptive regulation strategies which 
can take weeks, months, or even years to master. Examples can be drawn from all stages 
of the process model including: situation selection and modification strategies like 
learning to approach feared stimuli (exposure therapy), utilize activity scheduling 
(behavioural activation) or engage in problem focused coping (stress management). They 
can include learning attentional deployment strategies like mindfulness mediation, deep 
breathing, and self-soothing or positive distraction. They can include training in cognitive 
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regulation strategies like reappraisal, decentering, and hypothesis testing; and they can 
include cultivating healthier response-focused strategies like exercise, sleep hygiene, 
social support and emotional expression. Few people are endowed with skills in all 
regulatory domains, but people who believe they can control their emotions may be more 
likely to practice the skills necessary for implementing effective regulation strategies. 
With a wider range of strategies at their disposal, incremental theorists may therefore 
have greater practice with, and flexibility using, emotion regulation strategies that are 
appropriate to the context, and consistent with their longer-term personal goals – 
hallmarks of adaptive emotion regulation (Werner & Gross, 2009). Because many 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies are learned (as in the examples above), they may 
also require that individuals are interested in, and receptive to, learning these techniques 
from colleagues or in coaching, counseling and psychotherapy. Limited research currently 
exists on emotion beliefs and regulatory skills and abilities. However, research on 
treatment preferences (see Schroder, 2014), indicates that entity theorists are typically less 
likely to seek psychological help for emotional difficulties. This may also lead to 
deficiencies in regulatory skills if it results in limited exposure to the individuals and 
situations that could assist with skill acquisition.  
6.5 Emotion Beliefs and Self-Fulfilling Proficies  
There is growing research indicating that emotions beliefs are linked to a range of 
important psychological health outcomes (Kneeland, Dovidio, Joormann & Clark, 2016; 
Tamir et al., 2007; Tamir & Mauss, 2011), but to date, it is not clear why they have such 
diverse social and emotional correlates. This chapter has presented theory and research 
evidence supporting one possible explanation: that emotion beliefs influence 
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psychological health by affecting the identification, selection and implementation of 
effective emotion regulation strategies. As presented in Figure 10 beliefs about emotions 
may be associated with regulatory problems at multiple stages. At the identification stage, 
entity theorists may less readily “see” opportunities for emotion regulation and may be 
less motived to initiate a regulatory attempt. At the strategy selection stage, entity 
theorists may have a restricted range of strategies available – relying largely upon 
external and antecedent-focused strategies, as well as avoidance to prevent exposure to 
situations or circumstances that might cause distress. They may also engage in 
maladaptive and passive coping strategies in response to difficult emotions and symptoms 
once they have arisen. Finally, at the implementation and monitoring stage, entity beliefs 
may lead to reduced persistence and practice with adaptive regulatory strategies that, in-
turn, perpetuate deficiencies in regulatory skills and abilities. And, at each stage of the 
regulatory process, it takes only one point of failure (represented by the arrow in Figure 
10) to thwart an emotion regulation attempt. For entity theorists, failures at regulating 
emotions can then also serve to confirm a perceived lack of control over emotions – 
reinforcing this beliefs in self-perpetuating ways. Entity beliefs about emotions may in 
this way also become self-fulfilling prophecies: a perceived lack of control over emotions 
leads to emotion regulation difficulties, which then serve to reinforce the belief that one 
cannot control their emotions.  
Incremental beliefs, on the other hand, may lead in many ways to regulatory 
success (see Figure 11). Perceived control over emotions may increase one’s ability to 
identify opportunities for emotion regulation as well as increasing motivation to engage in 
regulatory attempts. At the selection stage, incremental theorists may also have a wider 
range of regulatory options available, allowing for greater flexibility in applying strategies 
 105 
 
that are best suited to the specific context. Perceived control over emotions may also 
promote approach-based strategies and active internal emotion regulation that enables 
individuals to work with difficult emotions when they arise even if the situation or 
circumstances cannot be changed. Finally, at the implementation stage, with a focus on 
growing one’s abilities, incremental theorists may be more inclined to practice and persist 
with regulatory strategies, enabling them to cultivate greater regulatory skills across 
domains. As with entity beliefs about emotions, these incremental beliefs can also be self-
fulfilling: Perceived control over emotions promotes regulatory success, which may in-
turn confirm one’s belief that they can control their emotions. This chapter has provided 
an overview of the ways that emotion beliefs may influence emotion regulation. The next 
chapter provides a review of concepts and research presented so far and an introduction to 
the empirical work presented in this thesis.  
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Figure 10. How Entity Beliefs About Emotions Can Be Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
 
ENTITY	BELIEFS	ABOUT	EMOTIONS
IDENTIFICATION	Inability	to	"see"	opportunities	for	regulation	+	lack	of		motivation
SELECTIONRestricted	range	of	strategies	+	reliance	on	avoidance	and	maladaptive	ER
IMPLEMENTATION/MONITORINGLimited	practice	with	adaptive	ER	strategies	and	deficiencies	in	ER	Skills	and	abilities
EMOTION	REGULATION	FAILURE
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Figure 11. How Incremental Beliefs About Emotions Can Be Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
INCREMENTAL	BELIEFS	ABOUT	EMOTIONS
IDENTIFICATION	Abilities	to	"see"	opportunities	for	regulation	+	motivation
SELECTIONWider	range	of	flexible,	adaptive	strategies,	suited	to	context	and	goals
IMPLEMENTATION/MONITORINGPractice	and	persistence	with	adaptive	strategies	leads	to	increased	skills
EMOTION	REGULATION	SUCCESS
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7. INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
7.1 Chapter Summary 
The previous chapters (Chapters 1 and 2) reviewed literature on emotion and 
emotion regulation and explored a variety of definitions and models that have been used 
to understand emotion regulation processes. Chapter 3 introduced the Process Model of 
Emotion Regulation – which serves as the guiding framework for the current thesis. It 
reviewed research on the model’s five categories of regulation strategies in their temporal 
sequence – situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive 
change and response modulation – and research on the effectiveness of these different 
strategies. Chapter 4 sought to address the question: why is emotion regulation is so 
difficult? It introduced the Extended Process Model of Emotion Regulation, and explored 
variables that influence the identification, selection, and implementation of specific 
emotion regulation strategies. Chapter 4 also explored points of failure that can arise at 
each stage and links with psychopathology and psychological health. Chapter 5 
introduced work on implicit theories as one variable that may influence adaptive emotion 
regulation. It presented theoretical and empirical work on implicit theories across domains 
and reviewed research on implicit theories of intelligence, before introducing recent work 
on implicit theories of emotion and emotion regulation self-efficacy. Finally, Chapter 6 
integrated work on implicit theories and the process model of emotion regulation to 
explain how emotion beliefs may help or hinder regulatory efforts at the identification, 
selection and implementation/monitoring stages. The current chapter introduces the 
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chapter goals for the current thesis, as well as the broad theoretical assumptions and 
propositions that will serve as a guide for following empirical chapters.  
7.2 Chapter Goals 
 Research on, and interest in, implicit beliefs about emotions has grown 
extensively over the last six years in which this thesis has been written. When this work 
began, there was only one published paper on implicit theories about emotions (Tamir et 
al., 2007) and the overarching goal of this thesis was to contribute to this nascent 
literature by examining links between implicit theories, emotion regulation, and 
psychological health. A more specific goal was to explore links between implicit beliefs 
about emotion and the selection of adaptive or maladaptive regulatory strategies, as well 
as the longer-term consequences these beliefs might have for psychological health via 
their influence on emotion regulation. To date, there are now more than 15 peer-reviewed 
published papers that have examined links between emotion beliefs and emotion 
regulation or clinical outcomes (including several publications that have arisen from the 
current thesis). This work has been included in the literature review despite not existing in 
the earliest phase of these empirical works. As a starting point for research in this area, 
the first three studies represent some of the earliest work in this field and focus on scale 
development. Studies 4 and 5 examine links between emotion beliefs and avoidance-
based situation selection. Studies 6 and 7 examine links between emotion beliefs and 
mindfulness-based attention regulation. Studies 8, 9 and 10 examine links between 
emotion beliefs, anxiety and cognitive change strategies in clinical samples. And, Study 
10, focuses on the role of emotion beliefs in clinical treatment. An overview of the 
specific goals for Chapter 8 – 11 (Studies 1 – 8) is provided below. 
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Goals of Chapter 8 (Studies 1 – 3): Scale Development 
The first three studies of this thesis focus on scale development. Before 
undertaking additional research on implicit beliefs about emotions, it was necessary to 
ensure that an instrument for assessing emotion beliefs was finely tuned to, and capable of 
measuring, participants’ general beliefs about the potential for change (their implicit 
theories) as well as their personal beliefs about their unique capabilities (their self-
efficacy beliefs – see Chapter 5 for a review of the overlap between these constructs). The 
goal of Studies 1 – 3 was to develop a revised “first-person” measure of the implicit 
theories scale and to replicate and evaluate its validity across domains (beliefs about 
intelligence and emotions) and in different contexts (in a sample of students from 
Australia and the United States). To better understand how people actually think about 
their emotions, Study 3 was designed to further evaluate the new measure through a 
qualitative content analysis of open-ended survey responses. These studies also served as 
a preliminary test of predicted associations between implicit theories, motivation and 
emotion-regulation as well as their associations with psychological-health outcomes. 
Goals of Chapter 9 (Studies 4 and 5): Avoidance-Based Situation Selection 
 Chapter 9 focuses on emotion beliefs as a predictor of maladaptive avoidance-
based Strategy Selection. Specifically, Studies 4 and 5 test the prediction that entity 
beliefs will promote greater use of avoidance-based emotion regulation strategies (see 
Chapter 6 for a review of research and predictions). The goal of Study 4 was to use cross-
sectional correlational research to examine pre-existing associations between implicit 
beliefs about emotions and psychological health, as well as the role of maladaptive 
avoidance as a potential mediator of these relationships. The goal of Study 5 was to 
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manipulate participants’ beliefs about their emotions to test the causal role of emotion 
beliefs in the selection of avoidant-based emotion regulation strategies.  
Goals of Chapter 10 (Studies 6 and 7): Attention and Response Modulation  
 Chapter 10 focuses on emotion beliefs as a predictor of attention-regulation 
Strategy Selection. Specifically, Study 6 tests the prediction that entity beliefs will be 
associated with greater use of maladaptive attention-regulation strategies (e.g., 
catastrophizing) and lesser use of adaptive attention-regulation strategies (e.g., acceptance, 
planning, and mindful awareness). Study 6 also examines links between emotion beliefs 
and response modulation strategies (e.g. alcohol use and medication). Study 7 examines 
the role of belief-change in a longitudinal attention-regulation focused clinical 
intervention (mindfulness based stress reduction). Both studies test the prediction that 
emotion beliefs mediate psychological health outcomes via their influence on attention 
regulation.  
Goals of Chapter 11 (Studies 8, 9 and 10): Cognitive Change 
Chapter 11 focuses on emotion beliefs as a predictor of reduced cognitive-
regulation strategy selection. Specifically, Studies 6 and 7 test the prediction that 
compared to incremental beliefs, entity beliefs will be associated with less use of adaptive 
regulation strategies like cognitive reappraisal (see Chapter 6). Links between emotion 
beliefs, cognitive reappraisal, and psychological health are examined in an undergraduate 
sample of university students (Study 6), and in a clinical sample of patients with social 
anxiety disorder (Study 7). Study 7 was the first clinical study on implicit beliefs about 
emotions at the time of its publication. It provides an opportunity to examine how patients 
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in clinical samples differ from healthy control subjects in their beliefs about emotions and 
in their use of adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation. Finally, Study 8 examined 
the role of beliefs about emotions as a potential mechanism of change in cognitive-
focused psychotherapy. In a 12-week randomized clinical control trial, Study 8 examined 
whether changes in emotion beliefs would mediate post-treatment symptom reduction for 
patients diagnosed with social anxiety disorder. Study 8 also explored belief-change and 
symptom reduction at 6 and 12-month follow-up.  
Goal of Chapter 12: Clinical Case Study 
 The empirical work presented in Studies 1 – 10 examines links between emotion 
beliefs, emotion regulation and psychological health in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations. However, the reliance on quantitative data and self-report measures runs the 
risk of oversimplifying how these beliefs actually operate in real-life settings (and how 
complicated it can be actually changing someone’s beliefs about their emotions). The goal 
of Chapter 11 was to take a closer look at the complexity and nuance of emotion beliefs 
and how they operate in the lives of others by employing a clinical case study analysis. It 
examines why these beliefs can feel protective for clients (even when they are harmful), 
and demonstrates why psychoeducation may not always be the most effective intervention.  
7.3 Broad Theoretical Assumptions and Propositions 
This section outlines several broad assumptions grounded in the theoretical and 
empirical work presented in Chapter 1 – 6. It also presents the broad theoretical 
hypotheses that serve to guide the following empirical chapters (Chapters 8 – 10). These 
assumptions and hypotheses are as follows: 
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A1: Effective emotion regulation involves identifying, selecting, implementing and 
monitoring adaptive and flexible emotion regulation strategies that are suited 
to a specific context, and consistent with an individual’s short and long-term 
goals.   
A2: Points of failure at the identification, selection, implementation or monitoring 
stage of the regulation process can lead to failed attempts at emotion 
regulation and over-time negative psychological health outcomes. 
A3: Regulation strategies can meaningfully be classified according to the Process 
Model of Emotion Regulation. These categories include situation selection, 
situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change and response 
modulation. Each category contains a range of different regulatory strategies.  
 A4: Regulation strategies are not inherently positive or negative but some 
strategies (e.g., cognitive reappraisal) have broadly more adaptive profiles 
than others (e.g., avoidance). 
A5: A number of contextual and individual difference variables influence the 
effective identification, selection, implementation and monitoring of emotion 
regulation strategies. 
From these initial assumptions about emotion regulation processes, three central 
propositions form the basis of future testable hypotheses in the current thesis. These 
propositions are based on theory and evidence presented in Chapter 6: 
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P1: Emotion beliefs influence emotion regulation processes – specifically the 
identification, selection, implementation and monitoring of regulatory 
strategies that in turn determine how successful one is at regulating their 
emotions. 
P2: Emotion beliefs will be associated with psychological health and well-being 
outcomes via their influence on emotion regulation processes. 
P3: Emotion beliefs will serve as a key mechanism of change in clinical 
treatments and interventions.  
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8. THE IMPLICIT ‘SELF-THEORY’ SCALES1 
8.1 Introduction to Study 1, 2 and 3 
 Chapters 1 – 7 provided an overview of the existing theory and research on emotion 
regulation and implicit theories, as well as the potential implications emotion beliefs 
might have for how people regulate their emotions in daily life. The present chapter 
introduces the first set of empirical studies in this thesis, which focus on the development 
of the implicit self-theory scales.  
 To date, there is a great deal of research on implicit theories across domains (see 
Chapter 5). Traditionally, implicit theory measures have assessed people’s beliefs about 
the fixed or changeable nature of a domain in general. For example, “to be honest, you 
can’t really change how intelligent you are” (implicit theories of intelligence); or “the 
truth is people have very little control over their emotions” (implicit theories of emotions). 
However, it is not clear if (and to what extent) general implicit theories differ from 
people’s personal beliefs about their own abilities. Believing that a domain is in principal 
‘changeable’ does not necessarily mean people are confident in their own ability to 
change. People may, for example, hold different theories for themselves and others – 
endorsing entity or incremental beliefs more or less depending on whether they are that a 
                                                
1 This chapter has been published in two independent publications:  
 
De Castella, K. & Byrne, D. (2015). My intelligence may be more malleable than yours: The revised 
implicit theories of intelligence (self-theory) scale is a better predictor of achievement, motivation and 
student disengagement. The European Journal of Psychology of Education, 30(3), 245 – 267. EUPE-D-14-
00016R3. And, 
 
De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Ziv, M., Dweck, C. S., & Gross, J. J. (2013). Beliefs about 
emotions: Links to emotion regulation, well-being, and psychological distress. Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology, 35(6); 497-505.  
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domain is in principal ‘changeable’ does not necessarily mean people are confident in 
their own ability to change. People may, for example, hold different theories for 
themselves and others – endorsing entity or incremental beliefs more or less depending on 
whether they are Furthermore, people who endorse stronger entity beliefs for themselves 
than others may be particularly vulnerable to helplessness and disengagement if this 
reflects comparative and negative views about personal inadequacy.  
 Personal beliefs about one’s abilities and skills have traditionally been examined in 
research on self-efficacy (see Bandura 1997 for a review), which refer to an individual’s 
beliefs about his or her own personal capacity to exert control over the events that matter 
(Banduara, 1997). As reviewed in Chapter 5.5, there is significant overlap between the 
constructs of implicit theories and self-efficacy beliefs.  However, self-efficacy measures 
classically assess “current operative capabilities” and “perceived competences” that one 
already possesses, in highly specific situations (e.g., “on a scale of 0 – 100, how confident 
are you that you can complete the study required to do well in your next test”). Bandura 
(2006) provides a detailed review of self-efficacy scales and measures. Because self-
efficacy scales are highly specific and focus on existing abilities, they do not assess 
people’s beliefs in their potential to change or “grow” their abilities. This subtle point of 
intersection is the focus of Studies 1 and 2, which sought to develop a revised Implicit 
‘self-theories” scale – a scale that that taps aspects of implicit theories and self-efficacy 
beliefs by measuring people’s beliefs about their personal ability to change and grow in 
specific domains. Figure 12 (below) illustrates this point of intersection using a Venn 
diagram which show the points of overlap between implicit theories and self-efficacy. 
The enclosed region between the two constructs represents “self-theory beliefs” – an area 
of overlap between constructs and the point of focus for this thesis.  The primary aim of 
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Study 1 and 2 was to construct a revised self-report measure of the implicit theories scales 
that focused specifically on self-theory beliefs.  
Figure 12. Hypothesized Overlap Between Implicit theories and Self-efficacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Study 1 begins by developing and examining the utility of a revised ‘Self-Theory’ 
scale in the domain of intelligence – based on the first and most widely used measure of 
implicit theories (Dweck, 1999). Study 2 then develops and evaluates the utility of a 
revised ‘self-theory’ version of the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale (Tamir et al., 
2007). This second instrument becomes the primary measure of interest for the current 
thesis. In both studies these measures were modified, re-phrasing items in the first person 
so that people were asked to respond to questions about their ability to change their 
intelligence and their emotions (rather than being asked about intelligence and emotions 
in general). These studies represent the first work on ‘self-theories.’ Since this work has 
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been published, there has been growing interest in this area with some researchers calling 
for the development of self-theory measures in other implicit theory domains (Howell, 
Passmore & Holder, 2016).  
 In the context of Studies 1 and 2, I predicted that people’s general implicit theories 
would differ significantly from their private views about their own abilities (their “self-
theories”). Because personal and domain-specific beliefs also tend to be more powerful 
predictors of goals, attributions and academic performance (Bandura, 1997; 2006), I also 
expected that a self-theory measure would serve as an even better predictor of related 
outcomes including motivation, self-regulation and psychological health. Finally, Study 3 
used qualitative methods to take a closer look at how entity and incremental theorists 
actually think about their emotions. It also offered an opportunity to examine potential 
difference in the kinds of emotion regulation strategies entity and incremental theorists 
spontaneously refer to when asked whether they believe they can change or control their 
emotions. 
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STUDY 1 
8.2 Implicit Self-Theories of Intelligence 
Research indicates that general implicit theories of intelligence are important 
predictors of achievement goals (Cury, Elliot, Da Fonseca & Moller, 2006; Dweck & 
Legget, 1988; Robins & Pals, 2002) as well as attributions for success and failure (Hong, 
Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999), truancy, disengagement and academic performance 
(Blackwell et al., 2007; Cury et al., 2008; Howell & Buro, 2009; Rhodewalt, 1994; 
Robins & Pals, 2002) – see Chapter 5 for a review. Based on this research, Study 1 
focused on exploring whether people’s beliefs about intelligence in general differed from 
their beliefs about their own intelligence, and if so, what impact these ‘personal’ views 
have on goals, attributions, motivation, self-regulation and academic achievement.  To do 
this, Study 1 presents a revised, first-person, self-report measure of implicit theories of 
intelligence scale that explicitly targets students’ private beliefs about their ability to 
change their own intelligence. The general Implicit Theories of Intelligence Questionnaire 
(Dweck, 1999) was modified by rephrasing items in the first person. Consistent with 
previous research (Blackwell, et al., 2007; Robins & Pals, 2002, see Dweck 1999 for a 
review), I predicted that across achievement and motivation measures: 
H1: Entity beliefs about intelligence would be associated with poorer outcomes on 
measures of achievement, motivation and self-regulation, including: lower mastery 
goals; higher performance and avoidance goals; and higher attributions of 
helplessness; higher self-reported truancy, self-handicapping and student 
disengagement; and lower self-reported academic performance.  
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H2: Compared to students’ beliefs about intelligence in general (implicit theories), their 
beliefs about their own intelligence (self-theory scale) will explain greater outcome 
variance on all measures.  
Methods 
Participants 
  Participants consisted of 680 Australian students from five different high schools 
(years 10 – 12) in the Australian Capital Territory. Schools were selected to capture a 
spread of low, intermediate and high performing schools based on national performance 
indicators. (Australian Tertiary Admission Rankings ATAR)2 Of the total sample, 35 
percent of students (N = 235) were from private schools and 65 percent (N = 445) were 
from public schools. Students ranged from 15 to 19 years of age (M = 16.6, SD = 1.01), 
38 percent were male (N = 258) and 62 percent were female (N = 422). 
Measures 
Implicit theories of intelligence (general scale). Students’ theories of 
intelligence were measured using the eight-item Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale 
(Dweck, 1999). The complete scale contains four incremental and four entity theory items 
and assesses general beliefs about the fixedness vs. malleability of intelligence (See Table 
1 for scale items). The four incremental scale items were then reverse scored and all eight 
items were summed with higher scores indicating greater endorsement of entity beliefs 
about intelligence. Overall, research indicates the scale displays good internal consistency 
                                                
2 Our sample of schools included: Radford, Merici, Melba Copland, Canberra College and Lake 
Ginninderra. Rankings for these schools based on the Australian Tertiary Admission Rank (ATAR) can be 
found at: www.bettereducation.com.au/results/ACT/2010/ACT.aspx   
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(α = .82 to .97) and test-retest reliabilities at two weeks (α = .80 to .82, Dweck, Chiu & 
Hong, 1995). The scale has also demonstrated good construct validity with scores 
predicting theoretically meaningful relationships with a range of variables (Dweck et al., 
1995). The scale further appears unaffected by social desirability, intellectual ability, 
political beliefs or self-presentation concerns, indicating good discriminate validity 
against a range of potentially confounding variables (Dweck et al., 1995). In the current 
study, the general implicit theories of intelligence scale again demonstrated good internal 
reliability with a combined Chronbach’s alpha for the general entity and incremental 
subscales of .87. 
Implicit theories of intelligence (self-theory scale). The self-theory version of 
the theories of intelligence scale was based on the original measure by Dweck and 
colleagues (Dweck, 1999). All eight-items were re-worded so that each statement 
reflected a first-person claim about the extent to which intelligence was fixed or malleable 
(see Table 1 for scale items). Efforts were made to ensure items stayed closely aligned to 
the originals. Incremental items on both measures were reversed scored and the average 
scores across the eight-items provided a measure of students’ entity beliefs about their 
own intelligence. Like the general, this scale showed good internal consistency, α = .90. 
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Table 1. Implicit Theories of Intelligence - Scale Items and Reliabilities (Study 1, n = 643) 
 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence (Original)  Implicit Theories of Intelligence (Self-Theory) 
 
Entity Beliefs Subscale (α = .87) 
 
 
Entity Self Beliefs Subscale (α = .90) 
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t really do 
much to change it.  
 1. I don’t think I personally can do much to increase my intelligence  
2. Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change 
very much.  
 2. My intelligence is something about me that I personally can’t change very 
much.  
3. To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you are.   3. To be honest, I don’t think I can really change how intelligent I am.  
4. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic 
intelligence.  
 
 4. I can learn new things, but I don't have the ability to change my basic 
intelligence.  
 
 
Incremental Beliefs Subscale (α = .88) 
 
 
Incremental Self Beliefs Subscale (α = .92) 
 
1. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your 
intelligence level.  
 1. With enough time and effort I think I could significantly improve my 
intelligence level  
2. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are.   2. I believe I can always substantially improve on my intelligence  
3. No matter how much intelligence you have you can always change 
it quite a bit.  
 3. Regardless of my current intelligence level, I think I have the capacity to 
change it quite a bit.  
4. You can change even your basic intelligence level considerably   4. I believe I have the ability to change my basic intelligence level considerable over time.  
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Achievement goals. To assess students’ goal orientations, subscales were drawn 
from Elliot and McGregor’s (2001) Revised Achievement Goal Questionnaire (AGQ). 
Each orientation consists of three items that assess different goal striving. Students were 
asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with each of the following 
statements about what was important to them as a student in their class. For example: 
Performance Approach (e.g., “It is important to me to do better than other students”); 
Performance Avoidance (e.g., “I just want to avoid doing poorly in my classes”); and 
Mastery Approach (e.g., “I want to learn as much as possible in class”). Research 
indicates that the revised (Elliot & McGregor, 2001) scale is psychometrically sound, 
reliable and a replicable measure of achievement goal constructs (Church, Elliot & Gable, 
2001; Donnellan, 2008; Fryer & Elliot, 2007; McGregor & Elliot, 2002). In the current 
sample, all three subscales displayed adequate reliability (Performance approach, α = .91; 
Performance avoidance, α = .75; Mastery, α = .83). 
Helplessness attributions. Attributions of helplessness were measured using the 
seven-item ‘Helplessness Beliefs’ sub-scale from the Strategy and Attribution 
Questionnaire (Nurmi, Salmela-Aro & Haavisto, 1995; SAQ). SAQ items are designed to 
assess helplessness beliefs in a school context (e.g., “I do not have the means to affect the 
way my studies go”). Overall, the scale has demonstrated good internal reliability and 
test-retest reliability at six months (Eronen, Nurmi & Salmela-Aro, 1998; Nurmi, Onatsu 
& Haavisto, 1995). Cronbach alpha for the current sample was .74. 
Academic achievement. Because academic records could not be obtained, self-
reported grades were measured with four items asking students to describe their general 
academic performance and their comparative standing relative to other students in their 
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class or year (e.g., “In the past 12 months the grades I mostly received were…”). 
Responses were coded on a seven-point Likert scale and scores ranged from 1 (“D-
average” or “among the worst in my class”) to 7 (“A-average” or “among the best in my 
class”). Mean scores across the four items provided an average index of students reported 
grades. Although self-report measures of this kind are subject to memory distortions or 
bias, research indicates that the extent of these biases is typically small (Cassady, 2001). 
While a minority (2-3%) of students may over-report by a letter grade or more (Gramzow, 
Elliot, Asher, & McGregor, 2003; Maxey & Ormsby, 1971), in most cases this deviation 
is less than .1 on a four-point scale (Gramzow et al., 2003; Gramzow & Willard, 2006).  
Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was .90. 
Self-handicapping. Academic self-handicapping behaviour was measured using 
the six-item subscale from the Patterns of Adaptive Learning Survey (PALS; Midgley, et 
al., 1998). Each of the six items asks about an a priori defensive strategy used to excuse 
poor performance (e.g., “Some students fool around the night before a test. Then if they 
don’t do well, they can say that is the reason. How true is this of you?”). Responses 
ranged from 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 (very true of me). Unlike earlier measures of 
self-handicapping, the PALS items assess the use of intentional strategies and behaviours 
and are thereby distinguishable from post hoc excuses and attributions. Previous research 
indicates that the six-item scale shows good validity and internal consistency (α = .84) 
and sound construct validity, relating in predictable ways to theoretically relevant 
variables (Midgley, Arunkumar & Urdan, 1996; Midgley et al., 1998; Midgley & Urdan, 
2001). Participants’ responses were summed across the six items (scores ranging from 6 
to 42), providing an overall index of students’ tendency to engage in self- handicapping 
strategies. Cronbach’s alpha in the current sample was .86. 
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Disengagement & truancy. Three items were used to measure disengagement 
and were adapted from the Motivation and Engagement Scale (MES-HS; Green, Martin 
& Marsh, 2007). These items included: “I often feel like giving up in school”; “I’ve pretty 
much given up being interested in school” and “I really couldn’t care less about school.” 
Based on psychometric testing with over 21,000 students in Australia, the MES-HS has 
been found to be a valid and reliable instrument with a sound factor structure and 
demonstrates factorial invariance across gender, subject and year level (Green et al., 2007; 
Martin, 2001; 2003). In addition to measuring students’ general disengagement from 
school, two items were included to assess self-reported truancy: “I sometimes wag school” 
and “I’ll skip class when I can get away with it”. These items were written in Australian 
vernacular specifically for use with high school students.  
Procedure 
 All survey items were administered to students online under normal classroom 
conditions and took approximately 20-30 minutes to complete. Measures were presented 
in the following order: achievement goals, implicit theories of intelligence (general and 
self-theory scales), helplessness attributions, self-handicapping, disengagement, truancy, 
grades. Supervising teachers informed the students that participation was voluntary and 
anonymous, and that there were no right or wrong answers. They were also informed that 
the information would be kept confidential and that no one at home or school would see 
their results. Ethics approval for the project was obtained from appropriate governing 
bodies including the Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(HREC); the Department of Education and Training (DET) and the Catholic Education 
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Office (CEO), as well as principals and teachers at participating schools, and all students 
gave informed consent.  
Results 
Prior to analysis, all variables were examined through SPSS for missing values 
and distributional assumptions of multivariate analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Of 
the total 680 respondents, 37 surveys were left incomplete (missing data > 25 per cent) 
and were deleted reducing the total sample to 643. For the remaining cases, missing data 
was extremely rare (< .01 per cent) and where present were replaced with the mean for 
that variable – a conservative technique in such cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Scale Reliability and Validity 
 Full-scale scores for both the general Implicit Theories of Intelligence 
Questionnaire and the new self-theory measure, as noted, demonstrated good internal 
consistency (α = .87 and α = .90 respectively). Individual incremental and entity subscales 
also showed strong internal consistency (subscales ranging from α = .87 to .92). 
Reliability ratings for sub-scales can be seen in Table 2.   
To test the higher order structure of the revised scale, confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) was conducted on both the Original and Self-Theory Implicit Theories of 
Intelligence measures using AMOS 18.0 (Arbuckle & Worthke, 1999). Structural 
Equations Modelling (SEM) allows for a test of the hypothesised two-factor structure by 
evaluating item loadings on the Implicit and Incremental constructs. Estimation using 
maximum likelihood was used for all analyses (see Figure 13). For each of the scales, fit 
indices were compared for a one-factor congeneric model (Model 1) and the hypothesised 
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two-factor structure (Model 2). Variances for the latent factors were fixed at unity while 
entity and incremental items were allowed to load freely on the latent factor(s). In 
evaluating the fit of the measurement models, the likelihood ratio χ2 statistic and goodness 
of fit indices were examined. The χ2 test assesses the discrepancy between the sample and 
fitted covariance matrices and decreases as model fit improves. However, the χ2 test is 
considerably inflated with large samples (Stevens, 1996). For this reason, several 
commonly used goodness of fit measures were also considered in assessing model fit. 
These included: the goodness of fit (GFI), adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI) and the 
comparative fit index (CFI). For these measures values approaching 1.0 indicate better fit 
of the model to the data (Dickey, 1996). The root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) was also consulted and indicates adequate fit with values less than .08 and very 
close fit with values less that .05 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). Finally, the parsimonious 
goodness-of- fit index (PGFI) was used take into account model parsimony. In evaluating 
the PGFI, higher values are desirable since a better fit can always be achieved by adding 
more parameters (Dickey, 1996). These results are reported in Table 2.  
The goodness of fit statistics indicated that model fit was slightly better for the 
self-theory scale. For both scales, the two-factor model (Model 2) fit the data very well 
and performed better than the one-factor model (Model 1). Although this is consistent 
with some existing research on the implicit theories of intelligence scale (Abd-El-Fattah 
& Greg, 2006), the instrument is most typically used in a single factor format by reverse 
scoring the incremental theory items (Molden & Dweck, 2006; see Dweck 1997 for a 
review). For this reason, the one factor model was used in the current study. All latent 
variables and factor loadings were significant and the goodness of fit measures indicated 
good overall fit to the data. 
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Figure 13. Study 1: Confirmatory Factor Analyses for General and Self-Theory Implicit Theory of Intelligence Scales (Study 1, n = 643) 
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Table 2: Goodness-of-Fit Indices – Implicit Theories of Intelligence (Study 1, n = 643)  
Model df χ2 GFI AGFI CFI RMSEA PGFI 
General Scale 
1 – Factor Model 
 
20 
 
913.4** 
 
.68 
 
.42 
 
.71 
 
.26 
 
.38 
2 – Factor Model 19 158.4** .94 .88 .95 .11 .49 
Self-Theory Scale 
1 – Factor Model 
 
20 
 
963.1** 
 
.68 
 
.32 
 
.77 
 
.27 
 
.36 
2 – Factor Model 19 95.4** .96 .93 .98 .08 .50 
Note. N = 643. **p<.00 for all χ2 values. GFI = Goodness-of-fit; AGFI = Adjusted Goodness of Fit; CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; PGFI = Parsimony 
Goodness of Fit Index. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Links to Goal, Attributions, Self-Regulation & Achievement  
 Means (M), standard deviations (SD), ranges, internal consistencies (α) and 
correlations for all variables are presented in Table 3. Both the general and self-theory of 
intelligence measures demonstrated significant correlations with the achievement and 
motivational variables, with the exception of performance approach goals, which were 
significantly correlated only with the self-theory scale. An entity theory of intelligence 
was negatively associated with achievement goals and this was true for mastery, 
performance approach, and avoidance goal subtypes. On both measures, students who 
believed intelligence was fixed also displayed higher attributions of helplessness; were 
more likely to self-handicap, skip class and disengage from school; and they reported 
poorer overall academic performance.  
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Hypothesis 2: General Beliefs vs. Personal Beliefs   
 To examine whether students’ beliefs about their own intelligence differed from 
their beliefs about intelligence in general, I first conducted a within-subjects t-test to 
compare students’ scores on the general and self-theory scales. Results revealed that 
students endorsed incremental beliefs more when asked about their personal ability to 
improve their intelligence (M = 2.96) than when asked about intelligence in general (M = 
3.14), t(642) = 6.96, p < .001. This was a small effect by Cohen’s (1988) standards (d 
= .17). To explore whether the first person, self-theory measure explained greater 
variance in outcomes, I conducted a series of two-step hierarchical regressions analyses 
(see Table 4). Despite the high correlation between the general and self-theory measures 
(r = .80), there was no evidence of multicollinearity (all VIF’s < 2.84).  For each of the 
dependent variables, the general theories of intelligence measure was entered first, 
followed by the self-theory measure in the second step.  In a second set of analyses 
regression were repeated entering the scales in reverse order. The general scale failed to 
explain unique variance on any of the dependent variables when controlling for ‘self-
theories.’
 131 
Table 3. Implicit Theories of Intelligence – Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities and Correlations (Study 1, n = 643). 
 
 
^p<0.05 *p<0.01 ** p < 0.
    
 
Range 
 Correlations 
Variable M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Entity Theory of Intelligence (General) 3.14 1.05 1.00 – 7.00 .87 1 .80** -.28** -.03 -.11* -.18** .38** .17** .14** .16** -.09^ 
2. Entity Theories of Intelligence (Self-Theory) 2.96 1.08 1.00 – 7.00 .90  1 .35** -.12** -.12* -.23** .45** .22** .20** .18** -.13** 
3. Difference (Self – General) -1.48 5.38 -28.00 – 20.00  .94   1 -.14** -.02 -.09^ .13** .08^ .12** .04 -.08^ 
4. Performance-Approach  14.64 3.95 3.00 – 21.00 .91    1 .18** .42** -.22** -.13** -.18** -.17** .42** 
5. Performance-Avoidance  15.54 3.78 3.00 – 21.00 .75     1 .29** -.10^ .07^ -.00 -.07 -.05 
6. Mastery-Approach Goals 16.30 3.15 3.00 – 21.00 .83      1 -.30** -.21** -.25** -.24* .22** 
7. Helplessness Attributions 19.69 6.11 7.00 – 49.00 .74       1 .40** .39** .31** -.30** 
8. Self-Handicapping 19.28 7.80 6.00 – 42.00 .86        1 .44** .40** -.31** 
9. Disengagement  9.70 4.34 3.00 – 21.00 .82         1 .50** -.38** 
10. Truancy  5.60 4.88 2.00 – 14.00 .86          1 -.29** 
11. Grades 19.15 4.88 4.00 – 28.00 .90           1 
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Table 4. Hierarchical Regressions Predicting Achievement, Motivation and Self-
Regulation from the Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scales (Study 1, n = 643). 
  b   
 Dependent Variable and Step At Step Final R2 R2Change 
 
Performance-Approach Goals 
    
1. Implicit Theories (General) -.03 .17* .00  
2. Implicit Theories (Self)   -.25** .02** 02** 
      
Performance-Avoidance Goals     
1. Implicit Theories (General) -.11** -.04 .01**  
2. Implicit Theories (Self)  -.09 .01** .00 
 
Mastery-Approach Goals 
    
1. Implicit Theories (General) -.18** .02 .03**  
2. Implicit Theories (Self)  -.24** .05** .02** 
 
Helplessness Attributions 
    
1. Implicit Theories (General) .38** .06 .14**  
2. Implicit Theories (Self)  .40** .20**    .06** 
 
Self-Handicapping     
1. Implicit Theories (General) .17** -.00 .03**  
2. Implicit Theories (Self)  .23** .05** .02** 
 
Disengagement 
    
1. Implicit Theories (General) .13** -.08 .01**  
2. Implicit Theories (Self)  .26** .04** .03** 
 
Truancy  
 
    
1. Implicit Theories (General) .16** .05 .02**  
2. Implicit Theories (Self)  .14* .03** .01* 
 
Grades   
  
1. Implicit Theories (General) -.09* .06 .01*  
2. Implicit Theories (Self)  -.18** .02** .01** 
 
**p < .001 * p < .05  
 
Beta is the standardised regression coefficient, and significance levels are based on two-tailed significance tests. 
Increments for variables entered at R2Change significance levels are based upon F tests for that step. Reversing this 
process on each measure – Self-theory scale entered in the first step and general theories in the second step – also 
demonstrated that the general scale did not explain unique variance when controlling for students’ implicit self-theories. 
Findings were also replicated using the 4-item entity belief sub-scales for both measures. All results reported above were 
significant and the general scale did not explain unique variance when controlling for students’ implicit self-theories.  
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Table 4 displays the standardized regression coefficients (b), R2 and R2 change for the full 
and restricted models in each analysis. Both scales accounted for a significant amount of 
variance in all analyses (with the exception of performance-approach goals, which were 
significant only for the revised scale). The belief that intelligence was fixed predicted 
lower achievement goals and self-reported grades, greater attributions of helplessness, and 
increased self-handicapping, truancy and disengagement. Importantly, and in line with 
predictions, of the two scales, the self-theory measure explained more outcome variance 
when both measures were used to predict the dependent variables. That is, the self-theory 
measure consistently predicted unique variance in outcomes above and beyond the 
general measure of theories of intelligence. This was true for all dependent variables 
except avoidance goals, for which there was no significant difference between the general 
and self-theory scales. While the additional variance explained was small (typically 
between 1 and 6 per cent), the self-theory scale was consistently superior when both 
measures were used to predict the dependent variables. 
Supplementary Analysis: When “My” Intelligence is More Fixed  
 In addition to examining the predictive power of both scales, I expected the 
difference between the two scales (e.g., intelligence may be malleable in principal, but not 
for me) would also be associated with achievement and motivation outcomes. To examine 
this hypothesis, a difference score was computed by subtracting students’ scores on the 
general scale from their scores on the self-theory scale (see Table 3). Positive values 
indicate comparatively higher entity beliefs on the self-theory scale e.g., “My intelligence 
is more fixed than others”. Consistent with predictions, students who endorsed stronger 
entity beliefs for themselves than others held lower performance-approach and mastery-
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approach goals; reported increased helplessness; self-handicapping and disengagement; as 
well as lower academic grades. The difference between the two scales however, was not 
associated with avoidance goals or truancy.  
Discussion 
 The aim of Study 1 was to develop and validate a revised first-person measure of 
the Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale, and to examine whether students’ implicit 
theories about intelligence in ‘general’ differ from their implicit self-theories (their beliefs 
about their own intelligence). I expected that a revised first-person, self-theory measure 
would explain greater variance in outcomes related to implicit theories of intelligence – 
achievement, motivation and self-regulation.  
Results from the current study indicated that the revised Implicit Theories of 
Intelligence (Self-Theory) Scale was psychometrically sound, internally consistent and 
reliable, structurally valid and related in predictable ways with measures of achievement 
goals, attributions, self-regulation, motivation and achievement. Consistent with previous 
research (Dweck, 1999; Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995; Levy & Dweck, 1998; Rhodewalt, 
1994), the more students endorsed an entity theory of their intelligence, the lower their 
mastery-approach goal striving. When asked about their academic performance, entity 
beliefs were predictive of lower self-reported grades and an increased likelihood of 
making helpless attributions about one’s studies. An entity theory of intelligence was also 
associated with increased self-handicapping, truancy, and a greater likelihood of giving 
up on school altogether. These findings are noteworthy particularly given the lack of 
research on implicit theories, self-handicapping, truancy and disengagement in high 
school settings. Traditional models explaining how implicit theories give rise to academic 
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outcomes have often concentrated on the role of achievement goals, causal attributions 
and effort (Blackwell et al., 2007; Robins & Pals, 2002). However, results from the 
current study indicate that – consistent with early work by Rodewalt (1994) – entity 
beliefs are also associated with a greater likelihood of engaging in maladaptive self-
protective strategies that may ultimately serve to undermine academic performance. 
While both the general and personal scales predicted goals, attributions and academic 
outcomes, the new scale explained unique variance on these measures.  
Examined side by side, students’ belief in their personal ability to improve their 
intelligence also differed significantly from their general beliefs about intelligence as a 
broader construct. On average, students reported significantly higher endorsement of 
incremental items when appraising their own intelligence and higher endorsement of 
entity items when considering intelligence more broadly. This finding is consistent with 
research on self-presentational biases, positive illusions, and contrast effects (Fisher & 
Katz, 2000; Gramzow, Elliot, Asher & McGregor, 2003; Story & Dunning, 2002; Taylor 
& Armor, 1996). The belief that intelligence, or any ability for that matter, is ‘more 
malleable’ for oneself than others may therefore be a strategy that works to boost self-
esteem, improving and protecting one’s self-concept. For a small portion of students 
however, entity beliefs were endorsed more strongly on the self-theory scale indicating 
that they believed their intelligence was more fixed than others’. As expected, these 
students also reported fewer achievement goals, poorer academic grades and greater risk 
of helplessness and disengagement from school. Across all outcome measures, the Self-
Theory scale was an even better predictor of achievement, motivation and self-regulation.  
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Implications 
The current study was an important first step in the development of first-person 
“Self-Theory” measures of implicit theories. Implicit theories have been examined in a 
variety of contexts, including personality and morality (Dweck, 1999), emotion (Tamir, 
John, Srivastava & Gross, 2007), sport (Chen et al., 2008; Ommundsen, 2001), 
interpersonal and romantic relationships (Knee, Patrick & Lonsbary, 2003), stereotype 
threat (Aronson et al., 2002; Levy & Dweck, 1998), memory (Werth & Forster, 2002), 
fame (Maltby et al., 2008) and shyness (Beer, 2002). The development of self-theory 
measures may thus have potential in many areas where self-efficacy and ability 
attributions play a predominant role. Indeed, recently there have been calls for the 
development of self-theory scales in other implicit theory domains (Howell, Passmore & 
Holder, 2016).  
Based on findings from Study 1, the aim of Study 2 was to develop and evaluate a 
self-theory scale for assessing implicit beliefs about emotions. Recognizing that there may 
be a discrepancy between students’ broader implicit theories and their personal beliefs 
about their abilities is also particularly important in the context of interventions and 
training. Research on implicit theories has repeatedly demonstrated that simple 
interventions can lead to long-lasting change (Aronson et al., 2002; Good et al., 2003; 
Blackwell et al., 2007). Entity and incremental beliefs have been induced experimentally 
through explicit messages, case studies and vignettes (Bergen 1992) and indirectly 
through feedback, praise or criticism (Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Muller & Dweck, 1998). 
Other interventions have taught an incremental theory through online programs 
(Brainology, 2010), workshops (Blackwell et al., 2007), videos, mentoring, and letter 
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writing tasks (Aronson et al., 2002; Good et al., 2003). In the domain of ‘intelligence’, 
these initiatives typically focus on providing students with scientific research on memory, 
brain plasticity and the brain’s potential for development and growth. While this message 
is powerful – particularly for ‘entity theorists’ who may have doubts about one’s potential 
for improvement – it is a message that may not reach all students. The results of Study 1 
demonstrate that for many, knowing change is possible is not the same as believing 
personally in one’s ability to change. For underachieving students, particularly those 
struggling with self-regulation (vulnerable to self-handicapping and disengagement), the 
shift from general to personal belief in one’s ability to improve may not be a simple 
process. Yaeger & Walton (2011) argue that this kind of change takes place through 
gradual private successes and recursive processes that slowly shift achievement 
trajectories as students gain momentum over time: “when students achieve success 
beyond what they thought possible, their beliefs about their potential may change, leading 
them to invest themselves more in school, further improving performance and reinforcing 
their belief in the possibility of growth” (p. 286). Understanding how to help people 
internalize this message will be an important area for future research.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
While the current study makes important contributions to research on implicit 
theories, several limitations should be noted. First, despite examining a wide range of 
achievement and motivation outcomes, it is important to recognize that findings in the 
current study are based on participant self-reports. Self-report measures are used in much 
of the research on implicit theories (see Dweck, 1999 for a review) and self-reported 
handicapping and disengagement have been validated against actual behaviour (Deppe & 
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Harachkiewicz, 1996; Strube, 1986). Nonetheless, many students may engage in these 
strategies unconsciously or be disinclined to concede that they adopt them. For this reason, 
it is possible that higher-rates of self-handicapping, truancy and student disengagement 
exists among these student populations.  
Second, it is important to note that the findings reported in the current study are 
also based on relatively small effect sizes. These results however, are consistent with 
much of the existing research in the field (Harris, Snyder, Higgins & Schrag, 1986; 
Haynes, Daniels, Stupnisky, Pery & Hladky, 2008; Howell & Buro, 2009; Martin & 
Brawley, 2002; Midgley & Urdan, 2001; Ommundsen, 2001), and likely reflect the 
multiplicity of factors that give rise to achievement and motivation outcomes in school. It 
is also important not to overlook the fact that small effect sizes can have a major impact 
on academic performance over time (Abelson, 1985; Blackwell et al., 2007; Dweck, 
2008; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1982).  
Third, while self-theories appear to offer a number of benefits of traditional 
implicit theory measures, the results of the current study can only be generalized to 
research on implicit theories of intelligence in high-school student samples. It remains to 
be seen whether self-theory scales offer unique benefits in other populations and in other 
implicit theory domains. Despite these limitations, results from the current study indicate 
that the beliefs students’ hold about intelligence is associated with a range of achievement 
and motivation outcomes, and importantly, it is the beliefs students’ hold about 
themselves and their ability to improve that is most predictive of their willingness to 
embrace opportunities for learning.  
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STUDY 2 
8.3 Implicit Self-Theories of Emotion 
Study 1 indicated that students’ implicit beliefs about their own intelligence 
differed significantly from their beliefs about intelligence in general. These self-beliefs 
also served as a greater predictor of achievement, motivation and self-regulation. The goal 
of Study 2 was to extend this work by developing and evaluating a revised Self-Theory 
measure of implicit theories of emotion (a scale developed by Tamir et al. 2007). Based 
on findings from Study 1, I was also interested in examining how people’s beliefs about 
the controllability of emotions in general might differ from their beliefs about the 
controllability of their own emotions. I made the following predictions:  
H1: Entity beliefs about emotions will be negatively associated with well-being (reduced 
self-esteem and satisfaction with life), and positively associated with psychological 
distress (stress and depression).  
H2: Compared to people’s beliefs about emotions in general (general scale), people’s 
beliefs about their own emotions (self-theory scale) will explain greater outcome 
variance on all measures. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 216 undergraduate psychology students (67% female) 
from Stanford University. Students ranged from 17 to 29 years of age (M = 19.1, SD = 
1.6). The sample consisted of 45% White Caucasian, 12% Chinese, 8% South/East Asian, 
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8% Hispanic, 8% African American, 6% Mixed, 5% Indian, 4% Mexican, and 3% Other. 
Students were invited to participate in exchange for course credit. All students were 
informed that participation was voluntary, and that there were no right or wrong answers. 
They were also informed that the information would be kept confidential.   
Measures 
Implicit beliefs about emotions.  General beliefs about the malleability of 
emotions were assessed with the four-item Implicit Beliefs about Emotion Scale (Tamir et 
al., 2007). Two items measured incremental beliefs e.g., “If they want to, people can 
change the emotions that they have,” and two measured entity beliefs e.g., “The truth is, 
people have very little control over their emotions” (see Table 5 for scale items). 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement on a five-point Likert scale. Incremental 
theory items were then reverse-scored and averaged with higher scores reflecting an entity 
theory and lower scores an incremental theory of emotions. In past research with 
undergraduates, the scale showed good internal consistency ( = .75, Tamir et al., 2007).  
In the present sample, internal consistency was .77.  
Personal beliefs about the malleability of emotions were assessed using a variant 
of the original four-item measure (Tamir et al., 2007). All items were again modified to 
reflect a first-person claim about the extent to which one could personally change or 
control their emotions. Efforts were made to ensure items stayed closely aligned to the 
originals. In the present sample, internal consistency was .79. Both scales were treated as 
continuous variables. This approach is consistent with previous research (Plaks & Stecher, 
2007; Robins & Pals, 2002; Tamir et al., 2007) and avoids loss of power associated with 
typologizing dimensional variables (Cohen, 1983). For ease of interpretation, Irefer to 
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those with higher scores as holding entity beliefs and those with lower scores as holding 
incremental beliefs. Psychometric properties of these two implicit theories of emotion 
scales are presented in Table 5. 
Indicators of well-being. Self-esteem and life satisfaction were assessed as 
general indicators of well-being:   
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured using The Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale 
(SISE; Robins, Hendin & Trzensniewski, 2001). The SISE asks subjects to rate their 
agreement with the following item: “I have high self-esteem”. Responses are recorded on 
a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Research with the SISE indicates that the scale is reliable and displays good criterion 
validity across a wide range of measures. For this reason, it has been presented as a 
practical alternative to the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) in adult samples (Robins 
et al., 2001).  
 Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was measured using the five-item Satisfaction 
with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985).  The SWLS is a 
commonly used measure of life satisfaction (e.g., “In most ways my life is close to ideal”). 
Items are rated on a seven-point Likert scale with total scores ranging from five to 35. 
Research indicates the scale is internally consistent and displays good test-retest 
reliability (Pavot & Diener, 1993; Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 1991).  In the 
present sample, internal consistency was .89.
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Table 5: Implicit theories of Emotions Scale Items and Reliabilities (Study 2, n = 216) 
 
Appendix 2: Implicit Theories of Emotions Scale Items and Reliabilities 
 
Implicit Theories of Emotions (General, α = .77 )   Implicit Theories of Emotions (Self-Theory α = .79 ) 
 
 
Stem: In the following questions we are interested in your 
thoughts about emotions. There are no right or wrong 
answers. We are just interested in your views. Using the 
scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with the following statements. 
 
 
 
 
Stem: In the following questions we are interested in 
your thoughts about your personal ability to change the 
emotions you experience. There are no right or wrong 
answers. We are just interested in your views.  
 
 
Scale Items: 
 
1. The truth is people have very little control over their 
emotions. 
 
Scale Items: 
 
1. The truth is, I have very little control over my emotions. 
 
2. No matter how hard they try, people can't really change 
the emotions they have.  
2. No matter how hard I try, I can’t really change the 
emotions that I have 
3. Everyone can learn to control their emotions.  3. I can learn to control my emotions. 
 
4. If they want to, people can change the emotions that they 
have. 
 
 4. If I want to, I can change the emotions that I have. 
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Psychological distress. Measures of stress and depression served as indicators of 
psychological distress:  
Stress. Stress was measured with the four-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4; 
Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983). The PSS-4 asks about the extent to which life 
situations are appraised as stressful over the past month (e.g., “I felt that difficulties were 
piling up so high that I could not overcome them”). Items are scored on a four-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (rarely or none of the time) to 4 (most or all of the time). 
Total scores range from four to 16. The PSS-4 has been shown to be a reliable and 
internally consistent measure of stress (Hewitt, Flett, & Mosher, 1992). In the present 
sample, internal consistency was .81. 
Depression. Depressive symptoms were measured using the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The CES-D is a 20-
item self-report scale and is widely used as measure of depressive symptoms among 
adults (Radloff, 1977) and adolescents (Radloff, 1991) in the community. Participants are 
asked to rate the frequency of various thoughts and feelings over the last week (e.g., “I 
felt hopeful about the future” and “I had crying spells”). Responses are recorded on a 
four-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the 
time). Total scores range from 0 to 60 with scores of 15 and above indicative of mild to 
moderate depression. Research with the CES-D indicates that it is internally consistent 
and displays good construct validity and test-retest reliability (Radloff, 1977).  In the 
present sample, internal consistency was .91. 
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Procedure 
All survey items were administered to students online as part of a larger 
university-wide survey distributed to all incoming Psych 1 student at Stanford University. 
The entire survey packet took approximately one hour for students to complete and was 
available to students in the first two weeks of the academic quarter. Students were 
informed that the information would be kept confidential. Ethics approval for the project 
was obtained from appropriate governing bodies including the Stanford Human Subjects 
Research and Institutional Review Board (IRB).  
 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Prior to analysis, all variables were examined for missing values and distributional 
assumptions of multivariate analysis. Of the total sample, eight surveys were left blank or 
incomplete (missing data > 10%) and were excluded from the analysis. This reduced the 
total sample to 208. Across all variables, missing data were rare (< 1%), and were 
imputed with the overall mean for that variable – a conservative technique in such cases 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As in previous work on implicit theories (Tamir et al., 2007), 
beliefs about emotion were not significantly related to gender or ethnicity and these 
variables are not discussed further. Means (M), standard deviations (SD), ranges, internal 
consistencies (), and correlations for all variables are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Implicit Theories of Emotion – Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities and Correlations (Study 2, n = 216) 
    Correlations 
Variable M SD Range α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. General Entity Beliefs  10.37 2.76 4.00 – 20.00 .77 1 .73** -.26** -26** -.18* .31** .15^ 
2. Personal Entity Beliefs  9.66 2.82 4.00 – 20.00 .79  1 -.34** -.37** -.24** .38** .27** 
3. Cognitive Reappraisal  30.44 5.78 10.00 – 70.00 .89   1 .34** .37** -.33** -.38** 
4. Self-esteem 3.60 1.01 1.00 – 5.00 -    1 .53** -.51** -.43** 
5. Satisfaction with life  26.54 6.09 5.00 – 35.00 .89     1 -.57** -.48** 
6. Stress 7.09 2.49 4.00 – 16.00 .81      1 .67** 
7. Depression  26.75 8.00 0.00 – 60.00 .91       1 
^p<0.05 *p<0.01 ** p < 0.001 
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Hypothesis 1: Links to Well-Being, and Psychological Distress 
Consistent with H1, both the general and personal scales demonstrated significant 
correlations with well-being, and psychological distress. Entity beliefs were associated 
with lower levels of self-esteem, and satisfaction with life, and higher levels of stress and 
depression. 
Hypothesis 2: General Beliefs vs. Personal Beliefs   
A within-subjects t-test between the general and personal scales was used to 
examine whether people’s general beliefs about emotions differed significantly from their 
appraisal of their own emotions. Consistent with H2, and findings in Study 1, people 
endorsed entity beliefs less on the personal measure (MPersonal = 9.66, MGeneral = 10.37, t(208) 
= 4.98, p < .001, d = .26), indicating greater perceived control over their own emotions.  
To examine whether personal beliefs explained greater variance in emotion 
regulation, well-being, and psychological distress, when compared to general beliefs (H2), 
I conducted a series of two-step hierarchical regression analyses to examine the unique 
variance explained by the self-theory measure. Despite the high correlation between the 
general and self-theory scales (r = .73) there was no evidence of multicollinearity. For 
each dependent variable, the general scale was entered first, followed by the personal 
scale in the second step3. Table 7 displays the standardized regression coefficients (b), R2 
and R2 change for the full and restricted models in each analysis.  
                                                
3 In a second set of analyses we repeated the hierarchical regression in the reverse order entering the Self 
Theory scale in the first step and the General Theory scale in the second. The General scale failed to explain 
unique variance on any of the dependent variables when controlling for ‘Self-Theories’.  
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Both scales accounted for a significant portion of variance in all variables. The 
belief that emotions were fixed predicted increased psychological distress (stress and 
depression), and decreased well-being (lower self-esteem and satisfaction with life). The 
personal scale consistently explained unique variance on these measures over and above 
the general scale.  
Table 7. Hierarchal Regressions – General and Self-Theory Scales (Study 2, n = 216) 
 
 
The Personal vs. General Implicit Beliefs About Emotion Scales: Hierarchical 
Multiple Regressions Predicting Well-Being, and Psychological Distress 
 
  β   
Dependent Variable and Step Step Final R2 R
2 
Change 
Self Esteem     
1. General Entity Beliefs -.26** .01 .06**  
 Personal Entity Beliefs  -.37** .13** .07** 
Life Satisfaction      
1. General Entity Beliefs -.18** -.01 .03**  
 Personal Entity Beliefs  -.24** .05** .02* 
Stress     
1. General Entity Beliefs .31** .07 .09**  
 Personal Entity Beliefs  .33** .14** .05** 
Depression     
1.  General Entity Beliefs .15* -.10 .02*  
  Personal Entity Beliefs  .34** .07** .06** 
 
**p < .001 * p < .05 Beta is the standardized regression coefficient. Adjusted R2 values and 
increments for R2 Change significance levels are based upon F tests for!
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Discussion 
The primary aim of Study 2 was to build upon findings in Study 1 by developing 
and evaluating a revised “Self-Theory” measure of the implicit theories of emotion scale 
(an instrument that would serve as the primary measure of emotion beliefs in the current 
thesis). Study 2 focused on examining people’s beliefs about their personal ability to 
control their emotions as well as possible links to indicators of well-being, and 
psychological distress. Findings indicated that entity beliefs about emotions were indeed 
associated with decreased well-being (reduced self-esteem and satisfaction with life) and 
increased clinical symptoms of stress and depression. At the time this study was 
conducted, very little work had examined implicit beliefs about emotions and their 
implications for psychological health and illness. Study 2 thus contributed to a nascent 
literature on implicit theories and began to extend this work to the clinical domain.  
Results from Study 1 indicated that people’s beliefs about their own intelligence 
(self-theories) were a better predictor of outcomes than their beliefs about intelligence in 
general (general implicit theories). Study 2 replicated these findings in the domain of 
beliefs about emotions. Specifically, people’s beliefs about their ability to control their 
own emotions predicted well-being and clinical symptoms over and above their beliefs 
about emotions in general. Results from Studies 1 and 2 indicate that Self-Theory scales 
may thus offer theoretical and practical advantages over general implicit theory scales 
across domains.  
Recognizing that there may be discrepancies between people’s broader implicit 
beliefs about emotions and their beliefs about their own emotions is important in the 
context of clinical treatments and interventions. As with research on implicit beliefs about 
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intelligence (Study 1), the results of the current study demonstrate, knowing that change 
is possible for some is not the same as believing personally in one’s ability to change. The 
extent, then, to which incremental beliefs are personally internalized may determine how 
and for whom this message is most effective and may ultimately have important 
consequences for psychological health and well-being. In addition to extending research 
on implicit beliefs, these results may have important implications for work on emotion 
regulation and psychopathology.  The current study examined emotion beliefs, well-being 
and psychological distress in a healthy undergraduate sample. However, the relationship 
between implicit beliefs, and psychological health indicates that these beliefs could also 
play an important role in the strategies people use to regulate their emotions in daily life.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current study replicated findings presented in Study 1 in a new domain – 
beliefs about emotions and marked an important first step towards understanding the role 
of implicit beliefs in psychological health and well-being. Despite this, several limitations 
should be noted. First, data collected in the current study are again based on student 
samples and participant self-reports. As with much of the research on implicit beliefs in 
other domains, this limits generalizability beyond ‘healthy’ student samples. Given that 
implicit beliefs about emotions may have important clinical implications, research with 
clinical populations is needed to better understand the role these beliefs play in 
psychological illness.  
A second limitation relates to measurement. In the current study, I included only a 
relatively small set of clinical and well-being indicators. A reliance on quantitative survey 
research data also limits understanding of how individuals actually think about their 
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emotions and their reasoning behind their views (this is a limitation I sought to address in 
Study 3). Finally, while the current studies identified links between implicit beliefs about 
emotions and psychological health, we do not yet know why these beliefs have these 
psychological correlates. One possibility, presented in Chapter 6 and 7, is that implicit 
theories of emotion influence emotion regulation efforts in day-to-day life. Emotion 
dysregulation is a core feature of most Axis I and Axis II psychological disorders 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and training in emotion regulation strategies is 
a key component of many forms of psychotherapy (Werner & Gross, 2009). However, the 
strategies patients ultimately use to regulate their emotions – and whether they even make 
such attempts at all – may be linked to the implicit beliefs they hold about their ability to 
control the emotions they experience. People holding entity beliefs about emotions might, 
for example, be more likely than people holding incremental beliefs to rely on external 
regulation strategies (e.g., avoidance, medication, drug use, tobacco, alcohol or caffeine).  
The process model of emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007) points to a 
wide range emotion regulation strategies available to people at different stages in the 
emotion generation process. Given that many features of psychopathology involve poorly 
implemented, inflexible or context-insensitive strategies (Werner & Gross, 2009), links 
between implicit theories of emotion and emotion regulation may explain the effects these 
beliefs have on psychological health and well-being. Results from Study 2 indicate that 
the implicit beliefs people hold – particularly about their emotions – may have important 
implications for emotion regulation. In an attempt to better understand what individuals 
actually believe about their emotions, and the associations this may have with emotion 
regulation, Study 3 examines qualitative data and differences in the kind of emotion 
regulation strategies people spontaneously refer to in day-to-day life.   
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STUDY 3 
8.4 Understanding Implicit Theories (A Qualitative Study) 
Study 1 and Study 2 used quantitative research methods to demonstrate that 
people’s implicit beliefs about their own intelligence and emotions differ significantly 
from their beliefs about intelligence and emotions in general. These self-beliefs also 
served as a greater predictor of achievement, emotion regulation and psychological health 
than general beliefs and were associated with these outcomes in significant and 
meaningful ways. While these findings point to important differences in the way people 
think about their emotions, much of the meaning and context of participants’ responses is 
lost without also examining the explanations for, and thinking behind, their views. For 
this reason, the primary aim for Study 3 was to use qualitative methods to take a closer 
look at how entity and incremental theorists actually think about their emotions. It also 
offered an opportunity to examine potential difference in the kinds of emotion regulation 
strategies entity and incremental theorists spontaneously refer to when asked if they can 
change or control their emotions.  
Mixed methods research –– employing both quantitative and qualitative methods – 
is increasingly regarded a pragmatic way of expanding the scope or breadth of research 
while also offsetting the weaknesses of each approach (Rossman & Wilson 1991). Some 
even regard it as essential for interpreting and strengthening the validity of significant 
quantitative findings (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham 1989), and even as a “gold standard” 
for research in social and psychological sciences (Oneuegbuzie & Leech, 2004). In this 
vein, Study 3 was designed as a qualitative exploration and investigation into the 
following research questions: 
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Q1: What do incremental and entity theorists actually think about their ability to change 
and control their emotions? What kind of reasons do they give to justify their views? 
Q2: Do participants’ scores on the four-item personal implicit theories of emotion scale 
(ITES) correspond with what they actually say when asked about their ability to 
change or control their emotions? And, 
Q3: Do incremental and entity theorists (as categorized by the ITES), differ in the kinds 
of emotion regulation strategies they make reference to when asked about their 
ability to change or control their emotions?  
Based on the theoretical hypotheses presented in chapter 6 and 7, I predicted: 
H1: Entity theorists, compared to incremental theorists, will display a restricted range of 
emotion regulation strategies (spontaneously making reference to fewer strategies) in 
their open-ended responses. 
H2: Entity theorists, compared to incremental theorists, will refer to proportionally fewer 
internal strategies (e.g., cognitive change and attentional deployment) and a 
proportionally greater number of external and antecedent-focused strategies (e.g., 
avoidance, problem solving, response modulation etc.) for regulating their emotions. 
Incremental theorists on the other hand, will refer to a proportionally greater number 
of internal emotion regulation.  
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Methods 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 158 individuals (57% female) recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Each participant was offered 
50 cents in exchange for completing the short online survey. Participants ranged from 18 
to 63 years of age (M = 33.76, SD = 12.09). The sample consisted of 47% White 
Caucasian, 27% Asian, 4% Hispanic, 4% African American, 2% European; 1% 
Australian/New Zealander; 1% Native American/Alaskan; 1% Other and 13% of subjects 
chose not to indicate their ethnicity. Participants also varied in educational backgrounds: 
11% indicated their highest level of education consisted of high school or equivalent; 3% 
indicated they had attained vocational/technical training; 30% reported having some 
university education; 36% reported completing university; 16% completed a master’s 
program; 3% had completed a doctoral degree/PhD; and, 1% completed a professional 
degree (MD/JD).  
Measures 
Implicit theories of emotion were assessed using the four-item Personal Implicit 
Theories of Emotion Scale described in Study 2. Please refer to Study 2 (Table 5) for 
scale items, and information on anchor points and scoring. For the purpose of examining 
categorical differences in open-ended responses, participants were classified either as 
incremental theorists, entity theorists, or as ‘neutral’/ ‘undecided’ according to their 
scores on the four-item ITES. According similar methods for categorizing implicit theory 
responses (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999), Incremental theorists were 
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categorized as participants with scores of 10 and below (average disagreement with the 
five-point, Agree – Disagree items); entity theorists were categorized as those with scores 
of 14 and above (average agreement with the ITES items); and participants were 
classified as “neutral” or “undecided” with scores ranging from 11 - 13 (average 
endorsement of the scale midpoint – “neither agree nor disagree”). Participants were 
asked the following question: “Do you think emotions are things you can change or 
control? Please briefly explain why or why not in the space below”. 
Content Coding  
Open-ended responses were independently coded by three coders (the primary 
researcher and two additional coders who were naïve to the research hypotheses). 
Responses were coded for: 1) Implicit beliefs about emotions (1 = incremental beliefs; 2 = 
unsure or neutral; 3 = entity beliefs) and, 2) Reference to emotion regulation strategies (0 
= no strategies mentioned; 1 = external strategies; 2 = internal strategies). Coders were 
given the following instructions about coding “People hold different beliefs about their 
emotions. Some people think emotions are things that can’t really be changed or 
controlled (entity beliefs), other people believe that we can control or change them 
(incremental beliefs). For each of the responses below, you are being asked to indicate 
what you think this person believes about their emotions.” To code for external emotion 
regulation strategies, coders were provided with the following instructions: “Some people 
believe they can control their emotions by using external strategies like changing aspects 
of a situation, environment, or circumstance. This might mean avoiding certain people, 
places or things that trigger negative feelings. Or, it might mean seeking out certain 
people, places or things that produce more positive feelings. If the response refers to 
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changing the situation in some way, please tick this box.” To code for internal emotion 
regulation strategies, coders were given the following instructions: “Some people believe 
they can control their emotions by using internal strategies like redirecting their attention, 
distracting themselves or otherwise changing their beliefs or thoughts about a situation. 
This might mean changing their thinking away from negative aspects of a situation. Or, it 
might mean thinking about positive images or things. If the response refers to internal 
strategies in some way, please tick this box”. Finally, coders were instructed, “some 
responses make no mention of how one can control their emotions. If there are no external 
or internal strategies mentioned in the response, please tick this box”  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Of the 158 initial responses, 11 were either duplicate surveys (by the same 
participant) or left mostly blank or incomplete (missing data > 25%); eight respondents 
failed to answer the primary open-ended about whether emotions could be controlled; and 
another 15 responses were either unclear or illegible (e.g., “Yes, because emotions should 
be let get better upon you”). These responses were excluded from the analysis reducing 
the total sample to 124. To establish inter-coder reliability, two additional coders 
independently coded a selection of 20 responses randomly selected from each coding 
category. A correct answer was recorded when coders ticked the same boxes as the 
researcher and left the same boxes unchecked. The researcher and additional coders were 
blind to participants’ scores on the four-item ITES measure. All three coders were in 
agreement with how to categorize 80 percent of the responses on participants’ beliefs 
about their emotions and 85 percent of responses for the presence or absence of internal 
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and external emotion regulation strategies. Inter-coder reliability ratings were calculated 
using Cohen’s Kappa – which provides a measure of agreement between raters while also 
taking into account chance levels of agreement. Cohen’s Kappa is regarded as robust 
albeit conservative measure of reliability between coders (McHugh, 2012; Viera & 
Garrett, 2005). A kappa of 1 indicates perfect agreement, whereas a kappa of 0 indicates 
agreement equivalent to chance. Independent coding of responses for implicit beliefs 
about emotions yielded good reliability ratings with the primary researcher (Rater 1, k 
= .67, p < .001; Rater 2, k = .75, p < .001) indicating ‘substantial agreement’ between 
raters according to Cohen’s Standards (Viera & Garrett, 2005). There was even stronger 
reliability between raters in coding responses for reference to emotion regulation 
strategies (Rater 1, k = .82, p < .001; Rater 2, k = .83, p < .001) – ‘almost perfect 
agreement’ between raters according to Cohen’s Standards (Viera & Garrett, 2005). 
These findings indicated good overall inter-coder reliability across raters and coding 
categories.  
Implicit Theories of Emotion 
According to the ITES, on average more people endorsed incremental beliefs 
about their emotions (n = 67). Forty-two participants were classified as ‘undecided’ and 
only 15 respondents indicated average agreement with entity beliefs about their emotions. 
The ITES coding was also reliably correlated with participants’ blindly coded open-ended 
answers about their ability to change or control their emotions (r = .84, k = .78, R = .87, p 
< .001). Samples of open-ended responses by participants according to their ITES scores 
can be seen in Table 8.  Samples of responses containing reference to internal and 
external emotion regulation strategies can also be see in Table 9.  
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Table 8. Examples of Open-Ended Responses to the Question: “Do you think emotions are things you can change or control?” 
Responses are organized by participants’ scores on the 4-item Implicit Theories of Emotion Measure. 
 
 
Incremental Beliefs (n = 67) 
Implicit Theory Scores: 4 - 10 
 
Neutral or Undecided (n = 42) 
Implicit Theory Scores: 11 – 13 
 
 
Entity Beliefs (n = 15) 
Implicit Theory Scores: 14 - 20 
 
“Of course you can -- you can change your 
point of view, you can do lots of things” 
 
“I am not sure. I would like to think that they 
are, I just don’t have any evidence that it is 
true” 
 
“Emotions are who you are - they cannot be 
changed. Emotions are just a part of what 
makes you up like your genes” 
 
“Yes. People can control their emotion with 
practice and professional help. For example, 
people who go to anger management classes so 
that they can control their outbursts” 
 
“I think I might be able to control my emotions 
in certain situations but to change them overall 
would be difficult. To me an emotion is a 
natural reaction you have to a situation” 
“I've tried to control my emotions, but I can't.  
If I'm mad, people can always tell.  I cry at a 
drop of a hat, even when it isn't appropriate” 
“Yes. Everyone has shifts in mood, and to 
some extent, that's normal. However, I know 
personally that I can turn them around instead 
of falling apart” 
 
“I'm a clinical psychologist and know that 
people's emotions can be changed. However, I 
have also struggled with MDD my entire life 
and I have difficulty believing that my own 
emotions are changeable” 
 
“I think emotions are a result of your 
upbringing and are pretty set by the time 
adulthood arrives. There may be some 
emotions one can control, but mostly they 
remain the same throughout one's life” 
“It’s not easy when you experience strong 
emotions, but we have the capacity to choose 
to change our emotions. We have free will, we 
are not slaves to our feelings” 
  
“I think some people have more control over 
their emotions than others, but everybody 
learns to keep their emotions in check to some 
extent. Imagine the tantrums you'd witness 
daily, and the public weeping if they didn't!” 
 
“I don't think emotions are things we can 
control or change. We might try to suppress 
them sometimes, but I think they are an 
integral part of who we are” 
 
“Definitely! A person doesn't have to be mood 
driven. Anyone who wants to learn to control 
their emotional responses to life situations can 
do it.” 
 “I believe that you can control your emotions 
to some extent, but in the face of traumatizing 
events, I believe it isn't possible to control 
them” 
  
“No, I can't change or control them. If it was 
possible, then all people in this world would 
look happy all the time”  
 
“Yes, you can change how you react to your 
life experiences” 
“Some people can I believe. But, not all. I try 
to learn from things that were overly emotional 
by preparing myself for the next time the same 
thing happens” 
 
“No because they are natural you cant help 
how you feel about a situation” 
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Table 9. Examples of Responses Referring to Internal and External Strategies for Regulating Emotions  
 
 
External Strategies 
(E.g., situational avoidance, social support, problem solving, medication etc.) 
 
Internal Strategies 
(E.g., reappraisal, distraction, relaxation etc.) 
 
“You can control some emotions by withdrawing yourself from the 
situation that caused the emotions” 
 
“Yes its possible to control my emotions through meditation and 
breathing exercises”  
 
“I think you can. You can always put yourself in a better situation. For 
example, if you are feeling lonely - call a friend. Company is sure to 
cheer you up” 
“It takes time and practice, but I believe people can change their beliefs 
about how they perceive certain things and eventually be able to 
change the emotions attached to those beliefs” 
 
“Yes, if you're feeling bad you can take actions to remedy what's 
making you feel bad” 
“Emotions can be changed by thinking about things differently and 
making choices that are opposite to bad thinking.” 
“Yes it’s possible to control my emotions. Physical exercise helps 
greatly in the process of controlling my mood despite heavy 
depression. 
“I think you can make an effort to control your emotions through things 
like meditation and relaxation. You can put yourself into a better state 
to not over-react” 
“Yes, because if you subject yourself to negative things… you are 
going to experience negative emotions. However, if you start to subject 
yourself to positive things... you will start to experience positive 
emotions instead!”  
 
“I think we can change our emotions with cognitive therapy. We can 
change our perspective on things by reframing the extent of how 
negative it is: "it was a bad day" versus "it was the worst day of my 
life" - it's what we say to ourselves”  
“The more you stay around someone the more emotions you develop 
for them and the more you stay away from them the less emotions you 
have for them” 
“Emotions are things that you can change and control. All is inside you 
and your mind, and you have the power to change it. Focusing on 
something positive may help”.  
“Yes. People can do things to control their emotions. For example, 
people can listen to music to change their mood” 
 
“Since emotions are the result of chemicals flooding our brains, if we 
can change the chemicals, we can change the emotions, via medication 
mostly” 
 
“I do think emotions can be changed… There are techniques to calm 
down, ways to talk yourself into seeing things differently. Counselling 
and psychotherapy can also help change how you think and react” 
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Reference to Internal and External Emotion Regulation Strategies 
Of the 124 open-ended responses, 80 contained reference to either internal or 
external strategies for regulating emotions. Twenty-six responses cited external strategies 
for regulating emotions (e.g., situation selection, seeking social support, problem solving, 
exercise etc.); and 54 responses cited internal strategies (e.g., meditation, relaxation, 
reappraisal, cognitive therapy techniques etc.). Consistent with H1, entity theorists, 
compared to incremental theorists, appeared to display a restricted range of emotion 
regulation strategies in their open-ended responses. As seen in Figure 14, people holding 
incremental beliefs about their emotions were more likely than people holding entity 
beliefs to make reference to some form of either internal or external emotion regulation in 
their answers. In fact, in the current sample over 80 per cent of incremental theorists self-
generated strategies for regulating their emotions. Consistent with H2, incremental 
theorists also referred more frequently than entity theorists to internal strategies 
(particularly strategies involving cognitive change) over external ones (see Figure 14). 
People holding entity beliefs about their emotions, on the other hand, were generally less 
likely than incremental theorists to make reference to any strategies in their open-ended 
responses. Over 65 per cent of entity theorists, made no reference to any kind of emotion 
regulation. When entity theorists did refer to emotion regulation strategies, they more 
often referred to external strategies for regulating emotions over internal ones. In fact, in 
the current sample, only five entity theorists referred to external strategies and no entity 
theorists made reference to internal strategies for regulating their emotions.  
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Figure 14. Emotion Beliefs and Emotion Regulation Strategies 
 
Figure 14: Type of emotion regulation strategy referenced in open ended answers by 
respondents holding different implicit beliefs about their emotions 
 
Discussion 
Quantitative research methods offer notable strengths in psychological research 
including: precision, objectivity, replicability, and the possibility of making generalizable 
causal inferences regarding the relationships between variables. These methods however, 
can also been criticized for being overly reductionist, artificial, and poorly suited to 
understanding the more complex meaning and context of phenomena. The primary aim of 
Study 3, was to explore how incremental and entity theorists actually think about their 
ability to change and control their emotions, and the deeper meaning and context behind 
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their views. Participants were asked the open-ended question: “Do you think emotions are 
things you can change or control. Please briefly explain why or why not in the space 
below”. In their responses, incremental theorists more frequently than entity theorists 
cited ‘their personal experience,’ ‘agency,’ ‘free will’ and one’s ability ‘learn and change’ 
as explanations for their perceived control over their emotions. Entity theorists on the 
other hand, were more likely than incremental theorists to describe emotions as “natural,” 
part of “who you are” and the results of “upbringing” and “genes”. Results from blind 
content coding indicated that the ITES scale also corresponded with participants’ open-
ended answers indicating that the four-item scale is a good measure of people’s beliefs 
about their emotions. 
In addition to examining the meaning of participants’ beliefs about their emotions, 
qualitative analyses of responses revealed that incremental and entity theorists also 
differed in the kinds of emotion regulation strategies they spontaneously made reference 
to. Consistent with predictions, incremental theorists referred more frequently than entity 
theorists to ‘internal’ attention regulation and cognitive change strategies such as 
“meditation,” “relaxation,” “breathing exercises,” and “changing ones thinking.” Entity 
theorists, on the other hand, were less likely than incremental theorists to make reference 
to any emotion regulation strategies. When they did, they were more likely to refer to 
external strategies like “problem solving,” “avoidance” and “withdrawal” from situations 
that caused negative emotions.  
Advocates of mixed-methods research argue that the when used to augment 
structured responses, qualitative methods can provide key insights into complex and 
unexpected relationships: “When we illuminate that complexity through multiple lenses, 
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we see more facets than when we only use one” (Rossman & Wilson, 1991, p.16). These 
comments bear some truth in the current study: In addition to helping validate the ITES as 
an accurate measure of peoples’ beliefs about their emotions, Study 3 provides some 
contextual data for understanding how and why people hold such varied beliefs on this 
topic. An examination of the kinds of emotion regulation strategies entity and incremental 
theorists make reference to, also point to the possibility that implicit theories influence 
emotion regulation choice in meaningful and important ways. In particular, it may be that 
implicit beliefs about emotions do, indeed, predispose entity theorists towards less 
adaptive, external and avoidance-based situation selection strategies and incremental 
theorists to more adaptive strategies like cognitive change. The first of these hypotheses is 
explored in the next chapter.  
8.5 Chapter Summary 
Studies 1 – 3 examined the implicit “self-theory” scales and their utility in 
research on self-regulation, emotional health and well-being. In Study 1 the Personal 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale was developed and validated in a sample of 643 
Australian high school students. Findings indicated that personal beliefs (incorporating 
both implicit theories and self-efficacy) were a more powerful predictor of outcomes than 
general implicit theories. In this first study, the belief that intelligence was 'fixed' – and 
outside of one’s control – was predictive of fewer achievement goals, greater helplessness 
attributions and poorer self-reported academic grades. Fixed 'entity' beliefs were also 
predictive of increased self-handicapping, truancy and disengagement from school. 
Consistent with predictions, the new self-theory scale uniquely explained greater variance 
on all these measures over and above the General Implicit Theories of Intelligence Theory 
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Scale. In Study 2 the Personal Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale was developed and 
validated in a sample of 216 American university students. In this study, a perceived lack 
of control over emotions predicted increased stress and depression as well as reduced self-
esteem and satisfaction with life. Like the Personal Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale, 
the revised Personal Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale also explained unique variance 
over and above the General Scale on all dependent variables. Finally, in a qualitative 
study (Study 3), open-ended responses helped contextualize the different ways entity and 
incremental theorists actually think about their emotions. Blind content analysis helped 
further validate the ITES and revealed that people holding entity beliefs about their 
emotions were less likely than people holding incremental beliefs to report using emotion 
regulation strategies in their open-ended responses. When they did, they were more likely 
than incremental theorists to refer to external strategies (like avoidance). Incremental 
theorists on the other hand, more frequently referred to emotion regulation strategies in 
their open-ended answers and more readily referred to internal strategies (like cognitive 
change). These qualitative findings point to differences in the kinds of strategies entity 
and incremental theorists spontaneously refer to for regulating their emotions lending 
some preliminary support to hypothesized links between Implicit Theories of Emotion and 
different forms of emotion regulation. The rest of this thesis focuses on the potential 
implications people’s implicit beliefs about emotions have for how they regulate their 
emotions in daily life. Using the revised personal implicit theories of emotion scale, 
Chapter 9 and 10 examine links between implicit theories of emotion and the selection of 
different emotion regulation strategies. Chapter 9 begins by testing associations between 
entity beliefs about emotions and the use of cognitive and behavioural avoidance 
strategies in daily life.    
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9. EMOTION BELIEFS AND AVOIDANCE4 
9.1 Introduction to Studies 4 & 5 
Chapter 8 demonstrated that people’s beliefs about intelligence and emotions have 
important associations with motivation, self-regulation and psychological health. Studies 
1 and 2 also showed that people’s beliefs about their personal intelligence and emotions 
are a stronger predictor of outcomes than their beliefs about intelligence and emotions in 
general. In the context of emotion beliefs, people who believe they cannot control their 
emotions were more likely to report reduced self-esteem and reduced satisfaction with life, 
as well as increased stress and depression. An important question that remains, however, 
is why these beliefs have such important social and affective correlates. One possibility is 
that beliefs about emotions influence the identification, selection and implementation of 
emotion regulation strategies that, in turn, determine how successful one is at managing 
their emotions (see Chapter 6 for a theoretical review). Study 3 (a qualitative research 
study) provided some preliminary support for this hypothesis. Compared to incremental 
theorists, entity theorists referred to fewer strategies for regulating their emotions in daily 
life and were more likely to cite external strategies (like avoidance) over internal 
strategies (like cognitive change).  The current chapter empirically tests these 
relationships, focusing on emotion beliefs and avoidance. Study 4 examines links between 
emotion beliefs and avoidance in daily life, and Study 5 experimentally tests these causal 
relationships by manipulating people’s beliefs about their emotions. 
                                                
4 This chapter is currently in press in Cognition & Emotion: De Castella, K., Platow, M., Tamir, M., & 
Gross, J. (2017). Implicit theories of emotion: Implications for avoidance, emotion Regulation, and 
psychological health. Emotion and Cognition. In press. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2017.1353485. 
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STUDY 4 
9.2 Implicit Theories of Emotion & Avoidance 
Study 4 examines links between implicit beliefs about emotion and avoidance-
based situation selection strategies in a diverse cross-sectional study. It also examines 
whether emotion beliefs influence well-being and clinical symptoms via avoidance-based 
emotion regulation strategies. Study 4 aimed to test the following predictions: 
H1: Entity beliefs about emotions will be positively associated with avoidance-based 
situation selection strategies (e.g., cognitive and behavioural avoidance). It will also 
be negatively associated with well-being (loneliness and satisfaction with life), and 
positively associated with clinical symptoms (stress, anxiety and depression).  
H2: The relationship between implicit beliefs and well-being/clinical symptoms will be 
explained by avoidance-based emotion regulation.   
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 112 individuals (67 female) recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Participants were offered 70 cents in 
exchange for completing a short online survey and participation was restricted to Amazon 
Turk workers with a HIT approval rate > 95% and minimum of 500 approved HITS. 
These basic requirements help ensure a higher quality of survey responders (Buhrmester 
et al., 2011). A statistical power analysis was performed for sample size estimation using 
the software package GPower (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 2016). Based on data from 
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similar research on implicit theories of emotion (Study 2, De Castella et al., 2013), 
correlation coefficients ranged from .24 to .38 - a small to medium effect by Cohen's 
(1988) standards. With a two-tailed test, an alpha = .05 and power = 0.8, the projected 
sample size needed to detect effects of this size (i.e. larger than r = .20) is approximately 
N = 110. Based on this analysis, data collection continued until I obtained a valid sample 
> 110. From 150 responses collected in total, ten were either duplicate surveys (by the 
same participant) or left mostly blank or incomplete (missing data > 10%) and were 
excluded from the analysis. To identify participants who may not have been carefully 
reading all the survey items, three questions were embedded randomly in different 
sections of the survey that instructed participants to select a specific response (e.g., 
“please select “strongly disagree”). Twenty-eight participants incorrectly answered these 
screening questions and were removed from the analysis, reducing the final sample to 112.  
Participants in the final sample ranged from 18 to 66 years of age (M = 35.27, SD 
= 12.37). The sample consisted of 58% White Caucasian, 20% Asian, 4.5% Hispanic, 
1.2% African American, 0.9% European; 15.4% of subjects chose not to indicate their 
ethnicity. Participants varied in educational backgrounds: 10.5% indicated their highest 
level of education consisted of high school or equivalent; 3.2% indicated they had 
attained vocational/technical training; 30.5% reported having some university education; 
37.9% reported completing university; 14.7% completed a masters program; 2.1% had 
completed a doctoral degree/PhD; and, 1.1% completed a professional degree (MD/JD).  
Measures 
Implicit theories of emotion. Implicit theories of emotion were assessed using 
the four-item General and Personal Implicit Theories of Emotion Scales – see Table 5 for 
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scale items (De Castella et al., 2013). Internal consistency in the current sample was 
adequate (general beliefs α = .60, personal beliefs α = .73). Descriptive statistics for all 
measures can be found in Table 10.   
Avoidance.  Avoidance was measured using the Cognitive-Behavioural 
Avoidance Scale (CBAS, Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004). The CBAS contains 31 items that 
measure avoidance strategies along cognitive, behavioural, social, and non-social 
dimensions. These include: Cognitive Social Avoidance (e.g., “I try not to think about 
problems in my personal relationships”); Behavioural Social Avoidance (e.g., “I tend to 
make up excuses to get out of social activities”); Cognitive Nonsocial Avoidance (e.g., “I 
avoid making decisions about my future”); and Behavioural Nonsocial Avoidance (e.g., “I 
quit activities that challenge me too much”). Participants are asked to rate the items on a 
five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all true for me, to 5 = Extremely true for me). 
Given the study goals, and interest in assessing common cognitive and behavioral 
avoidance-based emotion regulation strategies, I utilized the total avoidance scale and the 
separate cognitive and behavioural subscales, collapsing across the social and nonsocial 
items. Previous research using only the cognitive and behavioural scales provides support 
for this two-factor model (Blalock, 2000), and indicates that these scale dimensions are 
valid and reliable, displaying good internal consistency (Cognitive Avoidance α = .90; 
Behavioural Avoidance α = .93), and test-retest reliability at one week (Cognitive 
Avoidance α = .87; Behavioural Avoidance α = .91) (see Carvalho & Hopko, 2011). For 
each scale, items were averaged to yield a mean avoidance score, with higher scores 
indicating a greater degree of avoidance (Carvalho & Hopko, 2011). Cronbach alpha for 
the current study was .85 for cognitive avoidance and .90 for behavioural avoidance. The 
mean total avoidance score (the average across all items) was used for ease of reporting, 
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when examining avoidance as a potential mediating variable Iutilized. Descriptive 
statistics for the CBAS subscales and total CBAS scale can be found in Table 10. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the total CBAS scale was .93. 
Psychological health. Psychological health was assessed using measures of well-
being (loneliness and life satisfaction) as well as measures of clinical symptoms 
(depression, anxiety, and stress). For well-being, loneliness was measured using the 8-
item revised version of the UCLA Loneliness Scale (ULS-8, Hays & DiMatteo, 1987). 
The original UCLA Loneliness Scale (ULS-20) and the four-item short form (ULS-4) are 
widely used in personality research (Russell, 1996; Russell, Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980), 
but the newer ULS-8 is considered a reliable and valid alternative to the 20-item measure, 
and a better substitute for the ULS-20 than is the ULS-4 (Hays & DiMatteo, 1987). 
Research indicates that the ULS-8 is reliable (α = .84) and displays good concurrent and 
discriminant validity with related constructs (Hays & DiMatteo, 1987; Wua & Yao, 2008). 
Life satisfaction was measured using the five-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; 
Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). The SWLS is a commonly used measure of 
life satisfaction (e.g., “In most ways my life is close to ideal”). Items are rated on a seven-
point Likert scale with total scores ranging from 5 to 35. Internal consistency in the 
current sample was good for both scales (ULS-8, α = .86; SWLS α = .90). 
Clinical symptoms. Clinical symptoms were measured using the 21-item 
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS-21; Henry & Crawford, 2005; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 contains three subscales (each with seven items) that 
assess symptoms of stress (e.g., “I found it hard to wind down”), anxiety (e.g., “I felt 
scared without any good reason”), and depression (e.g., “I felt that life wasn’t 
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worthwhile”) within the past week. Research with the DASS indicates that the scale is 
reliable and valid for use in both clinical (Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997) 
and nonclinical samples (Henry & Crawford, 2005; Page, Hooke, & Morrison, 2007) and 
the combined 21 total score is a sensitive tool for screening for stress, anxiety and 
depression (Tran, Tran, & Fisher, 2013). In the current sample, internal consistency for 
the DASS scales was good (Stress α = .90; Anxiety α = .92; Depression α = .94; Total 
DASS α = .96). Principal components analysis of all psychological health items revealed 
that the depression, anxiety and stress (DASS) scales formed a single factor (Eigenvalues 
= 14.40, factor loadings > .61) accounting for 42.4% of the overall variance. This was 
followed by two separate factors for satisfaction with life (SWLS, Eigenvalues = 4.48, 
factor loadings > .64) and loneliness (ULS, Eigenvalues = 1.67, factor loadings > .40). 
For this reason, to examine the indirect effect of avoidance on these measures, I retained 
the separate ULS and SWLS scales and used the summed DASS-21 scale as the global 
indicator of clinical symptoms.   
Procedure 
Participants were invited to complete surveys online through Amazon Turk. They 
were also informed that participation was voluntary, confidential, that they could 
withdraw at any time, and that there were no right or wrong answers. Participants first 
completed measures of implicit theories, followed by the dependent variables: measures 
of cognitive and behavioural avoidance, psychological health, and clinical symptoms. The 
presentation order for scales and items were randomized. Ethics approval for this project 
was obtained from the Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(HREC).  
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Across all variables, missing data were rare due to form validation settings (< 1%), 
and were imputed with the overall mean for that variable – a conservative technique in 
such cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As in previous work on implicit theories (Tamir 
et al., 2007), theories of emotion were not significantly related to gender or ethnicity and 
these variables are not discussed further. Means (M), standard deviations (SD), ranges, 
internal consistencies (α) and correlations for all variables are presented in Table 10.  
As part of the preliminary analyses, I again examined which of the two emotion 
belief scales would be most meaningfully related to our dependent variables. I expected, 
as with previous research on implicit theories (Study 1 and 2, De Castella & Byrne, 2015; 
De Castella et al., 2013), that people’s personal beliefs about their emotions would be a 
better predictor of avoidance-based emotion regulation and psychological health than 
general implicit theories. To explore the predictive validity of each measure, I conducted 
a series of two-step hierarchical regression analyses examining the unique variance 
explained by the implicit theory and self-efficacy emotion beliefs measures. For each of 
the dependent variables, implicit theories of emotion were entered in the first step, 
followed by emotion regulation self-efficacy in the second step. Age, gender and 
education were not significant predictors and were therefore excluded from the analysis as 
covariates. Table 11 displays the unstandardized (B) and standardized regression 
coefficients (b), as well as R2 and R2change for the full and restricted models in each 
analysis.  
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Table 10: Emotion Beliefs and Avoidance – Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Product-Moment Correlations (Study 4, N = 112) 
    
 
Range 
Correlations   
Variable M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Emotion Beliefs & Avoidance Strategies               
1.  Fixed Emotion Beliefs Personal (ITES-P) 10.47 2.53 4.00 – 17.00 .60 1 .75** .29** .28* .30** .34** -.19^ .28* .30* .34** 
2.  Fixed Emotion Beliefs General (ITES-G) 10.55 3.02 4.00 – 20.00 .73  1 .37** .39** .41** .40** -.24^  .31** .34** 37** 
3.  Cognitive Avoidance (CBAS-C) 2.37 0.86 1.00 – 4.88 .85   1 .79** -.21** .62** -.27** .55** .59** .63** 
4.  Behavioral Avoidance (CBAS-B) 2.52 0.91 1.00 – 5.00 .90    1 .94** .64** -.32** .50** .56** .58** 
5.  Total Avoidance (CBAS-T) 2.44 0.84 1.00 – 4.75 .93     1 .67** -.31** .55** .61** .63** 
Psychological Health                
6. Loneliness (ULS-8) 15.19 4.52 7.00 – 27.00 .86      1 -.53** .46** .53** .66** 
7. Life Satisfaction (SWLS) 21.77 6.96 5.00 – 35.00 .90       1 -.11 -.09 -.41** 
8. Stress (DASS-S) 13.41 5.08 7.00 – 28.00 .90        1 .80** .76** 
9. Anxiety (DASS-A) 11.46 5.08 7.00 – 28.00 .92         1 .75** 
10. Depression (DASS-D) 12.75 5.67 7.00 – 28.00 .94          1 
 
Note:  ITES = Personal Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale; CBAS = Cognitive-Behavioural Avoidance Scale; ULS-8 = UCLA Loneliness Scale; 
SWLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale; DASS = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Table 11. Hierarchical Regression Predicting Avoidance, Well-being and Clinical 
Symptoms, Controlling for Alternative Measures of Implicit Theories (Study 4, N = 112) 
 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 
 
Dependent Variable and Step5 
 B 
 
SE 
B 
 
 
b 
 
R2 B 
 
SE 
B 
 
 
b 
 
 
R2 
Total 
 
R2 
Change 
 
Cognitive Avoidance 
         
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (General) .78 .25 .29** .08** .04 .36 .02   
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (Personal)     .82 .30 .36 .14** .06** 
          
Behavioral Avoidance           
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (General) 1.0 .33 .28** .07** -.14 .48 -.04   
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (Personal)     1.30 .40 .43** .16** .08** 
          
Loneliness (ULS)          
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (General) .60 .16 .34** .11** .14 .24 .08   
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (Personal)     .51 .20 .34** .17** .05** 
          
Life Satisfaction (SWLS)          
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (General) -.52 .26 -.19^ .04^ -.07 .39 -.03   
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (Personal)     -.50 .32 -.22 .06^ .02 
          
Clinical Symptoms (DASS)          
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (General) 1.9 .52 .33** .11** .71 .77 .12   
Fixed Emotion Beliefs (Personal)     1.3 .65 .28^ .15^ .04^ 
          
 
^ p < .05, *p < .01, **p < .001.  Results from hierarchical regression analyses reported above. Significance levels 
are based on two-tailed significance tests. Increments for variables entered at R2Change significance levels are 
based upon F tests for that step.
                                                
5 For all variables analyses were repeated using only the emotion regulation self-efficacy measure to examine whether 
efficacy beliefs predicted outcomes independently (without including the implicit theories control measure). Regulatory 
self-efficacy beliefs explained significant variance on all variables: Cognitive Avoidance R2 = .14, p < .001; Behavioral 
Avoidance R2 = .16, p < .001; Loneliness R2 = .16, p < .001; Life Satisfaction R2 = .06, p < .01; Clinical Symptoms 
(DASS) R2 = .14, p < .001. 
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Beliefs About Emotion, Psychological Health, and Avoidance 
 Consistent with H1, a lack of perceived control over emotions (personal entity 
beliefs) was associated with higher levels of cognitive avoidance (r = .37, p < .001); 
behavioral avoidance (r = .39, p < .001) as well as lower levels of psychological health – 
increased loneliness (r = .40, p < .001) and reduced satisfaction with life (r = -.24, p 
< .05) as well as higher levels of stress (r = .31, p < .001), anxiety (r = .34, p < .001), and 
depression (r = .37, p < .001) (see Table 10). 
The Mediating Role of Avoidance 
To test whether avoidance strategies mediated the associations between implicit 
theories and psychological health (H2), I conducted three separate analyses, examining 
the mediating effect of implicit theories (the predictor) via total avoidance strategies (the 
intermediary) on measures of psychological health (the dependent variables). For ease of 
reporting and because of the high correlation between the cognitive and behavioral 
avoidance subscales r = .86, I used the total avoidance scores (CBAS-T) in all analyses of 
indirect effects. The CBAS Total score is often used as an indicator of general avoidance 
and is correlated with a range of convergent measures of avoidance and depressive 
symptoms (Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004; Ottenbreit, Dobson & Quigley, 2014). In the first 
and second analyses, I examined the indirect effect of avoidance on measures of 
loneliness and satisfaction with life. In the third analyses, I examined the indirect effect of 
avoidance on clinical symptoms (stress, anxiety and depression)6. This indirect effect is 
                                                
6 In each of the three analyses (loneliness; satisfaction with life; and clinical symptoms) we used the 
summed total avoidance scale as the mediating variable and the summed total score for the DASS scales as 
the global indicator of clinical symptoms. We also conducted supplementary analyses with multiple 
mediators to examine the independent contribution of the behavioral and cognitive avoidance subscales. 
Cognitive and behavioral avoidance were both significant intervening variables in all models. 
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quantified as the product of the coefficients, a and b (See Figure 1 and 2). The direct 
effect, c’, was also estimated but is not relevant when testing mediation or indirect effects 
(Hayes, 2009)7. This indirect effect was tested for significance using the most recent 
version of the Preacher and Hayes (2008; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011) 
SPSS PROCESS macros for indirect effects, which includes a bootstrap of 10,000 
samples generating an empirically derived sampling distribution and confidence intervals 
to test for significance of the indirect effect. Unlike other traditional tests of mediation, 
such as the Sobel test (1982, 1986) and those presented by Baron and Kenny (1986), the 
bootstrap method does not assume standard errors are normally distributed and it does not 
compromise statistical power with multiple tests. It is also the preferred approach for 
small-to-medium samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). To evaluate the size of the indirect 
effects, Preacher and Kelly (2011) suggest the use of Kappa Squared (κ2) – a ratio of the 
indirect effect to the maximum possible effect permitted by the design and data. Kappa 
Squared (κ2) may vary between 0 (no indirect effect) to 1 (maximum possible indirect 
effect) and, they suggest interpreting it like R-squared with 0.01, 0.09 and 0.25 
representing small, medium, and large effects respectively. 
Results indicated that the indirect effect of emotion regulation self-efficacy via 
avoidance strategies was significant for both measures of well-being, with 95% 
confidence intervals excluding zero: loneliness (ab = .37, 95% CI = [.19, .59], κ2 = .26); 
satisfaction with life (ab = -.24, 95% CI = [-.51, -.05], κ2 = .10) (see Figure 14a). The 
indirect effect of emotion regulation self-efficacy via avoidance strategies was also 
                                                
7 The Baron and Kenny (1986) causal steps approach to mediation requires that the effects of X on Y (path 
c), X on M (path a), and M on Y (path b) are significant, as well as that the effect of X on Y controlling for 
M (path c’) is smaller than c by a non-trivial amount. However, mediation effects may still be observed in 
the absence of a significant total effect (path c) and/or a direct effect (path c’).  
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significant for clinical symptoms (ab = 1.3, 95% CI = [.76, 1.98], κ2 = .28) (see Figure 
14b). These were large effects for loneliness and clinical symptoms and a medium effect 
for satisfaction with life according to standards for Kappa squared (Preacher & Kelly, 
2011). 
Secondary Analyses 
In addition to testing the proposed causal model, I tested three alternative models 
of indirect effects: (1) Reverse causation: loneliness, satisfaction with life, and clinical 
symptoms predicting entity beliefs via avoidance (mediating variable), (2) Avoidance 
predicting loneliness, satisfaction with life, and clinical symptoms via entity beliefs 
(mediating variable), and (3) Entity beliefs predicting avoidance via loneliness, 
satisfaction with life, and clinical symptoms (mediating variables).  
Model 1 was not significant for loneliness (ab = .11, 95% CI = [-.01, .24], κ2 
= .13) or clinical symptoms (ab = .04, 95% CI = [-.00, .08], κ2 = .15), but was significant 
for satisfaction with life (ab = -.05, 95% CI = [-.10, -.01], κ2 = .11). Model 2 was not 
significant for loneliness (ab = .01, 95% CI = [-.00, .03], κ2 = .08), satisfaction with life 
(ab = -.01, 95% CI = [-.02, .00], κ2 = .08) or clinical symptoms (ab = -.00, 95% CI = [-
.00, .01], κ2 = .09). Model 3 however, was significant for all three potential mediators: 
loneliness (ab = .07, 95% CI = [.03, .10], κ2 = .25); satisfaction with life (ab = .14, 95% 
CI = [.00, .04], κ2 = .05) and clinical symptoms (ab = .06, 95% CI = [.03, .11], κ2 = .22).  
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Figure 15. Emotion Beliefs and the Mediating Role of Avoidance (Study 4, n = 112).  
 
 
 
Figure 14a. The indirect of Entity beliefs about emotions on loneliness and life satisfaction via avoidance. Values are standardized coefficients. 
When controlling for cognitive and behavioural avoidance, the regression coefficient for the effect of implicit theories (in parentheses) 
decreases to non-significance for satisfaction with life but remains significant for loneliness.  ^p < .05, *p < .01, **p < .001 
 
 
Figure 14b. The indirect of Entity beliefs about emotions on clinical symptoms via avoidance. Values are standardized coefficients. When 
controlling for cognitive and behavioural avoidance, the regression coefficient for the effect of implicit theories (in parentheses) decreases to 
non-significance for clinical symptoms (stress, anxiety and depression). ^p < .05, *p < .01, **p <.001 
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Discussion 
The primary aim of Study 4 was to examine links among implicit theories of 
emotion, avoidance-based emotion regulation, and psychological health. Consistent with 
predictions, entity beliefs about emotions were associated with increased use of self-
reported cognitive and behavioural avoidance in daily life. The more strongly people 
believed they could not control their emotions, the more they also reported difficulties 
with psychological health – increased loneliness and decreased satisfaction with life, as 
well as increased stress, anxiety and depression (findings that are consistent with results 
from Study 2). Consistent with predictions, Study 4 found evidence for the mediating role 
of avoidance with avoidance strategies indirectly explaining associations between implicit 
theories of emotion and psychological health.  Secondary analyses, however, also found 
evidence for the mediating role of emotion beliefs on avoidance via clinical symptoms 
and well-being. These findings point to the possibility of a cyclical relationship between 
avoidance and psychological health. Emotion beliefs appear to predict avoidance, well-
being and clinical symptoms, but the relationships between avoidance and clinical 
symptoms remain unclear. It may be that entity beliefs predispose people towards 
avoidance-based emotion regulation strategies, which are in turn, associated with 
increased risk of clinical symptoms and poorer overall satisfaction with life. However, it 
is also possible that entity beliefs predispose people towards poorer psychological health 
which, in-turn, promote increased avoidance-strategies in daily life. The inability to 
clarify causal relationships between variables is a limitation of correlational studies like 
this one. To help clarify these causal links, Study 5 was designed as an experimental test 
of the causal role of emotion beliefs in cognitive and behavioral avoidance.   
 178 
STUDY 5 
9.3 Manipulating Implicit Theories of Emotion 
Study 4 indicated that people’s beliefs about emotions are associated with 
avoidance-based strategies, which are in-turn associated with psychological health and 
well-being. Nonetheless, as with much of the research on implicit theories of emotion (De 
Castella et al., 2014; Kappes & Schikowski, 2013; Schroder, Dawood, Yalch, Donnellan, 
& Moser, 2015; Tamir et al., 2007), the correlational nature of this research cannot speak 
to the causal relationships between implicit theories and outcomes. For example, although 
it is possible that implicit theories predispose people towards specific emotion regulation 
strategies, it is also possible that clinical symptoms perpetuate maladaptive emotion 
regulation strategies. Similarly, when people habitually use adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies, and experience greater success regulating their emotions, they may also come 
to hold a more incremental theory (see Chapter 6 and Figures 10 and 11 – emotion beliefs 
as self-fulfilling prophecies). In the current chapter I ask, “do people’s beliefs about their 
emotions actually affect their emotion regulation efforts and in turn their psychological 
health?” 
To date, only three studies (Bigman, Mauss, Gross, & Tamir, 2015; Kneeland, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2016a; 2016b) have sought to experimentally manipulate 
people’s beliefs about emotional control. In one experimental study, Bigman and 
colleagues (2015) used a placebo drug to temporarily manipulate participants’ beliefs 
about their emotion regulation self-efficacy. Participants were told either that the drug’s 
side effects enhanced emotion regulation success (expected success condition), or that 
there were no additional side effects (control condition). They were then instructed to 
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regulate their emotions while viewing a negative film clip, and to rate their emotional 
experience as well as their emotion regulation efforts. Results indicated that participants, 
who were led to expect emotion regulation to be more successful, were subsequently 
more successful in regulating their emotional reactions compared to the control condition. 
Other experiential research, however, has produced mixed results.  
In a recent study, Kneeland et al. (2016a) temporarily manipulated people’s 
general implicit beliefs about emotions by having participants read and summarise a 
passage of text and fictitious data describing emotions as either ‘fixed’ or ‘malleable’.  
Participants then completed a negative mood induction by recalling and describing an 
upsetting personal memory before completing a state measure of emotion regulation 
(CERQ, Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001). After the negative mood induction, 
people in the ‘emotions are fixed’ condition (compared to the ‘emotions are malleable 
condition’) were less inclined to use perspective taking when considering their upsetting 
memory, but actually reported significantly reduced self-blame and greater acceptance 
regarding the upsetting event. There were also no significant differences between groups 
on other emotion regulation strategies (e.g. rumination, positive refocusing, reappraisal or 
suppression).  
In a third experimental study by the same authors, Kneeland et al. (2016b) 
examined how beliefs about emotions influenced spontaneous regulation of social anxiety. 
After completing the experimental manipulation of emotion beliefs, participants were 
given an anxiety-inducing impromptu speech task. Participants in the emotions-are-
malleable condition reported spontaneously engaging in more cognitive reappraisal 
during the speech task, but reappraisal was not associated with reductions in negative 
affect. Findings from these three experimental studies indicate that it is indeed possible to 
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manipulate people’s beliefs about emotions. Emotion beliefs also appear to influence the 
selection of emotion regulation strategies, like reappraisal. However, the consequences 
these beliefs have for emotion regulation efforts remains unclear. Furthermore, no 
research to date has explicitly examined the links between perceived control over 
emotions and avoidance-based emotion regulation or its associations with psychological 
health.  
The primary aim of Study 5 was to clarify the causal role of emotion beliefs by 
leading people to make stable internal attributions about emotional control (e.g. by 
manipulating people’s personal beliefs about their emotions) and then by assessing the 
impact of these beliefs. To do this, I provided fictitious feedback to people about the 
degree to which they could personally change or control their emotions. Historically, 
entity and incremental beliefs have been induced experimentally through explicit 
messages, case studies, and vignettes (Bergen, 1991), and indirectly through feedback, 
praise or criticism (Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Other 
interventions have taught an incremental theory using scientific research through online 
programs (Brainology, 2010), workshops (Blackwell et al., 2007), and videos, mentoring, 
and letter writing tasks (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003). 
These interventions typically focus on teaching people about brain plasticity and the 
potential change and growth; however, it is a message that may not reach all who hear it. 
Results from Studies 1, 2 and 4 (De Castella & Byrne, 2015; De Castella et al., 2013; De 
Castella et al., 2014) indicate that knowing that emotional control is possible is not the 
same as believing personally in one’s ability to change. For this reason, I sought to 
influence participants’ beliefs about how much they personally could change or control 
their own emotions, rather than focusing on their beliefs about emotions in general. I did 
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this by drawing on self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), which postulates that “individuals 
come to ‘know’ their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by 
inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior” (Bem, 1972, p. 2). Our 
manipulation, presented in the form of an online survey, was therefore devised to provide 
fictitious feedback to participants about their ability to control their emotions relative to 
others.  
In addition to this experimental manipulation, in Study 5 I included two new 
measures of avoidance. In addition to assessing cognitive and behavioural avoidance, I 
was curious about whether these findings might also extend to help-seeking avoidance: 
differences in people’s openness to, or avoidance of, psychotherapy. Research indicates 
that only a small number of people who are suffering from psychological difficulties 
actually seek psychotherapy, and treatment-avoiders often experience the highest levels of 
treatment anxieties (Kushner & Sher, 1989) as well as stigma concerns and fear of 
psychological distress (Deane & Chamberlain, 1994). Like behavioural avoidance, help-
seeking avoidance is an anticipatory avoidance-based emotion regulation strategy that can 
prove harmful for long-term psychological health to the extent that it prevents people 
from seeking mental health services.  
While there are many reasons why people might avoid seeking help – e.g., they 
may wish to avoid discussing distressing or personal information (Vogel & Wester, 2003) 
or experiencing painful feelings (Komiya, Good & Sherrod, 2000) – the most commonly 
cited reason for help-seeking avoidance is the stigma associated with seeking treatment 
(Corrigan, 2004; Corrigan & Penn, 1999, for a review). In Study 5, I was particularly 
interested in this third kind of help-seeking avoidance – avoidance and denial of mental 
health concerns in an effort to protect one’s image, self-esteem, and self-worth (Corrigan, 
 182 
2004). Entity beliefs and low self-efficacy beliefs often predict self-handicapping and 
other avoidance-based self-protective strategies in the event of setbacks and failures (see 
Study 1, De Castella & Byrne, 2015). I predicted that these findings would also extend to 
the realm of emotion regulation, with individuals being particularly prone to this kind of 
stigma-based help-seeking avoidance when they believed emotions were things that could 
not be controlled.  
To date, there has been limited research on implicit theories and help seeking, but 
entity beliefs are linked with a preference for medication over individual therapy as a 
hypothetical treatment (Schroder et al., 2015). In addition to these measures, and in an 
effort to go beyond self-report, I also assessed experiential avoidance behavior – 
specifically, avoidance of upsetting emotional stimuli. I asked participants to indicate 
their willingness to complete four additional fictitious research studies at the end of the 
experiment and provided options that were either neutral or potentially distressing. I 
predicted: 
H1: Participants in the entity (versus incremental) condition will be more likely to 
endorse cognitive and behavioural avoidance intentions in daily life, as well as 
avoidance of psychological help, and 
H2: Participants in the entity (versus incremental) condition will display greater 
avoidance of potentially distressing stimuli seen in their reduced willingness to 
participate in potentially distressing research studies.  
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Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 101 people (63 female) recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. Participants were again offered 70 cents in exchange for completing a short online 
survey. To further improve the quality of responses, participation was restricted to 
Amazon Turk workers with “Masters Qualifications” – an even more stringent 
requirement for experience with and quality of work on Amazon Turk (Buhrmester et al., 
2011). Study 5 data was collected more than 12 months after Study 4. I anticipated this 
would help reduce the likelihood of interference and overlap between participants across 
studies. Once again statistical power analyses were performed for sample size estimation 
using the software package, GPower (Erdfelder et al., 2016). Based on data from similar 
experimental research on emotion regulation self-efficacy (Bigman et al., 2015) and on 
implicit theories (Blackwell et al., 2007; Yeager, Miu, Powers, & Dweck, 2013) I 
expected between conditions effect sizes ranging from d = .6 – 1.0 (a medium to large 
effect by Cohen's (1988) standards). With a two-tailed test, an alpha = .05 and power = 
0.8, the projected sample size needed to detect effects of this size (e.g. > .57), is 
approximately N = 100. Based on this analysis, data collection continued until I obtained 
a valid sample > 100. 
Participants ranged from 21 to 66 years of age (M = 36.43, SD = 11.13) and 
consisted of 77.2% White, 12.9% Asian, 7.9% Hispanic, 5% African American, 1% 
Pacific Islander; 2% Native American/Alaskan; 2% other; and 8% indicated mixed 
ethnicities. Participants varied in educational backgrounds: 12.9% indicated their highest 
level of education consisted of high school or equivalent; 9.9% indicated they had 
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attained vocational/technical training; 30.7% reported having some university education; 
35.6% reported completing university; 8.9% completed a Masters program; and, 2% 
completed a professional degree (Ph.D/MD/JD). In total 157 initial responses were 
collected, 12 of these were duplicate surveys or left mostly incomplete (missing data > 
10%) and were excluded from the analysis. Missing data were rare due to form validation 
settings (< 1%), and were imputed with the overall mean for that variable. I again 
embedded items to screen out participants who were not reading the survey questions. 
Fifteen participants incorrectly answered these questions. Because the experimental 
manipulation required English language proficiency, I also excluded an additional six 
participants who indicated that English was not their first or primary spoken language. 
Finally, three items were embedded at the end of the survey as a manipulation check 
assessing participants’ comprehension of the ‘emotional control survey’ (i.e. “the 
emotional control survey was a measure of my ability to change my emotions”). Twenty-
three participants failed one or more of the manipulation checks, and were removed from 
the analyses, reducing the final sample to 101 (63 female). There was no significant 
difference between conditions in screening items, attrition rates or demographic variables.  
Measures 
Implicit theories of emotion.8 Implicit theories of emotion were again assessed 
using the 4-item implicit theory scales provided in Study 2 (see Table 5 for scale items). 
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale in the current sample was .85. Descriptive statistics, scale 
                                                
8 I also included measures of general implicit theories of emotion (Tamir et al., 2007), and general implicit 
theories of personality (Dweck, 1999), as well as a revised personal measure of implicit theories of 
personality. An analysis of the specificity of measures indicated that consistent with Study 1 and 2, people’s 
theories about their own emotions uniquely predicted all dependent variables over and above general 
implicit theories about emotions. Personal emotion beliefs also predicted all outcomes over and above 
general and personal implicit theories of personality.   
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means, reliabilities and correlations for Study 5 measures can be found in Tables 11 and 
12. For all dependent variables, the presentation order of scale items was randomized.   
Avoidance. To examine whether the manipulation of implicit theories led to 
changes in avoidance intentions, I developed a revised version of the cognitive and 
behavioural avoidance scale (CBAS, Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004), that assessed the 
intention to use avoidance strategies. Instead of asking participants to “indicate how true, 
in general, each statement is for you…” I asked participants to think about their behaviour 
“OVER THE NEXT MONTH” and indicate “how true you think each statement will be 
for you” (cf., Cruwys, Platow, Rieger, & Byrne, 2013). Each of the 31 scale items were 
revised to reflect behavioural intentions. For example, items like “rather than try new 
activities, I tend to stick with the things I know” now read, “rather than try new activities, 
I will stick with the things I know.” Items like “I try not to think about problems in my 
personal relationships” now read, “I'll try not to think about problems in my personal 
relationships.” Subscale scores were again calculated separately for cognitive and 
behavioural avoidance, using a five-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all true for me, to 5 = 
Extremely true for me). Scores were averaged separately for cognitive and behavioural 
avoidance, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of avoidance. Internal 
reliabilities for the current study were α = .95 for Cognitive Avoidance Intentions and α 
= .94 for Behavioural Avoidance Intentions.  
 Help-Seeking Avoidance. To examine avoidance of psychological help, I used 
the Self-Stigma of Seeking Help Scale (SSOSH, Vogel, Wade, & Haake, 2006). Research 
indicates that, along with age, gender, and distress, stigma concerns are among the 
strongest predictors of help-seeking behaviour (Deane & Chamberlain, 1994). The 
 186 
SSOSH is a 10-item scale that measures an individual’s likelihood of seeking help from a 
psychologist or mental health professional and the individual’s perceptions of help 
seeking as potentially stigmatizing (e.g., “I would feel inadequate if I went to a therapist 
for psychological help”). Participants were asked to rate each item on a seven-point Likert 
scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, to 7 = Strongly Agree). The internal reliability of this scale 
in the current study was α = .93.  
 Avoidance of Distressing Stimuli. In addition to the self-report measures 
described above, I developed a behavioural measure to assess avoidance of potentially 
distressing emotional stimuli. After completing the self-report portion of the survey, 
participants were given an opportunity to specify their interest in participating in a series 
of additional studies on emotion regulation: “Before we finish, we're interested in whether 
you would like to participate in some additional research studies. Please indicate how 
interested you are in doing the studies below and include your email, and we will send 
you a link to these surveys when they become available.” Two of the studies presented 
where emotionally nonthreatening. For example, “this survey examines links between 
emotion regulation and perception. It assesses your ability to regulate your emotions 
while looking at a series of optical illusions. This survey will take approximately 15-20 
min to complete.” The other two studies were potentially distressing. For example, “the 
purpose of this survey is to examine emotional responses to the consequences of 
homelessness and drug addiction. It involves assessing your ability to regulate your 
emotions while looking at a series of images and videos documenting drug addiction and 
homelessness. This survey will take approximately 15-20min to complete. Warning: some 
of the images and videos in this study may be distressing.” After reading each study 
description, participants were asked: “Are you interested in doing this survey?” 
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Responses were rated on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Definitely not) to 4 
(Definitely yes). Item scores were then averaged to provide one measure of intent to 
participate in the combined neutral studies (α = .92), and one measure of intent to 
participate in the combined distressing studies (α = .96). Presentation order for the 
fictitious potential future studies was also randomized.  
Control Measures. Finally, I included several control measures at the end of the 
online survey. Because the manipulation was providing positive feedback to people in the 
incremental condition and negative feedback to people in the entity condition, I also 
believed it may be important to control for mood – a potential confound in the 
experimental manipulation of implicit theories. To do so, I included the 10-item state 
version of the International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (I-
PANAS-SF, Thompson, 2007). This brief scale is composed of two five-item scales 
assessing “Positive Affect” (e.g., alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active) and 
“Negative Affect” (e.g., upset, hostile, ashamed, nervous, afraid). Participants were 
instructed to indicate to what extent they felt this way “RIGHT NOW that is, at the 
present moment.”  Each item was rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very 
slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Research with the I-PANAS-SF in qualitative and 
large cross-cultural studies indicates consistent independence between the two affect 
subscales; that the scale is reliable (α ranging from = .72 - .80); and displays good 
convergent, criterion and cross-cultural validity across a range of validation studies 
(Thompson, 2007). Reliabilities for the current study were α = .75 for negative affect and 
α = .85 for positive affect.  
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Procedure 
Eligible participants were invited to participate in a 15-20 minute research study 
about "people's moods and emotions, and the way in which people deal with difficult 
emotions in daily life." Participants were told, “this is a multiple-choice survey where you 
may learn about how effective you are at controlling your emotions - it involves 
completing a series of multiple choice questions and providing some short answers.” 
Upon reading the informed consent guidelines, participants were randomly assigned to 
either an "entity" (n = 51) or "incremental" (n = 50) condition.  
Experimental Manipulation. The manipulation took place in three parts. First, 
after beginning the study, all participants were told that they were completing an 
"Emotional Control Survey" designed to assess "how much control you have over your 
emotions." Participants were instructed to be "as honest as possible when completing 
these questions" and told, "there are no right or wrong answers." The emotional control 
survey consisted of 10 items, and participants were asked to indicate "whether the 
following statements are mostly true or mostly false for you." To manipulate participants’ 
beliefs, items were biased to promote acquiesce with either an entity or incremental view 
of emotions (adapted from procedures used by Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). For 
example, in the entity condition, items were worded to encourage endorsement of entity 
beliefs (e.g., "sometimes I can't control my emotions" and "I sometimes find myself in a 
'bad mood' at work/school"). In the incremental condition, items were worded to 
encourage endorsement of incremental beliefs (e.g., "most of the time, I'm pretty good at 
controlling my emotions" and "I rarely have emotional outbursts at work/school"). I 
expected that participants’ beliefs about their ability to control their emotions would be 
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partially inferred from observing their own responses to these multiple-choice questions 
(Bem, 1972) and would substantiate the fictitious feedback provided at the end of the 
manipulation.  
Second, I manipulated ease of retrieval in a recall task (Schwarz et al., 1991; Song 
& Schwarz, 2008). Ease of retrieval and task difficulty manipulations have frequently 
been used to manipulate self-efficacy beliefs (Sanna, 1992; Schwarz et al., 1991), with 
easy tasks often leading participants to believe they have greater control and/or abilities. 
To manipulate ease of retrieval, participants were asked to provide "personal examples 
from the past six months where you feel that you successfully managed, changed, or 
controlled your emotions." They were asked to "do your best to provide one example in 
each of the spaces below" and were told, "when you've completed all the examples (or as 
many as you can), click the arrows below to move on to the next set of questions." In pilot 
testing (n = 23), the average number of spontaneously generated examples per participant 
was 4.43 and only one participant was able to provide 10 examples. Based on this 
information, I assumed it would be relatively easy for participants to recall up to four 
examples of successful emotion regulation over the last six months, but that providing 
more than 10 examples would be difficult. For the second segment of the manipulation, I 
manipulated task difficultly by providing only four spaces for examples of successful 
emotion regulation in the incremental condition (an easy task) and a total of 14 spaces for 
examples in the entity condition (a difficult task). I anticipated that participants would 
interpret this difficulty with recall as evidence of their difficulty controlling their 
emotions.  
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Third, after completing the Emotional Control Survey and providing personal 
examples of emotional control from their own lives, participants were then provided with 
fictitious performance feedback on their ability to control their emotions. Fictitious 
feedback manipulations have long been used to manipulate people’s beliefs about their 
skills and abilities (Valins, 1966) and relative identification with social groups (Platow, 
Huo, Lim, Tapper, & Tyler, 2015). In the current study, I provided the following feedback 
in the Incremental Condition: “You appear to have a substantial degree of control over 
your emotions. You have scored in the top 15% of people in our research on emotion 
regulation.” In the Entity Condition, participants were told, “You may have substantial 
difficulty controlling your emotions. You have scored in the bottom 15% of people in our 
research on emotion regulation.” Participants were also provided with an image of a bell 
curve, which visualized their relative ability to control their emotions (cf., Platow & 
Knippenberg, 2001).  
  After completing the experimental manipulation, participants completed measures 
of implicit theories to examine the effects of the manipulation. They then completed three 
measures of avoidance (the outcome variables): self-report measures of avoidance 
intentions; help seeking avoidance; and a behavioural measure of avoidance of distressing 
emotional stimuli (see measures section above).  Finally, after completing the survey, 
participants were debriefed and informed about the experimental nature of the study. 
They were also provided with information and research about implicit theories and 
emotion regulation and invited to contact the researcher for copies of the research articles 
or to learn more about the topic. 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Prior to analysis, all variables were examined for missing values, which were rare 
due to form validation measures (< 1%), and were imputed with the overall mean for that 
variable. Correlations for all variables in each condition can be seen in Table 12. Means 
(M), standard deviations (SD), ranges, and between-subjects t-tests for all variables are 
presented in Table 13.  
I first tested whether there were differences between conditions on measures of age, 
gender, education or ethnicity. There were none; and there were no associations between 
these variables and participants’ implicit theories. These variables are not discussed 
further. Next, I examined whether the manipulation caused differences in positive or 
negative affect (a potential confounding variable). Results indicated no significant 
difference between conditions in positive affect or in negative affect, ruling out mood 
changes between conditions as an alternative explanation of findings. Finally, I examined 
whether the manipulation led to differences in participants’ implicit theories about their 
emotions. Results indicated a significant difference between conditions on participants’ 
implicit theories, indicating the manipulation had the intended effect on participants’ 
beliefs about their emotions9.  
 
                                                
9 The experimental manipulation also uniquely led to changes in participants’ implicit theories of emotion 
and not their implicit theories of personality (Mentity = 12.10, SD = 5.10; Mincremental = 10.18, SD = 4.81), 
t(99) = 1.95 p = .55, R2 = .04, CI [-.04, 3.88]. These data confirmed that the effects of manipulation were 
focused on implicit theories of emotion and did not generalize to other domains of implicit theories such as 
implicit theories of personality. 
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Table 12: Entity and Incremental Conditions – Correlations (Study 5, N = 101) 
 
 
 
Note:  Correlation coefficients for the entity condition are presented above the diagonal and correlations for 
the incremental condition are presented below the diagonal; CBAS = Cognitive-Behavioural Avoidance 
Scale; Help Seeking Avoidance = Self-Stigma of Seeking Help Scale (SSOSH). I-PANAS-SF = 
International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
 
Effects of the experimental manipulation on emotion beliefs 
To examine whether the manipulation led to significant differences in participants’ 
beliefs about emotions I conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA), examining the 
effect of the manipulation on the different belief measures: implicit theories of emotion 
and emotion regulation self-efficacy. Results indicated a significant difference between 
conditions on participants’ beliefs about emotions. This was true both for their general 
implicit theories about emotions (Mentity = 13.49, SD = 4.98; Mincremental = 9.72, SD = 3.94), 
F(99) = 17.7 p < .001, ηp2 = .15) and for their personal implicit theories (Mentity = 12.76, 
SD = 4.9; Mincremental = 9.14, SD = 4.81), F(99) = 11.59 p < .001, ηp2 = .14). Higher scores 
denote a greater perceived lack of control over emotions. These data indicate that the 
manipulation did lead to significant differences between conditions in participants’ beliefs 
about emotions.  
                             Correlations 
Variables  α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Emotion Beliefs & Avoidance         
1.  Entity Beliefs (Self-Theory) .85 1 .51** .57** 56** .17 .25 -.05 
2.  Cognitive Avoidance (CBAS) .95 .59** 1 .86** .96** .46** .37** -.20 
3.  Behavioural Avoidance (CBAS) .94 .58** .86** 1 .97** .47** .27* -.20 
4.  Total Avoidance (CBAS) .97 .61** .96** .97** 1 .48** .33* -.20 
5.  Help Seeking Avoidance  .93 .41** .35* .43* .41** 1 .29* .02 
Control Measures         
6. Negative Affect (I-PANAS-SF) .75 .41* .26 .28 .28 .47** 1 -.17 
7. Positive Affect (I-PANAS-SF) .85 -.31^ -.19 -.26 -.24 -.11 .01 1 
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Table 13. Experimental Effects on Avoidance and Other Outcomes by Condition (Study 5, N = 101) 
 
Note: Means (and SD’s) for each condition. F-tests, p-values, confidence intervals for the difference between conditions and measures of effect size (Cohen’s d).
 Entity Condition  (n = 51) 
Incremental  
Condition (n= 50) 
   
95% CI 
 
Variables M (SD) M (SD) Range  F(99) p LL      UL Cohen’s d  
 
Implicit Theories & Avoidance   
 
   
 
1. Entity Beliefs about Emotions (Self-Theory) 12.76 (4.89) 9.14 (4.21) 4 – 28 15.98 <.001 [1.83, 5.42] .81 
2. Cognitive Avoidance Intentions (CBAS-C) 2.14 (0.86) 1.65 (0.77) 1 – 5 9.06 .003 [.17, .81] .60 
3. Behavioural Avoidance Intentions (CBAS-B) 2.62 (0.94) 1.99 (0.83) 1 – 5 12.76 <.001 [.28, .99] .71 
4. Total Avoidance Intentions (CBAS-T) 2.38 (0.87) 1.82 (0.77) 1 – 5 11.71 <.001 [.24, .89] .68 
5. Avoidance of Psychological Help (SSOSH) 3.31 (1.2) 2.81 (1.24) 1 – 5 4.26 .04 [.19, .96] .41 
6. Distressing Studies 2.09 (1.6) 2.34 (1.12) 1 – 4 6.53 .01 [.13, 1.01] .51 
7. Avoidance of Neutral Studies 2.38 (1.1) 2.04 (1.02) 1 – 4 2.57 .11 [-.08, .77] .32 
Control Measures        
8.  Entity Beliefs about Emotions (General) 13.49 (4.99) 9.72 (3.94) 4 – 28  17.70 <.001 [1.99, 5.55] .84 
9. Negative Affect (I-PANAS-SF) 6.53 (2.34) 5.82 (1.70) 5 – 25  1.74 .09 [-.10, 1.52] .34 
10. Positive Affect (I-PANAS-SF) 14.39 (5.15) 15.60 (5.02) 5 – 25  -1.19 .24  [-3.21, 0.80] -.24 
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Emotion beliefs and avoidance intentions  
To test whether our manipulation led to increased avoidance intentions, I conducted 
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effect of the manipulation on all our 
avoidance measures (see Table 4). As predicted, the manipulation led to significant 
differences in cognitive and behavioral avoidance, with participants in the entity condition 
reporting greater total avoidance intentions (MEntity = 2.38, SD = 0.87; MIncremental = 1.82, 
SD = 0.77), F(99) = 11.71 p < .001, d = .68). Results also indicated that participants in the 
entity condition, compared with the incremental condition, reported significantly greater 
likelihood of avoiding psychological help (MEntity = 3.31, SD = 1.2; MIncremental = 2.81, SD 
= 1.24), F(99) = 4.26 p < .05, d = .41).  See Figure 16.  
Emotion beliefs and avoidance of potentially distressing emotional stimuli  
To test whether the implicit theory manipulation actually led to changes in 
behavioural avoidance of distressing emotional stimuli, I conducted a 2 (condition: entity 
vs. incremental) X 2 (study type: distressing vs. neutral) mixed ANOVA with condition 
as the between-subjects factor and study type interest as the within-subject variable. As 
predicted (H2), the analysis yielded a significant main effect for condition, F(1, 99) = 
5.10, p = .026, indicating that people in the entity condition were significantly more likely 
to avoid both kinds of fictitious emotion regulation studies than participants in the 
incremental condition (MEntity = 2.65, SD = 1.1, MIncremental = 2.2, SD = 1.1).  There was 
also a significant within-subject main effect for study type, F(1, 99) = 24.85, p < .001. 
Across conditions, participants were significantly more likely to avoid the potentially 
distressing research studies than the neutral ones (MDistressing = 2.62, SD = 1.1, MNeutral = 
2.2, SD = 1.1) 
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Figure 16. Experimental Manipulation on Avoidance Strategies (Study 5, n = 101) 
 
Figure 16. The effect of the manipulation on self-reported avoidance intentions. 
Compared to participants in the incremental condition, participants in the entity 
condition reported increased intentions to engage in avoidance-based emotion regulation 
strategies over the next month and reported being more likely to avoid seeking 
psychological help. * p < .05,  ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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There was no significant interaction between conditions and study type, F(1, 99) = 1.90, p 
= .17). Examining the conditions separately using between-subjects t-tests, results 
indicated there were no significant differences between conditions in participants’ interest 
in the neutral studies (see Table 13). However, people in the entity condition did report 
significantly less interest in participating in the potentially distressing studies. These 
findings indicate that when people believe they cannot change or control their emotions, 
they are more likely to avoid not only stimuli that could be distressing, but any stimuli 
that requires them to regulate their emotions.  
Discussion 
Study 5 showed that it was possible to change people’s personal implicit theories 
about their emotions by leading them to infer that they either struggled with (entity 
condition) or had control over (incremental condition) their emotions. Compared to the 
incremental condition, participants in the entity condition reported greater intentions to 
use cognitive and behavioural avoidance strategies to regulate their emotions over the 
next month, and they also reported greater likelihood of avoiding psychological help. 
Furthermore, when presented with opportunities to participate in a series of additional 
fictitious studies, people in the entity condition reported being significantly more likely to 
avoid emotion regulation studies.  
Chapter Summary: Studies 4 & 5 
 The primary aim of studies 4 and 5 was to examine links between implicit beliefs 
about emotion and avoidance-based emotion regulation. In a cross-sectional study (Study 
4), people who believed they could not control their emotions were more likely to report 
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using cognitive and behavioural avoidance strategies in daily life. These avoidance 
strategies, in turn, mediated the associations between implicit theories and psychological 
health. Study 5 (an experimental study) assessed the causal relationship between implicit 
theories and avoidance by manipulating people’s beliefs about their emotions. Compared 
to people in the incremental condition, when people were led to believe that they had 
difficulty controlling their emotions (entity condition), they endorsed significantly greater 
intentions to use cognitive and behavioural avoidance over the next month. They also 
reported greater intentions to avoid psychological help for emotional difficulties, and 
were more likely to avoid opportunities to participate in additional emotion regulation 
research. These findings shed light on the relationship between implicit theories and 
emotion regulation. They indicate that people’s implicit theories about their emotions 
influence how they seek to regulate their emotions in daily life. When emotions are 
believed to be uncontrollable, these beliefs appear to incline people towards maladaptive 
avoidance strategies, reduced likelihood of seeking psychological help, and avoidance of 
potentially distressing emotional stimuli. 
Implications for Research on Emotion Beliefs 
These findings provide novel evidence for the causal role of implicit theories in 
influencing a range of different avoidance strategies. To date, only three studies have 
successfully manipulated people’s beliefs about emotional control and demonstrated the 
impact of these beliefs on emotion regulation and experience (Bigman et al., 2015; 
Kneeland, Dovidio, Joormann, & Clark, 2016a; 2016b). Although research has 
demonstrated links between control beliefs and avoidance in educational settings 
(Blackwell et al., 2007; De Castella & Byrne, 2015; Robins & Pals, 2002), the current 
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study represents an important step in extending this work to the field of emotion 
regulation. Importantly, by examining the role of avoidance-strategies, these findings 
begin to clarify existing relationships between implicit theories and psychological health 
outcomes (see Studies 2 – 4). They also suggest that avoidance based emotion regulation 
strategies may be one potential mechanism, which explains how, and why, beliefs about 
emotion are associated with psychological health and well-being.  
Results from the current study indicate that when people believe they cannot 
control their emotions they are more likely to engage in avoidance-based emotion 
regulation. As an antecedent-focused, situation selection strategy, avoidance enables 
people to intervene prior to an emotion-eliciting situation to influence the developmental 
course of an emotion before it has fully arisen (Gross & Thompson, 2007). As reviewed 
in Chapter 6.3, avoidance strategies may become the strategy of choice for individuals 
who perceive themselves incapable of regulating their emotions. This may be the case 
because these people feel helpless in managing their emotions; because they perceive 
limited alternative strategies available to them; or because they lack self-efficacy for 
implementing other emotion regulation strategies. Furthermore, emotion-eliciting 
situations may also be particularly frightening or worrisome for individuals who believe 
they cannot control their emotions which may be yet another reason for utilizing 
avoidance. By examining the role of avoidance-based emotion regulation strategies, 
results from Study 5 begin to clarify existing relationships between perceived control over 
emotions and psychological health outcomes (Studies 2, 3 and 4; De Castella & Byrne, 
2015; Romero, Master, Paunesku, Dweck, & Gross, 2014; Schleider, 2015; Tamir et al., 
2007), by pointing to one potential mechanism (avoidance), which may explain how and 
why beliefs about emotion have such important social and psychological correlates.  
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Implications for Emotion Regulation and Psychological Health 
Beyond the implications these findings have for research on implicit theories, 
results from the current study have important implications for research on psychological 
health. Although avoidance can, at times, be used skilfully as an emotion regulation 
strategy, reliance on avoidance is widely regarded as a maladaptive form of emotion 
regulation, and one that is associated with procrastination, self-handicapping, and poor 
performance (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; De Castella & Byrne, 2015; Zuckerman, Kieffer, 
& Knee, 1998), as well as greater feelings loneliness, inauthenticity, and disconnection 
(John & Gross, 2004), and lower overall well-being and satisfaction with life (Gross & 
John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004). Avoidance-strategies also predict daily levels of 
anxiety and increased risk of depression in non-clinical (Dickson, Ciesla, & Reilly, 2012; 
Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & Wong, 2007; Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004) and in clinical 
samples (Kuyken & Brewin, 1994; Ottenbreit, Dobson, & Quigley, 2014). Given the 
many negative consequences of avoidance strategies, it is puzzling why people so often 
rely on these strategies for regulating their emotions in daily life. Findings from these 
studies help clarify the role of implicit beliefs as antecedents to this kind of emotion 
regulation. They indicate that when people believe they have limited control over their 
emotions, they are more likely to turn to avoidance-based strategies to regulate them.  
These findings also have important practical implications for psychological 
treatments and interventions. Research on implicit theories has repeatedly demonstrated 
that simple interventions can have long-lasting effects (Aronson et al., 2002; Blackwell et 
al., 2007; Good et al., 2003). The current study succeeded in temporarily manipulating 
people’s implicit theories about their emotions. This indicates that it may be possible – 
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through carefully crafted interventions – to bring about meaningful change in people’s 
beliefs about their emotions. Developing interventions aimed at longer-term belief-change 
promises to be fruitful area for future research and may have important implications for 
psychotherapy and clinical treatment. In addition to focusing on the role of avoidance, the 
process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b) identifies a wide range of emotion 
regulation strategies available to people at different stages in the emotion generation 
process. The current chapter has considered cognitive and behavioural avoidance as one 
set of situation selection focused strategies. However, it is also important to examine the 
relationships between implicit beliefs about emotions and other adaptive and maladaptive 
forms of emotion regulation such as strategies involving attentional deployment and 
cognitive change (a focus of the next chapters – Chapter 10 and 11).  
In addition to influencing the use of cognitive and behavioural avoidance, results 
from the current studies indicate that implicit theories may also play an important role in 
promoting help seeking behaviour. In Study 5, participants who were led to believe they 
could not control their emotions were significantly more likely to report intentions to 
avoid psychological help. Research indicates that stigma, anxiety and treatment 
fearfulness are significant predictors of treatment avoidance (Kushner & Sher, 1989; 
Deane & Chamberlain, 1994). Psychotherapy can be anxiety provoking for many, and this 
may be particularly true for people who believe they cannot control their emotions. If 
patients more readily hold fixed entity beliefs about their emotions — believing them to 
be stable qualities or personality traits rather than a treatable psychiatric problem — this 
may help explain why many sufferers fail to seek treatment (Grant et al., 2005). To the 
extent that treatment ambivalence is associated with patients’ entity theories of their 
emotions, or a desire to avoid exposure to their own emotions, strategies for explicitly 
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targeting these beliefs may help motivate people to seek treatment and to see it through to 
completion.  
Planning Next Studies 
Despite making a number of important contributions to research on implicit 
theories and emotion regulation, several limitations should be noted. First, the current 
studies explored implicit theories in diverse community samples through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). These samples have been found to be at least equal in quality 
and superior in representation and diversity to traditional student samples (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). MTurk is also increasingly used clinical research and has been 
used to recruit clinical populations (Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). Nonetheless, 
the MTurk’s user populations assume participants must have regular computer and 
Internet access, and an understanding of the MTurk platform to qualify for studies. For 
this reason, it is important to acknowledge that certain populations (e.g., low income, 
older adults) may be underrepresented among MTurk users. MTurk, being an online study 
platform, also suffers from higher attrition rates than may be present in more controlled 
experimental samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011). This may also be a limitation of Studies 4 
and 5. A total of 23 participants failed the manipulation check in Study 5 indicating the 
possibility of non-random attrition. There were, however, no significant differences 
between participants who passed, and participants who failed, the manipulation check on 
demographic variables (age, gender and ethnicity) or on any of the dependent variables. 
Nonetheless, future research with community and clinical samples and more controlled 
experimental studies would help control for attrition and broaden the generalizability of 
the identified links between emotion beliefs, emotion regulation and psychological health.  
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Second, in the current studies I focused on examining links between implicit 
theories and avoidance in non-clinical samples. This is an important first step in 
understanding links between implicit theories and emotion regulation. However, given the 
potential implications this research has for mental health (Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004; 
Hayes et al., 1996), it will be important to examine links between implicit theories and 
symptoms in clinical samples. Findings from the current research suggest that cognitive, 
behavioral and help-seeking avoidance may be potent mediating variables in explaining 
links between emotion beliefs and clinical symptoms. To date, it is not clear to what 
extent entity beliefs arise with repeated difficulty regulating emotions, and to what extent 
they become self-fulfilling prophecies leading to maladaptive emotion regulation and 
clinical symptoms for patients. Further research is still needed to clarify the reciprocal 
relationship between emotion beliefs and emotion regulation. Study 5 demonstrated that it 
is possible to change people’s beliefs about their emotions. Examining how implicit 
theories might be changed in clinical populations is an important topic of future research 
and may have implications for clinical treatment (something I explore in Chapter 11). 
Third, in the present research, when people were led to believe they could not 
control their emotions, they also reported being more likely to avoid psychological help. 
Help-seeking avoidance is a significant problem in many clinical populations with 
individuals often struggling for prolonged periods (often up to 9 years) before finding 
appropriate specialist care (Wagner, Silove, Marnane, & Rouen, 2006). If patients hold 
fixed entity beliefs about their emotions – believing them to be stable qualities or 
personality traits rather than a treatable psychiatric disorder – this may help explain why 
many sufferers fail to seek treatment (Grant et al., 2005). Targeted interventions aimed at 
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addressing these beliefs may therefore have potential not just in treatment, but also for 
promoting help-seeking behavior in the first place.  
A fourth limitation relates to measurement. Much of the current research on 
implicit theories has relied on self-report measures (see Dweck, 1999 for a review). A 
strength of the current study was the ability to replicate the findings for the association 
between implicit theories and avoidance across studies and measures. In addition to using 
the self-report cognitive and behavioural avoidance scales and measures of help-seeking, 
the manipulation also influenced actual avoidance behaviour. In Study 5, participants in 
the entity condition displayed significantly greater actual avoidance of fictitious emotion 
regulation studies. These findings begin to move beyond self-reports by examining 
avoidance behaviour. Larger longitudinal research studies would also offer benefits for 
clarifying the causal relationships between mediating variables; how emotion regulation 
patterns change over time; and the impact this might have on emotion regulation, clinical 
treatments and psychological health (this is something I explore in the next chapter). 
Despite these limitations, the current studies make several important contributions to 
research on implicit theories and emotion regulation. Consistent with findings from Study 
2 and existing research on implicit theories of emotion (Kappes & Schikowski, 2013; 
Schroder et al., 2015; Veilleux, Salomaa, Shaver, Zielinski, & Pollert, 2015), the current 
chapter identified avoidance strategies as a potential mediating variable between implicit 
theories and psychological health (Study 4). Study 5 (an experimental study), further 
demonstrated a causal link between implicit theories and avoidance, indicating that the 
beliefs people hold about their ability to change or control their emotions do indeed have 
important consequences for emotion regulation, avoidance and help-seeking behaviour.  
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10. EMOTION BELIEFS, ATTENTIONAL DEPLOYMENT   
AND RESPONSE MODULATION10 
10.1 Introduction to Studies 6 and 7 
Chapter 9 demonstrated that people’s beliefs about their emotions have important 
implications for avoidance-based emotion regulation. In Study 4 (a cross-sectional study), 
fixed entity beliefs about emotions were associated with increased use of cognitive and 
behavioral avoidance in daily life. In study 5 (an experimental study), when people were 
led to believe they had difficulty controlling their emotions (entity condition), they were 
significantly more likely to report intentions to use avoidance strategies over the next 
month. They also reported greater intentions to avoid psychological help for emotional 
difficulties and were more likely to avoid subsequent emotion regulation studies. These 
findings start to explain why people’s beliefs about their emotions have such important 
associations with motivation, well-being and psychological health (Studies 1 – 3). 
However, avoidance strategies only represent one category of emotion regulation. Could 
emotion beliefs also influence the selection and implementation of other emotion 
regulation strategies that have more or less adaptive consequences for psychological 
health? The current chapter focuses on this question in relation to attention-focused and 
response-focused emotion regulation. Study 6 examines links between emotion beliefs, 
attention regulation and response modulation in a cross-sectional sample. Study 7 extends 
this work in a longitudinal intervention study.  
                                                
10 This chapter is currently in prep for submission: De Castella, K., Platow, M., & Gross, J. (2017). 
Emotion beliefs as mediators of change in Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR). Behavior 
Research and Therapy.  
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STUDY 6 
10.2 Emotion Beliefs, Attention Regulation and Response Modulation 
Attention regulation broadly refers to “how individuals direct their attention within a 
given situation in order to influence their emotions” (Gross & Thompson, 2007 p.13). 
Common examples include distraction, concentration, mindfulness, rumination and 
catastrophizing (see Chapter 3 and 4 for a review). As with most forms of emotion 
regulation, attention regulation strategies can be used in adaptive and maladaptive ways. 
Rumination and catastrophizing are generally regarded as maladaptive attention 
regulation strategies because they most often involve intrusive and uncontrollable 
negative thinking (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), and are associated with various 
forms of psychopathology (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, Roemer, & Kinyon, 1995) and 
physical disability (Severeijins, Vlaeyen, van den Hout, & Weber, 2001). Mindfulness, on 
the other hand, is a widely regarded as adaptive attention regulation strategy (Lutz, 
Slagter, Dunne & Davidson, 2008). It involves a state of being attentive to, and aware of, 
what is taking place in the present moment, in an accepting and nonjudgmental way 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Mindfulness has also been described as “lucid awareness” (Bodhi, 
2013), “clear comprehension,” and “the meta-attentive ability to monitor one’s mental 
states” (Dreyfus, 2013). As a meditation technique, mindfulness has been practiced for 
thousands of years in Eastern religions as a method for cultivating insight, equanimity and 
spiritual growth (Kabat-Zinn, 2011). More recently, researchers also become interested in 
mindfulness because of its beneficial impact on psychological distress (Khoury, Shama, 
Rush & Fournier, 2015) and a wide variety of chronic medical conditions (Bohlmeijer, 
Prenger, Taal & Cuijpers, 2010).  
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 When individuals are unable to successfully regulate their emotions with early-
stage strategies like attention regulation, they may turn to later-stage strategies like 
response modulation to manage symptoms of emotional distress once they have arisen 
(see Chapter 3 for a review of early and later-stage emotion regulation strategies in the 
Process Model). Response modulation refers to strategies aimed at “influencing 
physiological, experiential or behavioural responding as directly as possible” (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007 p.15). Common examples include: suppression, prescription medication, 
illicit drug use, alcohol, nicotine and caffeine. While response modulation strategies are 
widely used, and can have short-term benefits for managing emotions in daily life, 
reliance on these strategies can lead to dependence and become problematic, even harmful, 
for long-term physical and psychological health (Compton & Volkow, 2006; Kelly & 
Bardo, 2016).  
Despite the maladaptive impact of strategies like rumination, catastrophizing and 
response modulation, and the adaptive impact of attention regulation strategies like 
mindfulness, not everyone makes use of adaptive strategies in day-to-day life. Why is 
this? One possibility is that people’s beliefs about their emotions predispose them towards 
specific attention regulation and response modulation strategies that have more or less 
adaptive profiles. As reviewed in Chapter 6, when people believe they cannot control 
their emotions, they may be less inclined to identify, select and implement intentional and 
internal attention and cognitive regulation strategies (e.g., mindfulness). With a restricted 
range of strategies at their disposal, people holding entity beliefs about their emotions 
may in turn be more likely to engage in rumination and catastrophizing about their 
perceived lack of control over their emotional distress, possibly also inclining them 
towards external response modulation strategies to manage their symptoms.  
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Preliminary findings from Study 3 indicate that when individuals believe they 
cannot control their emotions, they are spontaneously more likely to make reference to 
using external regulation strategies (like response modulation) over internal strategies 
(like attention regulation). As reviewed in Chapter 6, there is also some research linking 
emotion beliefs with response modulation strategies like alcohol and drug abuse 
(Schroder et al., 2017), and increased preference for medication over psychotherapy for 
mental health problems (Schroder et al., 2015). These findings are consistent with 
research on essentialist beliefs about mental illness, specifically, that a perceived lack of 
control over mental health conditions is positively associated with a desire for medication 
and biological treatments (Dar-Nimrod & Heine 2011; Deacon 2013; Kvaale et al. 2013; 
Phelan et al. 2006). 
In addition to these direct links between emotion beliefs and response modulation, it 
is also possible that emotion beliefs influence response modulation via their impact on 
attention regulation. There is growing research linking mindfulness-based attention 
regulation with reduced reliance on medications and substance use (common response 
modulation strategies). Mindfulness training, for example, significantly reduces reliance 
on nicotine (Brewer et al., 2011; 2014), alcohol and drug use (Bowen, Chawla & Marlatt, 
2010; Tang, Tang & Posner, 2016) as well as medication for insomnia (Gross et al., 2011) 
and pain management (Kabat-Zinn, 1985). In one study with patients suffering from 
chronic pain, mindfulness training led to a reduction in use of analgesics for 44 percent of 
patients, and 28 percent of patients discounted use of analgesics altogether (Kabat-Zinn, 
1985). Based on these findings (and the theory and research presented in Chapter 6), the 
current study aimed to test the following predictions: 
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H1: Entity beliefs about emotions will be negatively associated with adaptive attention 
regulation (e.g., mindfulness) and positively associated with maladaptive attention 
regulation strategies (e.g., rumination, catastrophizing) in daily life. 
H2: Entity beliefs about emotions will be positively associated with the use of response 
modulation strategies (e.g. use of alcohol, caffeine, cigarettes and medication) as a 
means of regulation emotions. And,  
H3: The relationship between entity beliefs about emotions and response modulation (e.g. 
alcohol, caffeine, cigarettes and medication) will be explained via mindfulness-based 
attention regulation. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 94 individuals (55 female) recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Each participant was offered 
50 cents in exchange for completing the short online survey. Of 100 initial responses, six 
were either duplicate surveys (by the same participant) or left mostly blank or incomplete 
(missing data > 10%) and were excluded from the analysis, reducing the sample to 94. 
Participants in the final sample ranged from 18 to 68 years of age (M = 35.81, SD = 12.4). 
The sample consisted of 49% White Caucasian, 30% Asian, 2% Hispanic, 2% African 
American, 1% European; 16% of subjects chose not to indicate their ethnicity. 
Participants varied in educational backgrounds: 12% indicated their highest level of 
education consisted of high school or equivalent; 3% indicated they had attained 
vocational/technical training; 31% reported having some university education; 35% 
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reported completing university; 15% completed a Masters program; 3% had completed a 
doctoral degree/PhD; and, 1% completed a professional degree (MD/JD).  
Measures 
Emotion beliefs. As with previous studies, implicit theories of emotion were 
assessed using the 4-item Personal Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale – see Table 5 (De 
Castella et al., 2013). Internal consistency in the current sample was adequate (α = .68).  
Maladaptive attention regulation. Maladaptive attention regulation strategies 
were measured using two subscales (rumination and catastrophizing) from the short 
version of the cognitive emotion regulation questionnaire (CERQ-short). Each subscale 
contained two items. For the rumination scale these included: “I often think about how I 
feel about what I have experienced” and “I am preoccupied with what I think and feel 
about what I have experienced”. For the catastrophizing scale items included: “I keep 
thinking about how terrible it is what I have experienced” and “I continually think about 
how horrible the situation has been”.  Research with the CERQ-short indicates that the 
scales are valid and reliable replicating the relationship between the longer CERQ and 
related measures of psychological health (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006). Internal consistency 
for the current sample was adequate (Rumination α = .60; Catastrophizing α = .70).  
Adaptive attention regulation (mindfulness). Adaptive attention regulation was 
measured using the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al. 2006) The 
FFMQ is the most widely used measure of mindfulness-based attention regulation. It is a 
39-item self-report scale that was created through factor analysis using five pre-existing 
mindfulness questionnaires. The FFMQ contains five factors which appear to represent 
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different elements of mindfulness as it is currently conceptualized. These elements 
include: 1) Observing (e.g., “I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily 
sensations, and emotions”), 2) Describing (e.g. “Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I 
can find a way to put it into words”), Acting with Awareness (e.g. “I am easily distracted 
(Reverse scored)), Non-judging of Inner Experiences (“I criticize myself for having 
irrational or inappropriate emotions”), and Non-reactivity to Inner Experiences (“I watch 
my feelings without getting lost in them”). Research with the FFMQ indicates that it is 
internally consistent and reliable (Baer et al., 2006; 2008). The scale also displays good 
construct validity with mindfulness facets differentially correlated in expected ways with 
related constructs and psychological symptoms (Baer et al., 2006; 2008; Van Dam, 
Earleywine & Danoff-Burg, 2009; Williams, Dalgeish, Karl & Kuyken, 2014). Internal 
consistency for the current sample was good with coefficients for the five facets ranging 
from .78 to .93  
Response Modulation. Response Modulation was measured with 20 items that 
asked participants about their use of specific substances to regulate their emotions 
(alcohol, caffeine, cigarettes, and medication). These items were developed for the 
purposes of the current study. Items included “I drink alcohol to help me forget my 
worries” and “I drink alcohol to cheer up when I’m in a bad mood.” Complete scale items 
can be seen in Table 14. Internal consistency for the current sample was good with 
coefficients for each of the response modulation subscales ranging from .91 to .95 (see 
Table 15). 
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Table 14.  Response Modulation Scales (Study 6, n = 94) 
 
STEM: “Below are a number of reasons people often consume alcohol, caffeine, nicotine, and other medications. Using the scale below, 
please indicate to what extent the following statements are true of you”.  
 
Anchor:  
1 = “Not at all like me” 2 = “Not like me” 3 = “Not much like me” 4 = “Neutral” 5 = “Somewhat like me” 6 = “Like me” 7 = “Just Like Me” 
 
 
ALCOHOL USE 
 
CAFFINE USE MEDICATION USE NICOTINE USE 
1. I drink alcohol to help me 
forget my worries 
1. I drink caffeine to help me 
forget my worries 
1. I use prescription medication 
caffeine to help me forget my 
worries 
1. I smoke cigarettes to help me 
forget my worries 
 
2. I drink alcohol to cheer up 
when I'm in a bad mood 
 
2. I drink caffeine to cheer up 
when I'm in a bad mood 
 
2. I use prescription medication 
to cheer up when I'm in a bad 
mood 
 
2. I smoke to cheer up when 
I'm in a bad mood 
 
3. I feel more caring and giving 
after I've been drinking 
 
3. I feel more caring and giving 
after I've had some caffeine 
 
3. I feel more caring and giving 
when I’m taking prescription 
medication 
 
3. I feel more caring and giving 
after I've been smoking 
 
4. I drink alcohol to feel more 
friendly 
 
4. I drink caffeine to feel more 
friendly 
 
4. I use prescription medication 
to feel more friendly 
 
4. I smoke to feel more friendly 
 
5. I drink alcohol to put myself 
in a better mood 
 
5. I use caffeine to put myself 
in a better mood 
 
5. I use prescription medication 
to put myself in a better mood 
 
5. I smoke to put myself in a 
better mood 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Across all variables, missing data were rare due to form validation settings (< 1%), 
and were again imputed with the mean for that variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As 
in previous studies, emotion beliefs were not significantly related to gender or ethnicity 
and these variables are not discussed further. Means (M), standard deviations (SD), 
ranges, internal consistencies (α) and correlations for all variables can be seen in Table 15.  
Emotion Beliefs, Attention Regulation, and Response Modulation 
H1 predicted that entity beliefs about emotions would be negatively associated 
with adaptive attention regulation (e.g., mindfulness) and positively associated with 
maladaptive attention regulation (e.g., rumination, catastrophizing). Results indicated that 
entity beliefs did predict reduced adaptive mindfulness attention regulation as measured 
by different facets of the FFMQ: describing B = -.47; R2 = .04, F = 25.64, p < .001; non-
judgment B = -.37; R2 = .14, F = 14.72, p < .001; non-reactivity B = -.20; R2 = .04, F = 
3.96, p < .05; and acting with awareness B = -.28; R2 = .08, F = 7.51, p < .01. Consistent 
with predictions, entity beliefs also positively predicted catastrophizing B = .20; R2 = .04, 
F = 3.85, p < .05. However, counter to predictions, entity beliefs were associated with 
reduced rumination B = -.22; R2 = .05, F = 4.88, p < .05. H2 predicted that entity beliefs 
about emotions would be associated with increased use of later-stage response modulation 
strategies (e.g. alcohol, caffeine, nicotine and medication) as a means of regulation 
emotions. Again, there was partial support for this hypothesis. Entity beliefs predicted 
higher levels of alcohol use (B = .21; R2 = .04, F = 3.87, p < .05) and medication (B 
= .24; R2 = .06, F = 5.51, p < .05); but there were no associations between emotion 
beliefs, caffeine and cigarette use regulation strategies.    
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Table 15: Emotion Beliefs, Attention Regulation and Response Modulation – Descriptive Statistics, Cronbach’s Alphas, and Pearson 
Product-Moment Correlations (Study 6, N = 94) 
*p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001
    
 
Range 
 Correlations   
Variable M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  
Implicit Theories & Attention Regulation                
1.  Entity Theory of Emotions (ITES-P) 10.86 2.92 4.00 – 20.00 .68 1 .20^ -.22^ .14 -.47** -.37** -.20^ -.28* .20** .03 .02 .24^ 
2.  Catastrophizing (CERQ-short) 5.66 1.94 2.00 – 10.00  .70  1 .51** .14 -.32* -.65** -.20^ -.44** .29** .31* .29* .33** 
3.  Rumination (CERQ-short) 6.33 1.59 2.00 – 10.00 .60   1 .13 .10 -.41** .12 -.17 .09 .19 .22^ .18 
4.  Observing (FFMQ) 24.84 5.41 8.00 – 40.00 .82    1 .19 -.13 .24^ -.17 .10 .30** .09 .11 
5. Describing (FFMQ) 25.65 6.36 8.00 – 40.00 .89     1 .37** .35** .44** -.12 -.09 -.02 -.30** 
6. Non-Judgment (FFMQ) 25.63 7.22 8.00 – 40.00 .93      1 .14 .59** -.25* -.34** -.20^ -.39** 
7. Non-Reactivity (FFMQ) 21.09 4.46 8.00 – 40.00 .78       1 .09 .28** .14 .18 -.03 
8. Acting with Awareness (FFMQ) 26.64 6.77 8.00 – 40.00 .90        1 -.34** -.38** -.19 -.40** 
Response Modulation Strategies                  
9. Emotion Regulation with Alcohol  13.61 8.05 5.00 – 35.00 .92         1 .51** .46** .39** 
10. Emotion Regulation with Caffeine 11.91 7.51 5.00 – 35.00 .91          1 .55** .50** 
11. Emotion Regulation with Nicotine 12.41 7.93 5.00 – 35.00 .95           1 .74** 
12. Emotion Regulation with Medication 11.02 6.64 5.00 – 35.00 .91            1 
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The Indirect Effect of Attention Regulation Strategies 
To test whether attention regulation strategies indirectly explained the associations 
between implicit theories and substance-based response modulation strategies (H3), I 
examined the indirect effect of emotion beliefs (the predictor) via adaptive and 
maladaptive attention regulation strategies (the intermediary) on response modulation (the 
dependent variable). For the purpose of simplifying the mediation analysis, I used the 
summed total on the FFMQ as a measure of adaptive mindfulness-based attention 
regulation, and the summed total of the CERQ items (catastrophizing and rumination) as a 
measure of maladaptive attention regulation (the intermediary). The dependent variable 
consisted of the summed total of the four different response modulation strategies 
(alcohol, caffeine, nicotine and medication, α = 94). This indirect effect was quantified as 
the product of the coefficients, a and b (See Figure 17). The direct effect, c’, was also 
estimated but is not relevant when testing mediation or indirect effects (Hayes, 2009). As 
described previously, this indirect effect was tested for significance using the most recent 
version of the Preacher and Hayes (2008; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011) 
SPSS PROCESS macros for indirect effects, which includes a bootstrap of 10,000 
samples generating an empirically derived sampling distribution and confidence intervals 
to test for significance of the indirect effect. To evaluate the size of the indirect effects, 
Kappa Squared (κ2) was again used as a ratio of the indirect effect to the maximum 
possible effect permitted by the design and data (Preacher & Kelly, 2011). Kappa Squared 
(κ2) may vary between 0 (no indirect effect) to 1 (maximum possible indirect effect) and, 
they suggest interpreting it like R-squared with 0.01, 0.09 and 0.25 representing small, 
medium, and large effect sizes respectively. 
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Figure 17. Emotion Beliefs and the Mediating Role of Mindfulness (Study 6, n = 94) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. The indirect of Entity beliefs about emotions on response modulation via mindfulness based attention regulation 
strategies. Values are standardized coefficients. When controlling for attention regulation, the regression coefficient for the 
effect of implicit theories (in parentheses) decreases to non-significance. ^p < .05, *p < .01, **p <.001 
Mindfulness Based  
Attention Regulation 
-.24***  -.41*** 
c  (c’) 
.15 (.06)  
Response Modulation 
(Alcohol, caffeine, 
nicotine and 
medication use) 
R2 = .42 
 
 
Personal 
Entity Theory 
of Emotions 
a b 
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Results indicated that the indirect effect of emotion beliefs via adaptive 
mindfulness-based attention regulation strategies was significant for the composite 
measure of response modulation strategies (alcohol, caffeine, cigarettes, medication), with 
95% confidence intervals excluding zero (ab = .73, 95% CI = [.22, 1.58], κ2 = .08); (see 
Figure 17). This was a medium effect according to standards for Kappa squared (Preacher 
& Kelly, 2011). There were no significant effects when examining the mediating effect of 
emotion beliefs on response modulation via maladaptive attention regulation strategies 
(catastrophizing and rumination) (ab = .03, 95% CI = [-.60, .65], κ2 = .004).  
Discussion 
Findings from Study 6 indicate that when people believed they could not control 
their emotions, they were less likely to report engaging in adaptive mindfulness-based 
attention regulation strategies in daily life and were more likely to engage in 
catastrophizing. People holding entity beliefs about their emotions were also more likely 
to report using later-stage response modulation strategies like alcohol use and medication 
as a means of regulating their emotions, and attention regulation strategies indirectly 
explained the relationship between emotion beliefs and response modulation. Although 
these findings provide some preliminary support for the hypothesized links between 
emotion beliefs, attention regulation and response modulation, they are again based on 
cross-sectional data at a single time point, so cannot speak to the causal relationship 
between variables. These preliminary findings, however, point to mindfulness-based 
attention regulation as important emotion regulation strategies and indicate that emotion 
beliefs may play a role in their use. The next study (Study 7), aims to better clarify the 
causal relationship between variables in a longitudinal study by examining whether 
emotion beliefs mediate treatment outcomes in a mindfulness-based-intervention.    
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STUDY 7 
10.3 Emotion Beliefs and Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction 
Study 6 examined links between implicit beliefs about emotion, attention-based 
and response-focused emotion regulation strategies in a diverse cross-sectional sample. 
Results provided some preliminary support for the hypothesis that entity beliefs about 
emotions predict reduced use of mindfulness-based attention regulation strategies and 
increased use of later-stage substance-based response modulation strategies. Attention 
regulation also indirectly explained links between emotion beliefs and response 
modulation. These findings provide some preliminary support for the hypothesized links 
between emotion beliefs, mindfulness, and response modulation. They also indicate that 
emotion beliefs could play an important role in mindfulness-based clinical treatments. 
However, Study 6 also utilized a cross-sectional sample and data was collected at a single 
time point.  For this reason, findings from Study 6 cannot speak to the directional 
relationship between variables. And, even though people’s perceived control over their 
emotions were successfully manipulated in Study 5, it is not yet clear whether emotion 
beliefs are subject to longer-term change, and what impact (if any) this has on 
psychological health and response modulation. To address these questions, Study 7 
examines the role of emotion beliefs in a longitudinal intervention study utilizing 
mindfulness-based attention training. In this study, I examine the potential mediating role 
of emotion beliefs in an 8-week program of mindfulness based stress reduction (MBSR). 
To date, MBSR is among the most widely used and researched mindfulness training 
programs (Hölzel et al., 2011) with diverse benefits for physical and psychological health. 
I begin by reviewing research on MBSR, before examining the potential role of emotion 
beliefs as a mediator of MBSR-related treatment outcomes.  
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Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) 
Mindfulness based stress reduction (MBSR) is a widely regarded 8-week program 
of intensive training in mindfulness and meditation practices designed to help individuals 
cultivate greater moment-to-moment awareness in their everyday life. The program was 
originally developed in 1979 by Jon Kabat-Zinn at the University of Massachusetts 
Medical Center, and was designed to provide a coping resource for patients suffering with 
chronic pain and other serious medical conditions (Kabat-Zinn, 1994b). Today, more than 
24,000 people have completed the 8-week MBSR program at the University of 
Massachusetts and tens of thousands more have completed the trainings in other locations 
around the world in hospitals and clinics, community settings, schools and universities, 
prisons, athletic and military training programs, and in professional organizations and 
corporations (Center for Mindfulness, 2017). Growing interest in mindfulness programs 
has also led to adaptations of MBSR, including mindfulness-based cognitive therapy 
(MBCT; Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002) for recurrent depression; mindfulness-based 
relapse prevention (MBRP, Bowen, Chawla & Marlatt, 2010) for individuals in recovery 
from addictive behaviors; mindfulness-based eating awareness training (MBEAT; 
Kristeller & Hallett, 1999) for disordered eating; and other empirically-based 
psychological interventions like acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT, Hayes, 
Strosahl & Wilson, 1999) and dialectal behavior therapy (DBT, Linehan et al., 1999). 
Research on MBSR has also grown exponentially over the last 30 years, increasing from 
fewer than 50 publications between 1980 and 1995, to more than 500 clinical trials of 
MBSR published in peer-reviewed journals annually since 2012 (Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 
2014).  
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Over the eight-week program, approximately half the time in each class is spent 
practicing formal guided meditation. The meditation practices taught in MBSR are non-
elaborative, non-conceptual attention-focusing meditations that fall into two primary 
categories: (a) focused attention, defined as object-based selective attention in the present 
moment with ongoing assessment of the quality of attention (e.g., focusing awareness on 
the sensations of breathing), and (b) open monitoring, defined as broadening attention into 
a state of mere observation or monitoring in the present moment in any experience and 
without any explicit focus on an object (e.g., simultaneous awareness of sensations, 
sounds, thought, emotions as they arise and pass away in the field of awareness) (Lutz, 
Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008). Within these two primary categories, guided 
meditations are further divided into formal and informal practices. Formal meditation 
practices include: a lying-down body scan meditation; sitting meditations focusing on 
different objects of awareness (e.g. breath, sensation, sound, thoughts, emotions, open 
awareness); loving-kindness meditation, and meditation on movement (e.g. walking 
meditation and hatha yoga). Informal meditations, on the other hand, are designed to be 
more easily integrated into participants’ day-to-day lives and include: eating meditation, 
awareness of pleasant and unpleasant events, awareness of interpersonal communication 
habits and styles, awareness of repetitive cognitions and their relationship with body 
sensations and emotions, and awareness of helpful and harmful lifestyle habits and 
behaviors (Kabat-Zinn & Santorelli, 2014).  Classes also provide information on such 
topics as: stress physiology and neuroplasticity, stress reactivity, the effects of perception, 
appraisal and cognitive distortions. They also cover seven key attitudinal themes: 
practicing with the freshness of a beginner’s mind, non-judgmental awareness, patience, 
non-striving, trust, acceptance and letting go. MBSR instructors are encouraged to make 
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these didactic elements of the curriculum “come alive” via elicitation of dialogue and 
class inquiry oriented around the direct experience of program rather than simply 
lecturing to participants (Kabat-Zinn & Santorelli, 2014).  
To date, there is growing empirical support for the efficacy of MBSR in the 
treatment of a wide range of physical and psychological conditions. Published evaluations 
of medical outcomes resulting from patient participation have shown on average a 35% 
reduction in the total number of medical symptoms, a 40% reduction in psychological 
symptoms, and gains which were maintained at three and four-year follow-up (Kabat-
Zinn 1982, 1985, 1986; Miller et al., 1995). MBSR has also been effective in the 
treatment of a wide range of specific medical problems. For example, MBSR has 
successfully been used to treat chronic pain (Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Kabat-Zinn, 1985), with 
patients reporting a 33-50% decrease in pain symptoms, 44% of patients reporting 
decreased use of analgesics, and 28% of patients discontinuing analgesics altogether 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1985). Other research on chronic pain indicates that MBSR is associated 
with improved quality of life, increased perceived control and acceptance of pain, and 
decreased psychological distress in response to pain sensations (MacCoon et al., 2012; La 
Cour & Petersen, 2015). There is also evidence that the practice of open monitoring is 
particularly effective in pain management as seen in long-term meditators (Perlman, et al., 
2010).  
Outside of research on chronic pain, benefits of MBSR programs include: 
amplified immune functioning (Davidson et al., 2003); a four-fold increased skin clearing 
rates (vs. treatment as usual) in patients with moderate to severe psoriasis (Kabat-Zinn, 
Relman, Riley, Hosmer & Dossey, 2001); a 40 percent reduction in hot flashes among 
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women with menopause (Carmody, Crawford & Churchill, 2008); decreased physical 
symptoms and increased social and psychological functioning in patients with 
fibromyalgia (Schmidt et al., 2011; Weissbecker et al., 2002); clinically significant 
improvements in symptoms for patients with irritable bowel syndrome (Zernicke et al., 
2013); improvements across a range of somatization disorders including fibromyalgia, 
chronic fatigue syndrome and irritable bowel syndrome (Lakhan & Schofield, 2013); 
lowered glucose levels in patients with type I diabetes (Rosenzweig et al., 2007); 
improvements in balance and a wide range of symptoms in patients with multiple 
sclerosis (Simpson et al., 2014; Mills, 2000); improvements in quality of life and stress in 
patients with asthma (Pbert et al., 2012), and in other studies actual improvements in 
functional status and frequency of asthma attacks (Devine, 1996); improvements in across 
a range of measures including blood pressure and BMI for patients with coronary heart 
disease (Parswani, Sharma & Iyengar, 2013); significantly reductions in blood pressure 
for patients with hypertension (Hughes et al., 2013)11; moderate to large improvements in 
memory and cognitive functioning among older adults aged 65 and older (Lenze et al., 
2014); and improvements across a range of measures for patients with melanoma, prostate 
and metastatic breast cancer (Carlson et al., 2003; Shennan, Payne & Fenlon, 2011). 
There is also growing interest in MBSR as a treatment for a wide variety of 
psychological conditions. For example, mindfulness practices are believed to increase 
awareness of – and therefore the potential to interrupt – dysfunctional thinking, self-
focused attention, rumination and experiential avoidance characteristic of depression, 
OCD, PTSD and anxiety disorders (Baer, 2007; Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002). For 
                                                
11 Other research has found minimal or non-significant effects for ambulatory blood 
pressure (see Blom et al., 2014). 
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patients with recurrent depression, there is evidence that MBSR has broad anti-depressive 
effects and is associated with reduced rumination and depressive symptoms when 
compared to waitlist controls (Marchard 2012; Ramel, Goldin, Carmona & McQuaid, 
2004). The modified mindfulness-based cognitive therapy program (MBCT) is considered 
particularly effective in the treatment of depression and is widely recommended as an 
adjunctive treatment for unipolar depression and relapse prevention (Marchard 2012; 
Kuyken et al., 2010; Segal et al., 2010; Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002; Teasdale et al., 
2000).  
For patients with generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder and agoraphobia, 
there is evidence that MBSR leads to significant reductions in stress, anxiety and 
depression (Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt & Walach, 2004; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992; 
Vøllestada, Sivertsena & Nielsena, 2011), and that these improvements are maintained at 
6-month (Vøllestada, Sivertsena & Nielsena, 2011) and 3-year follow-up (Miller, Fletcher 
& Kabat-Zinn, 1995). In one controlled experimental study using a laboratory stress test 
(consisting of mental arithmetic and a speech task), participants who completed MBSR 
also displayed larger pre-post decreases in systolic and diastolic blood pressure, but no 
differences in heart rate or cortisol levels (Nyklicek, Mommersteeg, Van Beugaen, 
Ramakers & Boxtel, 2013). Patients with social anxiety disorder also appear to benefit 
from MBSR training. In one randomized clinical trial, Goldin and Gross (2010) found 
that participants in the MBSR group reported significant reductions in stress, anxiety and 
depression, as well as significant increases in self-esteem. Pre-post functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) assessments also verified patient self-reports, with MBSR 
participants displaying reduced amygdala activation and increased activity in brain 
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regions associated with emotion regulation and attentional deployment during a social 
evaluation task (Goldin & Gross, 2010)12. 
Further support for the efficacy of MBSR in the treatment of depression and 
anxiety disorders comes from several meta-analyses. In one meta-analysis of nine studies 
on mental health among breast cancer patients, MBSR resulted in clinically significant, 
moderate to large reductions in stress, anxiety and depression (Zainal, Booth & Huppert, 
2013). A second a meta-analysis of 39 studies and over 1,140 patients suffering from 
generalized anxiety disorder, depression and other psychiatric or medical conditions, 
MBSR led to clinically significant improvements in anxiety (Hedges’s g = 0.97) and 
mood symptoms (Hedges’s g = 0.95) (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, A. & Oh, 2010). In a third 
systematic review and meta-analysis (Goyal et al., 2014), researchers examined evidence 
for meditation programs exclusively from randomized clinical control trials with active 
control groups (to better account for possible placebo effects). The authors included 
studies on mantra-based meditation programs, transcendental meditation (TM), and 
clinically standardized meditation programs (CSM). Study results were also evaluated 
based on risk of bias, precision, directness and consistency, and effect sizes were 
calculated based on the relative difference between groups in change from baseline. From 
a total of 18,753 publications, 47 trials (with 3,515 participants) met inclusion criteria. 
Results indicated that mindfulness programs uniquely led to moderate improvements in 
anxiety (effect size, 0.38 [95% CI, 0.12-0.64] at eight weeks, and 0.22 [0.02-0.43] at 3-6 
months) and depression (0.30 [0.00-0.59] at 8 weeks and 0.23 [0.05-0.42] at 3-6 months). 
                                                
12 Research comparing MBSR and MBCT with cognitive behavioral group therapy 
(CBGT) for social anxiety disorder indicate that CBGT remains as effective (Piet et al., 
2010), or more effective at treating social anxiety symptoms (Koszycki et al., 2007). 
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These effect sizes were comparable with (if not superior too) effect sizes for the use of 
antidepressants in primary care populations13   
Beyond research on depression and anxiety, there is evidence that MBSR is also 
associated with clinically significant reductions in suicidal ideation and symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among veterans (Goldsmith et al, 2014; Serpa, 
Taylor & Tillisch, 2014), and among adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse 
(Vujanovic, Niles, Pietrefesa, Schmertz & Potter, 2013). There is also some evidence 
from case reports (Patel, Carmody & Simpson, 2007) and nonclinical student samples 
(Hanstede, Gidron & Nyklicek, 2008) that MBSR may be beneficial in the treatment of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), comorbid physical and psychological disorders 
(Hazlett-Stevens, 2012; Zainal et al., 2013), binge eating disorders (Smith, Shelley, 
Leahigh & Vanleit, 2006; Smith, Shelly, Dalen, Wiggins, Tooley & Bernard, 2008)14, and 
well as transdiagnostic problems like insomnia (Zhang et al., 2015). Finally, in non-
clinical settings MBSR is also associated with improvements in general psychological 
health and well-being in both underserved inner-city populations (Smith, Metzker, Waite 
& Gerrity, 2015), among caregivers of parents with dementia (Whitebird et al., 2013), and 
with inmates in correctional prison populations (Samuelson, Carmody, Kabat-Zinn, & 
Bratt, 2007). 
 
                                                
13 In a patient-level meta-analysis for antidepressant effects, Fournier et al. (2010) found that for patients 
with mild to moderate depressive symptoms, antidepressants had an effect size of 0.11 (95% CI, −0.18 to 
0.41), whereas for those with severe depression, antidepressants had an effect size of 0.17 (−0.08 to 0.43) 
compared with placebo. 
14 Research on mindfulness interventions for binge eating is mixed with some studies identifying a 
reduction in binge eating (Smith, Shelley, Leahigh & Vanleit, 2006; Smith, Shelly, Dalen, Wiggins, Tooley 
& Bernard, 2008) and other studies using MBCT identifying a decrease in objective binges but an increase 
in subjective perception of binge eating over the 8-week period (Baer, Fischer & Huss, 2005).  
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Potential Mediators of Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction 
Taken together there is substantial evidence for the efficacy of MBSR in the 
treatment of a wide range of physical and psychological conditions. However, it is not yet 
clear why MBSR has so many positive benefits, or why some people benefit from MBSR 
programs while other do not.  In an attempt to answer these questions, researchers have 
begun developing theoretical models of MBSR that include a wide range of potential 
mediators. For example: acceptance (Baer, 2003; Grabovac et al., 2011), exposure to 
unpleasant sensations, thoughts and emotions (Baer, 2003; Brown et al., 2007; Holzel et 
al., 2011; Shapiro et al., 2006), attention-regulation, cognitive change and decentering 
(Baer, 2003; Holzel et al., 2011; Shapiro et al., 2006); self-compassion (Kuyken et al., 
2010; Bergen-Cico & Cheon, 2013; Keng et al., 2012), reduced worry and rumination 
(Heeren & Philippot, 2011; Labelle, 2012; Lengacher et al., 2014; Shahar et al., 2010) 
self-regulation and behavioral flexibility (Baer, 2003; Brown et al., 2007; Shapiro et al., 
2006; Vago & Silbersweig, 2012).  
In a recent meta-analytic review of MBSR and MBCT mediation studies, Gu, 
Strauss, Bond and Cavanagh (2015) used two-stage meta-analytic structural equation 
modeling (TSSEM) to evaluate the impact of assessed mediators on clinical outcomes. 
The authors identified 20 studies (15 of which were randomized control trials) that met 
inclusion criteria with samples ranging from 27 to 205 participants. Mental health 
outcomes assessed across studies included depression, anxiety, stress, distress and 
negative affect. The most commonly tested mechanisms in these studies included: 
mindfulness (n = 16) followed by rumination (n = 7), worry and concerns (n = 5), self-
compassion (n = 3), psychological flexibility (n = 1), emotional reactivity (n = 1), 
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cognitive reactivity (n = 1), and autobiographical memory specificity (n = 1). Results 
indicated that there was strong and consistent evidence for the mediating effect of 
changes in cognitive and emotional reactivity. There was also consistent and moderate 
evidence for the mediating effect of mindfulness and changes in repetitive negative 
thinking (worry and rumination). The authors found only preliminary or insufficient 
evidence however, for the role of self-compassion and psychological flexibility.  
These findings point to a range of potential mediating variables in MBSR 
treatment programs and begin to explain how and why MBSR lead to so many health 
benefits. However, one currently unexplored variable is people’s perceived control over 
their emotions. Study 6 identified significant associations between emotion beliefs and 
mindful awareness, worry, rumination, and reactivity. Given these links, and the evidence 
for the mediating role of these variables in MBSR, it is possible that people’s beliefs 
about their emotions play an important role in mindfulness based interventions. Study 7 
aims to test this hypothesis in a longitudinal study by examining whether people’s 
perceived control over their emotions mediates MBSR-related treatment outcomes. Based 
on the research presented and findings from Study 6, Study 7 aimed to test the following 
predictions: 
H1: Compared to participants in the matched control group, individuals completing 
MBSR will show a significant reduction in entity beliefs about emotions post-
treatment and at 12-month follow-up.  
H2: Compared to participants in the matched control group, individuals completing 
MBSR will show significant improvements in psychological symptoms (increased 
satisfaction with life and reduced loneliness, stress, anxiety, and depression). 
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Individuals completing MBSR will also show a reduction in response modulation 
strategies (reliance on alcohol, smoking, caffeine and medication) post-treatment.  
H3: Participants’ beliefs about their emotions post-course (8-weeks) will mediate MBSR-
related improvements in psychological health, well-being and response modulation at 
12-month follow-up. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 50 individuals (35 female) completing an 8-week 
mindfulness based stress reduction class, and 50 matched controls (35 female) recruited 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). All participants 
in the final sample were required to complete pre- post-class assessments.  
MBSR-treatment Group. MBSR participants were recruited from four classes – 
two taught in Australia (n = 21) and two taught in the United States (n = 29). From an 
original baseline sample of 126 participants, 64 participants were excluded because they 
did not complete post-course surveys. Another 12 participants were also excluded because 
they had previously completed a MBSR class or were in training to become an MBSR 
teacher. All MBSR instructors were certified to teach MBSR through the University of 
Massachusetts, Centre for Mindfulness and adhered to the same 8-week course 
curriculum (Kabat-Zinn & Santorelli, 2014). There were no significant differences 
between classes or course instructors on outcome variables and these variables are not 
discussed further. MBSR participants ranged from 19 to 76 years of age and 46 per cent 
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had some prior experience with a mindfulness or yoga practice; however, no participants 
had previously completed an 8-week MBSR course.   
Control Group. Control participants were selected from the larger Amazon Turk 
sample presented in Study 6. These participants were offered 50 cents in exchange for 
completing a short online survey. To control for variables that might be related to 
meditation interest (e.g., the self-selecting tendencies of people who elect to take MBSR), 
Turk participants were only eligible if they reported being interested in meditation and in 
taking an 8-week MBSR class. Meditation interest was assessed with two questions: 
“Meditation isn’t worth the time/effort” (1 = Strongly Agree; 5 = Strongly Disagree), and 
“If you had the opportunity to attend an 8-week Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction 
Course, how interested would you be in taking the course?” (1 = Not at all Interested; 5 = 
Extremely Interested). Turk participants were eligible for Study 7 if they scored above the 
midpoint (3 and above) on both of the meditation interest screening items. From the 
original sample of 100 participants, 16 people were excluded because they reported 
insufficient interest in mediation or mindfulness based stress reduction. The remaining 
subjects were selected based to match as closely as possible the demographic information 
and prior meditation experience in the MBSR treatment group. Demographic information 
for all participants in both samples in provided in Table 16.  
Measures 
Emotion beliefs. As with Study 6, implicit theories of emotion were assessed 
using the 4-item Personal Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale – see Table 5 (De Castella 
et al., 2013). Internal consistency in the current sample was adequate (α = .68). 
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Table 16. Emotion Beliefs and MBSR – Demographic variables (Study 7, n = 100) 
 MBSR 
n = 50 
Control 
n = 50 
Age (SD) 46.2 (15.1) 44.1 (13.9) 
English (First Language) 44 41 
% Female 70 70 
% Prior Mindfulness Practice*  46 50 
* Note: Prior mindfulness practice included experience with meditation (Zen, 
Vipassana, transcendental meditation, yoga, tai chi or other personal practice). 
 
Psychological health. Psychological health was assessed using the same measures 
provided in Study 4. These included measures of well-being (loneliness and life 
satisfaction) as well as measures of clinical symptoms (depression, anxiety, and stress). 
For well-being, loneliness was measured using the 8-item revised version of the UCLA 
Loneliness Scale (ULS-8, Hays & DiMatteo, 1987). Life satisfaction was measured using 
the 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 
1985). Internal consistency was good for both scales in with MBSR participants (ULS-8, 
α = .88; SWLS α = .93) and with participants in the Control Group (ULS-8, α = .86; 
SWLS α = .90). 
Clinical symptoms. Clinical symptoms were measured using the 21-item 
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS-21; Henry & Crawford, 2005; Lovibond & 
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Lovibond, 1995). See Study 6 for details on the DASS. In the current sample, internal 
consistency for the DASS scales was good in both samples (MBSR Group: Stress α = .93; 
Anxiety α = .86; Depression α = .92; Total DASS α = .95; Control Group: Stress α = .90; 
Anxiety α = .93; Depression α = .94; Total DASS α = .97). Consistent with findings from 
Study 6, I report results for the Total DASS scale as a measure of clinical symptoms to 
streamline reporting in mediation analyses. Individual scale scores, correlations and 
descriptive statistics for both samples can be seen in Table 11.  
Response Modulation. Response Modulation was measured with the same 20 
items included in Study 6. These included questions that asked participants about their use 
of specific substances to regulate their emotions (alcohol, caffeine, cigarettes, and 
medication). Example items include, “I drink alcohol to help me forget my worries” and 
“I drink alcohol to cheer up when I’m in a bad mood.” Complete scale items can be seen 
in Table 14. Internal consistency for the current samples was also good (MBSR Group: 
Alcohol α = .91; Caffeine α = .93; Cigarettes α = .98; Medication α = .80; Control Group: 
Alcohol α = .92; Caffeine α = .91; Cigarettes α = .95; Medication α = .89).  
Procedure 
MBSR Treatment. MBSR is typically taught in small groups of 10 – 40 
participants. There is a didactic component of instruction and discussion, group sharing, 
and a range of guided meditation and mindfulness practices covered in each class. 
Students meet for two and a half hour each week, for eight weeks, and also attend a 
daylong silent meditation retreat after their sixth class. In addition to the classes and 
retreat, students are encouraged to commit to significant home practice each week 
including: 45 minutes of guided meditation or yoga daily, informal mindfulness exercises, 
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and optional assignments or readings (Kabat-Zinn & Santorelli, 2014).  Participants 
completing MBSR attended an initial 2.5 hour-long orientation, followed by eight-hour 
weekly classes and a silent full day mindfulness retreat after the 6th class. Classes were 
2.5 hours in length. MBSR was taught according to the course curriculum (Kabat-Zinn & 
Santorelli, 2014). In addition to the classes and retreat, students were encouraged to 
commit to significant home practice each week, including 45 minutes of guided 
meditation or yoga daily, informal mindfulness exercises, and optional assignments or 
readings from the companion book Full Catastrophe Living (Kabat-Zinn, 1990).  
Assessments. MBSR participants completed 20-minute online surveys at three 
time intervals: Week 1 (baseline n = 50), week 9 (post-MBSR n = 50), and at 12-month 
follow-up (n = 34). MBSR participants who completed all three assessments received a 
copy of a mindfulness book “Living with Your Heart Wide Open” as a free gift. Sixteen 
people in the MBSR group failed to complete 12-month follow-up assessments. For 
control group participants, online surveys were administered through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk at the same time intervals: baseline (n = 50), week 9 (n = 50), and at 12-month 
follow-up (n = 47). Participants received 50 cents for the baseline surveys and $1.50 for 
the follow-up assessments.   
Statistical Analyses 
To evaluate the effects of MBSR on patients’ emotion beliefs (H1), a 2 group 
(MBSR vs. Control) x 3 Time (baseline; 8-week; and 12-month follow-up) repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted followed by paired-sample t-tests for the MBSR and 
Control groups. Next, to examine the effect of MBSR on indicators of psychological 
health, well-being and response modulation strategies (H2), a 2 group (MBSR vs. 
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Control) x 2 Time (baseline and post-treatment/8-weeks) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted followed by paired-sample t-tests for the MBSR and Control groups. Finally, 
to examine whether changes in people’s beliefs about their emotions post-treatment 
mediated treatment outcomes (improvements in psychological health, well-being and 
reduced reliance on response modulation, H3), separate mediation analyses were 
conducted for each of the dependent variables. Models examined the effect of MBSR vs. 
Control group (the predictor) on psychological health outcomes at 12-months (the 
dependent variables) via emotion beliefs post-MBSR/8-week follow-up (the mediator). 
As reported previously mediation effects were tested using the Preacher and Hayes (2008; 
Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011) PROCESS macro for SPSS (see Studies 4 and 
6). Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals were also calculated based on a bootstrap of 
5000 samples. Mediation analyses are repeated – and measures of effect size calculated – 
for each of the dependent variables. Although participants were not randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups, by incorporating data at 3 distinct time points (baseline, 
post-MBSR and 12-month follow-up), it was possible to establish temporal precedence 
(an important requirement for assessing the causal relationship between variables). 
Results are reported as standardized coefficients.  
Results 
Prior to analysis, all variables were examined for missing values and distributional 
assumptions (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Normality, linearity, and homogeneity of 
variance were all found to be satisfactory. Missing data were rare (less than 5% on any 
variable) and were imputed with the overall mean for that variable – a conservative 
technique in such cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). See Table 17 for descriptive 
statistics and correlations for all variables at baseline. 
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Table 17: Emotion Beliefs and MBSR – Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Product-Moment Correlations at Baseline (Study 7, N = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Range 
Correlations  
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Implicit Theories & Psychological Health              
1.  Entity Beliefs about Emotions (ITES-P) 10.18 2.96 4.00 – 20.00 1 .10 -.11 .31* .38** .36** .37** .30* .02 -.06 .25* 
2. Loneliness (ULS-8) 16.69 4.80 8.00 – 30.00  1 -.53** .56** .56** .60** .59** .02 .19 .03 .23* 
3. Satisfaction with Life (SWLS) 20.95 7.19 5.00 – 35.00   1 -.31* -.24* -.51** -.39** .05 .08 .03 -.11 
4. Stress (DASS-Stress) 14.03 5.17 7.00 – 28.00    1 .79** .80** .94** .31** .27* .24^ .34** 
5. Anxiety (DASS-Anxiety) 11.50 4.77 7.00 – 28.00     1 .75** .90** .30** .26* .35** .50** 
6. Depression (DASS-Depression) 12.85 5.64 7.00 – 28.00      1 .92** .27* .24^ .25^ .41** 
7. Total Clinical Symptoms (DASS-Total) 38.38 14.41 21.00 – 84.00       1 .33** .28** .31* .45** 
Response Modulation Strategies                
8. Emotion Regulation with Alcohol  12.36 8.11 5.00 – 35.00        1 .32** .35** .43** 
9. Emotion Regulation with Caffeine 12.36 7.82 5.00 – 35.00         1 .35** .29** 
10. Emotion Regulation with Nicotine 10.09 7.81 5.00 – 35.00          1 .64** 
11. Emotion Regulation with Medication 8.18 5.36 5.00 – 35.00           1 
^p < .05, *p < .01, **p <.001 
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At baseline assessment, there were no significant differences between groups (MBSR vs. Control) 
in age, gender, English language ability or prior experience with mindfulness/meditation. There 
was also no significant difference at baseline between groups on participants’ implicit beliefs about 
their emotions (MMBSR = 10.00, SD = 2.80 vs. MControl = 10.36, SD = 3.13), t (98) = -0.61, p = .55), 
or on any of the other dependent variables.  
MBSR and Emotion Beliefs  
Consistent with H1, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant treatment x time 
interaction, F(2, 79) = 9.07, p < .001, R2 = .10.  Follow-up planned paired t-tests showed that, 
compared to baseline, MBSR participants reported lower entity beliefs about their emotions post-
MBSR (Mbaseline = 10.00, SD = 2.80, M9Weeks = 8.44, SD = 2.64; t(49) = 4.90, p < .001). For MBSR 
participants, this difference also remained significant at 12-month follow-up (Mbaseline = 9.71, SD = 
2.54, M12M = 7.97, SD = 2.34; t(33) = 4.23, p < .001). There was, however, no significant 
difference over time for patients in the CONTROL group at 9 weeks (Mbaseline = 10.36, SD = 3.13 
vs. M9Weeks = 10.60, SD = 3. 63), t(49) = -0.72, p = .48) or at 12-month follow-up (Mbaseline = 10.40, 
SD = 3.11 vs. M12M = 10.68, SD = 3.10), t(46) = -0.76, p = .45)  (see Figure 18).  
MBSR, Psychological Health and Response Modulation 
Consistent with H2, repeated-measures ANOVAs revealed significant treatment x time 
interactions for stress (F(1, 98) = 20.38, p < .001, R2 = .17), anxiety (F(1, 98) = 3.70, p < .05, R2 
= .04), depression (F(1, 98) = 8.19, p < .01, R2 = .08), and loneliness (F(1, 98) = 9.45, p < .01, R2 
= .09), but not for satisfaction with life (F(1, 98) = 1.97, p = .16, R2 = .02) or response modulation 
(F(1, 98) = 1.78, p = .19, R2 = .02). Separate analyses were also conducted to examine changes in 
each of the specific response modulation strategies. There were no significant treatment group x 
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time interactions for any of the strategies including self-reported use of alcohol (F(1, 98) = .20, p 
= .65, R2 = .002); medication ((1, 98) = 1.72, p = .19, R2 = .02); caffeine (F(1, 98) = .50, p = .49, 
R2 = .005); or nicotine (F(1, 98) = .29, p = .59, R2 = .003) to regulate emotions. 
Figure 18. MBSR-Related Changes in Emotion Beliefs Over Time (Study 7, n = 100) 
 
 
Follow-up planned paired t-tests showed that, compared to baseline, MBSR participants 
reported lower entity beliefs about emotions, lower levels of loneliness, and clinical symptoms 
(stress, anxiety and depression) post-treatment. For participants in the control condition however, 
there was no significant difference over time on any of the dependent variables (with the exception 
of stress, which had increased at follow-up). Results from paired-samples t-tests for the treatment 
and control conditions on all dependent variables can be seen in Table 18. 
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Table 18: Paired Samples t-tests for Treatment and Control Groups at Baseline and Post-Treatment (9-weeks) (Study 7, N = 100) 
 
  
 MBSR GROUP (n = 50) CONTROL GROUP (n = 50)  
 Baseline  9-weeks  Baseline  9-weeks   
Variables M (SD) M (SD) t(49) M (SD) M (SD)  t(49) 
 
Implicit Theories & Psychological Health       
1.  Entity Beliefs about Emotions (ITES-P) 10.00 (2.80) 8.44 (2.64) 4.90** 10.36 (3.13) 10.60 (3.36) -.72 n.s 
2. Loneliness (ULS-8) 17.29 (5.60) 15.06 (4.44) 5.43** 16.10 (3.83) 15.88 (4.29) .44 n.s 
3. Satisfaction with Life (SWLS) 20.37 (7.62) 22.10 (6.85) -2.34* 21.52 (6.77) 21.90 (6.86) -.61 n.s 
4. Stress (DASS-Stress) 14.18 (5.13) 11.96 (4.14) 3.97* 14.00 (5.11) 15.16 (4.42) -2.31^ 
5. Anxiety (DASS-Anxiety) 11.00 (3.52) 9.28 (2.97) 3.68** 12.54 (5.55) 12.10 (4.80) .93 n.s 
6. Depression (DASS-Depression) 12.40 (5.45) 10.60 (4.62) 3.54** 13.30 (5.75) 13.5 (5.44) -.41 n.s 
7. Total Clinical Symptoms (DASS-Total) 37.14 (10.41) 32.02 (10.40) 3.91** 39.58 (15.91) 40.76 (13.74) -.98 n.s 
8. Response Modulation Strategies Total 36.13 (16.31) 38.38 (17.40) -.27 n.s 49.77 (24.20) 46.68 (22.94) 1.04 n.s 
       
^p < .05, *p < .01, **p <.001 
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Emotion Beliefs as a Mediator of MBSR 
To test H3, that beliefs about emotions would mediate MBSR-related treatment outcomes 
(loneliness, satisfaction with life, stress, anxiety, depression, and response modulation strategies), 
separate mediation analyses were conducted that examined each of the dependent variables. 
Mediation analyses included assessments at three different time points to help establish temporal 
precedence. This included examining the effect of MBSR vs. Control group (the predictor) on 
outcomes at 12-months (the dependent variables) via emotion beliefs post-treatment (MBSR/9-
week follow-up, the mediator).  
There was no significant effect for emotion beliefs as a mediator of loneliness (ab = .80, 
95% CI = [-0.01, 2.21], κ2 = .08 (95% CI = 0.01, 0.21)) or satisfaction with life (ab = -.24, 95% CI 
= [-1.59, 0.93], κ2 = .02 (95% CI = 0.00, 0.06)) at 12-months. However, post-MBSR beliefs about 
emotions did mediate clinical symptoms at 12-month follow up. This was true for stress (ab = 1.22, 
95% CI = [0.40, 2.49], κ2 = .13 (95% CI = 0.04, 0.25)), anxiety (ab = 1.00, 95% CI = [0.31, 2.05], 
κ2 = .11 (95% CI = .04, .22)) and depression (ab = 1.18, 95% CI = [0.33, 2.52], κ2 = .12 (95% CI 
= .03, .23)). Post-MBSR beliefs about emotions also mediated self-reported use of response 
modulation strategies at 12-months (ab = 2.785, 95% CI = [.25, 6.88], κ2 = .07 (95% CI 
= .01, .16)). According to Preacher and Kelly’s (2011) standards, effects sizes for kappa squared of 
0.01, 0.09 and 0.25 represent small, medium and large effects respectively. These findings indicate 
medium to large effect sizes for stress, anxiety and depression and a small to medium effect for 
response modulation (see Figure 19).  
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Figure 19. The mediating effect of MBSR on clinical symptoms and response modulation at 12-months via post-
treatment/follow-up beliefs about emotions (Study 7, n = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The mediating effect of treatment (8-week MBSR Course vs. 8-week Control Group) on stress, anxiety, depression and response 
modulation at 12-month follow-up via post-course beliefs about emotions. Values are standardized coefficients. In all models, when 
controlling for post-treatment beliefs about emotions, the regression coefficient for the effect of implicit theories (in parentheses) 
decreases to non-significance.  * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Discussion 
Study 7 examined the role of emotion beliefs as a mediator of treatment in a 
longitudinal intervention study of mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR). 
Participants consisted of 50 people enrolled in an 8-week MBSR course and 50 matched 
control participants completing online assessments at the same time intervals. Consistent 
with prior findings (Studies 2 and 4), at baseline, entity beliefs about emotions were 
associated with lower satisfaction with life and increased symptoms of stress, anxiety and 
depression. Consistent with findings from Study 6, entity beliefs were also associated 
with the self-reported use of later-stage response modulation strategies like alcohol use 
and medication as a means of regulating emotions. At the end of the 8-week mindfulness 
meditation program, participants in the MBSR group (compared with the control group) 
were more likely to view their emotions as things they could change or control. This 
change in thinking also persisted at 12-month follow-up. Compared to control participants, 
at the completion of the program MBSR participants also showed significant 
improvements in psychological symptoms (reduced loneliness, stress, anxiety, and 
depression), and participants’ beliefs about their emotions mediated these MBSR-related 
treatment outcomes (reduced stress, anxiety, depression and response modulation) at 12-
month follow-up.  
10.4 Chapter Summary: Studies 6 & 7 
The primary aim of Studies 6 and 7 was to examine links between implicit beliefs 
about emotions, and the use of attention-focused and response-focused emotion regulation 
strategies. In a cross-sectional study (Study 6), people who believed they could not 
control their emotions reported engaging less in mindfulness-based adaptive attention 
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regulation strategies (e.g. describing, non-judging, non-reactivity and acting with 
awareness) than those who believed they could control their emotions. Entity beliefs 
about emotions were also positively associated with catastrophizing and with the use of 
later-stage response modulation strategies (e.g. managing emotions with alcohol and 
medication). An analysis of indirect effects further indicated that entity beliefs about 
emotions predicted increased use of response modulation via reduced use of mindfulness-
based attention regulation.  
Building on the cross-sectional findings presented in Study 6, the relationship 
between emotion beliefs, attention regulation and response modulation were then 
examined in longitudinal intervention study (Study 7). Fifty participants completed an 
intensive 8-week course in mindfulness mediation and daily home practice in formal and 
informal mindfulness-based attention regulation strategies. MBSR participants completed 
pre- and post-course assessments as well as follow-up assessments at 12-months. A 
matched control group (who did not complete the MBSR training) also completed 
assessments at the same time intervals. Results indicated that at baseline, fixed entity 
beliefs about emotions were again associated with increased stress, anxiety and 
depression, as well as increased self-reported use of alcohol and medication to manage 
emotions. At 9-weeks (post-MBSR) participants in the MBSR group (compared to 
controls) reported significantly lower entity beliefs about their emotions. MBSR 
participants also reported reduced stress, anxiety, depression and loneliness, however 
there was no significant change in the use of response modulation strategies at 9-week 
follow-up. Mediation analyses indicated that people’s beliefs about their emotions post-
MBSR significantly explained treatment-related improvements in stress, anxiety, 
depression and response-modulation at 12-month follow-up. Participants who held lower 
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entity beliefs about their emotions at the completion of the MBSR program were more 
likely to report lower levels of stress, anxiety and depression, as well as reduced use of 
response modulation strategies at 12-month follow-up. Emotion beliefs however, did not 
mediate changes in loneliness or satisfaction with life.  
Implications for Research on Emotion Beliefs 
 These findings provide new evidence for the causal role of implicit beliefs about 
emotions in attention-focused and response-focused emotion regulation. To date research 
on emotion beliefs has focused mostly on associations with psychological health and 
cognitive-change (which will be covered in the next chapter). To address this gap in the 
literature, this chapter examined associations between emotion beliefs and mindfulness-
based attention regulation strategies. Findings from the current study suggests that when 
people hold fixed entity beliefs about their emotions, they may also be less likely to use 
adaptive attention regulation strategies and may even resort to response-modulation 
strategies (like alcohol and medication) to manage difficult emotions when they arise. 
Although emotion beliefs were not experimentally manipulated (as in Study 5), findings 
from Study 7 indicate that it is possible for people to change their implicit beliefs about 
their emotions. This may even happen naturally when people are introduced to, and gain 
practice with, adaptive strategies for regulating their emotions (like formal and informal 
mindfulness practices). These findings also help clarify some of the pre-existing links that 
have been identified between emotion beliefs and psychological health outcomes (see 
Studies 2 – 4). In addition to cognitive and behavioral avoidance, Study 6 and 7 indicate 
that emotion beliefs may also be associated with adaptive and maladaptive attention 
 242 
regulation and response modulation strategies, that are in-turn associated with 
psychological health and well-being.  
Implications for Research on Mindfulness 
Findings from Studies 6 and 7 also contribute to growing research on mindfulness 
based stress reduction and point to emotion beliefs as another potential mechanism of 
change in mindfulness interventions. Consistent with previous research (Hofmann, 
Sawyer, Witt, A. & Oh, 2010; Goyal et al., 2014), participants completing MBSR 
reported reductions in stress, anxiety and depression post-treatment and at 12-month 
follow-up. However, the current study indicates that participants who came to view their 
emotions as more controllable post-treatment were the ones who reported significant 
greater reductions in symptoms at 12-months. Understanding how and why programs like 
MBSR are so effective is important for fine-tuning existing interventions, trainings and 
for the development of future mindfulness-based treatment programs. It may also help 
explain why some participants fail to experience benefits. Consistent with the research 
already presented (Studies 2 - 6), beliefs about emotions may predispose people towards 
specific emotion regulation strategies that have more or less adaptive consequences for 
psychological health. MBSR may prove to be a helpful and adaptive training program for 
attention-based emotion regulation. However, it may be that participants who come to 
view their emotions as malleable, stand to benefit the most from this clinical treatment.  
Findings from Study 7 also fit with existing research on mindfulness training and 
response modulation: namely, that mindfulness practices can help reduce reliance on 
maladaptive substance or food-based coping strategies like disordered eating (Kristeller & 
Hallett, 1999), drinking and substance use (Bowen, Chawla & Marlatt, 2010) as well as 
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the use of analgesics and other medications (Kabat-Zinn, 1985). As an early stage 
emotion regulation strategy, attention regulation offers an added advantage of helping 
individuals regulate emotions in the beginning stages before they have fully arisen 
(Sheppes & Gross, 2011). In this light, mindfulness attention regulation may help reduce 
reliance on modulation strategies because attention helps bring awareness to reactive and 
habitual patterns of responding and because the ability to regulate emotions effectively at 
early stages may also help reduce reliance on later-stage substance-based response 
modulation strategies.  
In summary, Study 7 demonstrated that beliefs about emotions may be an 
important mechanism of change in treatment helping to explain how MBSR exerts it 
effects on so many diverse areas of functioning. These findings also raise questions about 
the potential role of emotion beliefs in other psychological treatments and interventions, 
for example, widely used short-term therapies like cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). 
Studies 2 – 7 have examined links between emotion beliefs and three stages of the process 
model: situation selection (avoidance); attentional deployment (mindfulness) and 
response modulation (substance-use). Chapter 11 will examine the potential associations 
between emotion beliefs and cognitive change (the fourth stage in the Process Model of 
Emotion Regulation). I begin by examining associations between emotion beliefs and 
cognitive strategies in community and clinical samples before examining the role of 
emotion beliefs in cognitive-change focused treatments.  
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11. IMPLICIT THEORIES AND COGNITIVE CHANGE15 
11.1 Introduction to Studies 8, 9 and 10 
 The previous chapters examined implicit theories of emotion and their role in 
adaptive and maladaptive attention regulation and response modulation. In a correlational 
study (Study 6), entity beliefs about emotions predicted greater maladaptive attention 
regulation (e.g., catastrophizing) and lesser adaptive attention regulation (e.g., 
mindfulness). In a longitudinal treatment study using an attention-regulation focused 
intervention (Study 7), emotion beliefs were examined pre- and post- an 8-week 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) program and again at 12-month follow-up. 
Compared to participants in a matched control group, MBSR participants were more 
likely to view their emotions as things they could change and control post-treatment. 
These changes in emotion beliefs mediated treatment outcomes (reduced stress, anxiety, 
depression and response modulation) at 12-month follow-up. Together with findings from 
Studies 2 -6, these findings provide some preliminary evidence for associations between 
emotion beliefs and the selection and implementation of a variety of emotion regulation 
                                                
15 This chapter utilises previously unreported findings from Study 2 (Chapter 8). Findings from this chapter 
have been published in three separate publications: 
 
De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Ziv, M., Dweck, C. S., & Gross, J. J. (2013). Beliefs about 
emotions: Links to emotion regulation, well-being, and psychological distress. Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology, 35(6); 497-505. 
 
De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Ziv, M., Heimberg, R. G., & Gross, J. J. (2014). Emotion beliefs in 
social anxiety disorder: Associations with stress, anxiety and well-being. Australian Journal of Psychology, 
66, 139-148. 
 
De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Ziv, M., Dweck, C. S., & Gross, J. (2014). Emotion beliefs and 
cognitive behavioural therapy for social anxiety disorder. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 1-14 
DOI: 10.1080/16506073.2014.974665 
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strategies. Building on these findings, Chapter 11 focuses on the role of emotion beliefs 
within the third part of the Process Model of Emotion Regulation – strategies involving 
cognitive change. Study 8 examines associations between emotion beliefs, cognitive 
change and well-being outcomes in a college student sample. Study 9 examines 
associations between emotion beliefs, cognitive change strategies and psychological 
health in a clinical sample of patients with social anxiety disorder.  And Study 10 utilizes 
a randomized clinical control trial of cognitive behavioural therapy (a cognitive-change 
focused therapy) to further examine the role of belief-change in clinical treatments and 
interventions.   
  
 246 
STUDY 8  
11.2 Emotion Beliefs and Cognitive Change 
Cognitive change emotion-regulation strategies refer to any strategies that involve 
changing how we appraise or think about a situation in order to change how we feel. 
Examples include: problem solving, denial, defensive pessimism, projection, 
intellectualization, and upward or downward social comparison. As with each class of 
strategies, cognitive change strategies can be used adaptively and effectively or in 
maladaptive and ineffective ways depending on the specific strategy and context. One 
cognitive change strategy that has a broadly adaptive profile, however, is cognitive 
reappraisal (Gross, 2002; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007). This emotion 
regulation strategy involves changing the way one thinks about an emotion-eliciting 
situation in order to change its emotional impact (Gross & Thompson, 2007). While it is 
true that reappraisal can be used in ways that are beneficial or detrimental, in general, 
reappraisal is considered an effective emotion regulation strategy for decreasing negative, 
and increasing positive emotions in the present moment (Goldin et al., 2009). Habitual 
use of reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy is also associated with higher levels 
of positive, and lower levels of negative affect, as well as improved interpersonal 
functioning, fewer depressive symptoms, greater self-esteem, and improved satisfaction 
with life (Gross & John, 2003). See Chapter 3.5 for a review of research on cognitive 
reappraisal.  
As with the adaptive and maladaptive attention regulation strategies reviewed in 
the previous chapter, not everyone makes use of adaptive strategies like cognitive 
reappraisal in daily life. This is not surprising, as cognitive reappraisal often requires 
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greater introspective skills and emotional awareness than strategies which are focused on 
attending to, changing, or avoiding aspects of emotion-arousing situations (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). In addition to these basic challenges with using cognitive reappraisal, 
one important determinant of reappraisal use may be the beliefs people hold about the 
nature of the emotions they experience. For example, when people believe that emotions 
cannot readily be controlled, they may be less inclined to see value in using intentional 
cognitive strategies (like reappraisal) to regulate their emotions in daily life.  
At the time when Study 8 was under development (see De Castella et al., 2013), 
there was only one peer-reviewed publication, which had examined associations between 
implicit theories of emotion and cognitive reappraisal in daily life (Tamir et al., 2007). In 
their longitudinal study with undergraduate students, Tamir and colleagues (2007) found 
that prior to college, students holding entity beliefs about emotions reported using 
cognitive reappraisal less frequently than their incremental counterparts (see Chapter 5.5 
for a review of the Tamir et al., 2007, study). The goal of Study 8 was to extend this 
initial research by examining whether cognitive reappraisal actually mediated associations 
between personal beliefs about emotions and psychological health. I predicted:  
H1: Entity beliefs about emotions will be negatively associated with cognitive reappraisal. 
Entity beliefs will also be negatively associated with well-being (reduced self-esteem 
and satisfaction with life), and positively associated with psychological distress 
(stress and depression).  
H2:  The relationship between implicit beliefs and well-being/psychological distress will 
be explained by reappraisal frequency.   
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Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
 Participants consisted of 216 undergraduate psychology students (67% female) 
from Stanford University. The current sample was used previously to examine the utility 
of the revised implicit theories of emotions (self-theory) scale (see Study 2 for details).  
Measures 
Emotion Beliefs. Emotion beliefs, well-being and psychological distress measures 
are identical to those presented in Study 2. They include: the four-item Implicit Beliefs 
about Emotion Scale (Tamir et al., 2007); the personal beliefs about emotions scale (De 
Castella et al.  2013). 
Well-being. For a global measure of well-being this study included: The Single-
Item Self-Esteem Scale (SISE; Robins, Hendin & Trzensniewski, 2001) and the five-item 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985).  
Clinical symptoms. For psychological distress, measures included the four-item 
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 1983); and the Center 
for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). See Study 2, 
Chapter 8 for a review of these measures.  
Emotion Regulation (Cognitive Reappraisal). In addition to these well-being 
and psychological distress measures, cognitive reappraisal use was assessed using the six-
item cognitive reappraisal scale from the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross 
& John, 2003) (e.g., “When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m 
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thinking about the situation”). Responses are rated on a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Research indicates that the scale is 
internally consistent (values ranging from .83 to .86, Moscovitch, 2011) and displays 
strong convergent and discriminant validity (Gross & John 2003). Cronbach’s alpha for 
the current sample was .89. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
As described previously in Study 2, prior to analysis, all variables were examined 
for missing values and distributional assumptions of multivariate analysis. Of the total 
sample, eight surveys were left blank or incomplete (missing data > 10%) and were 
excluded from the analysis. This reduced the total sample to 208. Across all variables, 
missing data were rare (< 1%), and were imputed with the overall mean for that variable – 
a conservative technique in such cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Means (M), standard 
deviations (SD), ranges, internal consistencies () and correlations for all variables are 
presented in Table 6. 
Hypothesis 1: Links to Emotion Regulation, Well-Being, and Psychological Distress 
As previously reported in Study 2, both the general and personal scales 
demonstrated significant correlations the well-being measures, and measures of 
psychological distress. Consistent with predictions, entity beliefs were also associated 
with reduced cognitive reappraisal (r = -.34, p < .001). Cognitive reappraisal use was also 
associated with greater overall well-being: self-esteem (r = .34, p < .001) and satisfaction 
with life (r = .37, p < .001); and lesser clinical symptoms: stress (r = -.33, p < .001) and 
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depression (r = -.38, p < .001). As in previous work, beliefs about emotion were not 
significantly related to gender or ethnicity and these variables are not discussed further.  
Hypothesis 2: The Indirect Effect of Cognitive Reappraisal 
To test whether the relationship between implicit beliefs and well-being and 
psychological distress was explained by reappraisal frequency (H2), I examined the 
indirect effect of implicit beliefs via reappraisal using separate analyses for each of the 
dependent variables (self-esteem, satisfaction with life, stress, depression). As reported 
previously (see Study 4), the Preacher and Hayes (2008) SPSS macros were used for 
calculating indirect effects. Gender, age and ethnicity were not associated with implicit 
beliefs, reappraisal or any of the dependent variables. Results indicated that the indirect 
effect of emotion beliefs via cognitive reappraisal was significant in each analysis, with 
95% confidence intervals excluding zero: self-esteem (ab = -.03, 95% CI = [-.06, -.01]); 
satisfaction with life (ab = -.24, 95% CI = [-.47, -.10]); stress (ab = .07, 95% CI = 
[.02, .14]), and depression (ab = .31, 95% CI = [.10, .67]).16 See Figure 20a and 20b. 
In addition to testing the proposed causal model, three alternative models were 
also examined: (a) Reverse causation: well-being and clinical symptoms linked with 
entity beliefs via reappraisal, (b) Entity beliefs predicting reappraisal via well-being and 
clinical symptoms, and (c) Reappraisal predicting well-being and clinical symptoms via 
entity beliefs. Model 1 was significant for all DVs except depression. Model 2 was 
significant for all DVs. For Model 3, the indirect effect of reappraisal via entity beliefs 
was only significant for stress and depression and not for self-esteem or life satisfaction.  
                                                
16 To accommodate alternative analyses of indirect effects I also ran Sobel tests for each of well-being and 
clinical measures. The effect of implicit beliefs via reappraisal was significant in each analysis: self esteem 
(z = -2.98, p < .001), satisfaction with life (z = -3.49, p < . 001), stress (z = 2.74, p < .01) and depression (z 
= 2.92, p < .01). 
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Figure 20a and 20b. Emotion Beliefs and the Mediating Role of Cognitive Reappraisal (Study 8, n = 216) 
 
Figure 20a. The indirect effect of entity beliefs about emotions on well-being via reappraisal. Values are standardized coefficients. When controlling for cognitive 
reappraisal use, the regression coefficient for the effect of implicit beliefs (in parentheses) decreases to non-significance for satisfaction with life but remains 
significant for self-esteem. ^p < .05. *p < .01**p < .001. 
 
Figure 20b. The indirect effect of entity beliefs about emotions on psychological distress via reappraisal. Values are standardized coefficients. The regression 
coefficient for the effect of implicit beliefs (in parentheses) decreases when controlling for cognitive reappraisal but not to non-significance. ^p < .05. *p < .01. **p 
< .001.
Figure 1. 
The indirect effect of entity beliefs about emotions on self-esteem and life satisfaction via reappraisal.!!!!!!
 
Figure 2. Values are standardized coefficients. When controlling for cognitive reappraisal use, the regression coefficient for the effect of implicit 
beliefs (in parentheses) decreases to non-significance for satisfaction with life but remains significant for self-esteem.   
*P < .01 **P < .001 
 
  
Self&esteem!R2adj=!.18!Personal!!Entity!Beliefs!!!
Reappraisal!Use!&.34**! .25**!
&.37**(&.28**)!
Satisfaction!with!Life!R2adj=!.14!Personal!Entity!Beliefs!!!
Reappraisal!Use!&.34**!! .33**!&.24**(&.13)!
 
 
Figure 2.  
The indirect effect of entity beliefs about emotions on stress and depression via reappraisal.  !!!!
 
Figure 2. Values are standardized coefficients. The regression coefficient for the effect of implicit beliefs (in parentheses) decreases when 
controlling for cognitive reappraisal but not to non-significance.  
^ p < .05 *P < .01 **P < .001 
 
 
 !
Stress!R2adj=!.19!!Personal!Entity!Beliefs!!!
Reappraisal!Use!&.34**!! &.23**!.38**(.30*)! Depression!R2adj=!.16!Personal!!Entity!Beliefs!!!
Reappraisal!Use!&.34**!! &.32**!.27**(.16^)!
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Discussion 
Findings from the current study indicated that the more students endorsed entity 
beliefs about emotions, the less likely they were to report using cognitive reappraisal (an 
adaptive cognitive change strategy) in daily life. Entity beliefs about emotions were also 
associated with decreased well-being (reduced self-esteem and satisfaction with life) and 
increased psychological distress (stress and depression) via differences in students’ 
habitual use of reappraisal. Results from Study 8 indicate that differences in reappraisal 
use partially explain the relationship between implicit beliefs, well-being and 
psychological distress. These findings suggest that, in addition to situation selection 
strategies (Chapter 9), and attention regulation strategies (Chapter 10), emotion beliefs are 
also associated with important differences in adaptive use of cognitive change strategies 
(Chapter 11). These strategies in-turn may have important consequences for 
psychological health and well-being. Beyond merely linking emotion beliefs with 
reappraisal use, Study 8 demonstrated cognitive reappraisal use is one variable that 
explains the associations between emotion beliefs and psychological health outcomes.  
Despite this contribution, some limitations of the current study should be noted. 
First, it is important to recognize that finding from Study 8 are correlational and based on 
student samples. As with much of the research on implicit beliefs in other domains (see 
Dweck, 1999), a reliance on student samples significantly limits generalizability to other 
populations – particularly clinical populations which are of primary interest in studying 
deficiencies in emotion regulation. For this reason, Study 9 focuses on examining how 
non-clinical and clinical populations differ in their beliefs about their emotions and what 
role emotion beliefs play in clinical symptoms and psychological illness.  
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Planning Next Studies 
Results from Study 8 indicated that people who believed they could control their 
emotions were more likely to use adaptive emotion regulation strategies like cognitive 
reappraisal in daily life. This, in-turn, partly accounted for their increased levels of well-
being and decreased psychological distress. Given that adaptive use of cognitive 
regulation strategies is absent in many clinical disorders (Werner & Gross, 2009), 
emotion beliefs may also have important implications in clinical settings. For this reason, 
Studies 9 and 10 focus on examining the role of emotion beliefs in clinical populations. 
These studies focus specifically on social anxiety disorder (SAD) – an extremely 
prevalent anxiety disorder and a disorder that may be particularly relevant to research on 
beliefs about emotion. Patients with SAD struggle with attending to, describing, 
expressing, and regulating their emotional experiences (Mennin, McLaughlin, & Flanagan, 
2009; Werner, Goldin, Ball, Heimberg, & Gross, 2011) and frequently underestimate their 
control over external events (Leung & Heimberg, 1996). Barlow (2000) argues that, for 
patients with SAD, repeated experience with uncontrollable events and aversive 
emotional reactions may also reinforce a belief that their emotions, in particular, are 
outside of their control, which in-turn perpetuates fear and avoidance of social situations. 
The aim of Study 9 was to examine how patients with SAD differed from healthy controls 
in their beliefs about emotions. Study 10 then examines belief change in the context of a 
randomized clinical trial of cognitive behavioural therapy for SAD. At the time of 
publication, these studies represented the first published research on implicit beliefs about 
emotions in clinical samples. I begin by outlining research on social anxiety and the role 
of maladaptive beliefs in this disorder.   
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STUDY 9 
11.3 Emotion Beliefs in Clinical and Non-Clinical Samples  
(Patients with Social Anxiety Disorder) 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common condition affecting approximately 15 
million Americans at any one time (Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005) and approximately 
1.35 million Australians in their lifetime (Crome et al., 2015). This equates to a lifetime 
prevalence of up to 12.1% in the United States (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, Merikangas, & 
Walters, 2005) and 8.4%in Australia (Crome et al., 2015). It is the fourth most common 
psychiatric disorder after major depression, substance use disorders, and specific phobias 
(Kessler et al., 2005). It is also a chronic and disabling disorder, with symptoms typically 
developing at an early age and following a chronic, unremitting course (Reich, 
Goldenberg, Vasile, Goisman, & Keller, 1994). SAD can interfere noticeably with daily 
life, often leading to avoidance behaviours, stress, and impairments in work (Bruch, 
Fallon, & Heimberg, 2003), school (Kashdan & Herbert, 2001; Schneier et al., 1994), 
friendships, and intimate relationships (Montesi et al., 2012; Rodebaugh, 2009). 
Beliefs About Emotions in Social Anxiety Disorder   
Study 9 represents one of the first clinical studies to examine differences in 
implicit beliefs about emotions in clinical populations. There is, however, some 
preliminary evidence that implicit beliefs may play a role in maintaining and exacerbating 
anxiety symptoms, particularly in social and performance situations. In a study of 
teenagers with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), Da Fonseca et al. (2008) 
experimentally manipulated students’ implicit beliefs about intelligence. Compared to 
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control subjects, anxious students who received information about how their intellectual 
ability could be controlled performed better on a subsequent IQ test and scored lower on 
measures of state anxiety.  
In the context of shyness (a feature of social anxiety), implicit theories have also 
influenced whether patients choose to approach or avoid anxiety provoking situations. In 
a series of self-report and experimental studies, Beer (2002) found that when 
undergraduates held an entity theory about their shyness – “my shyness is something 
about me that I can’t change very much” – they reported and demonstrated greater 
avoidance-behaviour in social settings. Shy incremental theorists on the other hand, were 
more likely to view social situations as learning opportunities. They reported and 
exhibited more approach-orientated behaviour despite their fears, and were also rated as 
more socially skilled, likeable, and talkative in conversation tasks by independent 
observers.  These findings suggest that implicit beliefs, particularly about one’s emotions 
and one’s anxiety, may play an important role in understanding social anxiety disorder.  
Hofmann (2005) suggests that when patients with SAD believe they cannot 
control their anxiety, they may avoid social situations, in part, because they anticipate a 
lack of control over their emotions when exposed to social threat. In contrast to other 
kinds of maladaptive beliefs, it may be this perceived lack of control – and subsequent 
concerns about blushing, sweating, panic attacks, etc. – that make social situations so 
threatening. Research indicates that individuals with social anxiety often display distorted 
beliefs both about the likelihood of negative social events (a probability bias), and 
distorted beliefs about the consequences of these events being awful or unbearable (a cost 
bias). In research by Hofmann (2005) patients perceived control over their anxiety 
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mediated the relationship between probability/cost biases and fear/avoidance in SAD. 
These results provide preliminary support for the potential role of emotion beliefs in SAD. 
They are, however, based on a small cross-sectional study and so cannot adequately 
address questions concerning the potential role these beliefs may play in treatment.  
The Current Study 
The goal of the current study was to examine whether patients with SAD and non-
clinical participants differ in their beliefs about their emotions. For Study 9 participants 
completed measures of (a) general and (b) personal beliefs about emotions, as in Study 2. 
They also completed measures of (c) more specific beliefs about social anxiety, which 
may be particularly important for patients who are struggling to control their anxiety 
symptoms. By assessing emotion beliefs in several different domains, I sought to further 
examine whether people’s beliefs about the controllability of emotions in general differed 
from their beliefs about the controllability of their own emotions and, more specifically, 
their beliefs about the extent to which they could change or control their social anxiety.  
I predicted that: 
H1: Compared to healthy control subjects, patients with SAD will hold stronger 
entity beliefs about emotions.  
In keeping with findings from Studies 2, I also predicted that: 
H2: As with beliefs about intelligence, non-clinical control subjects will display 
stronger entity beliefs about emotions in general than about their own. 
Patients with SAD, on the other hand, will view themselves as deficient in 
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emotion regulation (compared to others) and will endorse stronger entity 
beliefs about their own emotions than about emotions in general.  
Finally, based on findings from Study 8, I also expected that for patients with SAD: 
H3: Entity beliefs about emotions will be negatively associated with well-being 
(positive and negative affect, self-esteem, and satisfaction with life), and 
positively associated with clinical symptoms (social anxiety, perceived stress, 
and trait anxiety). 
In these analyses, I also conducted hierarchical linear regressions to examine the extent to 
which patients’ emotion beliefs explained unique variance in the dependent variables 
above and beyond what might already be explained by their existing level of social 
anxiety. Finally, in addition to these self-report measures, I assessed the association 
between beliefs about emotions and positive and negative beliefs about the self, using a 
computer task called the self-referential encoding task (SRET). I predicted that: 
H4: Compared to healthy non-clinical subjects, patients with SAD would display 
greater endorsement of negative self-attributes and lesser endorsement of 
positive self-attributes. 
H5: For patients with SAD, entity beliefs about emotions will be associated 
with greater negative and lesser positive views about the self, and these 
differences will be explained by via cognitive reappraisal use in daily life.  
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Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were recruited in 2007 to 2010 as part of a larger study on the neural 
substrates of emotion regulation conducted in the Clinically Applied Affective 
Neuroscience (CAAN) lab at Stanford University. This broader multi-year research study 
examined the neural substrates of emotion regulation in generalized SAD and its 
treatment with cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT, see Goldin et al., 2012). The primary 
researchers involved in that CAAN lab at this time were: Philippe R. Goldin, Michal Ziv, 
Hooria Jazaieri and Stanford CAAN Lab director, James Gross. The overall design of the 
study and its main outcomes, including adherence to CONSORT guidelines, have been 
reported elsewhere (Boden et al., 2012; Goldin et al., 2012).  
A total of 436 potential patients expressed interest in the study and were phone 
screened to assess study eligibility. Because participants were part of a larger study using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, they also had to be right-handed and pass safety 
screening. They were also excluded if they reported a history of medical disorders, head 
trauma, current pharmacotherapy or psychotherapy. From this initial screening, 110 
subjects qualified and were administered a semi-structured interview to determine 
whether they met diagnostic inclusion and exclusion criteria. From these interviews, 75 
participants (40 men, 35 women) met the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for a principal 
diagnosis of generalized SAD and agreed to participate in the study.   
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In addition to this clinical sample, 42 healthy, non-clinical participants (20 men, 
22 women) were recruited and also underwent the same screenings and diagnostic 
interviews. Non-clinical participants had no history of current or past DSM-IV psychiatric 
disorders. All participants were between 21 and 53 years of age (M = 33yrs, SD = 9yrs) 
and were ethnically heterogeneous (55% Caucasian; 29% Asian; 7% Latino; 2% Filipino; 
1% African American; 6% Other). There were no significant age, gender, ethnicity, or 
educational differences between SAD patients and non-clinical participants (all p values 
> .75). Non-clinical participants and patients with SAD both underwent extensive 
diagnostic screening prior to selection including survey and telephone screening as well 
as an in-person diagnostic interview (the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule Lifetime 
Version (ADIS-IV-L) for the DSM-IV (Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994)). Clinical 
psychologists conducted the interviews, which assessed current (and past) episodes of 
anxiety, mood, somatoform and substance use disorders as well as patients’ medical and 
psychiatric treatment history. Among patients, current Axis-I co-morbidity included 14 
with generalized anxiety disorder, five with specific phobia, three with panic disorder, 
and three with dysthymic disorder. All other co-morbidities were exclusion criteria. 
Thirty-six patients reported past psychotherapy (i.e., ended more than one year ago), and 
25 reported a past history of pharmacotherapy. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants.  
Measures 
Implicit Theories of Emotions. General beliefs about the malleability of 
emotions were assessed with the 4-item Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale (Tamir et al., 
2007) and Personal beliefs about the malleability of emotions were assessed using the 4-
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item personal scale (See Table 5 for scale items and coding). In addition to these emotion 
belief measures, a revised version of the implicit theories of emotion scale was 
constructed to assess beliefs about the malleability of social anxiety. Once again, efforts 
were made to ensure the four scale items stayed closely aligned to the originals with each 
reflecting a first-person claim about one’s ability to change or control one’s social anxiety. 
These items were as follows: “If I want to, I can change the social anxiety that I have,” “I 
can learn to control my social anxiety,” “The truth is, I have very little control over my 
social anxiety,” and “No matter how hard I try, I can’t really change the social anxiety 
that I have.” Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Cronbach’s alphas for all scales can 
be found in Tables 19 and 20. 
Emotion Regulation. Cognitive reappraisal use was assessed again using the 
eight-item cognitive reappraisal scale from the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; 
Goldin, T. Manber-Ball, et al., 2009; Gross & John, 2003) Participants were asked to 
‘consider the past month’ while rating their agreement with a series of statements (e.g., 
“When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation”). Responses are rated on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). See study 8 for research on the ERQ reliability and 
validity. Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was .94. 
Stress. Stress was again measured with the four-item Perceived Stress Scale 
(Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983). See Study 2, Chapter 8 for a review of this 
measure. In clinical samples, the PSS-4 has been shown to be internally consistent and 
reliable (Hewitt, Flett, & Mosher, 2012).  
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Anxiety. Trait anxiety was measured with the trait subscale of the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The STAI-T 
is a widely-used measure of clinical anxiety and assesses how patients “general feel” (e.g., 
“I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter”). Responses are scored on a 
four-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (almost never) to 3 (almost always). Summed 
scores ranged from 20 to 80. Overall, the STAI-T displays good convergent and 
discriminant validity, internal consistency, and retest reliability (Spielberger et al., 1983).  
Social interaction anxiety. Social interaction anxiety was measured with the 
Social Interaction Anxiety Straightforward Scale (SIAS-S, Rodebaugh, Woods, & 
Heimberg, 2007; Rodebaugh, Woods, Heimberg, Liebowitz, & Schneier, 2006). Based on 
the original 20-item SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998), the revised SIAS-S excludes three 
reversed-keyed items, reducing the scale to 17 straightforward items that measure social 
anxiety in social situations, dyads and groups (e.g., “I have difficulty making eye-contact 
with others”). Items are rated on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (Not at all 
characteristic or true of me) to 4 (Extremely characteristic or true of me). Summed scores 
ranged from 0 to 68. The SIAS-S has demonstrated good internal consistency and 
construct validity, and research indicates it is an improved measure of social interaction 
anxiety in clinical and non-clinical samples (Rodebaugh, Woods & Heimberg, 2007; 
Rodebaugh et al., 2006).   
Social anxiety. Social anxiety was assessed with the self-report version of the 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Fresco et al., 2001). The LSAS is a commonly used 
clinical measure of social anxiety, and the clinician administered (Liebowitz, 1987) and 
self-report versions yield equivalent results (Fresco et al., 2001). The scale consists of 24 
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items, which assess fear and avoidance of social (e.g., meeting strangers) and 
performance (e.g., taking a written test) situations during the past week. Participants rate 
their fear and avoidance on a four-point scale from 0 (no fear/avoidance) to 3 (severe fear 
or anxiety/ usually avoid). Total scores, summing fear and avoidance ratings, range from 
0 to 144. Research indicates the scale is reliable and displays good convergent and 
discriminant validity (Fresco et al., 2001; Ledley, Erwin, Morrison, & Heimberg, 2013).  
Well-being Measures 
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was assessed using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES, Rosenberg, 1965). The RSES is a widely-used measure of global self-esteem. It 
contains 10-items rated on a four-point Likert-type scale (total scores ranging from 10 – 
40). The scale demonstrates good convergent validity, test-retest reliability, and internal 
consistency in research on social anxiety (Kuo, Goldin, Werner, Heimberg, & Gross, 
2011).  
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was measured using the five-item Satisfaction 
with Life Scale (SWLS, Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985).  The SWLS is a 
commonly used measure of life satisfaction (e.g., “In most ways my life is close to ideal”). 
See Study 2, Chapter 8 for a review of this measures. Items are rated on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale with total scores ranging from 5 to 35.  
Positive and negative affect. Positive and negative affect was assessed using the 
20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The 
scale consists of two 10-item subscales containing adjectives that assess positive (e.g., 
enthusiasm) and negative affect (e.g., irritable) over the last week. Responses are scored 
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on a five-point Likert-type scale with total scores ranging from 10 to 50. The scale is a 
widely-used measure of positive and negative affect and displays excellent psychometric 
properties (Crawford & Henry, 2004; Watson et al., 1988). 
Self-Referential Encoding Task (SRET)  
 The self-referential encoding task (SRET; Derry & Kuiper, 1981) is considered an 
information-processing measure of self-schema. In this task, a series of pre-selected 
adjectives are randomly presented to subjects who are asked to make a categorical 
decision about whether the word is self-descriptive or not. Stimuli for the current study 
consisted of 25 positive and 25 negative social trait adjectives from the Affective Norms 
of Emotion Words database (Bradley & Lang, 1999). Adjectives were balanced on word 
frequency, number of letters, arousal and valence (all ps >.51), based on the nine-point 
Self-Assessment Manikin rating system (Lang, 1980). In the current study the SRET was 
programmed with Eprime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). The 
computer task ran for five minutes, 39 seconds. Participants completed four trials. Each 
trial began with the word “READY” and a prompt (either “Describes ME?” or “UPPER 
case?”). Next five adjectives of the same valence were presented one at a time for three 
seconds each. The “Describes ME?” condition assessed self-referential social-evaluative 
processing. The “UPPER case?” condition used case identification as a comparison 
control condition asking subject to indicate whether the words presented consisted of all 
upper- or all lowercase letters. After the prompt, the stimulus adjective appeared in the 
center of the screen and participants were instructed to respond – indicating whether or 
not a word was self-descriptive or appeared in uppercase letters – by pressing one of two 
keys corresponding with ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Neutral adjectives were not used as a control in 
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this study because there are few neutral adjectives that could not be misconstrued as 
positive or negative by a patient with SAD. Block sequences and word order were both 
randomized. SRET analyses were performed on a reduced sample because eight of the 
SAD subjects; and four of the healthy control subjects failed to complete the SRET task. 
Results 
Means (M), standard deviations (SD), ranges, internal consistencies (α), and 
correlations among the three emotion belief domains and measures of clinical symptoms, 
anxiety, perceived stress, and well-being are presented in Tables 19 and 20.  
Hypothesis 1 and 2: Emotion Beliefs in SAD Patients and Non-Clinical Controls 
To examine whether patients with SAD differed from non-clinical participants 
(NC) in their beliefs about emotions, I conducted a 2 group (SAD vs. NC) x 3 belief type 
(personal, general, anxiety) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the first 
independent variable between participants, and the second within participants. Consistent 
with H1, there was a significant main effect for group (F(1, 115) = 34.06, p < .001, R2 
= .23), and consistent with H2, there was also a significant group x belief domain 
interaction (F(1, 115) = 29.25, p < .001, R2 = .20). Follow-up planned t-tests showed that, 
compared to non-clinical participants, patients with SAD were significantly more likely to 
hold fixed entity beliefs about their own emotions (t(115) = 6.04, p < .001,  d =1.18). 
They also held stronger entity beliefs about emotions in general (t(115) = 2.04, p < .05,  d 
= 0.40) and about their social anxiety (t(115) = 7.80, p < .001, d = 1.42). This was a small 
to medium effect on the general scale and a large effect on the personal and anxiety belief 
scales, according to Cohen’s (1988) conventions. The interaction indicated that for 
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Healthy Controls, entity beliefs decreased as beliefs became more specific (from general 
beliefs to personal and to personal beliefs about anxiety). The reverse was true for 
patients with SAD who reported increased entity beliefs as they became more specific.  
Figure 21 displays the interaction effect between conditions (SAD vs HC) on belief type. 
Paired-samples t-tests for each group were also used to examine whether 
participants’ personal beliefs about their own emotions differed significantly from their 
beliefs about emotions in general. I also examined whether their personal beliefs differed 
from their beliefs about their social anxiety. Patients with SAD endorsed stronger entity 
beliefs on the personal scale than on the general scale (t(74) = - 4.71, p < .001, d = 0.5417), 
indicating a greater perceived lack of control over their own emotions. They also held 
stronger entity beliefs about their social anxiety than about emotions in general (SD = 3.44, 
t(74) = - 4.40, p < .001, d = 0.51). There was no significant difference between patients’ 
scores on the personal and anxiety belief measures (t(41) = - 1.17, p = .25, d = 0.14).  
For non-clinical participants, the reverse pattern emerged. Consistent with 
findings in Study 2, non-clinical participants endorsed entity beliefs less on the personal 
measure than on the general measure, indicating greater perceived control over their own 
emotions (SD = 3.17 t(41) = 2.94, p < .01, d = 0.45). They also endorsed entity beliefs 
less on the anxiety scale than on the general scale (t(41) = 3.84, p < .001, d = 0.60), 
indicating greater perceived control over their social anxiety. Once again there was no 
significant difference between non-clinical participants’ scores on the personal and 
anxiety belief measures (t(41) = 1.83, p = .08). 
                                                
17 Within-subjects estimates of effect size using J. Cohen’s d have been corrected for 
dependence between the means (See equation 8, Morris & DeShon, (2002))  
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Table 19. Descriptive Statistics, Cronbach’s alphas, Means and Standard Deviations for Patients with Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD, n 
=75) and Non-Clinical Participants (NC, n = 42, Study 9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possible 
Range 
 
SAD 
 
NC SAD 
 
NC 
Variable  α  α M SD M SD 
Emotion Beliefs        
1. Entity Beliefs about Emotions (General)  4 – 20 .78 .70 9.77 3.42 8.5 3.13 
2. Entity Beliefs about Emotions (Personal) 4 – 20 .80 .91 11.40 3.54 7.43 3.17 
3. Entity Beliefs about Emotions (Anxiety)  4 – 20 .81 .92 11.77 4.03 6.79 2.78 
Stress and Anxiety      
4. Perceived Stress (PSS-4) 4 – 16 .81 .64 10.21 3.15 6.45 1.99 
5. Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) 20 – 80 .89 .87 55.02 9.11 29.19 6.34 
6. Social Anxiety (SIAS-S) 0 – 68 .89 .88 44.63 10.21 13.4 8.6 
7. Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) 0 – 144 .91 .92 82.78 18.25 15.95 10.24 
Well-being        
8.  Self Esteem (RSES) 10 – 40 .88 .79 24.92 5.21 35.19 3.74 
9. Life Satisfaction (SWLS) 5 – 35 .91 .88 16.68 5.99 26.62 5.44 
10.  Positive Affect (PANAS)  10 – 50 .87 .85 28.10 5.70 34.93 6.60 
11. Negative Affect (PANAS) 10 – 50 .89 .87 25.64 7.67 14.62 4.89 
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Figure 21.  Clinical vs. Non-Clinical Differences in Emotion Beliefs (Study 9) 
 
Note: Patients with SAD held stronger entity beliefs about emotions than non-clinical 
participants (in all belief domains), and stronger entity beliefs on the personal and 
anxiety scales than on the general scales. Non-clinical participants, by contrast, held 
weaker entity beliefs on the personal and anxiety scales than on the general. For patients 
with SAD and non-clinical participants, there was no significant difference between 
emotion beliefs on the personal and anxiety scales.  
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Hypothesis 3: Emotion Beliefs, Clinical Symptoms and Well-being in SAD 
H3 predicted that emotion beliefs would be negatively associated with well-being 
and positively associated with clinical symptoms. See Table 20 for correlations between 
SAD patients’ beliefs about their emotions and clinical symptoms and well-being. 
Consistent with predictions, among patients with SAD, personal emotion beliefs and 
anxiety emotion beliefs were significantly correlated with perceived stress and trait 
anxiety. Social anxiety beliefs were also positively correlated with social interaction 
anxiety. General emotion beliefs, by contrast, were only associated with perceived stress. 
None of the emotion belief scales were associated with fear and avoidance of social 
situations as indicated on the LSAS-SR.  
To test whether patients’ emotion beliefs predicted stress and trait anxiety above 
and beyond what might already be explained by their existing social anxiety symptoms, a 
series of two-step hierarchical regressions were conducted which controlled for social 
anxiety (LSAS-SR and SIAS) in the first step. Emotion beliefs were then entered in the 
second step to examine the unique variance explained on each of the dependent variables 
(see Table 21). Results revealed that even when controlling for social anxiety, patients’ 
beliefs about their emotions (general, personal and anxiety belief measures) accounted for 
11 - 23 per cent of unique variance in stress. For trait anxiety, personal emotion beliefs 
also contributed four per cent of unique variance. The general and anxiety belief scales 
however, did not predict stress or trait anxiety over and above social anxiety symptoms.  
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Table 20. Correlations Between Measures for Patients with Social Anxiety Disorder (Study 9, n =75). 
 
 Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Emotion Beliefs  
1. Entity Beliefs about Emotions (General)  1 .65*** .51*** .43*** .11 .01 -.13 -.13 -.08 -.09 .17 
2. Entity Beliefs about Emotions (Personal)  1 .79*** .40*** .23* .15 -.02 -.39*** -.15 -.07 .26* 
3. Entity Beliefs about Emotion (Anxiety)    1 .36*** .24* .23* .08 -.41*** -.17 -.06 .28** 
Stress and Anxiety  
4. Perceived Stress (PSS-4)    1 .50*** .29* -.40*** -.40*** -.60*** -.42*** .40** 
5. Trait Anxiety (STAI-T)     1 .36*** .32** -.74*** -.66*** -.35** .57*** 
6. Social Anxiety (SIAS-S)      1 .55*** -.38*** -.37*** -.14 .29* 
7. Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR)       1 -.25* -.29** -.14 .34*** 
 
Well-being  
8.  Self Esteem (RSES)        1 .60*** .34*** -.52*** 
9.  Life Satisfaction (SWLS)         1 .26* -.42*** 
10. Positive Affect (PANAS)           1 -.14 
11. Negative Affect (PANAS)           1 
 
Note: Correlations for patients with social anxiety disorder (n =75). PSS-4 = Perceived Stress Scale; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait 
Scale); SIAS-S = Social Interaction Anxiety Straightforward Scale; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Self-Report); RSES = Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale; SWLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule.  * p < .05, ** p < .05, *** p < .001  
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Table 21. Regressions Predicting Variables from Emotion Beliefs in SAD Patients (n = 75) 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 
 
Dependent Variable and Step 
 
B 
 
SE B 
 
 
b 
 
R2 B 
 
SE B 
 
 
b 
 
 
R2 
Total 
 
R2 
Change 
Stress          
Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) .05 .02 .36**       
Social Anxiety (SIAS) .02 .04 .05 .15**      
General Emotion Beliefs     .37 .07 .49** .39** .23** 
Personal Emotion Beliefs     .31 .07 .41** .28** .16** 
Anxiety Emotion Beliefs     .22 .07 .34** .26** .11** 
 
Trait Anxiety 
         
Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) .09 .07 .18       
Social Anxiety (SIAS) .26 .13 .26* 15**      
General Emotion Beliefs     .38 .29 .14 .17** .02 
Personal Emotion Beliefs     .53 .28 .21* .19** .04* 
Anxiety Emotion Beliefs     .41 .25 .18 .18** .03 
 
Self Esteem 
         
Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) -.02 .04 -.06       
Social Anxiety (SIAS) -.20 .08 -.34 .14**      
General Emotion Beliefs     -.18 .17 -.12 .16** .02 
Personal Emotion Beliefs     -.51 .15 -.35** .26** .12** 
Anxiety Emotion Beliefs     -.44 .14 -.34** .26** .11** 
 
Life Satisfaction  
         
Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) .01 .05 .01       
Social Anxiety (SIAS) -.25 .10 -.32 .10*      
General Emotion Beliefs     -.13 .23 -.07 .10* .00 
Personal Emotion Beliefs     -.14 .23 -.07 .11* .01 
Anxiety Emotion Beliefs     -.09 .20 -.05 .10* .00 
 
Positive Affect  
         
Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) -.03 .04 -.10       
Social Anxiety (SIAS) -.05 .09 -.08 .03      
General Emotion Beliefs     -.18 .20 -.11 .04 .01 
Personal Emotion Beliefs     -.11 .19 -.06 .03 .00 
Anxiety Emotion Beliefs     -.05 .17 -.03 .03 .00 
 
Negative Affect  
         
Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) .11 .06 .26       
Social Anxiety (SIAS) .12 .11 .14 .13**      
General Emotion Beliefs     .46 .25 .20 .17** .04 
Personal Emotion Beliefs     .54 .24 .25 .19** .06* 
Anxiety Emotion Beliefs     .44 .21 .23 .18** .05* 
* p < .05, **p < .01.  Results from hierarchical regression analyses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed 
significance tests. Increments for variables entered at R2Change significance levels are based upon F tests for that step.
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To examine whether entity beliefs about emotions were associated with lower 
levels of well-being in patients with SAD, I examined Pearson product-moment 
correlations between emotion beliefs and the well-being measures. Greater personal entity 
beliefs about emotions were associated with lower self-esteem and greater negative affect. 
The same pattern emerged for patients’ beliefs about their social anxiety however; neither 
measure was associated with positive affect or life satisfaction. General emotion beliefs, 
on the other hand, were not correlated with any of the well-being measures.  
To see whether patients’ emotion beliefs accounted for unique variance in well-
being, I again conducted a series of hierarchal regressions controlling for social anxiety 
following the procedures outlined above. Once again, personal and anxiety emotion 
beliefs (but not general beliefs) accounted for unique variance: explaining an additional 
11 – 12 per cent of the variance in self-esteem; and 5 – 6 per cent of the variance in 
negative affect. None of the emotion belief measures however, were significant predictors 
of life satisfaction or positive affect. Overall, these findings indicate that even when 
controlling for symptom severity, patients with SAD differ in their beliefs about the 
controllability of their emotions, and these beliefs uniquely predict stress, trait anxiety, 
self-esteem and negative affect over and above patients’ social anxiety symptoms 
Hypothesis 4: Self-Referential Processing in Healthy Subjects and Patients with SAD 
To assess the association between beliefs about emotions and positive and 
negative self-endorsement, I examined clinical and non-clinical participants’ results on 
the self-referential encoding task (SRET). First, to ensure patients with SAD and non-
clinical participants (NC) both completed the SRET task accurately, responses to the 
control condition – which asked about whether adjectives appeared in all “UPPER CASE” 
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or “lower case letters” – were examined for accuracy. Between subject t-tests revealed no 
significant differences between patients with SAD and HCs in case-accuracy on positive 
(t(103) = -1.88, p > .05) or negative adjectives (t(103) = -1.83, p > .05). Next, to examine 
whether patients with SAD differed from non-clinical participants (NC) in their self-
referential processing (H4), I conducted a 2 group (SAD vs. NC) x 2 adjective type 
(positive vs. negative adjectives) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the first 
independent variable between participants and the second within-participants.  
Figure 22. Self-Referential Processing for Patients with SAD and Non-Clinical Subjects 
(Study 9, SAD n = 75, NC n = 42).  
 
Note: Patients with SAD were significantly more likely than non-clinical subjects to endorse 
negative trait-adjectives and were significantly less likely to endorse positive trait adjectives. 
There were no significant differences between groups in the case-accuracy control conditions.  
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Results indicated a significant main effect for adjective type (F(1, 103) = 103.15, 
p < .001) and a significant group x adjective type interaction (F(1, 115) = 137.76, p 
< .001). See Figure 22 for a visual representation of the interaction between positive and 
negative self-referencing among patients with SAD and non-clinical subjects. Follow-up 
planned t-tests showed that, compared to non-clinical participants, patients with SAD 
endorsed significantly fewer positive trait adjectives as self-descriptive (t(103) = -12.53, p 
< .001,  d =2.33), and significantly greater negative trait adjectives as self-descriptive 
(t(115) = 12.57, p < .001,  d =2.29). There was a large difference in endorsement of 
positive and negative adjectives for non-clinical subjects (t(37) = 29.47, p < .001,  d = 
7.56) but no significant difference for SAD patients (t(66) = -1.10, p > .05,  d = 0.24).  
Hypothesis 5: Implicit Theories of Emotion and Self-Referential Processing 
To examine whether implicit beliefs about emotions were associated with 
cognitive reappraisal and self-referential processing (H5), I examined Pearson product-
moment correlations between subjects’ implicit beliefs, cognitive reappraisal frequency, 
and their endorsement of positive and negative trait-adjectives (see Table 22). Among 
patients with SAD, personal and social anxiety entity beliefs were significantly correlated 
with lower endorsement of positive trait adjectives but were not significantly correlated 
with negative adjectives. For non-clinical subjects, however, the reverse pattern emerged - 
personal and social anxiety entity beliefs were significantly correlated with higher 
endorsement of negative trait adjectives but were not significantly correlated with positive 
adjectives. General emotion beliefs, were not associated with SRET endorsement in either 
group.   
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Table 22. Correlations Between Emotion Beliefs, Cognitive Reappraisal and Self-
Referential Processing in Patients with SAD (n = 75) and Non-Clinical Subjects (n = 42).  
 
Note: Correlations for patients with SAD (n = 67) are reported above the diagonal. Correlations 
for non-clinical subjects (n = 38) are reported below the diagonal. ^p <.05 *p <.01 **p <.001  
 
 
The Indirect Effect of Cognitive Reappraisal on Self-Concept for Patients with SAD 
To test the potential intervening role of cognitive reappraisal (H5), I examined 
whether the effect of implicit theories of emotion (the predictor) on positive and negative 
self-referencing (the dependent variable) was explained via frequency of using cognitive 
reappraisal in daily life (the intermediary). This indirect effect (see Figure 23) was tested 
for significance using the same methods described previously (see Studies 4, 6, 7 and 8). 
In H5, I predicted that SAD patients’ implicit beliefs about their emotions would 
indirectly explain differences in self-referencing (SRET) via cognitive reappraisal use in 
daily life. As predicted, the indirect effect for cognitive reappraisal frequency was 
significant with confidence intervals excluding zero. This was true both for positive self-
endorsement (ab = -.58, 95% CI = [-1.49, -.11], κ2 = .09 [95% CI = .02, .22]), and 
negative self-endorsement (ab = .65, 95% CI = [.13, 1.68], κ2 = .09 [95% CI = .02, .22]). 
These were medium effects by Preacher and Kelly’s (2011) standards (see Figure 23).   
 
 Correlations  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Entity Theory of Emotions (General) 1 .66** .51** -.22 -.19 .15 
2. Entity Theory of Emotions (Self-Theory) .71** 1 .79** -.24^ -.24^ .12 
3. Entity Theory of Emotions (Anxiety) .53** .71** 1 -.19 -.27^ .06 
4. Cognitive Reappraisal Frequency -.22 -.30* -.19 1 .13 -.10 
5. Positive Adjectives (Self Endorsement)  -.23 -.08 -.25 .35* 1 -.60** 
6. Negative Adjectives (Self Endorsement)  .20 .42** .36* -.32* -.25 1 
           
^p<0.05 *p<0.01 **p < 0.001 
Correlations for patients with SAD (n = 67) are reported above the diagonal. Correlations for non-
clinical subjects (n = 38) are reported below the diagonal.  
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Figure 23. The Indirect Effect of patients’ implicit beliefs on self-referencing via cognitive 
reappraisal frequency (Study 9, SAD  n = 75) 
 
Figure 23. Values are standardized coefficients. When controlling for cognitive reappraisal, the 
regression coefficient for the effect of implicit beliefs (in parentheses) decreases and is non-
significant for both positive and negative self-referencing (SRET).   
 
Discussion 
Results from Study 9 indicate that in addition to their associations with emotion 
regulation and psychological health, implicit beliefs about emotion can help to distinguish 
patients with SAD from healthy non-clinical participants. For SAD patients, these beliefs 
are linked to differences in cognitive-change based emotion regulation, clinical symptoms, 
stress, anxiety, and well-being. There was also a significant interaction between SAD 
patients and health controls on belief type. Patients with SAD, reported significant strong 
entity beliefs about their own emotions and anxiety than about emotions in general. 
Healthy controls, on the other hand held stronger entity beliefs about emotions in general 
than about their own indicating a belief that they had greater control over their emotions 
than might be true of others (emotions in general). SAD patients also differed in their 
perceived control over their emotions even when controlling for their self-reported social 
anxiety symptoms and these beliefs explained unique variance on clinical symptoms and 
well-being. Those who believed they could not change or control their emotions, reported 
Figure 1. 
The indirect effect of entity beliefs about emotions on self-referencing via cognitive reappraisal frequency!!!!!
 
Figure 2. Values are standardized coefficients. When controlling for cognitive reappraisal, the regression coefficient for the effect of implicit beliefs 
(in parentheses) decreases to non-significance for both positive and negative self-referencing.   
* P < .05 **P < .01  
 
The indirect effect of entity beliefs about emotions on self-referencing via cognitive reappraisal frequency!!!!!
 
Figure 2. Values are standardized coefficients. When controlling for avoidance, the regression coefficient for the effect of implicit beliefs (in 
parentheses) decreases to non-significance for satisfaction with life but remains significant for loneliness.   
^ P < .05 *P < .01 **P < .001 
Positive!Self,Referencing!R2=!.14!
Personal!!Entity!Beliefs!!About!Emotions!!
Cognitive!Reappraisal!,.24*! .35**!
,.24*!(.15)!
Negative!Self,Referencing!R2=!.10!Personal!Entity!Beliefs!About!Emotions!!!
Cognitive!Reappraisal!,.24*!!! ,.32**!.12!(.03)!
Pos tive!Self,Referencing!R2=!.46!
!Entity!Beliefs!!About!Anxiety!!
Cognitive!Reappraisal!,.18! .67**!
.40**(.16^)!
Negative!Self,Referencing!R2=!.11!Entity!Beliefs!About!Anxiety!!!
Cognitive!Reappraisal!,.18!! ,.32**!.06(.02)!
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higher levels of perceived stress and anxiety, higher levels of negative affect, and lower 
levels of self-esteem. Interestingly, entity beliefs were not significantly correlated with 
positive affect or life satisfaction. These results are somewhat inconsistent with observed 
links between emotion beliefs and indices of well-being in larger non-clinical samples 
(See Study 2, 4, 7 and 8). However, it is possible that for patients with SAD, emotion 
beliefs have a smaller – or indirect – association with these indices of positive well-being. 
The large degree of variance in the LSAS-SR (see Table 19) may have also explained the 
lack of association between emotion beliefs and this measure of social anxiety. 
The clinical significance of emotion beliefs, accord well with existing research. 
Hofmann (2000, 2005, 2007) suggests that perceived control over emotions may also play 
an important role in promoting treatment for SAD. Patients with SAD typically struggle 
with their symptoms for a prolonged period, often waiting more than nine years before 
finding appropriate specialist care (Wagner, Silove, Marnane, & Rouen, 2006). If patients 
with SAD more readily hold fixed entity beliefs about their emotions and anxiety – 
believing them to be stable qualities or personality traits rather than a treatable psychiatric 
disorder – this may help explain why many sufferers fail to seek treatment (Grant et al., 
2005). Acknowledging discrepancies between people’s broader beliefs and their beliefs 
about themselves is also important in the context of clinical interventions. Treatment 
credibility and positive expectations for change in treatment are considered one of the 
most potent nonspecific factors in predicting general treatment response (Arnkoff, Glass, 
& Shapiro, 2002). Such expectations are linked to treatment outcomes for patients with 
SAD (Safren, Heimberg, & Juster, 1997), and they predict rate of change in CBT for SAD 
patients (Price & Anderson, 2011). 
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These results provide important insights into how beliefs about emotion operate in 
clinical populations. This study was the first of its kind to examine implicit beliefs about 
emotion in a clinical sample. Results indicated that patients with social anxiety disorder 
hold significantly greater fixed entity beliefs about their emotions than healthy control 
subjects. Even when controlling for social anxiety symptom severity, the beliefs patients 
held about their emotions uniquely predicted levels of stress, trait anxiety, negative affect 
and self-esteem. Importantly fixed entity beliefs about emotions were associated with 
reduced likelihood of using adaptive cognitive change strategies like cognitive reappraisal 
in daily life. Reappraisal use in-turn mediated links between emotion beliefs and positive 
and negative self-referencing (an important indicator of social anxiety disorder). Since the 
publication of this study, researchers in the field have also begun examining the role of 
implicit beliefs in other clinical domains. For example, recent work by Yalch, Schroder, 
Dawood & Donnellan (2017) found that fixed entity beliefs about anxiety predicted 
clinical symptoms in borderline personality disorder above and beyond maladaptive 
personality traits (as outlined in the current edition of the DSM-5). These findings 
indicate that personality traits and implicit beliefs about emotions are independent 
predictors of symptoms in clinical disorders and may therefore come to play an important 
role in their etiology and treatment.  
Findings from Study 9 also contribute to growing research on implicit theory 
measurement. The current study demonstrated that patients’ implicit beliefs about their 
anxiety are an even stronger predictor of clinical outcomes than their personal and general 
beliefs about their emotions. Researchers in the field have recently extended this work by 
examining the domain specificity of a variety of health-related implicit theories. For 
example, Schroder, Dawood, Yalch & Moser (2016) recently evaluated the latent 
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structure and predictive ability of implicit beliefs across seven different domains: 
emotions, personality, intelligence, anxiety, social anxiety, depression and drinking 
tendencies. For the purposes of this research, the authors also created new implicit theory 
scales for depression, social anxiety and drinking tendencies.  Results found support for 
an underlying global dimension of entity or incremental beliefs that cuts across implicit 
theory domain, significantly predicting mental health symptoms. There was also evidence 
for the specificity of implicit theories with specific emotion beliefs (e.g. beliefs about 
anxiety) predicting specific clinical symptoms (e.g. worry and social anxiety symptoms).  
These findings, and results from the current study, indicate that domain-specific 
measures of implicit theories may be an important construct for future clinical research 
(Schroder et al., 2016). Despite important contributions to research on emotion beliefs 
and social anxiety, several limitations should be noted. The first limitation relates to 
generalizability. Patients in the current study were carefully screened and only eligible if 
they met the criteria for a principal diagnosis of generalized SAD. Although this carefully 
defined clinical population is a key strength of the current study, it is also a limitation. 
SAD is highly prevalent and is frequently comorbid with other mood and anxiety 
disorders (Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992). These findings 
then, while representative of most patients with SAD, cannot be generalized to all people 
with social anxiety. It is also important to note that in clinical studies patients are typically 
seeking treatment for their symptoms and are often required to undergo multiple 
assessments as part of the overall research program. In this way, clinical samples such as 
this one, typically reflect a highly-motivated population who likely believe in the utility of 
research, therapy and their capacity to change. Given that many patients fail to seek 
treatment (especially patients with SAD), it is possible – and even likely – that entity 
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beliefs about emotions are even more prevalent among non-treatment-seeking individuals 
with SAD in the general population. It will also be important to examine whether links 
between emotion beliefs, clinical symptoms and well-being can be generalized across 
multiple mood and anxiety disorders or alternatively, whether these findings are unique to 
patients with SAD. Examining patients’ beliefs about emotions in other clinical 
populations will help clarify the role these beliefs play more broadly in emotion 
dysregulation and psychological illness.  
Second, although the current study documents robust cross-sectional associations 
between emotion beliefs, perceived stress, anxiety, and well-being, we still know little 
about the origins and role of treatment in changing patients’ beliefs about their emotions. 
Research is also needed to better understand the causal links between emotion beliefs, 
perceived stress, anxiety and well-being, and the implications these beliefs might have for 
psychosocial interventions and long-term recovery. Findings from Study 7 indicate that 
emotion beliefs can change in clinical treatments like mindfulness based stress reduction 
(MBSR). Results from the current studies indicate that beliefs about emotions may also 
play an important role in cognitive change strategies like reappraisal, and may therefore 
be particularly important in therapeutic treatments like cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT), which actively teaches patients strategies for changing and controlling their 
emotions. It is also possible that entity beliefs reflect existing deficiencies in emotion 
regulation or that alternative variables account for the relationship between beliefs and 
symptoms. Study 10 begins to address these questions by directly examining if and how 
patients’ beliefs about their emotions can be changed in clinical treatment, and what effect 
(if any) this has on clinical symptoms and long-term recovery. 
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STUDY 10 
11.4 Emotion Beliefs and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
Results from Study 9 indicate that patients with SAD differed from non-clinical 
subjects in their beliefs about the controllability of emotions, and the personal emotion 
belief scales again explained greater variance than the general scale on measures of 
psychological health and well-being. Implicit emotion beliefs also predicted clinical 
symptoms and well-being even when controlling for patients’ degree of social anxiety 
symptoms. These findings indicate that patients’ beliefs about their emotions and anxiety 
are not simply a product of the severity of their anxiety symptoms – irrespective of 
anxiety levels, patients with SAD differ in their beliefs about their ability to control their 
emotions, and these beliefs predict important psychological health indicators via their 
influence on the selection and implementation of emotion regulation strategies like 
cognitive reappraisal (see also Study 8). Results from the current studies provides some 
insight into the role of emotion beliefs in clinical settings. They also suggest that in 
addition to situation selection (Chapter 9) and attention regulation (Chapter 10), cognitive 
changes strategies like reappraisal may be an important variable that helps explain 
associations between emotion beliefs and clinical outcomes.  
The mediation models presented in Studies 8 and 9 are ones in which implicit 
beliefs about emotion guide emotion regulation strategies, which in turn have important 
consequences for clinical symptoms and psychological health. While there is a great deal 
of empirical support for the causal role of implicit theory interventions and treatments in 
educational settings (Aronson et al., 2002; Blackwell et al., 2007; Good, Aronson & 
Inzlicht, 2003; Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Muller & Dweck, 1998), few studies have 
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examined how emotion beliefs change in therapy and clinical treatments. Results from 
Study 7 indicated that programs like mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) do 
successfully change participants’ beliefs about their emotions. At the end of an 8-week 
mindfulness meditation program, participants in the MBSR group (compared with the 
control group) were significantly more likely to view their emotions as things they could 
control (an outcome that also persisted at 12-month follow-up). Furthermore, changes in 
participants’ beliefs about their emotions mediated MBSR-related treatment outcomes for 
patients. These findings raise and important question: Could emotion beliefs be an 
important factor in the success of other clinical treatments and interventions?  
The aim of Study 10 was to examine whether cognitive-focused clinical 
treatments – like cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) – also lead to reliable long-term 
shifts in patients’ implicit beliefs about their own emotions and what impact, if any, this 
has on clinical outcomes. In the current study, I examine emotion beliefs and their role as 
a potential mediator of CBT-treatment outcomes. In an effort to extend research on 
emotion beliefs beyond healthy non-clinical samples, in this study I focus on a clinical 
population of patients with social anxiety disorder. I begin by reviewing research on 
cognitive behavioural therapy for social anxiety disorder, before examining some of the 
existing research on mechanisms of change in CBT-based treatments.  
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Social Anxiety Disorder 
One of the most common treatments for SAD is cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) (Wong, Gordon, & Heimberg, 2012). CBT for social anxiety aims to correct 
patients’ dysfunctional beliefs through cognitive restructuring and systematic exposure to 
feared stimuli. Research indicates that CBT is an effective treatment for SAD (Ledley et 
 282 
al., 2009) and in many cases, is more efficacious than interpersonal psychotherapy 
(Stangier, Schramm, Heidenreich, Berger, & Clark, 2011), psychodynamic therapy 
(Leichsenring et al., 2013), exposure and relaxation training (Clark et al., 2006), or 
treatments combining medication with either self-exposure (Clark et al., 2003) or 
emotional support (Mortberg, Clark, Sundin, & Aberg Wistedt, 2007). There is also 
evidence that CBT results in sustained long-term improvements in SAD (Heimberg, 
Salzman, Holt, & Blendell, 1993; Mortberg, Clark, & Bejerot, 2011). However, despite 
clear evidence for the efficacy of CBT, many SAD patients still fail to respond to 
treatment (Brozovich & Heimberg, 2011), and little is known about the mechanisms 
underlying CBT-based interventions (Hofmann, 2000).  
Potential Mediators of CBT in Treatment for SAD  
Cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 
2010; Hofmann, 2007) emphasize a number of cognitive distortions and dysfunctional 
beliefs in the disorder’s etiology and maintenance. For example, research indicates that 
patients with SAD often hold biased beliefs about the probability of negative social 
incidents occurring (probability biases), and biased beliefs about the costs or 
consequences of these negative incidents (cost biases) (Possis et al., 2013; Smits et al., 
2012). In a destructive cycle, cognitive factors like these are believed to lead to 
exaggerated emotional reactivity, dysregulation, and avoidance behaviour. Probability 
and costs biases are, however, just two of a range of cognitive factors that have been 
studied in SAD. Hofmann (Hofmann, 2000, 2007), believes that maladaptive beliefs 
contribute to the SAD’s development and maintenance and he broadly divides these 
beliefs into three categories: 1) beliefs about social situations – including unrealistic goals 
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and expectations for social performance, poor social self-efficacy, and dysfunctional 
beliefs about the probability and cost of behaving poorly; 2) beliefs about the self – 
including negative self-perception, rumination, and heightened self-focused attention; and 
3) beliefs about emotions – including the belief that one has little control over one’s 
emotions. Although there has been a good deal of research on probability and cost biases, 
and on maladaptive self-beliefs in SAD, to date there has been very little research on 
patients’ beliefs about how much they can change or control their emotions. This is 
surprising as emotion beliefs have been presented as a key mechanism of change in 
cognitive models of the disorder (Hofmann, 2000, 2007), and many have called for 
research on their role in treatment (Hofmann, 2000, 2007; Manser, Cooper, & Trefusis, 
2011; Tamir & Mauss, 2011).  
Understanding the changes in cognitive processes that occur during treatment is an 
important goal of clinical research (Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Hofmann, 2000). 
Intervening variables form the basis of many psychological theories and are of particular 
interest in clinical treatments and interventions. Existing research on beliefs as 
intervening variables in SAD has largely focused on beliefs about social situations – for 
example, probability biases (e.g., the likelihood that you will be ignored by someone you 
know) and cost biases (e.g., how bad or distressing it would be if this were to happen) 
(Smits et al., 2012). In their recent review article, Smits and colleagues (2012) 
systematically examined evidence for probability and cost biases as potential mechanisms 
of change in a variety of treatments for anxiety disorders. Only two of these studies 
examined mediation in the context of traditional CBT interventions for SAD. Although 
there was no support for change in probability estimates as a mediator of treatment 
outcome, both studies found some evidence for the indirect role of reduced social cost 
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biases (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Hofmann, 2004). Recent work by Possis et 
al. (2013) also found that reductions in cost biases explained improvements in a single-
session cognitive restructuring intervention for SAD.  
Maladaptive beliefs about social situations have also been examined from the 
perspective of perceived social self-efficacy – another variable that may play a role in 
treatment for SAD (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2003; Hofmann, 2000, 2007; Leary & Atherton, 
1986). Social self-efficacy refers to patients’ beliefs that they are capable of presenting 
themselves in a favourable light and avoiding negative evaluation in social situations 
(Leary & Atherton, 1986). To date, no studies have formally examined changes in social 
self-efficacy as a mediator of CBT treatment for SAD, although there is some evidence 
that CBT-related changes in these beliefs – along with changes in fears of negative 
evaluation – predicted post-treatment reductions in social anxiety (Gaudiano & Herbert, 
2003). 
In addition to research on probability and cost biases and perceived social self-
efficacy, researchers have also examined the role of negative self-beliefs in the treatment 
of SAD. For example, Rapee, Gaston and Abbott (2009) found that changes in patients’ 
negative beliefs about their appearance (together with their beliefs about the costs of 
negative evaluation) accounted for 29% of the variance in symptom reduction using a 
treatment comprised of cognitive restructuring, exposure, and attention retraining. The 
independent contribution of self-beliefs in this study, however, remains unclear. More 
recently, Boden et al. (2012) tested the role of maladaptive beliefs directly in the context 
of a randomized controlled trial of CBT for SAD. Rather than focusing on dysfunctional 
beliefs in particular domains (e.g., achievement and appearance), the authors developed a 
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global measure of maladaptive interpersonal beliefs characteristic of SAD. These core 
beliefs, drawn from patient reports and clinician interviews, consisted of unhelpful 
evaluative cognitions related to the self in interpersonal contexts (e.g., I am unlovable; I 
don’t fit in). Assessments pre- and post-treatment revealed that CBT (compared to 
waitlist) led to significant reductions in maladaptive interpersonal beliefs, and these 
reductions also accounted for CBT-related changes in social anxiety symptoms. In 
summary, there is some evidence for changes in social cost biases and maladaptive self-
beliefs as important variables in the treatment of SAD (Boden et al., 2012; Foa et al., 
1996; Hofmann, 2004; Rapee et al., 2009).  
The Current Study 
The aim of Study 10 was to examine the role of emotion beliefs as a mechanism of 
change in CBT for social anxiety disorder. In addition to general aim, I was interested in 
examining the specificity of emotion beliefs and their reliability over time. In this study, I 
chose to focus on beliefs about anxiety because findings in Study 9 indicated that anxiety 
beliefs were more strongly associated with clinical outcomes than general beliefs in 
patients with SAD. In the context of a randomized clinical controlled trial of CBT for 
SAD, I hypothesized that: 
H1: Compared to waitlist participants (WL), patients receiving CBT will show a 
significant reduction in entity beliefs about their emotions post-treatment.  
H2: Changes in patient’s implicit beliefs about their emotions will mediate CBT-
related improvements in social anxiety.  
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H3: Implicit beliefs will predict unique variance in post-treatment social anxiety 
beyond that accounted for by patients’ baseline social anxiety levels, and 
while also controlling for alternative belief measures (e.g., beliefs about 
social costs; perceived social self-efficacy and maladaptive interpersonal 
beliefs).  
H4: Changes in implicit beliefs about emotions during CBT will persist and will 
be predict social anxiety at 1-year follow-up.  
Method 
Study Design 
Participants were recruited from 2007 to 2010 as part of a larger study on CBT 
and the neural substrates of emotion regulation in generalized SAD. This research was 
conducted in the Clinically Applied Affective Neuroscience (CAAN) lab at Stanford 
University (See Study 9 for more details). The overall design of the study and its main 
outcomes, including adherence to CONSORT guidelines, have been reported elsewhere 
(Boden et al., 2012; Goldin et al., 2009; 2012).  
Participants 
From the total 75 participants with SAD (who were included in Study 9), 53 (24 
men, 29 women), went on to complete 16-weeks of CBT or waitlist (WL) assessments in 
a randomized clinical control trial of CBT for social anxiety. All patients met DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for a primary diagnosis of generalized 
SAD as assessed by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for the DSM-IV-Lifetime 
version (ADIS-IV-L, Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994). Patients were between 21 and 
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53 years of age (M = 34yrs, SD = 9.3yrs), and were ethnically heterogeneous (62% White; 
19% Asian; 9% Hispanic; 4% Filipino, 2% Pacific Islander; 4% Other). All patients 
underwent extensive diagnostic screening, including telephone and in-person diagnostic 
interviews by clinical psychologists. Patients were ineligible if they were receiving 
concurrent psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy, and were excluded for comorbid 
psychiatric disorders other than secondary diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder, 
specific phobia, panic disorder, or dysthymia. After being admitted to the study, 
participants completed a series of online questionnaires. Patients were then randomized to 
16 weekly sessions of individual CBT for SAD (n = 24) or a 16-week WL group (n = 29). 
During the 16 sessions of CBT, SAD patients completed assessments of anxiety and 
emotion regulation (Goldin et al., 2012) as well as a battery of assessments pre- and post-
treatment, and at 1-year post-CBT. There were no significant differences between groups 
on age, gender, years of education, duration of SAD, or comorbid diagnoses. 
Demographic information for SAD patients and WL controls are presented in Table 23. 
Table 23. Emotion Beliefs and CBT – Demographic and clinical variables for all included 
participants (Study 10, n = 53) 
 
 CBT 
n = 24 
Wait List 
n = 29 
Age (SD) 34.21 (8.1) 33.14 (10.8) 
Age of onset (SD) 12.36 (8.5) 13.04 (6.6) 
Years of education (SD) 16.14 16.35 
% Female 58 52 
% Married 43 20 
% Comorbid axis I 25 24 
Duration of SAD in years (SD) 22.91 (12.1) 20.0 (13.6) 
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Measures 
Implicit beliefs about social anxiety. Beliefs about the malleability of anxiety 
were assessed using the four-item Implicit Beliefs About Social Anxiety Scale (See Study 
9). Results from Study 9 indicate the scale displays high internal consistency in both non-
clinical subjects (NC) and in patients with SAD (NC α = .81, SAD α = .92). Moreover, 
the IBSA displays good convergent and discriminant validity, predicting stress and 
anxiety, self-esteem, and negative affect in patients with SAD (De Castella et al., 2014). 
All scale ranges and reliabilities at baseline, and post-CBT are reported in Tables 24 and 
25.  
Social anxiety. Severity of social anxiety was assessed with the self-report version 
of the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS-SR, Fresco et al., 2001). The LSAS-SR is a 
commonly used, reliable, and valid measure of social anxiety (Ledley, Erwin, Morrison, 
& Heimberg, 2013). The scale consists of 24 items, which independently assess fear and 
avoidance of social (e.g., meeting strangers), and performance (e.g., taking a written test) 
situations during the past week. Participants rate their fear and avoidance on a scale from 
0 (no fear/avoidance) to 3 (severe fear or anxiety/ usually avoid). Total scores range from 
0 to 144.  
Other maladaptive beliefs in SAD. To examine the specificity of emotion beliefs 
(H2), I included three additional measures based on existing research with SAD patients: 
(1) The Social Costs Questionnaire (SCQ, Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996) 
which measures perceived costs associated with social events by asking patients to rate 40 
negative hypothetical situations (e.g., “How bad would it be to unexpectedly be called in 
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to see your supervisor at work?”). Responses are recorded on a Likert-type scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all bad) to 8 (extremely bad).  
(2) The Perceived Social Self-Efficacy Scale (PSSE, Smith & Betz, 2000) which 
assesses confidence in one’s abilities to engage in social interaction tasks necessary for 
initiating and maintaining interpersonal relationships. The scale consists of 12 items (e.g., 
“How confident are you that you can mingle with others at a party or other social 
function.”) Responses are recorded on a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (cannot do at 
all) to 10 (certain can do).  
(3) The Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs Scale (MIBS, Boden et al., 2012) 
measures endorsement of nine negative self-beliefs relevant to SAD (e.g., “If people 
could see who I really am, they would reject me”). Responses are rated on a Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 (Definitely false or Strongly disagree) to 5 (Definitely true or 
Strongly agree).  
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy  
Patients receiving CBT completed 16 individual sessions with trained clinical 
psychologists hired by the Stanford CAAN lab. Sessions were 1hr, except for the first in-
session exposure session, which lasted 1.5hrs. CBT was delivered using a manualized 
treatment protocol which included a therapist guide (Hope, Heimberg, & Turk, 2006) and 
a client workbook (Hope, Heimberg, Juster, & Turk, 2000), and featured training in 
cognitive restructuring techniques for identifying and modifying negative self-beliefs. 
CBT sessions also involved psycho-education and graded exposure to anxiety-provoking 
situations both within session, and as homework. All sessions were recorded and coded 
 290 
for adherence by the primary researcher and trained researchers working in the CAAN lab. 
Coding was conducted according to the Therapist Adherence Scale (Hope, VanDyke, 
Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2001). There was no significant difference between therapists 
based on the adherence ratings (M = 4.16, SD = 0.24, F(3,33) = 0.11, p =.96).  
Statistical Analyses 
To evaluate the effects of CBT on patients’ implicit beliefs (H1), a 2 group (CBT 
vs. WL) x 2 Time (baseline vs. post-treatment/WL) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted, with the first independent variable being between subjects and the second 
being within subjects. This was followed by paired-sample t-tests for the CBT and WL 
groups. Next, to test the potential intervening role of implicit beliefs (H2), while 
accounting for baseline social anxiety, I first computed orthogonalized, residual gains 
scores for the LSAS-SR using pre-post output residuals. Orthogonalized scores represent 
a measure of change during treatment that is independent of pre-treatment status. Using 
orthogonalized scores I was able to account for baseline social anxiety in all analyses, and 
control for baseline correlations between the LSAS-SR and the other belief measures. 
Because orthogonalized scores are uncorrelated with baseline severity these scores also 
represent a more conservative estimate of change following treatment (Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003). I then examined the effect of CBT vs. WL (the predictor) on the 
LSAS-SR residuals (the dependent variable) via patients’ implicit beliefs (the 
intermediary). Indirect effects analyses were calculated using the Preacher and Hayes 
(2008; Rucker et al., 2011) PROCESS macro for SPSS and the same methods described 
previously. Gender, age and ethnicity were not associated with implicit beliefs or either of 
the dependent variables, and were not included as covariates. Indirect effect analyses were 
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repeated – and measures of effect size calculated – for each of the alternative belief 
measures (social costs, perceived social self-efficacy, and maladaptive interpersonal 
beliefs). In the current study, all waitlist subjects were offered treatment at the completion 
of the 12-week waitlist period. For this reason, a treatment vs. waitlist-control comparison 
can only be made at two time points: baseline and post-treatment. Results are reported as 
standardized coefficients.  
To examine whether the patients’ implicit beliefs predicted unique variance in 
treatment outcomes – beyond what might already be explained by their baseline social 
anxiety level, or by the alternative belief measures (H3) – I conducted two-step 
hierarchical regression analyses on the LSAS-SR residual scores. Post-treatment scores 
for perceived social costs (SCQ), perceived social self-efficacy (PSSE), and maladaptive 
interpersonal beliefs (MIBS) – were entered in the first step, followed by post-treatment 
implicit beliefs about social anxiety (IBSA) in the second step. Finally, to test whether 
CBT led to lasting changes in patients’ implicit beliefs and symptoms (H4), I conducted 
follow-up assessments with subjects in the CBT group (n = 24) at 12-months. Changes in 
implicit beliefs were assessed using paired-sample t-tests and by examining the Pearson 
product-moment correlation between scores at the two time points. To examine whether 
implicit beliefs predicted social anxiety at follow-up, I again conducted two-step 
hierarchical regression analyses on 12-month LSAS-SR residual scores, which controlled 
for baseline social anxiety. Post-treatment scores on the alternative belief measures (SCQ, 
PSSE and MIBS) were entered in the first step, followed by post-treatment implicit 
beliefs in the second step. Tables 24 and 25 display means, standard deviations and 
correlations for all study variables at baseline and post treatment for CBT patients. 
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Table 24. Emotion Beliefs and CBT for SAD – Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities 
and Correlations of Study Variables at Baseline (Study 10, N = 53) 
 
     Correlations 
Variable M SD 
Possible 
Range 
 
α 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Entity Beliefs (IBSA) 11.85 3.87 4 – 20 .78 1 .28* .23 -.17 .39* 
2. Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) 82.76 19.36 0 – 144 .92  1 .28* -.48** .46** 
3. Social Costs (SCQ) 205.4 47.08 0 – 320 .96   1 -.35* .35* 
4. Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) 50.85 20.33 0 – 120 .90    1 -.52** 
5. Interpersonal Beliefs (MIBS) 30.36   5.54 9 – 45 .85     1 
 
Table 2. IBSA = Implicit Beliefs about Social Anxiety Scale; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social 
Anxiety Scale-Self Report; SCQ = Social Costs Questionnaire; PSSE = Perceived Social Self-
Efficacy Scale; MIBS = Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs Scale. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
 
 
Table 25. Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities and Correlations of Study 
Variables Post-Treatment for CBT patients (Study 10, N = 24) 
 
     Correlations 
Variable M SD 
Possible 
Range 
 
α 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Entity Beliefs (IBSA) 7.08 3.49 4 – 20 .75 1 .54** -.13 -.36 .37 
2. Social Anxiety (LSAS-SR) 50.50 19.97 0 – 144 .91  1 .10 -.70** .67* 
3. Threat Appraisal (SCQ) 187.08 40.66 0 – 320 .97   1 -.39* .32 
4. Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) 69.70 20.89 0 – 120 .90    1 -.77** 
5. Interpersonal Beliefs (MIBS) 23.00   6.93 9 – 45 .85     1 
 
Table 3. IBSA = Implicit Beliefs about Social Anxiety Scale; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social 
Anxiety Scale-Self Report; SCQ = Social Costs Questionnaire; PSSE = Perceived Social Self-
Efficacy Scale; MIBS = Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs Scale. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
 
 293 
Results 
Prior to analysis, all variables were examined for missing values and distributional 
assumptions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). At baseline, there were no significant 
differences between groups in age, gender, ethnicity, income, marital status, education, 
current or past Axis I comorbidity, or prior experience with medication or psychotherapy. 
There were also no significant differences between groups on beliefs about anxiety (MCBT 
= 11.71, SD = 3.78 vs. MWL = 11.97, SD = 4.00), t(51) = -0.24, p = .81. 
Implicit Beliefs and CBT for Social Anxiety  
Normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance were all found to be 
satisfactory. Missing data were rare (less than 5% on any variable) and were imputed with 
the overall mean for that variable – a conservative technique in such cases (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Consistent with H1, the mixed-measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
treatment x time interaction, F(1, 51) = 30.03, p < .001, R2 = .37.  Follow-up planned 
paired t-tests showed that, compared to baseline, CBT patients reported lower fixed entity 
beliefs about their anxiety post-treatment (Mbaseline = 11.70, SD = 3.78, MPost = 7.08, SD = 
3.49; t(23) = 6.18, p < .001). This was a large effect by Cohen’s (1988) standards d = 
1.27. There was, however, no significant difference over time for WL patients (Mbaseline = 
11.97, SD = 4.00 vs. MPost = 12.34, SD = 3.43, d = 0.10), t(28) = -0.69, p = .50 (see 
Figure 24).  
  
 294 
Figure 24. CBT-Related Changes in Emotion Beliefs for SAD patients (Study 10, n = 53) 
 
Note: At baseline patients in CBT and WL groups did not differ in their implicit beliefs 
about anxiety. Post-treatment entity beliefs about anxiety declined for patients receiving 
CBT (n = 24) but not for waitlist patients (n=29). Error bars represent the standard error 
of the mean.   
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The Mediating Effect of Implicit Beliefs   
In H2, I predicted that patients’ implicit beliefs about their emotions would 
mediate CBT-related changes in social anxiety. As predicted, the mediating effect for 
implicit beliefs was significant, with confidence intervals excluding zero, (ab = 12.87, 
95% CI = [5.21, 24.00], κ2 = .28 [95% CI = .12, .46]). This was a large effect by Preacher 
and Kelly’s (2011) standards (see Figure 25).   
Figure 25. The mediating effect of patients’ implicit beliefs about anxiety on post-CBT 
social anxiety, while controlling for baseline social anxiety symptoms (Study 10, n = 53) 
 
The regression coefficient for the effect of treatment decreases when controlling for implicit 
beliefs about anxiety. Values are standardized regression coefficients. a LSAS-SR residuals 
represent post-CBT social anxiety (LSAS-SR) controlling for baseline social anxiety, b When 
controlling for implicit beliefs about anxiety, the association between treatment and social anxiety 
is no longer significant. IBSA = Implicit Beliefs about Social Anxiety; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale – Self-report. 
 
To compare the indirect effect of implicit beliefs with other intervening variables, 
I conducted additional analyses of indirect effects for perceived social costs (SCQ), 
perceived social self-efficacy beliefs (PSSE), and maladaptive interpersonal beliefs 
(MIBS). There were no significant indirect effects for perceived social costs (SCQ, ab 
= .38, 95% CI = [-3.07, 4.89], κ2 = .13 [95% CI = .00, .04]) or for perceived social self-
Figure 2. The indirect effect of patients’ implicit beliefs about anxiety on post-CBT 
social anxiety, while controlling for baseline social anxiety symptoms. 
   
 
 
 
 
The regression coefficient for the effect of treatment decreases when controlling for 
implicit beliefs about anxiety. Values are standardized regression coefficients. a LSAS-SR 
residuals represent post-CBT social anxiety (LSAS-SR) controlling for baseline social 
anxiety  b When controlling for implicit beliefs about anxiety, the association between 
treatment and social anxiety is no longer significant . IBSA = Implicit Beliefs about 
Social Anxiety; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale – Self-report. !
a!
Post'CBT!Entity!Beliefs!about!Anxiety!(IBSA)! .57***!b!!'.61***! c!!(c’)!
'.41**!('.10) b!
Post'CBT!social!anxiety!!(LSAS'SR) a!CBT!vs.!!Waitlist!
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efficacy beliefs (SSE, ab = 5.04, 95% CI = [-.25, 14.20], κ2 = .13 [95% CI = .01, .32]). 
However, the indirect effect for maladaptive interpersonal beliefs (MIBS) was significant 
with confidence intervals excluding zero, (ab = 10.26, 95% CI = [3.85, 20.29], κ2 = .26 
[95% CI = .11, .43]). This was also a large effect by Preacher and Kelly’s (2011) 
standards. These findings indicate that the extent to which patients’ beliefs about their 
anxiety changed in treatment determined their post-CBT social anxiety symptoms.  
Implicit Beliefs and Other Belief Measures  
In H3, I predicted that implicit beliefs would explain unique variance in post-
treatment social anxiety while accounting for baseline social anxiety and for the 
independent contribution of the other belief measures – perceived social costs (SCQ), 
perceived social self-efficacy (PSSE), and maladaptive interpersonal beliefs (MIBS). As 
predicted, implicit beliefs explained unique variance in social anxiety, above and beyond 
that explained by baseline social anxiety, the SCQ, PSSE, and MIBS. Table 26 displays 
the standardized regression coefficients (β), R2, and R2-change for this analysis. 
Implicit Beliefs about Anxiety at Follow-up 
In the final analysis, I examined whether CBT led to lasting changes in patients’ 
implicit beliefs, and if so, whether implicit beliefs would continue to predict anxiety 
outcomes at 12 months (H4). Of the original 24 subjects in the CBT-group, 18 completed 
the 12-month follow-up assessment. From treatment-completion to 12-month follow-up, 
patients’ implicit beliefs about anxiety were strongly correlated, with no significant 
differences between the two time points, r = .91, p < .001, (Mpost = 6.44, SD = 3.22 vs. 
M12m = 6.28, SD = 4.31; t(17) = 0.36, p = .71). Results of hierarchical linear regressions 
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revealed that post-treatment implicit beliefs and the alternative cognitive variables (SCQ, 
PSSE, and MIBS), together accounted for 29% of the variance in LSAS-SR residuals at 
12-months (R2 = .41, R2 adjusted = .29, F(4,19) = 3.31, p < .05). Consistent with H4, 
implicit beliefs explained unique variance in social anxiety, above and beyond that 
explained by the alternative belief measures (b = 2.4, t(19) = 2.06, p < .05, R2 change 
= .13). These findings indicate that CBT-related changes in implicit beliefs persisted and 
continued to predict symptom severity 12 months after treatment completion.   
 
Table 26. Hierarchical regression predicting post-treatment social anxiety (LSAS-SR) 
accounting for baseline anxiety and alternative belief measures (Study 10, n = 53). 
 
 B SE B b R2 R
2 
change F 
 
Step 1  
    
.47*** 
 
 
 
14.48*** 
1. Social Costs (SCQ) .01 .05 .01    
2. Perceived Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) -.14 .15 -.15    
3. Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs (MIBS) 1.5 * .41 .57*    
 
Step 2 
    
.52*** 
 
.05* 
 
13.22*** 
1. Social Costs (SCQ) .02 .05 .06    
2. Perceived Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) -.06 .15 -.07     
3. Maladaptive Interpersonal Beliefs (MIBS) 1.19** .41 .45**    
4. Entity Beliefs about Anxiety (IBSA) 1.37* .59 .29*    
 
Note:  LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self Report; IBSA = Implicit Beliefs about 
Social Anxiety Scale. Adjusted R2 values and increments for R2 change are based upon F tests for 
that step.  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Discussion 
The primary aim of Study 10 was to examine whether patients’ implicit beliefs 
about their ability to control their emotions predict CBT outcomes for patients with SAD. 
In Study 8, I identified links between implicit theories of emotions and cognitive 
reappraisal, and in Study 9 I found links between implicit theories and clinical symptoms 
in SAD patients. Cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg, Brozovich, 
& Rapee, 2010; Hofmann, 2007) have emphasized the role of maladaptive beliefs and 
dysfunctional cognitive content – particularly dysfunctional beliefs about social situations, 
and dysfunctional beliefs about the self. To date, however, there has been very little 
emphasis on patients’ beliefs about their emotions, and no studies have examined the role 
of emotion beliefs as a mediator of CBT for SAD. 
In Study 10, implicit beliefs and social anxiety were assessed at baseline, and at 
the completion of a 16-week randomized clinical control trial of CBT for SAD. As 
predicted, patients receiving CBT (compared to waitlist controls) were less likely to hold 
fixed entity beliefs about their anxiety post-treatment. This shift in thinking explained 
treatment-related reductions in social anxiety. Additional analyses revealed that patients’ 
implicit beliefs also uniquely predicted how much they benefited from treatment, even 
when controlling for baseline social anxiety and other categories of beliefs. Finally, 
implicit beliefs stayed constant at 12-month follow-up and continued to predict anxiety 
symptoms one year after completing CBT. At follow-up emotion beliefs uniquely 
explained 13% of the variance in anxiety symptoms.  
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Emotion Beliefs and CBT for Social Anxiety 
The current results suggest that implicit beliefs about emotions may play an 
important role in clinical treatments and interventions even mediating treatment outcomes 
for patients. This is true both for attention-based interventions like MBSR (see Chapter 
10), and also for cognitive change based therapies like cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT). The current chapter examined links between emotion beliefs and cognitive 
reappraisal (an adaptive cognitive change strategy). It also extended prior work on 
emotion beliefs in community samples to the clinical domain with two specifically 
looking at emotion beliefs in patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD). CBT for SAD 
teaches patients the skills required to ‘reframe’ and confront anxiety-provoking situations, 
and to examine the core beliefs that underlie their fears and avoidance behaviour 
(Heimberg et al., 2010; Hofmann, 2007). Patients learn about various cognitive 
distortions, attention and memory biases, are taught how to skilfully work with these 
habits to manage and reduce their anxiety (Ledley et al., 2013), and are empowered to use 
these skills through graded exposure. In working with fear and avoidance hierarchies 
through treatment, patients are also provided with direct evidence that their self-reported 
fear and anxiety levels do change. In this way, over time, patients in CBT may come to 
experience and internalize greater belief in their ability to change and control their 
emotions, even if this message is not explicitly emphasized as in interventions based on 
implicit theories of intelligence (Blackwell et al., 2007; Good et al., 2003).  
The Role of Emotion Beliefs in Treatment 
There are a number of explanations for why patients’ beliefs about their emotions 
may play an important role in treatment. First, Hofmann and Barlow (2002) suggest that 
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for patients with social anxiety, it may actually be the perceived lack of control over one’s 
emotional response – independent of judgment biases and fears of negative evaluation – 
that triggers fear and avoidance of social situations. This helps explain the prevalence of 
panic attacks among patients with SAD (Kessler et al., 2006), and why many attribute 
their fears more to panic attacks than traumatic events or indirect conditioning (Hofmann, 
Ehlers, & Roth, 1995). In this way, if patients come to believe they have greater control 
over their emotions, reductions in fear and avoidance behaviour may follow.  
Second, incremental beliefs about emotions may be a necessary prerequisite for 
many adaptive forms of emotion regulation (see Chapter 6 for a review of the potential 
role of emotion beliefs in the identification, selection and implementation of emotion 
regulation strategies). Research indicates that patients with SAD typically use 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies in day-to-day life, such as situational avoidance 
and emotional suppression (Werner, Goldin, Ball, Heimberg, & Gross, 2011). These 
strategies make sense as preventing or hiding one’s emotional reactions may be the only 
option if patients believe they cannot change or control their emotions. In Study 7 with a 
non-clinical sample, entity beliefs about emotions were linked with reduced likelihood of 
using adaptive emotion regulation strategies like cognitive reappraisal (De Castella et al., 
2013; Tamir et al., 2007). If CBT leads to a reliable shift in patients’ beliefs about their 
emotions, this may, in turn, promote use of a variety of more adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies (in addition to cognitive reappraisal). Given that many features of 
psychopathology involve poorly implemented, inflexible or context-insensitive strategies 
(Werner & Gross, 2009), examining how implicit beliefs influence emotion regulation 
choice is an important area for future research.   
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Third, patients’ beliefs about whether they can learn to control their emotions may 
play a key role in their commitment to and engagement with psychotherapy. Positive 
expectations for change in treatment are regarded as one of the most important 
nonspecific factors in predicting general treatment response (Arnkoff, Glass, & Shapiro, 
2002). Positive expectations for change also predict rate of change (Price & Anderson, 
2011), and treatment outcomes (Chambless, Tran, & Glass, 1997) for patients with SAD. 
Not surprisingly, these findings have led to renewed interest in motivational interviewing 
(MI, Miller & Rollnick, 2002), and its manualized variant, motivational enhancement 
therapy (MET, Miller, Zweben, DiClemente, & Rychtarik, 1992). Research indicates MI 
and MET techniques are effective additions to CBT for generalized anxiety (Westra, 
Arkowitz, & Dozois, 2009), and there is some support for their efficacy with SAD 
patients (Buckner & Schmidt, 2009). MI approaches, however, do not explicitly focus on 
patients’ beliefs about their emotions or the efficacy of treatments for managing one’s 
anxiety. If treatment ambivalence is due in part to patients’ implicit beliefs about their 
emotions, focusing on implicit beliefs in treatment, or as part of an orientation to 
treatment, may prove beneficial for improving MI and MET interventions.   
Finally, before one even finds their way to clinical professionals, emotion beliefs 
may influence help-seeking behaviour and one’s openness to various forms of treatment. 
Study 5 demonstrated that when people hold entity beliefs about their emotions they are 
more likely to avoid seeking psychological help. This is a particularly important finding 
given the current results from Studies 9 and 10. SAD is frequently misdiagnosed and 
under-treated, (as noted above) with patients often waiting more than nine years before 
finding appropriate specialist care (Wagner, Silove, Marnane, & Rouen, 2006). If patients 
with SAD hold entity beliefs about their anxiety – as something that is fixed and 
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uncontrollable rather than malleable and treatable – they may fail to seek treatment. When 
patients do seek help, emotion beliefs may also influence treatment preferences, with 
patients holding entity beliefs more readily turning to medication and symptom 
management over active cognitive change strategies taught in therapies like CBT. Study 4 
found some evidence for this with entity beliefs about emotions being positively 
associated with help-seeking avoidance. To date, however, there is still limited work in 
this area, and additional research examining links between emotion beliefs, help-seeking, 
and treatment preferences is needed.  
Implications, Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the current study makes important contributions to research on implicit 
theories and social anxiety, several limitations should be noted. The first relates to 
measurement. As with much of the research on implicit theories (see Dweck, 1999), this 
study is based largely on participant self-reports. Self-report data provide valuable 
insights into patients’ beliefs and their anxiety, and using self-reports has long been the 
primary approach for examining implicit theories. However, self-report methods – 
particularly for psychological symptoms – are not always as objective as other methods, 
such as independent evaluations, psychophysiological assessments, and behavioural tasks. 
And, self-report scales also fail to capture the richness of data present in more qualitative 
methods. In the future it will, therefore, be important to explore additional methodologies 
and approaches of measurement to further replicate, and extend these findings.   
A second limitation relates to the potential intervening role of cognitive variables 
in treatment. In the current study, I examined several cognitive variables that might 
explain treatment outcomes in CBT for SAD. These variables included: implicit beliefs 
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about emotion, perceived social costs, perceived social self-efficacy, and maladaptive 
interpersonal beliefs. By controlling for pre-treatment social anxiety, I was also able to 
examine the unique role of cognitive variables in treatment separate from patients’ pre-
existing levels of anxiety. Results revealed significant indirect effects for implicit beliefs 
and maladaptive interpersonal beliefs. Indirect effects, however, are not evidence of 
causation, and they do not rule out the possibility of other additional intervening variables. 
Researchers for example, have also examined the potential mediating role of emotion 
regulation strategies (Goldin et al., 2012), negative self-talk (Kendall & Treadwell, 2007), 
as well as attention, memory and information processing biases relevant to fear and 
anxiety (Hofmann, Moscovitch, Kim, & Taylor, 2004; Mansell & Clark, 1999). It will 
therefore be important in future research to directly examine the relative strength of these 
and other candidate variables, and their role in treatment. By incorporating experimental 
manipulations, clinical interventions, and/or multiple assessments throughout treatment, 
future studies may also be able to better clarify the degree to which cognitive variables 
play a causal role in healing and recovery. 
A final limitation relates to generalizability. Results from the current study should 
only be generalized to CBT for SAD. It remains to be seen whether implicit beliefs about 
emotions explain treatment-related gains in other disorders, and in other forms of 
psychotherapy, or whether findings reported in the current study are unique to CBT for 
SAD alone. Despite these limitations, this study provides preliminary evidence for the 
role of implicit beliefs in CBT treatment for SAD. Chapter 10 also found evidence for 
emotion beliefs as a mediator of attention-focused treatments like MBSR. Together these 
findings indicate that emotion beliefs do play a role in at least two diverse clinical 
interventions. It’s possible, then, that these beliefs also play a role in others. Study 10 also 
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consisted of a randomized clinical trial with a waitlist control group, which provides 
strong grounds for examining the efficacy of CBT and potential mechanisms of 
therapeutic change. While there has been growing research on the role of cognitive 
variables in treatment for SAD, to date, there is limited research on patients’ beliefs about 
their emotions. Study 10 demonstrates that CBT leads to a reliable long-term change in 
patients’ implicit beliefs. Implicit beliefs, in turn, explain treatment related reductions in 
social anxiety and account for unique variance in symptoms over and above that 
explained by baseline anxiety and alternative cognitive variables – perceived social costs, 
perceived social self-efficacy, and maladaptive interpersonal beliefs. These findings 
indicate that maladaptive beliefs – particularly about the self and about one’s emotions – 
may be important mediating variable in clinical treatments and interventions.  
11.5 Chapter Summary: Studies 8, 9 & 10 
Results from the empirical works presented in Chapters 8 – 11 indicate that people 
differ in their implicit beliefs about their emotions and these beliefs have important 
implications for emotion regulation and psychological health. Emotion beliefs appear to 
play an important role in the selection and implementation of a range of adaptive and 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies. Studies 9 and 10 began extending this work to 
the clinical domain by examining the role of implicit beliefs about emotions in a clinical 
sample of patients suffering with social anxiety disorder. Study 10 also examined emotion 
beliefs as a potential mediator of treatment outcomes. Results indicated that fixed entity 
beliefs about emotions are robust predictors of psychological health and clinical recovery 
for patients with social anxiety.  
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Implications for Clinical Disorders 
Since these preliminary findings were published (see De Castella et al., 2014a; 
2014b), there has been growing interest in the role of emotion beliefs in clinical 
populations (Schroder et al., 2015; 2016; Yalch et al., 2017). In a recent article, Kneeland, 
Dovidio, Joormann and Clark (2016) argue that implicit theories about emotions may be 
particularly relevant to problems of anxiety and depression. Cognitive theories of 
depression for example, typically focus on the role of an individual’s attributional style, 
emotional schemas, and impaired emotion regulation, all of which may be influenced by 
their implicit beliefs about their emotions. Research indicates that people suffering from 
major depression are significantly more likely to make stable, internal, and global 
attributions for negative experiences (e.g., “negative things will always happen to me 
because I’m depressed”) (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Sweeney, Anderson, 
& Bailey, 1986). The belief that one can’t change the emotions one experiences may 
therefore reinforce this attributional style by promoting an externally oriented perceived 
of lack of control and by promoting self-blame for negative experiences (Kneeland et al., 
2016). Other researchers have also linked symptoms of depression with perceptions of 
emotions as invalid, incomprehensible, and uncontrollable arguing that these beliefs 
perpetuate the depressive cycle by inclining individuals towards maladaptive emotion 
regulation strategies (like avoidance, substance use and rumination) that further contribute 
to depressive symptoms (Leahy, 2002). Kneeland et al. argue that “it could be the belief 
that emotion is fixed provides the genesis of a cognitive schema about how one’s own 
emotions are outside of personal control, thereby providing the foundation and 
maintenance for clinical levels of depression and psychological distress” (2016, p. 18).   
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 Like cognitive models of depression, cognitive models of anxiety also highlight 
the perceived lack of control over anxiety as a central feature in the development and 
maintenance of many anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2015; Hofmann, 2007). This perceived 
lack of control contributes to heightened distress in emotion-eliciting situations and 
promotes rigid cognitive or behavioural avoidance of social situations or phobic stimuli. 
Increased perceived anxiety coupled with avoidance (see Studies 4 and 5) and 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (see Studies 6 – 10), in-turn, reinforces anxiety 
symptoms and beliefs about the perceived lack of control over anxiety (Barlow, 2000; 
Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2014; Hofmann, 2007). From this perspective, holding 
entity beliefs about one’s emotions may plays a key role in perpetuating cycles of anxiety 
and avoidance.  
Implications for Clinical Treatment 
To date there is growing research on the important role of implicit theories of 
emotions in emotion regulation and psychological health. There is also evidence that, for 
many people, these beliefs do change on their own in clinical treatment (see Studies 7 and 
10). But is it possible, through psychoeducation and targeted interventions, to more 
directly change people’s implicit theories? Study 5 successfully manipulated people’s 
beliefs about their emotions, demonstrating that it is possible to temporarily change 
people’s beliefs, but the longer-term influence of these experimental manipulations 
remains unclear. In non-clinical settings entity and incremental beliefs have been induced 
experimentally through explicit messages, case studies, and vignettes (Bergen, 1991), and 
indirectly through feedback, praise or criticism (Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & 
Dweck, 1998). Other interventions focusing on creating longer-term change in implicit 
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beliefs have taught an incremental theory using scientific research on brain plasticity 
through online programs (Brainology, 2010), workshops (Blackwell et al., 2007) and 
videos, mentoring, and letter writing tasks (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Good, 
Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003). See Chapter 5 for a review of implicit theory interventions.  
 To date, implicit theory interventions have typically focused on teaching people 
about brain plasticity and the potential for change and growth; however, it is a message 
that may not reach all who hear it. Discrepancies between general implicit theories and 
people’s personal theories about their own abilities (see Studies 1, 2, 4 and 9: De Castella 
& Byrne, 2015; De Castella et al., 2013; De Castella et al., 2014) indicate that knowing 
change is possible is not the same as believing personally in one’s ability to change. And 
to date, no interventions have directly focused on changing people’s implicit beliefs about 
their emotions (or the consequences of these kinds of interventions in clinical settings). 
This will be an important area for future research and many researchers have called for 
work in this area (Kneeland et al., 2016; Schroder et al., 2015; 2016; Yalch 2017). 
Kneeland et al. (2016) argue that implicit theories of emotion may be a potent mechanism 
of change in therapy and a necessary precondition for intervention work:  
“Through engaging in cognitive exercises, such as cognitive restructuring, 
clinicians are either explicitly or implicitly conveying the message that emotions 
are malleable, and these cognitive therapeutic exercises could work through this 
mechanism. Importantly, it could be that having clients or patients endorse the 
idea that emotion is malleable and that they can actively work to change their 
emotions then provides the basic premise for these exercises and provides the 
platform through which these interventions have their efficacy… If a client has 
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more fixed emotion beliefs (either about emotions in general or their own 
emotions), the client could then benefit from a targeted treatment module that 
explicitly focuses on enhancing a more malleable view of emotion before 
initiating more active cognitive and behavioural interventions that rely on the 
premise that emotions, by their very nature, are changeable and dynamic… It is 
likely important to address emotion malleability beliefs in the therapy room, 
perhaps through psychoeducation, before clinicians engage clients to change the 
way they regulate their unwanted emotions. More research is needed to determine 
how best to promote a more malleable view of emotion in therapeutic contexts to 
enhance treatment outcomes”. (Kneeland et al., 2016 p. 25-26).  
The final chapter of this thesis will present a case study, which takes a qualitative look at 
the role of implicit theories in clinical settings. It examines how these beliefs may 
manifest for clients struggling with anxiety and depression, and the challenges involved in 
using psychoeducation and targeted interventions of the kind described by Kneeland et al. 
(2016).  
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12. CLINICAL CASE STUDY18 
“In response to the question, “where is the person in personality research?” 
it can be said that the person is there, waiting to be engaged by those of us 
who are willing to undertake the rather arduous task of trying to fathom 
[them] in all their complexity.” (Fowler & Epting, 1976, p. 159). 
 
12.1 Introduction 
The previous empirical chapters have document evidence for the importance of 
implicit beliefs about emotions in a wide range of emotion regulation strategies. Chapter 8 
(Studies 1, 2 and 3) employed survey research and qualitative content analysis to examine 
more closely how people actually think about their emotions. Chapter 9 (Studies 4 and 5) 
used correlational and experimental studies to demonstrate that emotion beliefs lead to 
differential use of avoidance-based situation selection strategies. Chapter 10 (Studies 6 
and 7) employed survey and longitudinal research to examine associations between 
emotion beliefs and attention regulation. In a controlled treatment study of mindfulness 
based stress reduction (MBSR), emotion beliefs also served as a mediator of change in 
treatment. Finally, Chapter 11 (Studies 8, 9 and 10) examined associations between 
emotion beliefs and cognitive change strategies like reappraisal. Study 9 identified 
important differences in emotion beliefs in clinical and non-clinical populations and 
                                                
18 The current chapter is currently in prep for submission:  
De Castella, K., Platow, M., Gard, D., & Gross, J. (2016). Implicit Theories of Emotion: A case 
study of the role of emotion beliefs in emotion regulation and clinical treatment. Journal of 
Clinical Psychology.  
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Study 10, a randomized clinical control trial of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), 
demonstrated that changes in emotion belief mediate treatment outcomes for patients. 
This empirical work demonstrates that people’s beliefs about their ability to control their 
emotions influence emotion regulation efforts, psychological health and well-being, and 
even play a key role in clinical disorders. Importantly, there is also evidence that emotion 
beliefs are one potential mediator of change in clinical treatments and interventions (like 
MBSR and CBT).  
Findings presented in Studies 1 – 10 indicate that emotion beliefs could be an 
important focus of treatment in clinical psychotherapy. Some researchers have even 
suggested that clinicians should focus on addressing these beliefs using psychoeducation 
at the outset of therapy (Kneeland, Dovidio, Joormann & Clark, 2016). However, no 
research to date has investigated the efficacy of this approach – or examined what these 
beliefs actually mean to clients in real-life settings. Furthermore, the research presented to 
date has been almost exclusively quantitative in nature which may not capture the nuance 
and complexity of people’s beliefs about their emotions, their meaning, and why they 
hold them. As Berg and Lune explain:  
“quantitative measures appear objective, but only so long as we don’t ask 
questions about where and how the data were produced… pure objectivity is not a 
meaningful concept if the goal is to measure intangibles [as] these concepts only 
exist because we can interpret them” (Berg & Lune, 2012, p. 340).  
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For this reason, mixed methods research –– which utilises both quantitative and 
qualitative methods – is increasingly regarded as the “gold standard” for research in social 
and psychological sciences (Oneuegbuzie & Leech, 2004). Despite many notable 
strengths, quantitative (experimental and survey) research methods are largely context-
bound and influenced by the structure of questionnaires and stimuli, and the specific 
hypotheses under investigation. These methods cannot control for all possible variables in 
real-life situations, and they often fail to take into account people’s unique ability to 
interpret their experiences and construct their own meanings. Based on these criticisms, 
many researchers argue that psychological science would benefit from better integration 
of research methods and paradigms with mixed-methods approaches offsetting the 
inherent weaknesses of any one approach (Berg & Lune, 2012; Driscoll, Appiah-Yeboah, 
Salib & Rupert, 2007; Gerring, 2004; Madill & Gough, 2008; Greene, Caracelli, & 
Graham 1989; May 2011).  
To address these shortcomings, the current chapter uses a previously reported 
clinical case study to illustrate the richness and complexity in one individual’s unique 
interpretation of his ability to control his emotions. In this case study, I examine the utility 
of psychoeducation as a clinical intervention as advocated by researchers like Kneeland et 
al. (2016).  I also examine potential difficulties that can arise when working with patients 
who hold fixed entity beliefs about their emotions, and explore why these beliefs can feel 
protective for clients even when they are associated with a range of maladaptive emotion 
regulation outcomes.  
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12.2 Case Presentation 
The following chapter focuses on a real-life case treated by the first author. This 
research was conducted under the supervision of Professor David Gard at San Francisco 
State University and adhered to all ethical requirements regarding clinical treatment, 
research and supervision. This case study is also based on a report that was submitted as 
part of clinical training through San Francisco State University. The case study is relevant 
to the theoretical and empirical chapters presented in this thesis, but is not being presented 
as part of the dissertation’s empirical works because it is based on work that has been 
previously submitted. In the following case study, the clients name and all identifying 
information have been modified for privacy and confidentiality. Some of the information 
presented is fictitious and has been changed to protect this client’s anonymity, but core 
elements of this case and all quotes are presented verbatim.  
Client Demographics 
At the time of intake, this client (pseudonym: “Alex”) was a 20-year-old – a 
heterosexual Latino-American male who grew up in Northern California. Alex was a full-
time college student in his sophomore year at a public university, and he lived in a share 
apartment with three other students’ off-campus. Alex moved from his home city the 
previous year for study, and was receiving some financial support from family, but mostly 
worked part-time on campus to support himself. Prior to intake, Alex had received a 
previous diagnosis of depression and anxiety from a local psychiatrist. Alex also had prior 
experience with psychotherapy and school counseling. At the time of intake, he was 
taking fluoxetine, tetracyclic antidepressants and lorazepam to manage his symptoms of 
insomnia, anxiety and depression.   
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Assessment 
Intake assessment with Alex consisted of a 90-minute clinical interview and 
several self-report surveys including: the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961); the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, Epstein, 
Brown, & Steer, 1988); and the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, Peplau, & Cutrona, 
1980). Alex’s initial score on the BDI at intake was 46 (indicating severe depression). He 
also scored 31 on the BAI (indicting moderate anxiety) and 29 on the UCLA loneliness 
scale (low/moderate loneliness).  
Presenting Complaints 
Alex’s primary goal for therapy was to manage his ‘depression and anxiety’. He 
explained that he had “a long history of mental illness” since he was eight years old and 
had been formally diagnosed with depression at 13 years. Alex later developed symptoms 
of anxiety and panic, and had been intermittently taking medications for most of his life. 
Alex described his anxiety and depression symptoms as “coming out of the blue” rarely 
with any precipitating thoughts or events as triggers. These periods of feeling anxious and 
depressed could last from several hours to several days and Alex felt he had few options 
but to “tolerate” and “endure” these periods. Alex struggled with adaptive emotion 
regulation and in an effort to manage his emotions when feeling anxious or depressed, he 
would typically hide and minimize his feelings, isolate herself in his room and sleep, or 
engage in non-suicidal self-injury in the form of cutting.     
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Beliefs about Emotions 
Although Alex was motivated to begin therapy, it was clear at the outset that he 
held firm fixed entity beliefs about his emotions – he understood his difficulties as 
“biologically based” and “part of his personality”. In Alex’s words, “depression and 
anxiety ran in his family,” it was “genetic,” “hereditary,” “a disease,” and something that 
had been “passed down through his family just like high blood pressure.” Alex was 
concerned that he too would pass the “depression and anxiety genes” on to his children 
and this also left him feeling conflicted about one day being a father. Alex was also 
convinced he would remain anxious and depressed for the rest of his life – a belief that 
worried people around him. For Alex, it was “safer and more realistic to expect the worst, 
than hope for the best.” Regular psychotherapy (like medication) was intended not for 
long-term clinical change, but rather as a necessary part of symptom management. 
12.3 History 
Alex grew up an only child in a middle-class single parent family. Alex 
remembers his parents fighting a lot when he was younger, eventually separating when he 
was five years old. Alex lost contact with his father shortly afterwards. When asked about 
his feelings towards his father, Alex reported that he “couldn’t care less about him.” He 
also resented that past therapists had focused so much on his father as an explanation for 
his problems. During his early childhood, Alex’s mother worked long hours. She had 
several other turbulent relationships with men, but never remarried. When Alex’s mother 
was unavailable or busy with work, Alex would stay with his maternal grandparents. He 
had a very close relationship with both grandparents who also helped care for Alex’s aunt 
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who struggled with substance use and had been repeatedly hospitalized for self-harming 
and attempted suicide when Alex was between the ages of 8 and 11.  
Although Alex was estranged from his father and ostensibly indifferent to his 
departure, he reported having an extremely close relationship with his mother: “we didn’t 
have anyone else, we had to be a team.” Alex recalled having separation anxiety as a boy 
when away from his mother, as well as nightmares and other phobias. Alex was very 
protective of his mother but also described times when times she could be ‘upset’ – 
sometimes depressed and down (crying behind closed doors), and at other times angry, 
explosive and controlling. Alex had difficulty understanding or preempting these mood 
swings and remembers “doing his best to be a good boy” and always wanting to know 
what was wrong and how he could help. Alex also appeared to carry a lot of guilt about 
his potential role in his mothers’ difficulties: “I was a really bad kid. My mother didn’t 
deserve that.” This guilt however, appeared largely disproportional to Alex’s actual 
descriptions of his “bad” behaviour, which consisted of: “having a bad attitude,” 
“withdrawing”, or “never wanting to go out and do things.” In addition to these early 
difficulties, Alex also struggled making friends in primary school and was bullied for over 
five years – a secret he mostly kept from his family. During his primary school years, 
Alex remembers angrily bursting into tears and being unable to explain what he was 
feeling. These outbursts were embarrassing for Alex when they occurred in front of other 
students. When they occurred in front of his mother, Alex would also be yelled at in 
frustration because his mother could not understand why he was crying. 
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12.4 Initial Case Conceptualization 
The initial case conceptualization for Alex focused on the problem of his implicit 
beliefs about his emotions. As with other kinds of implicit beliefs – like implicit beliefs 
about intelligence – it was possible that for Alex, these beliefs had been acquired through 
information provided by family members, teachers and/or other authoritative sources like 
Alex’s psychiatrist who may have sought to explain his anxiety and depressive symptoms 
primarily in biological terms (a strategy that could be have been used to encourage him in 
the direction of medication management). In one of our sessions, Alex explained that his 
psychiatrist did tell him about the genetic basis of his anxiety and depression. He reported 
that he had been told that “depression is, after all, recognized as being just like other 
hereditary diseases and health problems.”  
Based on this information, and in the absence of other ways of understanding his 
distress, it appeared that Alex had come to hold entity beliefs about his emotions. 
Consistent with theories and empirical evidence presented in Chapters 6 – 11 Alex’s 
entity beliefs about his emotions were also associated with a range of maladaptive coping 
strategies and emotion regulation efforts: Alex displayed difficulties with psychological 
health, stress, anxiety and depression, and he made global and stable attributions for his 
difficulties reporting a general feeling of hopelessness over his symptoms. In light of his 
perceived lack of control, Alex relied on medication and avoidance-based strategies 
(cognitive, behavioural and experiential avoidance), maladaptive attention regulation 
(ruminating, catastrophizing, distraction and suppression), and other maladaptive 
strategies like non-suicidal self-injury. Together these maladaptive and avoidant coping 
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strategies likely heightened the experience and duration of his distress in emotion-
eliciting situations, reinforcing a perceived lack of control his emotions (see Chapter 6.5).   
12.5 Initial Course of Treatment 
Based on the theory and research presented (Chapter 6 – 11), and 
recommendations made by researchers in the field (Kneeland et al. 2016), the initial 
treatment plan for Alex focused initially on psycho-education. Alex agreed to once 
weekly psychotherapy and during the first phase of treatment, sessions focused primarily 
on understanding Alex’s symptoms in the context of the diathesis-stress model. This 
involved explicating the combined influence of genetics and environmental factors in the 
etiology and maintenance of anxiety and depressive symptoms. These sessions involved 
discussing neuroscientific research on brain plasticity and the structural and functional 
brain change – and associated changes in emotion regulation – that can take place with 
treatment. Sessions also explored Alex’s current emotion regulation strategies and the role 
of maladaptive and avoidance-based coping in the etiology and maintenance of clinical 
anxiety and depression. Finally, sessions focused on discussing and highlighting examples 
of change and recovery, and even identifying examples from Alex’s own experience 
where he was able to successfully manage his emotions. As a supplement to these 
discussions, Alex was given a copy of Carol Dweck’s book Mindset (2006) – which 
discusses the role of entity and incremental beliefs and presents a variety of case studies 
and stories about personal growth, recovery and resilience.  
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Assessment of Progress and Treatment Obstacles 
 Despite the effectiveness these interventions in research settings, this initial course 
of psychoeducation proved largely ineffective with Alex, as evidenced by a wide range of 
therapeutic rupture markers. Safran and Muran (1996) define a rupture in the therapeutic 
alliance as deterioration in the relationship between the patient and the therapist or a 
difficulty in establishing such a relationship. According to Harper (1989) ruptures can be 
divided into withdrawal and confrontation: Withdrawal ruptures occur when the patient 
disengages from the therapist, the therapy or his/her own internal experience (e.g., by 
avoiding the therapist’s questions or by being overly deferential and appeasing); while 
confrontation ruptures occur when the patient moves against the therapist or some aspect 
of the therapeutic process in an aggressive, controlling, hostile or non-collaborative 
manner (e.g., by expressing complaints, resentment or dissatisfaction).  
 In these early sessions, Alex displayed several signs of withdrawal markers when 
the discussions inquired about, or presented information that challenged his fixed entity 
beliefs about his emotions. These rupture markers included: 1) minimal responding (e.g., 
going silent or providing single word answers to questions); 2) avoidant 
storytelling/shifting topics (e.g., shifting the discussion to an alternate topic like a conflict 
with a friend or difficulty with a teachers); 3) abstract communication (e.g., using vague 
or abstract language to keep the discussion away from his thoughts and feelings); 4) 
deferential and appeasing responses (e.g., being overly compliant and deferential to avoid 
conflict with single word statements of agreement); 5) content/affect splits (e.g., joking, 
smiling, laughing, minimizing or being very matter-of-fact about upsetting events and 
experiences thereby exhibiting positive affect that deflects and does not match the 
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difficult or upsetting content of what is being discussed); and 6) denial (e.g., conscious or 
unconscious denial of his true feelings). In addition to these withdrawal rupture markers, 
there were also several signs of confrontation ruptures such as: 7) efforts to control the 
therapist (e.g., covert warnings against talking about certain topics: “my last therapist 
tried to make all of this about my dad leaving… they didn’t get it”) and, 8) rejection of 
therapist interventions (e.g., responding to information about the potential to change 
one’s emotions with statements like “maybe that’s true for other people, maybe some 
people can change their depression or anxiety, but not me”).  
12.6 Revised Case Conceptualization 
In light of the ruptures that took place in the initial phase of therapy, it became 
clear that Alex’s implicit beliefs were serving an important protective function. Alex’s 
belief that he could not change or control his emotions was not something that could 
simply be addressed with psychoeducation. Berger warns against falling into the role of 
“therapist as the imparter of knowledge” (Berger, 1987 p. 194). It became clear 
throughout the initial course of treatment that efforts to challenge this belief directly were 
experienced both as serious empathic failures and potentially threatening to Alex’s 
identity. For Alex, this belief was a deeply held organizing schema. Without it – and the 
associated biological explanations the belief afforded for his anxiety and depression – 
Alex would be forced to consider alternate explanations for his difficulties.  
An alternative conceptualization of Alex’s case sought to incorporate an 
understanding of his symptoms, and his implicit beliefs about his emotions, within the 
context of his early life experiences: Alex grew up in an emotionally dysregulated, 
unstable family environment. The conflict between his parents and the experience of 
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abandonment by his father could have been grounds for a painful pathogenic belief that he 
was the problem – in his words “a mistake”. Without siblings or children his age, Alex 
entered an adult world, full of adult problems (including his parents’ separation and aunt’s 
hospitalizations). Alex’s mother and aunt frequently turned to him for psychological and 
emotional support, beyond his years, and it is possible that Alex also became the object of 
parental focus for his mother after her separation. Alex’s close relationship with his 
mother may have also resulted in a degree of enmeshment and fusion in thinking and 
feeling. Alex displayed many of the problematic characteristics of enmeshed relationships, 
such as: a strong need for attention and approval; difficulty dealing with others’ 
expectations; a tendency to blame himself for conflicts and problems; feelings of 
responsibility for others’ happiness; difficulties with emotional awareness and regulation; 
reduced tolerance for anxiety; and impulsive behaviour (like self-harming) as a means of 
relieving anxiety (Papero, 1983).   
Alex’s extreme sensitivity to his mother’s emotional states and his aunt’s distress 
also left him concerned about burdening others with his problems. Early adolescence is a 
vulnerable period for most young adults, and for Alex this was no exception. In addition 
to the typical pressures of school life Alex struggled with school and bullying. Despite 
this, he chose not to disclose these problems to his family. Alex’s close relationship with 
his mother, coupled with his mother’s emotional dysregulation and invalidation, 
undoubtedly made it difficult for Alex to separate, understand, and express what he was 
feeling.  Despite being highly attuned to others’ emotions, Alex lacked an understanding 
of how to work with his own. And, unable to express his emotions, Alex came to believe 
they were “out of control,” and there was “something wrong with him”. In the absence of 
alternative strategies for regulating his emotions, Alex ultimately turned to a range of 
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maladaptive emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive and behavioural avoidance, 
minimization, denial, suppression, self-harming and defensive pessimism. Alex’s 
mother’s need for extreme closeness with Alex also likely left Alex feeling responsible 
for his mother’s happiness, as well as guilty and conflicted about his own growth, 
independence, and closeness with others (issues that would later play out in his personal 
and romantic relationships). In addition to these difficulties with individuation, emotional 
awareness, and emotion regulation, Alex’s close relationship with his mother likely also 
led him to internalize his feelings of anger, rather than express them. By directing his 
anger at himself, Alex could preserve his relationships with his family, but only at the 
expense of chronic feelings of inferiority, doubt, guilt, and self-criticism.  
Why Beliefs about Emotions Can Feel Protective 
In re-evaluating Alex’s case formulation, it became apparent that Alex’s ‘fixed’ 
biological explanation for his depression and anxiety may have felt protective even if 
these beliefs also proved harmful. By identifying as someone with fixed and biologically-
based symptoms, Alex was able to find an external explanation for his problems. Framing 
‘the problem’ in purely medical terms, provided Alex with a way of rationalizing his 
difficulties while also diverting responsibility away from relevant others and experiences. 
This may have served to protect and redirect anger away from vulnerable or important 
family members (e.g., Alex’s mother and aunt), and it may have also helped defend 
against the potential impact of other difficult experiences (e.g., Alex’s father leaving, 
school bullying etc.). Redirecting accountability away from Alex’s mother may have been 
particularly important given the protectiveness, guilt and shame Alex reported feeling in 
this relationship. Entity beliefs about emotions also served to protect against therapeutic 
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efforts aimed at exploring potentially difficult and vulnerable topics. With a biological 
explanation for his anxiety and depression, Alex saw little point in talking about 
memories of past experiences (especially if they were painful and distressing). His 
resistance to the idea that these relationships may have played a role in his problems 
emerged as a reoccurring theme in therapy: “people are always trying to blame their 
parents for their problems,” “my aunt thinks she’s responsible because of everything that 
happened, but I don’t see it that way” and “I hate that other therapists are always asking, 
‘is it because your dad left?’  
Entity beliefs about emotions afforded Alex the opportunity to be depressed and 
anxious, without having to explain to other people what he was feeling or why. As an 
organizing belief however, entity beliefs also had the potential to be harmful because they 
denied Alex agency over his difficulties, deprived him of opportunities for deeper work in 
therapy, and become self-fulfilling prophecies that promoted maladaptive emotion 
regulation, which in turn confirmed his belief that he could not control his emotions.  
12.7 Revised Course of Treatment 
Rupture Resolution Strategies 
To facilitate greater openness to the therapeutic process, the second phase of 
treatment focused primarily on rupture repair work and on cultivating a stronger 
therapeutic alliance. Safran and Muran (1996) outline several core rupture resolution 
strategies that were used in these sessions including: 1) clarification of misunderstandings 
(e.g., acknowledging misunderstandings in the moment and clarifying/explaining 
comments); 2) changing tasks or goals (e.g., “I’m interested in this topic, and I also want 
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to make sure we have enough time today to revisit this import thing you brought up at the 
end of our last session…”); 3) acknowledgement of therapist contributions to ruptures 
(e.g., “I wonder if it felt like I misunderstood you there – you’ve struggled with this for 
most of your life and what I’m saying might feel like I just don’t get what it’s been like 
for you); 4) invitations to discuss thoughts and feelings about therapy (e.g., “I wonder if 
you might be a little frustrated with me and feel like it’s not OK to be frustrated with 
me?”; “when you say therapists are always thinking that, I wonder if you think I might 
also be thinking that?”); 5) therapist disclosure of internal experience of the interaction 
(e.g., “you’ve gone a little quite right now, I’m left wondering if there’s something I’ve 
said that upset you…”; “I noticed you laughed as you told me that, but I’m actually quite 
troubled by what you just said…”); 6) linking rupture to larger interpersonal patters (e.g., 
“you’ve spoken about how you sometimes feel like you just have to agree with what your 
mom’s saying, I’m wondering if you’re feeling that way with me right now too – like it’s 
not okay for you to disagree”). 
Empathic Responding  
In addition to this focus on rupture resolution, a second goal of this phase of 
treatment was to return to a focus on empathic responding. In Kahn’s words this this 
involved “putting one’s own world aside and fully entering that of the client’s” (Kahn, 
1997, p.177). Rogers’ also described empathic responding as follows:   
“To sense the client’s private world as if it were your own, but without ever losing the ‘as if’ 
quality - this is empathy, and this seems essential to therapy. To sense the client’s anger, 
fear, or confusion as if it were your own, yet without your own anger, fear, or confusion 
getting bound up in it, is the condition we are endeavouring to describe. When the client’s 
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world is this clear to the therapist, and he moves about in it freely, then he can both 
communicate his understanding of what is clearly known to the client and can also voice 
meanings in the client’s experience of which the client is scarcely aware” (1957, p.99). 
In sessions with Alex, this emphasis on empathic responding required completely 
letting go of ‘the therapist agenda’ to disconfirm his beliefs about his emotions. Instead it 
required curiosity about Alex’s lived experience and a focus on opportunities for deeply 
understanding, reflecting, and validating Alex’s emotions. Chung and Bemak (2016) 
explain that empathic understanding alone is not effective – therapists must also have the 
skills to communicate and demonstrate their empathic understanding. Appropriate use of 
therapist vulnerability and self-disclosure, particularly when Alex had shared something 
moving, also began to facilitate greater connection and vulnerability in sessions.  
This focus on empathic responding was an essential intervention with Alex not 
only for cultivating a more trusting therapeutic alliance and more open exploration of 
experience, but also for helping Alex learn how to better become aware of, identify and 
express his own emotions. Throughout the entire first phase of treatment, Alex had 
expressed very little emotion in sessions. Despite extremely high scores on the BDI and 
BAI at intake, Alex had never appeared sad or cried in the therapy room, nor had he 
displayed any visible signs of anxiety, stress, frustration or anger. Although he often 
spoke about his depression and anxiety in abstract terms, he also used very few other 
words to describe what he was feeling. There was no gradient in valence or intensity, no 
room for nuance in different kinds of emotional experience, and no apparent awareness of 
the association between his actions, thoughts and his feelings.  
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Working with Affect 
Brems (2000) argues that clients must first be aware of affect before they can begin 
to explore how they experience it and what it ‘feels like’ in the moment. They must also 
have this basic awareness of affect and understanding of internal experience before they 
can turn toward healthy and conscious outer expression (2000, p. 292). Using Brems’ 
model as a guide, sessions in the second phase of treatment focused on: 1) helping 
facilitate greater awareness of affect (e.g., with questions about what Alex actually felt 
(or was feeling) in his body during difficult experiences); 2) helping identify basic inner 
experiences of affect (e.g., helping Alex identify when he was feeling “off” and 
facilitating curiosity about this feeling rather than labelling it ‘depression’); 3) helping 
with labelling of basic affect (e.g., reflecting the emotional content of what was being 
shared in sessions and offering a wider range of feeling words for making sense of 
emotional experience); 4) helping with identification of default affect (e.g., helping Alex 
expand his repertoire of experienced affects and their associated labels); 5) helping with 
identification of affect intensity (e.g., utilizing reflective listening to help Alex identify 
and differentiate subtle shades of feelings such as slight sadness to overwhelming 
depression, irritation to rage etc.); 6) helping Alex identify mixed and conflicted affect 
(e.g., reflecting and validating the complexity of emotional experience and the ability to 
feel two conflicted emotions in the same moment, or towards the same person); 7) helping 
Alex identify underlying affect  (e.g., differentiating between kinds of affect, and 
facilitating exploration of vulnerable and painful emotions); and 8) helping Alex with 
acceptance of affect  (e.g., reflecting, contextualizing and validating his experience). In 
addition to Brem’s (2000) stage-model of working with affect, a final intervention for 
Alex focused on challenging his belief that vulnerable emotions were dangerous, harmful 
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and burdensome to others. By modelling self-disclosure and vulnerability, and through 
sharing personal stories of challenges with expressing emotions, it was possible to 
communicate that vulnerability can also be a sign of strength, and can facilitate greater 
intimacy and connection with others. These sessions provided the basis for discussions 
about the beneficial and healing process of ‘feeling feelings’ even when they are painful 
and difficult.  
Assessment of Progress 
Alex committed himself to weekly psychotherapy (which continued for two and a 
half years). He gradually brought more emotionally laden content into sessions and 
embraced a willingness to explore, discuss, and acknowledge the impact of difficult life 
events and early childhood experiences. Through focusing on rupture resolution, empathic 
responding, and working with affect, Alex began to display a more nuanced 
understanding of his inner emotional world and he gradually become better able to 
identify and describe painful and conflicting emotional experiences. He even began 
identifying his own defences (humour, minimization and distraction) and was able to 
connect more fully to what was really going un underneath them. Over time, Alex 
displayed increased ability to express his feelings, assert his needs, and show vulnerability 
both in sessions and in close relationships with others.  
After several months of therapy, Alex also started to let himself become more 
emotional and cry in a session. These moments of shared vulnerability facilitated deeper 
connection and may have served as the beginning of corrective emotional experiences – 
demonstrating that can be safe and even beneficial to feel one’s feelings fully and share 
them with others.  Paradoxically by feeling his feelings, Alex also discovered that he 
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could bring them under control in the wider sense – in his words, “surfing the highs and 
lows without getting dumped.” At the conclusion of therapy, Alex still believed that there 
were some biological components to his emotional difficulties, but he reported feeling 
more in control of his emotions and described feeling that his depression and anxiety was 
much more manageable. Alex also began utilizing more adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies – drawing, writing, connecting with friends, and reaching out for help (instead 
of isolating himself), when he felt overwhelmed. He also displayed more compassion for 
his emotional reactions when they arose, and was better able to understand them as valid 
and reasonable within the broader context of his life. Finally, Alex reported 
acknowledging the significant changes that had taken place for him over his time in 
therapy: “I wanted to tell [a friend struggling with depression], that it’s OK – it gets better. 
Look at me now and where I was a couple of years ago...”  By the end of treatment, Alex 
had also stabilized off his prescription medication. 
12.8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Implicit theories about emotions are beliefs that have important consequences for 
emotion regulation and psychological health. Research presented in this thesis has linked 
‘fixed’ entity beliefs about emotions with increased stress, reduced self-esteem, and 
reduced overall satisfaction with life; as well as with increased depression and anxiety in 
community and clinical samples. These beliefs are also linked with cognitive and 
behavioural avoidance and with greater use of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies 
in day-to-day life. Based on this growing research, there have been calls for interventions 
aimed at explicitly addressing these beliefs in clinical settings. Kneeland et al. (2016) for 
example, argue that targeted treatment modules using psychoeducation should be 
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implemented to address and disconfirm people’s beliefs about their emotions prior to 
therapy in order to enhance treatment outcomes. These authors however, overlook some 
of the potential pitfalls with this approach.  
In the current case study, directive psychoeducation interventions repeatedly failed 
to change Alex’s implicit beliefs about his emotions. Instead these direct attempts to 
challenge his beliefs head-on caused ruptures and a deterioration in the therapeutic 
alliance. The current chapter identified many ways in which entity beliefs about emotions 
can be protective for clients like Alex. It also illustrated the importance of rupture 
resolution strategies, empathic responding, and working with affect to more skilfully 
address the underlying reasons clients may hold these beliefs in the first place. Meyers 
(Myers, 1999, 2003) explains that in many cases it is the therapeutic relationship, not the 
relinquishing of a harmful belief, that is the source of healing and recovery. Instead, 
through empathy and connection with a therapist, a client is able to more fully understand 
themselves and with this understanding, develop compassion: “Through being listened to 
and empathized with, the client is freed to listen more accurately to himself, with greater 
empathy toward his own visceral experiencing, his own vaguely felt meanings” (Rogers, 
1975, p.8). As Meyers (2003) explains, it is this felt experience of being understood that 
helps one better understand themselves and why they hold the beliefs they do.  
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13. GENERAL DISCUSSION  
13.1 Review of Thesis Aims and Objectives 
Implicit theories about emotion refer to people’s beliefs about whether their 
emotions are fixed (entity beliefs) or malleable (incremental beliefs). The primary aim of 
this thesis was to examine how these beliefs are related to emotion regulation and 
psychological health. Chapters 1 – 4 reviewed research on emotion and emotion 
regulation and introduced the process model of emotion regulation (and the extended 
process model) as a framework for the current thesis. Chapters 5 – 7 introduced research 
on implicit theories and integrated this research with the extended process model of 
emotion regulation by considering the potential impact of emotion beliefs on the 
identification, selection, and implementation of different emotion regulation strategies. 
From these chapters, three central propositions formed the basis of future testable 
hypotheses. These included: 
1) Implicit beliefs about emotion will influence emotion regulation processes – 
specifically the identification, selection and implementation of regulatory 
strategies that in turn determine how successful one is at regulating one’s 
emotions. 
2) Implicit beliefs about emotion will be associated with psychological health and 
well-being outcomes via their influence on emotion regulation processes. 
3) Implicit beliefs about emotion will serve as a key mechanism of change in 
clinical treatments and interventions.  
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13.2 Review of Empirical Findings 
Results from empirical work presented in Chapters 8 – 11 found significant 
support for all three propositions. A summary of each of these empirical chapters is 
provided below:  
Chapter 8: Scale Development 
The first three studies of this thesis (Chapter 8) focused on scale development. 
Before undertaking additional research on implicit beliefs about emotions, it was 
necessary to develop a revised measure that assessed participants’ personal beliefs about 
their unique capacity for change (their personal implicit theories). I predicted that entity 
beliefs would be associated with a range of maladaptive regulation strategies and that a 
revised first-person measure of implicit theories would explain greater variance in 
outcomes. Consistent with predictions in Study 1, personal entity beliefs about 
intelligence predicted fewer achievement goals, greater helplessness attributions and 
poorer self-reported academic grades among Australian high school students (n = 643). 
Fixed 'entity' beliefs were also predictive of increased self-handicapping, truancy and 
disengagement from school, with the self-theory scale uniquely explaining greater 
variance on all measures over and above general implicit theories. In Study 2, personal 
entity beliefs about emotions predicted increased stress and depression as well as reduced 
self-esteem and satisfaction with life among American university students (n = 216). 
Once again, the new self-theory scale uniquely explained greater variance on all measures 
over and above general implicit theories. In Study 3, the revised personal implicit theory 
of emotion measure was further evaluated using a qualitative content analysis of open-
ended responses from online surveys (n = 124). Blind content analysis further validated 
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the new scale and revealed that compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists 
spontaneously referred to fewer strategies for regulating their emotions. Consistent with 
predictions, entity theorists also referred to proportionally fewer internal strategies (e.g. 
cognitive change and attentional deployment) and a proportionally greater number of 
external and antecedent-focused strategies for regulating their emotions (e.g. avoidance, 
problem solving etc.). 
Chapter 9: Avoidance and Situation Selection Strategies 
Using the newly developed implicit theories of emotion measure, Chapter 9 
examined the relationship between emotion beliefs and the use of avoidance-based 
emotion regulation strategies. This chapter examined emotion regulation strategies 
relevant to the first and second stages of the process model (situation selection and 
situation modification). Studies 4 and 5 tested the prediction that entity beliefs would 
promote greater use of avoidance-based emotion regulation strategies. Consistent with 
predictions, results from Study 4 (a correlational study, n = 112) indicated that entity 
beliefs about emotions were associated with increased use of self-reported cognitive and 
behavioral avoidance in daily life. The more strongly people believed they could not 
control their emotions, the more they also reported difficulties with psychological health – 
increased loneliness and decreased satisfaction with life, as well as increased stress, 
anxiety and depression. Avoidance strategies also mediated theses associations between 
implicit theories and psychological health outcomes. Study 5 (an experimental study, n = 
101) successfully manipulated people’s beliefs about their emotions by leading them to 
infer that they either struggled with (entity condition) or had control over (incremental 
condition) their emotions. Compared to participants in the incremental condition, 
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participants in the entity condition reported greater intentions to use cognitive and 
behavioral avoidance strategies in daily life, were more likely to avoid psychological help, 
and were significantly more likely to avoid future fictitious emotion regulation research 
studies. 
Chapter 10: Attentional Deployment and Response Modulation Strategies 
Chapter 10 examined emotion beliefs as a predictor of attention-regulation-based 
strategies. Attentional deployment strategies are the focus of the third stage of the process 
model. In Study 6 (a correlational study, n = 94) entity beliefs were associated with 
greater use of maladaptive attention-regulation strategies (e.g., catastrophizing) and lesser 
use of adaptive attention-regulation strategies (e.g., mindful awareness). Study 6 also 
examined links between emotion beliefs and substance-based response modulation 
strategies (the fifth stage of the process model). Results indicated that when people 
believed they could not control their emotions they were more likely to report using 
alcohol and medication to manage difficult emotions when they arose. Mindfulness-based 
attention regulation also indirectly explained this relationship with greater mindful 
awareness predicting reduced reliance on response modulation strategies. 
Study 7 then examined the role of belief-change in a longitudinal attention-
regulation-based intervention of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR). Data were 
collected from 50 participants who completed an eight-week course in MBSR, and a 
matched online control group who were interested in participating in an MBSR course in 
the future (n = 50). While there was no significant change in implicit beliefs about 
emotions for control subjects, participants completing MBSR reported significantly 
greater perceived control over their emotions at the end of the 8-week class, and at 12-
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month follow-up. Participants completing MBSR also reported significantly reduced 
stress, anxiety and depression post-treatment and reduced reliance on response 
modulation strategies (like alcohol and medication). Mediation analyses revealed that 
changes in MBSR-participants’ implicit beliefs about emotions mediated these treatment 
outcomes.  
Chapter 11: Cognitive Change Strategies 
Chapter 11 examined emotion beliefs as a predictor of cognitive-change-based 
emotion regulation (the third stage of the process model). Studies 8 and 9 tested the 
prediction that entity beliefs would be associated with lesser use of adaptive cognitive 
regulation strategies. Results from study 8 (a correlational study, n = 216) indicated that 
the more students endorsed entity beliefs about emotions, the less likely they were to 
report using cognitive reappraisal (an adaptive cognitive change strategy) in daily life. 
Entity beliefs about emotions were also associated with decreased well-being (reduced 
self-esteem and satisfaction with life) and increased psychological distress (stress and 
depression) via differences in students’ habitual use of cognitive reappraisal. Study 9 (a 
clinical study) examined how clinical and non-clinical samples differed in their implicit 
beliefs about emotions. Beliefs about emotions were examined in a sample of patients 
with social anxiety disorder (SAD, n = 75) and in a sample of healthy control subjects (n 
= 42). Results indicated that compared to healthy controls, patients with SAD held 
significantly greater fixed entity beliefs about their emotions.  Entity beliefs also 
predicted stress and anxiety, negative affect, and lower overall self-esteem, even when 
controlling for the overall severity of social anxiety symptoms.  
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Finally, in Study 10 (a clinical intervention study, n = 53), implicit beliefs and 
social anxiety symptoms were assessed at baseline, and at the completion of a 16-week 
randomized clinical control trial of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for SAD. Patients 
receiving CBT (compared to waitlist controls) were less likely to hold fixed entity beliefs 
about their anxiety post-treatment/waitlist, and this shift in thinking explained treatment-
related reductions in social anxiety symptoms. Additional analyses revealed that patients’ 
implicit beliefs about their emotions also uniquely predicted how much they benefited 
from treatment, even when controlling for baseline social anxiety and other kinds of 
maladaptive beliefs. Implicit beliefs also continued to predict anxiety symptoms at 12-
month follow-up uniquely explaining 13% of the variance in clinical outcomes.   
Chapter 12: Clinical Case Study 
 Based on growing research on implicit beliefs about emotions, there have been 
increasing calls for interventions aimed at explicitly disconfirming these beliefs using 
psychoeducation at the outset of psychotherapy (e.g. see Kneeland et al., 2016). The final 
chapter of this thesis examined the utility of this approach using a clinical case study of a 
client (pseudonym: Alex) who held fixed entity beliefs about his emotions. Consistent 
with predictions and empirical findings, for Alex these beliefs were also associated with a 
range maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (e.g., cognitive and behavioral avoidance, 
defensive pessimism, catastrophizing, self-harming) and perceived helplessness in the 
face of his depression and anxiety symptoms. Interestingly, psychoeducation 
interventions repeatedly failed to change this clients’ implicit beliefs about his emotions. 
Instead these direct attempts at belief-change caused ruptures and deterioration in the 
therapeutic alliance. A revised case formulation identified several ways that fixed entity 
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emotion beliefs can feel protective for clients (even when they can also be harmful). This 
case study illustrates the importance of rupture resolution strategies, empathic responding, 
and working with affect as ways of skilfully addressing the underlying reasons clients 
may hold these beliefs.  
13.3 Conclusion 
Emotion regulation is difficult. As reviewed in Chapter 4, effective emotion 
regulation requires correctly identifying, selecting and implementing the right strategy for 
the right context, at the right time. Over the past decade, there has been exponential 
growth in research on emotion regulation. Much of this work has focused on exploring 
different kinds of regulation strategies and their effectiveness (Augustine & Hemenover, 
2009; Aldo, Nolen-Hoeksema & Schweizer, 2010; Webb, Miles & Sheeran, 2012). While 
we are gradually coming to understand more about emotions and emotion regulation, we 
still know little about why people habitually choose to regulate their emotions the way 
they do and why, with so many adaptive strategies available, people so often turn to 
maladaptive strategies or use adaptive strategies in maladaptive ways.  
The current thesis examines people’s beliefs about their ability to control their 
emotions as one important variable that may help explain individual differences in 
emotion regulation preferences and tendencies. The theoretical and empirical work 
presented indicates that people’s beliefs about their emotions do indeed have important 
implications for emotion regulation and psychological health. Across several studies a 
perceived lack of control over emotions predicted increased stress, anxiety and depression, 
and even distinguished clinical populations from healthy non-clinical controls. Entity 
beliefs also predicted increased avoidance in daily life, increased avoidance of 
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psychological help for emotional difficulties, and increased reliance on response 
modulation strategies like alcohol use and medication as a means of managing emotions. 
In addition to predicting a range of potentially maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, 
entity beliefs also predicted decreased use of adaptive emotion regulation like 
mindfulness-based attention regulation and cognitive reappraisal. Finally, in clinical 
treatments like mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) and cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT), changes in participants’ beliefs about their emotions mediated treatment 
outcomes determining how much participants benefited from these programs. At the end 
of 8-weeks of MBSR or 12-weeks of CBT, the participants who had come to believe they 
could change their emotions experienced the greatest reductions in clinical symptoms and 
the greatest improvements in quality of life. For both programs, participants’ beliefs about 
their emotions also remained constant at follow-up and predicted psychological health 
and well-being 12 months after treatment completion. These findings have important 
implications for research on implicit theories, emotion regulation and clinical treatment.  
Implications for Research on Implicit Theories 
Research indicates that people hold implicit beliefs about the fixed or malleable 
nature of a wide range of traits and abilities (see Chapter 5 for a review). When work 
began on this thesis, there was only one published paper examining people’s implicit 
beliefs about their emotions (Tamir et al., 2007). Research in this field has grown 
significantly over the last 5 years, and findings from the current thesis have contributed to 
this nascent literature. Each of the studies presented represents novel and previously 
unexplored areas of research on implicit beliefs about emotions. Studies 9 and 10 
represent the first known works on implicit theories with clinical populations (patients 
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with social anxiety disorder), and Studies 7 and 10 are to date, the first know studies to 
examine implicit theories as a mediator of change in clinical treatments and interventions 
(MBSR and CBT).  
In addition to extending research on implicit theories to the clinical domain, the 
works presented in the current thesis have important implications for how implicit beliefs 
should be measured. As described in Studies 1 and 2, the implicit belief that change is 
possible does not necessarily mean people are confident in their own ability to change. 
People may, and often do, hold different theories for themselves and others – endorsing 
entity or incremental beliefs more or less depending on whether they are appraising their 
own abilities.  In the current thesis, I developed revised self-theory measures of implicit 
beliefs about intelligence (Study 1), emotions (Study 2) and anxiety (Study 9). Across 
numerous studies (e.g. Studies, 1, 2, 4, 9, 10) implicit self-theories uniquely explained 
greater variance in outcome variables over and above general implicit theories. These 
findings indicate that people’s beliefs about their emotions are a more powerful predictor 
of emotion regulation, psychological health and well-being than their beliefs about 
emotions in general. There have been increasing calls for the development of self-theory 
measures in other domains (Howell, Passmore & Holder, 2016) and this will be a valuable 
area for future research.  
Implications for Research on Emotion Regulation 
The current thesis draws upon the process model of emotion regulation as a 
guiding framework for exploring links between emotion beliefs and different emotion 
regulation strategies. The process model assumes that emotions unfold in a series of 
stages and each stage offers opportunities for regulating the unfolding emotion. These 
 338 
five stages include: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, 
cognitive change and response modulation (see Figure 8). The extended process model 
further examines difficulties associated with the identification, selection, implementation 
and monitoring of emotion regulation strategies. This model also describes variables that 
can influence what strategies people use and when they use them. For example, emotion 
regulation researchers have examined regulatory failures due to difficulties with basic 
emotional awareness, regulatory flexibility, emotion type and intensity, the availability of 
internal and external resources, and an individuals’ motivation, goals, preferences, habits 
and skills (see Chapter 4). The theory and research presented in this thesis indicates that 
in addition to these variables, the beliefs one holds about one’s emotions may determine 
regulatory success or failure. Chapter 4 presents a theoretical review integrating research 
on implicit theories with the process model (and extended process model). Empirical 
works presented in this thesis indicate that these beliefs may affect emotion regulation 
efforts at all five emotion regulation stages – situation selection and modification 
(Chapter 9); attentional deployment (Chapter 10); cognitive change (Chapter 11) and 
response modulation (Chapter 10). Given the diversity of strategies associated with 
emotion beliefs, it will be important for emotion regulation researchers to continue 
exploring how and why these beliefs influence regulatory efforts, and whether there are 
other emotion regulation strategies (e.g. distraction, problem solving, suppression, humor, 
exercise etc.) that have similar associations with people’s perceived control over their 
emotions. While the current thesis highlights many important links between entity beliefs 
and emotion regulation difficulties, it will also be important to further examine the cause 
of these problems. For example, do entity theorists struggle primarily with identifying 
their emotions and the need to regulate them? Do they struggle choosing from a restricted 
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range of emotion regulation strategies? Is the problem motivation, persistence or 
resilience when it comes to implementing adaptive emotion regulation strategies? Do they 
actually lack the necessary skills and abilities to regulate their emotions effectively? And, 
to what extent do emotion beliefs become self-fulfilling prophecies (see Chapter 6.5)? 
These are just some of the important questions that remain to be explored by researchers 
in the field.  
Implications for Research on Psychological Health 
Research indicates that emotion beliefs have important consequences for 
psychological health and well-being and may even play a role in clinical disorders and 
their treatment. In the current thesis, emotion beliefs consistently predicted clinical 
symptoms (stress, anxiety and depression) and well-being outcomes (self-esteem, life 
satisfaction, loneliness, positive and negative affect – see Studies 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9). The 
association between emotion beliefs and psychological health is also indirectly explained 
by specific emotion regulation strategies including: avoidance (Study 4), mindfulness-
based attention regulation (Study 6) and cognitive reappraisal (Study 8). These are three 
potential mediating variables that help clarify why fixed beliefs about emotions have such 
diverse consequences for psychological health and well-being. Future research, however, 
will need to examine the potential mediating role of other emotion regulation strategies.  
This research also has important implications for clinical disorders and their 
treatment. Study 9 examines emotion beliefs in a clinical sample of patients with social 
anxiety disorder. Results revealed that entity beliefs about emotions predicted clinical 
symptoms even when controlling for social anxiety severity. These beliefs were a 
defining feature of this clinical population and in Study 10 changes in emotion beliefs 
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served as a mediating variable in CBT-based treatment. Results from Study 7 (a 
longitudinal intervention study of MBSR) also indicated that compared to control 
participants, people completing MBSR came to hold more incremental beliefs about their 
emotions post-treatment. As with Study 10, belief change persisted at 12-month follow-up 
and predicted treatment outcomes for participants. Together these findings indicate that 
emotion beliefs play an important role in clinical disorders and psychological health. 
They may also play an important role in psychotherapy, clinical interventions and 
treatment. Based on this early work some researchers have already called for 
psychoeducation-based interventions that explicitly target patients’ fixed entity beliefs 
about their emotions (Kneeland, Dovidio, Joormann & Clark, 2016). However, results 
from the clinical case study presented in Chapter 11 indicate that while people’s beliefs 
about their emotions are in themselves malleable, changing them is not always an easy 
process. In the clinical case study, psychoeducation-based interventions repeatedly failed 
to shift a client’s beliefs about his emotions. These attempts actually contributed to 
ruptures in the therapeutic relationship. While these beliefs did shift over time, it is more 
likely that this change took place through concrete experience with successfully changing 
one’s emotions over time. While CBT and MBSR both successfully led to changes in 
participants’ beliefs about their emotions, further research is still needed to understand 
how this change took place. Understanding how people come to believe they can control 
their emotions may help with developing targeted interventions. It also remains to be seen 
whether emotion beliefs play a role in the etiology and treatment of other clinical 
disorders. In both cases, research on emotion beliefs promises to be a fruitful area for 
clinical research.  
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